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Abstract 
 
 
   This thesis examines the development and implementation of media control in France  
 
during the First World War. First it describes the evolution of the press control system  
 
between 1914 and 1916 and outlines its bureaucratic framework. The study then  
 
analyses the extent to which censorship of the press was useful in helping the French  
 
government achieve its aims during the particularly turbulent years of 1917 and 1918.  
 
The chapters are set out chronologically and contain sections that examine the role of  
 
censorship on a case by case basis.  
 
   The last two years of the war have been chosen for special examination in this thesis  
 
because in 1917 and 1918 France’s war effort was increasingly strained simultaneously  
 
by both internal and external events. In 1917 France was threatened with rising war  
 
weariness, coinciding with the failed Nivelle Offensive, mutinies at the front and  
 
international calls for a negotiated peace settlement. In 1918, as Clemenceau began to  
 
rally the nation, France faced its most crucial enemy attack since the Marne in 1914.  
 
   Most of the thesis focuses on censorship of newspapers in Paris. These papers not only  
 
had far larger ciculations than their provincial counterparts but often were read in the  
 
provinces more than were local papers. Finally by following a few papers specifically  
 
through these two years, it is possible to see the evolution of the way in which papers on  
 
the left, right and centre were monitored by the government.  
 
   This thesis argues that France’s censorship system, while not perfect was effective in  
 
achieving the aims set out as its goals in 1914 by the War Ministry: to keep military  
 
secrets from the enemy and to help maintain public order.  
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Introduction: Primary Sources, Historiography and the Importance of Censorship in 
1917-1918 France 
   The historiography of the First World War continues to grow as the conflict, one 
hundred years later, still inspires fascination and bewilderment among academics and 
among those for whom history is more a curiosity. This thesis examines a subject 
about which little has been written, particularly in English. It investigates the methods 
used by the French Government to both protect state secrets and control public opinion 
in 1917 and 1918 and evaluates its effectiveness in achieving these aims. Newspapers 
as the primary news source for citizens and soldiers were seen as useful tools by the 
French Government for shoring up public opinion in favour of the war effort. The 
written press, however, was also viewed as being potentially dangerous if left 
unchecked, because of its potential to leak state or military secrets and its capacity to 
foment unrest. Though works have been written which discuss the bureaucracy of the 
French information management system and the debates surrounding its practices, 
none have yet attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of French censorship in both 
achieving the aims set out for its use in 1914 and its value as a tool in helping France 
fight the war, particularly during the critical 1917-1918 period.  
   There are no extended monographs published in English on French censorship 
during the First World War, and only one in French. La Censure militaire et policière 
1914-19181 by Maurice Rajsfus glances over most aspects of government directed 
censorship during the war. It includes sections on censorship of the press, advertising, 
pamphlets, the post, feminist movements, music, theatre and cabarets. His central 
argument is that the French government in censoring the press extended its powers 
beyond what was needed to preserve public order and military discipline. At some 
points he argues this point effectively. The best examples are his analyses of the 
censorship of trench letters written to soldiers’ families2 and of the censorship of the 
                                                          
1 M., Rajsfus, La Censure militaire et policière 1914-1918 (Paris 1999).  
2 ibid., pp.143-152.  
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arts in Paris.3 Though Rajsfus’s study is adequately researched and is an interesting 
read, it contains several flaws which diminish its contribution to the field.    
   Rajsfus attempts to cover too much in 256 pages. Because he discusses broad 
subjects (political censorship 1914-1918, for example)4  in twenty pages or less he is 
forced to make sweeping statements while using few examples to defend his 
arguments. Many of his most strongly worded passages appear to be only partially 
relevant to the material immediately preceding them. This is not helped by the fact that 
his tone is often sarcastic and polemical. It seems Rajsfus approached the subject from 
the outset of his research with a pre-conceived opinion that all censorship is immoral 
and all censors are mean-spirited. His conclusion, for example, is entitled ‘Under the 
Gaze of the Perverse.’ The present thesis is narrower in scope than Rajfus’s book, 
allowing for an analysis more heavily based on archival material, and is also more 
nuanced in tone and less politically partisan.    
   The longest study on censorship in France during the First World War is an 
unpublished 994 page thesis written by Olivier Forcade under the supervision of Jean 
Jacques Becker at the University of Paris-X (Nanterre).5 Forcade’s thesis is 
meticulously researched and is an essential research tool for scholars of the subject. It 
contains extensive charts, graphs and a vast bibliography. His primary interest is in the 
political debates surrounding censorship and the creation and bureaucratic structure of 
the French information management system. His central argument is that by 1918 
wartime censorship was largely tolerated by both French citizens and by journalists. In 
addition he contends that by 1918 journalists had become so familiar with censorship 
practices that self-censorship became the primary method of French press control. 
Finally, he argues that censorship had a positive effect in rallying the nation behind the 
war effort.6   
                                                          
3 ibid., part 4.  
4 ibid., pp.51-69.   
5 O. Forcade ‘La Censure politique en France pendant la Grande Guerre’, doctoral thesis, (Paris, 1998). 
6 ibid., Conclusion.  
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   An occasionally heated, though more often nuanced, debate exists between French 
historians of the First World War over the extent to which French citizens and soldiers 
accepted the draconian wartime measures of their government between 1914 and 
1919.7 Two prominent historiographical centres are at the forefront of the debate. 
Historians associated with the Historial de la Grande Guerre, (known as the Historial) 
located in Péronne,8 have generally contended that the patriotism of citizens and 
soldiers led them to accept wartime measures and that this acceptance characterised an 
idiosyncratic wartime culture. Well-known scholars associated with this centre include 
Jean-Jacques Becker, Jay Winter, John Horne, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette 
Becker, Leonard V. Smith and Heather Jones. The other centre,  the  Collectif de 
Recherche International et de Débat sur la Guerre de 1914-1918 (known as the CRID), 
is based in Toulouse.9 Its primary argument in the debate surrounding consentement de 
guerre has been that draconian wartime policies such as strict censorship were 
imposed on unwilling French citizens and that many soldiers fought on primarily 
because they were offered no alternatives. Leading academics from this centre include 
Rémy Cazals, Nicolas Offenstadt, Frédéric Rousseau, Denis Rolland and André Loez.  
   Both Forcade and Rajsfus are associated with one of these schools, a fact reflected in 
their primary arguments. Forcade’s primary argument is that preventative censorship 
by the state of the media was replaced by self-censorship as the war matured because 
governmental control over the news became both more acceptable and predictable to 
the press and to the citizenry. For this reason fewer attempts were made to print 
prohibited or provocative material. This argument implies that the majority of French 
journalists and even citizens wilfully subjected their freedoms of information and 
speech to the greater cause of winning the war. Though much of the work stemming 
from the Historial is more nuanced regarding this assertion, Forcade does little to 
                                                          
7 Many of the wartime laws employed in August 1914 including the ‘State of Siege’ (see Chapter 1) were 
not repealed until after the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in October 1919. In France the term used 
in these debates for war acceptance is ‘consentement de guerre.’   
8 Its main contributors, however, live and work across France, the rest of Europe and the United States.  
9 The vast majority of academics working for the CRID work in various locations across France.  
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deviate from the school of thought in which his supervisor is a leading figure. 
Although Rajsfus is not an official member of the CRID (he is primarily an expert on 
Vichy France and the Holocaust) his work is both highly praised as ‘a wealth of 
information’10 and is cited in an article by the centre’s director, Rémy Cazals.11 
Rajsfus’s assertion that French censors operated in bad faith is more simplistic and 
politically motivated than much of the literature that derives from the CRID. His 
conclusion, however that censorship was imposed upon the French population 
conforms with the majority of the centre’s scholarship regarding the debate over 
consentement de guerre.  
   This thesis agrees with Forcade’s conclusion that censorship played an effective role 
in consolidating civilian morale. It does not operate, however, under the assumption 
that the vast majority of French citizens, journalists and soldiers supported the 
repression of press freedoms. Given the absence of contemporary opinion polls, this 
argument is difficult to prove. This thesis rather presupposes that newspapers, as the 
primary source of information for citizens and soldiers, were powerful instruments in 
influencing opinion at home and at the front. The Government used media censorship 
both to protect military secrets and to filter news of politically sensitive events at home 
and abroad. Newspapers influenced a mass audience of readers, and the government in 
Paris orchestrated what was reported in the news. For this reason, censorship affected 
public opinion in a way often determined by Paris. This thesis argues that government 
policy regarding the press affected the way in which events and debates were 
portrayed in newspapers, and this had an impact on their audiences. It does not 
necessarily follow that a vast majority of citizens and soldiers were consciously aware 
of the extent of government manipulation of the press. Newspaper readers were 
presented with a plethora of papers from which to choose. The majority of readers 
selected journals that reflected their own politics or sensibilities and were therefore 
influenced by what they read, sometimes unknowingly.  
                                                          
10 Bibliography for the CRID, http://www.crid1418.org/bibliographie/typologique/forguerre.htm#Bc. 
11 R.Cazals, ‘1914-1918: Oser penser, oser écrire’, Genèses, No.46, (Jan.2002), p.42.  
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    This thesis also agrees with Forcade that information management in France became 
more reliant on self-censorship during Georges Clemenceau’s tenure as Premier than 
in the previous years of the conflict. Forcade argues that this resulted from the press’s 
increased understanding of what was acceptable to print, which is correct but provides 
only part of the explanation of why papers were officially censored less under 
Clemenceau than under previous administrations. This thesis shows that under 
Clemenceau and his civil cabinet head Georges Mandel, the government (often 
Mandel himself) frequently provided newspaper editors with informal advice 
regarding prohibited material, sometimes over the telephone, before their drafts were 
submitted to the Press Bureau.12 As a result, editors self-censored more thoroughly 
their papers before submitting drafts to the Press Bureau. Because of this practice there 
are fewer official censorship orders to be found in the available archival material for 
this period. Finally, during the closing months of the war, after the Ludendorff 
Offensives of Spring 1918, the majority of events related to the conflict provided 
positive news stories for the French and therefore less press supervision was required 
than previously. Although positive news was always proof-read by the censors, mostly 
to limit rumours, prevent exaggerations and protect military secrets, the censorship of 
news related to negative events was always given priority at the Press Bureau.  
   This thesis both complements and adds to the work already undertaken by Rajsfus 
and Forcade.  Though it touches upon the debate surrounding consentement de guerre, 
this is not the primary focus of the study. It seems probable that public opinion 
towards government action varied throughout the country, making generalisation 
difficult. Rather than evaluate public opinion towards press censorship, this thesis 
evaluates the effectiveness of censorship as a tool of war. It examines how censorship 
was used by the government during the most significant events for the French during 
the crisis years of 1917-1918. It does this by assessing the goals of the government vis-
a-vis the press during each episode and then demonstrates how the government 
                                                          
12 The Press Bureau was the main body for press censorship in Paris. Its establishment and function are 
discussed in Chapter 1.  
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proceeded to manipulate the news in pursuance of those aims. Neither Rajsfus nor 
Forcade deal directly with censorship on a case by case basis or write about how news 
of specific events was censored. This approach contributes greatly to our 
understanding of how the mechanics of French censorship operated at particularly 
stressful moments to protect military secrets and to steer public opinion.   
   There are several shorter studies written on French censorship during the First World 
War. Ross Collins’s ‘The Development of Censorship in World War I France’13 is a 
concise 25 page overview of the bureaucratic structure and principal aims of the 
French wartime information management system, and provides a good starting point 
for those studying the subject. Collins’s detailed account of the introduction of 
Circular 1000 (September 1915) and its impact on the standardisation of censorship 
policies across the country (See Chapter 1) is particularly insightful. Forcade’s chapter 
on wartime censorship in the Encyclopédie de la Grande Guerre. 1914-191814 (a 
collection of writings published by the Historial) is also interesting because of its 
international, approach but is too short to provide detailed analysis. 
   Several shorter studies of specific events or individual aspects of censorship in 
France during the First World War were also helpful to the research for this thesis. 
Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, a French historical journal once run by 
the late Guy Pedroncini, has published a number of articles on the subject. Particularly 
important are two articles written by Françoise Navet-Bouron. Navet-Bouron’s article 
on censorship in France during the Battle of Verdun15 outlines how the French 
Government directed a campaign in the press which cemented the battle’s legendary 
character in the French national psyche long after it ended. Her study and chapter 3 of 
Paul Jankowski’s book on Verdun16 provide excellent analyses of how the ‘Legend of 
                                                          
13 R. Collins, ‘The Development of Censorship in World War I France’, Journalism Monographs, 
No.131, (Feb. 1992.).    
14 O. Forcade. ‘Information, Censure et Propagande’, in S. Audoin-Rouzeau and J-J. Becker, 
Encyclopédie de la Grande Guerre. 1914-1918 (Paris, 2004), pp.451-457.  
15 F. Navet-Bouron, ‘ Verdun et la censure’, Guerres mondiales et conflits Contemporains, No. 182, 
(Apr.1996), pp.45-56. 
16 P.Jankowski, Verdun: The Longest Battle of the Great War (New York, 2003).  
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Verdun’ (see Chapter 1) was in large part orchestrated in Paris. Navet-Bouron’s other 
article discusses censorship of issues related to women during the war,17 and is an 
invaluable tool in researching the press’s approach to the midinettes’ strike of spring 
1917 (see Chapter 4).   
    John Horne, a prolific historian of the First World War, has written several works 
related to this study. His article ‘Information, opinion publique et l’offensive Nivelle 
du 16 avril’18 is the best source written specifically on how the disastrous Nivelle 
Offensive of spring 1917 (see Chapter 3) was officially interpreted by the French 
media. As is characteristic of Horne’s work, it is meticulously referenced and provides 
an essential research tool. His chapter in State, Society and Mobilization in Europe 
during the First World War19 (of which he is also the editor) presents an interesting 
comparison between the attempts to combat German propaganda both domestically 
and in neutral countries by France and Britain. Finally, his monograph, Labour at 
War20 contains a great deal of useful background information on the understudied 
Loire strikes of late spring 1918 (see Chapter 6).          
    The most detailed account of the relationship between the French Army and press 
during the First World War is a relatively short 122 page monograph by Jean-Louis 
Maurin entitled Combattre et informer.21  Though written as a narrative it demonstrates 
how Generals Joseph Joffre (Western Front Commander until December 1916), Robert 
Nivelle (until late May 1917) and Philippe Pétain (thereafter) had distinctive 
approaches to army-media relations. It is a useful study because of its extensive 
collection of annexes and charts outlining the structure of the chain of command 
regarding the distribution of military information to the media. Another important 
                                                          
17 F. Navet-Bouron, ‘La censure et la femme pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale’, Guerres mondiales 
et conflits contemporains, No.198, (May 2000), pp.43-51. 
18 J.M. Horne ‘Information, opinion publique, et l’offensive Nivelle du 16 avril 1917’,in L. Gervereau 
and C. Prochasson, ed., Images de 1917 (Paris,1987).     
19J.M. Horne, ‘Remobilizing for Total War : France and British 1917-1918’, in J.M. Horne, ed., State, 
Society and Mobilization in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge, 1997), pp.195-211.    
20 J.M. Horne, Labour at War: France and Britain 1914-1918 (Oxford,1991).   
21 J-L, Maurin, Combattre et informer: L’Armée française et les médias pendant la première guerre 
mondiale (Paris, 2009). 
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work on this subject, though differing in primary focus, is Pyrrhic Victory22 by Robert 
A. Doughty, an authoritative account of French strategy and operations during the 
War. Finally, Reporting the Wars by Joseph J. Matthews23, an international history of 
war correspondence from the Napoleonic period to the 1950’s, contains an interesting 
chapter on the development of war correspondence during the First World War by 
placing the subject in an international context.  
    One of the most important and frequently cited works in this thesis is Les Secrets de 
la censure pendant la Guerre, published in 1932 by Marcel Berger and Paul Allard.24 
Berger and Allard worked as censors at the Press Bureau in Paris during the war and 
their book recounts their experiences during this period. They discuss the reaction of 
the French censorship system to almost all of the events covered in this thesis, and the 
book provides an invaluable resource because of its unique detailing of the inner 
workings of the Press Bureau. Not only does it discuss which orders were given to 
censors by their superiors (material that can be found in archives, see below), but it 
also provides insight into the personalities of the various Press Bureau directors and 
discusses the relationships between the Press Bureau and several important newspaper 
owners and editors. The limitations to this book as a research tool are those found 
when using memoirs in general. Thus the book not only relies in part on the memory 
of its authors but also is influenced by their personal feelings towards the personalities 
whom they discuss and, in a few rare cases, the necessities of press censorship itself. 
These deficiencies, however, in the case of this book are not significant enough to 
render it anything less than a highly significant source of information. Berger and 
Allard when writing the book clearly had access either to detailed personal notes from 
their time at the Press Bureau or to a copy of an old censor’s log book, because their 
frequently cited dates provided when discussing censorship orders in all cases match 
the corresponding archival records. Moreover, their insight into the personalities of the 
                                                          
22 R.A.Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (London,2005).  
23 J.J. Matthews, Reporting the Wars (Minneapolis, 1957).  
24 Berger and Allard, Les Secrets de la censure pendant la Guerre (Paris, 1932). 
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key figures involved in censorship during the war do not conflict with most of what 
has been written by historians or that can be found in the archives. Finally, they do not 
appear to espouse a political agenda when discussing the act of censorship. Rather 
their main analytical point (the book is written as a narrative) is that the censor’s task 
was busy, nerve-racking and thankless.  
   Much work has been done on the general history of the French press. The most 
thorough and informative study is a five-volume collection primarily edited by Claude 
Bellanger.25 Though the third volume in the series (covering 1881-1945) only contains 
40 pages dedicated to the French press during the First World War,26 both it and the far 
more accessible but shorter and more international in focus Histoire de la Presse by 
Charles Ledré27 are wonderful secondary resources for the history of the pre-war 
French press. Though more recent press histories have been written,28 Ledré’s remains 
perhaps the most useful one-volume study.  
   Several works have been published on the histories of specific newspapers, some 
focussing on 1914 -1918 more than do others. Though this thesis, which focusses on 
mainstream Parisian dailies, does not discuss the satirical journal founded during the 
First World War, le Canard Enchaîné, Allen Douglas’s book on that paper during the 
conflict29 provides interesting insights into the relationship between press leaders and 
government bureaucrats as well as the mentality behind the development of bourrage 
de crâne, a type of government-orchestrated propaganda (see Chapter 1).  That Jean 
Dupuy, the influential editor and owner of Le Petit Parisien, was at the forefront of 
this state directed propaganda, is revealed in the official history of Le Petit Parisien.30 
For a detailed history of trench journalism in France during the war (another important 
                                                          
25 C. Bellanger, Histoire générale de la presse française 5 vols. (Paris,1972).  
26 C. Bellanger, Histoire générale de la presse française. Tome III : De 1871 à 1940 (Paris,1972).  
27 C. Ledré, Histoire de la presse (Paris,1958).   
28 Far more recent but written for a mass audience and also international in scope is J-N. Jeanneney, Une 
Histoire des medias: des origins à nos jours (Paris,1996).  
29 A. Douglas, War, Memory, and the Politics of Humor: The Canard Enchaîné and World War I 
(Berkley,2002). For a further study of the history of the Canard Enchaîné see L. Martin, Le Canard 
Enchaîné: Histoire d’un journal satirique (1915-2005) (Paris,2001).   
30  F. Amaury, Histoire du plus grand quotidian de la III’ République : Le Petit Parisien 1876-1944 
(Paris,1972), pp.1065-1068. 
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subject indirectly related to this study) the most important study is Men at War 1914-
1918 by Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau.31    
   There has been little written on the history of Havas during the First World War. 
This is unfortunate, because Havas as France’s largest news agency played a crucial 
role in the dissemination of information to various newspapers by using its extensive 
network of foreign contacts. Curiously, Antoine Lefeubre’s history of Havas,32 the 
agency’s only general history, dedicates just five pages to the First World War.33 
Bellanger’s chapter on the French press during the First World War34 entirely omits 
Havas’s role. None the less, this study demonstrates the frequency with which Havas 
was censored and reveals its vast network of correspondents. Indeed Havas appears 
more often than any other agency in the telegraph censors’ logbooks of the archives at 
the Bibliotheque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (see below), not 
because its reporters were censored more heavily than were newspaper correspondents, 
but because of the frequency of its telegram activity. Another study which 
unfortunately neglects the history of the First World War is the official history of the 
important Parisian daily Le Figaro.35        
   In preparation for this study much research was done into the history of French 
public opinion, society and governance during the war. As mentioned above, the 
evaluation of public opinion in France between 1914 and 1918 is particularly difficult 
because of the lack of public opinion polls from the period. Some important studies, 
however, have attempted to evaluate French public opinion during the war by studying 
newspaper journalism, newspaper readerships, police reports and prefectural and 
mayoral communications with the authorities in Paris. The most important of these 
studies, because it discusses the entire war period and uses departmental examples 
when commenting on France as a whole, is The Great War and the French People by 
                                                          
31 S. Audoin-Rouzeau, Men at War 1914-1918: National Sentiment and Trench Journalism in France 
during the First World War English edition, (Providence,1992).  
32 A. Lefebure. Havas: Les Arcanes du pouvoir (Paris,1992).  
33 ibid., pp.175-185.  
34 Bellanger, Histoire générale de la presse française. Tome III  pp.407-445.  
35 C.Blandin, Le Figaro. Deux siècles d’histoire (Paris, 2007).  
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Jean-Jacques Becker.36 Becker skillfully evaluates the shifts in French public opinion 
during the war and convincingly argues that although significant cracks in the Union 
Sacrée existed by early 1917, the home front was scarcely in danger of collapsing at 
the war’s end. This study along with his La France en Guerre 1914-1918 37 provided 
invaluable secondary resource material in researching this thesis because Becker’s 
works, like this thesis, focus on the significance of individual events in influencing 
public opinion.38    
      Two other studies of French public opinion during the First World War provide 
examples of how methodologically this subject can be approached. France 1914-1918: 
Public Opinion and the War Effort by P.J.Flood39examines the shifts in morale during 
the conflict by focussing on the department of the Isère. He concentrates on three main 
influences on public opinion, namely the clergy, school teachers and the press. His 
approach not only avoids simplistic statements about the population in general but also 
contributes to our understanding of a relatively under-studied region of France. 
Another important study is Pierre Miquel’s book on French public opinion towards the 
Versailles settlement.40 Not only does Miquel provide an excellent template for how to 
use press analyses as an indicator of public opinion, but also in his bibliography he 
includes an extensive list of contemporary French newspapers accompanied by a list of 
major contributors and in most cases mentions their political affiliations.41 
    For more general works discussing French society as a whole between 1914 and 
1918, two studies provide useful starting points. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle’s La Grande 
Guerre des Français42 examines a multitude of issues related to France during the war 
(politics, economics, foreign affairs, public opinion, military fortunes etc…) in a 
chronological fashion and is an essential source for those interested in the 
                                                          
36 J-J. Becker, The Great War and the French People English edition, (Oxford,1993).  
37 J-J. Becker, La France en guerre 1914-1918: La Grande mutation (Paris,1988).  
38 Becker for example discusses the Mutinies of 1917, both Russian Revolutions of 1917, the Midinettes 
Strikes, the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918 and the Loire strikes of 1918. These subjects are all 
individually analysed in this thesis.  
39 P.J.Flood, France 1914-1918: Public Opinion and the War Effort (New York, 1990).  
40 P. Miquel, La Paix de Versailles et l’opinion publique française (Paris,1972).  
41 ibid., pp.572-579.   
42 J-B Duroselle. La Grande Guerre des français 1914-1918 (Paris,2002).  
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interconnection between these aspects of French wartime society. Shorter, but with a 
more analytical focus on social history, is France and the Great War 1914-1918,43 
written by three historians from the Historial, Leonard V.Smith, Stéphane Audoin-
Rouzeau and Annette Becker. Written in a clear, concise and accessible fashion, it is 
informative and enjoyable. Especially relevant to this thesis was the material in this 
study on the ‘crisis of 1917’ and particularly the attacks on ‘defeatism’ launched by 
Clemenceau and the far-right Action Française during the final trimester of that year.44                       
   For French governance from 1914 to 1918, perhaps the best study remains The 
Forms of War Government in France by the eminent Sorbonne professor Pierre 
Renouvin.45 Because the book was written 87 years ago, Renouvin’s access to archival 
material was limited. Renouvin none the less successfully broke the functions of 
government into chapters and made effective use of the sources available to him, 
mostly memoirs written by those directly involved in the wartime governments and the 
Annales de la Chambre, an official account of the debates in the Chamber of Deputies 
and a rough French equivalent to the British Hansard.  French war aims are also 
relevant to Paris’s motives in manipulating the press. Especially informative on this 
subject are French War Aims against Germany 1914-1919 by David Stevenson46  and 
Beyond the Balance of Power by Peter Jackson.47 Finally, for an overview of French 
political history during the First World War, the best guide is perhaps the second of 
seven volumes written by Georges and Édouard Bonnefous on the political history of 
the French Third Republic.48   
   An excellent companion to the Bonnefous’ seven-volume history is the ten-volume 
memoir by Raymond Poincaré,49 French President during the First World War. 
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Volumes nine and ten, which cover 1917 and 1918 respectively, are written in the 
form of a diary and provide a weekly (sometimes daily) account of the inner workings 
of the French government from Poincaré’s perspective. Though Pierre Miquel’s 50 and 
John Keiger’s51 biographies of Poincaré are interesting, far more relevant to this study 
are the biographies of Clemenceau by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle52 and Mandel by John 
M.Sherwood, 53 both of which discuss in detail the relationship between these central 
figures and the press.  
   Although censorship in France is the central topic of this thesis, it is important to 
make comparisons between the information management system in France and those 
of Britain and Germany. In all three countries the primary objectives of press 
censorship were to protect state and military secrets and to maintain morale on both 
the front lines and the home fronts.54 Also in all three cases the left wing press was 
monitored far more heavily than its centrist or right-wing counterparts because it was 
suspected to be potentially subversive when discussing war aims or steering civilians 
and soldiers towards defeatism, pacifism or (after the Bolshevik Revolution) socialist 
internationalism. Finally, in all three countries the debate over the use of political 
censorship, (i.e. the repression of information related to domestic politics), never fully 
subsided before the armistice.  
   In Britain, though the administration of press censorship differed in practice from 
that in France, on paper the two bureaucracies which dealt with information 
management shared many similarities. As in France, the central body that dealt with 
press censorship in Britain was originally named the Press Bureau and both nations 
implemented their nation’s laws governing freedom of the press in wartime during the 
first ten days of August 1914. Also as in France (see Chapter 1), the British 
Government linked the powers of its press bureau to a series of exceptional wartime 
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measures. In Britain these fell under the aegis of the Defence of the Realm Act 
(DORA), implemented on 7 August 1914.55 DORA originally included only three 
regulations 56 but by the end of February 1917 it had expanded to include 400 pages of 
rules covering most aspects of daily civilian life.57 Within this text, six regulations 
pertained directly to press regulations.58 Though the rules pertaining to censorship 
became more detailed as the war progressed, the primary purposes of censorship 
remained the same. On 26 October 1914 Sir Stanley Buckmaster, Director of the Press 
Bureau, issued a memorandum to all his censors informing them that their duties were 
‘A. To prevent the publication of news injurious to the naval and military operations of 
the British Empire. B. To prevent the publication of news likely to cause needless 
alarm and distress among the civil population and C. To prevent the publication of 
news objectionable on political grounds: news for example, calculated to injure the 
susceptibilities of other Allies.’59 
   Both Paris and London had to confront the sensitive issue of ‘political censorship’ 
early in the war. Indeed at the same time in late 1914 as French War Minister 
Alexandre Millerand declared to the Chamber of Deputies that ‘there existed no 
political censorship’ (see Chapter 1) Buckmaster issued an internal memorandum in 
the Home Office declaring that ‘There is no censorship on internal political criticism 
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and censorship of all matter is exercised with an anxious desire to allow as free 
publication as is consistent with public safety.’60 Political censorship in both countries 
became increasingly severe as the number of topics which were permitted to be 
discussed shrank and the number of rules and prohibitions imposed on newspapers 
multiplied.61 In neither country was the debate over the legitimacy of political 
censorship fully settled before wartime powers were finally revoked.62              
   As in France, a bureau was established in Britain in early 1916 to develop 
propaganda for foreign audiences, particularly in neutral countries. This office 
emerged from a split in the Press Bureau which was divided into MI7a, which dealt 
exclusively with press censorship, and a new office dealing with foreign propaganda 
entitled MI7b.63 In 1917 both France and Britain created agencies designed to combat 
local pacifism and enemy propaganda. In France this was  the Union des Grandes 
Associations contre la Propagande Ennemie, in Britain, the National War Aims 
Committee.64 More so than in France, influential press barons, particularly Lords 
Northcliffe 65 and Beaverbrook,66 had tremendous influence on the direction of 
government propaganda. Both men worked closely with the government particularly 
under the Lloyd George coalition in which Northcliffe became the ‘Director of 
Propaganda in Enemy Countries’ and Beaverbrook the Minister of Information 
responsible for propaganda in Allied and Neutral Countries. While many politicians in 
France owned, edited or contributed to newspapers (the most notable being 
Clemenceau) they were politicians first and tended to use their papers as mouthpieces. 
No press baron in France (Jean Dupuy was the largest) was ever approached to join the 
French Cabinet during the war. They were, however, censored less often for 
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disobeying censorship orders than were their less influential journalistic colleagues.         
   The most significant difference between the application of censorship in France and 
Britain was that while in France it was mandatory practice for all papers to submit 
articles to the Press Bureau for moderation prior to publication, in Britain only 
telegraphs were subjected to compulsory revision.67 Although the official (and 
implausible) reason given by the Directors of the British Press Bureau was that the 
government lacked the office space to accommodate a bureau entrusted with such a 
task as monitoring the entirety of the nation’s press, it has been argued that the Home 
Office (if not the military) was reluctant severely to stifle the media.68 Only when 
papers repeatedly discussed items such as battalion numbers were they referred to the 
Director of Public Prosecutions and even then if the verdict was doubtful, newspaper 
editors were given the benefit of the doubt.69 The same logic applied to the censorship 
of the telegraph. F.E.Smith when head of the Press Bureau instructed censors to ‘give 
all messages the benefit of the doubt; that is to say, if a message is considered to be on 
the borderline it is to be passed, not censored.’70 This comment suggests that the 
British approach to censorship was more lenient than that taken by the French, whose 
inclinations were to censor rather than allow ‘borderline’ material to pass. The 
practical implications of such leniency when reporting on war news, however, were 
diminished by the fact that all telegrams emanating from France (and therefore much 
of the immediate front line news) passed through the French telegraph office and were 
monitored by French censors.71  
   Finally, the distinct wartime cultures in France and Britain influenced the tone of 
journalism, the nature of press censorship and the influence of the press on public 
opinion in each country. In Britain censorship was loosely enforced by the government 
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in part because of the Liberal proclivities of the Asquith Government and later because 
of the political astuteness of Lloyd George.72 A grassroots political phenomenon which 
encouraged self-censorship, which contained dissent and was far more evident in 
British society than in France was the influence of the ‘Patriot groups’73 of pro-war 
activists who used violence against dissenters. Such groups were in general neither 
explicitly encouraged nor were they prosecuted by the British Government,74 and they 
were a significant force in deterring dissent in the media.75 The differences in the 
practice of censorship between Britain and France were both legal and political in 
origin.  
   For an overview of the structure and mechanics of the British information 
management system during the First World War, Tania Rose’s Aspects of Political 
Censorship 1914-1918 76 is concise and accessible. She is most informative when 
discussing censorship of events in Russia, the subject of her doctoral thesis.77  Brock 
Millman’s Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain 78 provides an 
excellent complement to Rose’s study for evaluating the effectiveness of the British 
Government in combating dissent. Millman is less informative in his discussion of the 
bureaucratic structures in wartime Britain than is Rose, but he details the various 
organisations which together comprised the British anti-war movement. He is effective 
in evaluating the threat posed by the various leaders of the anti-war movement and 
discusses their relationships to the national media. Millman convincingly argues that 
London took a flexible approach to media censorship because stifling free speech in 
Britain would have provoked added dissent. His argument is intriguing and the book 
would prove highly useful in a comparative study of censorship in Britain and France 
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during the First World War.  
   For background material on the portrayal of the British military in the press a useful 
series of essays can be found in The British Army in Battle and Its Image by Stephen 
Badsey.79 The most relevant essay found in this book for the subject of this thesis is 
‘Douglas Haig and the Press 1914-1918’, 80 which like Millman’s work would provide 
invaluable material for any future project comparing state-media relations in Britain 
and France. For a first-hand account of relations between the British press and the 
British Expeditionary Force in France Neville Lytton’s The Press and the General 
Staff 81 provides a wealth of information and is full of interesting and entertaining 
anecdotes.82 For an overview of British propaganda perhaps the most authoritative 
account is still British Propaganda During the First World War by M.L. Sanders and 
Philip M. Taylor.83 This book serves as a counterpart to Rose’s study 84 because while 
Rose outlines the bureaucratic structure of censorship in Britain during the war, 
Sanders and Taylor do likewise do so for the British propaganda mechanism. They 
then describe how propaganda operated in practice. Somewhat more accessible to non-
experts on the subject is Keep the Home Fires Burning by Cate Haste.85            
  Analysis of wartime Germany also provides particularly interesting comparisons with 
the French model of information management. Germany, like France, (see Chapter 1) 
had developed a wartime emergency measures act in the Nineteenth Century, the 
Prussian Siege Law of 1851, which came into operation on 1 August 1914 and 
empowered military commanders across the country to suspend liberties such as 
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.86 Censorship of 
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the press was less controversial in Germany than in France or Britain because it had 
already been used in extensively for thirty-five years before 1914.87 In Germany the 
Siege Law specifically suspended ‘the right to express opinion freely by word, print or 
picture.’88 Although France in August 1914 enacted laws that in practice had the same 
consequences their wording was more nuanced, a reflection of the cultural differences 
between the two nations.  
   The German press in the pre-war period, rather than constituting an independent 
check on government activities, generally championed both nationalism and 
imperialism.89 The German tabloid paper, the Generalanzeiger, was more sober in 
tone then its French and British equivalents and the official organ of the SPD,90 
Vorwärts, trod carefully in its criticisms of governmental institutions. Indeed the paper 
was allowed more freedom to discuss economic and social issues during the war than 
was L’Humanité, the principal socialist paper in France, on the condition that it 
‘enthusiastically’ supported the war effort.91   More than in France or Britain, the 
German press was an agent of the status quo before the war, and continued to be so 
until 1918, when impending defeat became impossible to conceal and German morale 
had deteriorated beyond repair. 
   Still the Prussian military establishment distrusted the media from the outset of 
hostilities. Unlike in France and Britain, the German information management system 
was operated entirely by the military. Questions dealing with censorship, public 
opinion and propaganda were handled by Section IIIb of the OHL,92 the ‘News 
Section’ (Nachrichtungabteilung). This office was originally founded in 1870-71 and 
was designed as an intelligence gathering agency against France. In the fifteen years 
leading up to the war, however, the bureau began to deal primarily with censorship and 
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propaganda.93 Unlike France or Britain, Germany already had its press bureau fully 
established before 1914.  
   For the entire war Section IIIb was run efficiently by Colonel Walter Nicolai.94 
Newspapers were presented daily at 11:00 by the military with official communiqués, 
and were prohibited from printing unofficial news related to military or international 
events.95 Enforcement of this rule was less strict in Germany than in France because 
newspapers were in any case severely limited in their sources of information. Wolff, 
Germany’s principal news agency, had cooperated with its three primary counterparts 
in the west, Havas in France, Reuters in Britain and The Associated Press in the 
United States before the war. Once the war began these ties were severed and Wolff, 
the sole provider to German newspapers of information related to international affairs, 
was limited to receiving information through neutral countries via its powerful 
telegraph agency at Nauen.96 In February 1915, in an attempt to standardize censorship 
practices throughout Germany and to present official information from both Wolff and 
the OHL to the press simultaneously, a Supreme Censorship Office (Oberzensurstelle) 
was established which in October was further expanded at the behest of the Kaiser and 
renamed the War Press Office (Kriegspresseamt). 
   Three major tasks were assigned to the War Press Office. ‘1. To facilitate co-
operation between the OHL and the civilian authorities with regard to the press. 2. To 
provide as much controlled information as possible to the various authorities and to the 
press. 3. To establish and supervise the uniform application of the censorship.’97 
Germany’s War Press Office performed the tasks that together were run by two French 
offices, a result of the dual information management system in France that was divided 
between civilian and military authorities.98 The Supreme Censorship Office continued 
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to operate as a branch of this enlarged bureau and its task was less arduous than that of 
its French counterpart. Papers were not subject to revision prior to publication but 
were reviewed later for indiscretions, meaning that time restraints did not apply to the 
same extent as in France. There were three penalties for violating censorship rules. ‘1. 
A warning indicating that a paper in the future may be subjected to censorship prior to 
publication. 2. Temporary preventative censorship of a paper. 3. A suspension, often 
only for a few days.’ 99 These punishments differed markedly from in France, where 
suspensions and fines (usually after warnings) were the regular punishment for 
violators and where preventative censorship was imposed upon all newspapers.      
   Punishments of newspaper editors in Germany were rare largely because journalists 
rarely broke the rules. On 1 August 1914 editors as in France were reminded of their 
heavy responsibility towards the nation, but unlike in France were instructed that their 
goal was to ‘patriotically educate’ the German citizenry. This was accompanied by a 
series of veiled threats towards newspaper editors during the following week, 
particularly those on the left.100 Censorship policies were also obeyed in Germany 
ironically because they were so confusing. The Supreme Censorship Office shortly 
after its creation had instructed the press that unofficial material related to military and 
international affairs was to be presented first to police authorities prior to publication. 
The Prussian Minister of the Interior Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebbel, however, 
instructed the police that this was only necessary regarding military news. Upon 
hearing this news the Supreme Censorship office in February 1915 declared that under 
the law of siege, the use of preventative censorship was ‘legally possible’ for both 
military and domestic news.101  Since German papers received almost all their news 
either from Wolff or the OHL, there was little latitude in how papers could differentiate 
one from one another and it seems few made the effort. The majority of German 
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newspapers for most of the war presented news in a uniform manner.102  
   Germany launched its wartime propaganda campaign in earnest before France or 
Britain. Germany as the violator of Belgian neutrality and the principal aggressor on 
the Western Front was placed on the defensive in the propaganda war in neutral 
countries. Propaganda until mid-1916 was directed by the Information Office, a 
subsection of the War Press Office.103 In August 1916, with the appointment of 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff to the OHL the German propaganda campaign intensified 
dramatically at home and abroad. In the month before Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s 
appointment the civilian government placed the responsibility for propaganda linked to 
the war economy, war related politics and both war-related film and photography 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ludendorff, however, who had argued for a 
Ministry of Propaganda (Germany would have one in the Second World War) had 
ensured that by spring 1917 this agency was under the direction of the OHL and in 
July 1918 changed its name to the Foreign Department of the Army High 
Command.104 Though Ludendorff was a proponent of a vigorous propaganda 
campaign, the OHL proved to have little success in changing German morale or the 
opinion of Germany abroad. Though the OHL attempted to censor material related to 
food shortages105 and military setbacks and to engage in ‘patriotic instruction’ of the 
troops through propaganda leaflets, posters, films and photographs, the signs of 
Germany’s impending defeat by mid-1918 could no longer be concealed. The 
mainstream press began to report on Germany’s military crisis only at the very end of 
the war. Most Germans (even journalists) were told by the OHL that German victory 
on the battlefield was assured until the very end, a factor which encouraged the ‘stab in 
the back’106 myth and a profound German distrust of the press. Though information 
management in Germany for most of the war was highly efficient in managing dissent 
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and maintaining morale, its rigidity and its short-term successes had damaging 
consequences and grave implications for the inter-war period.    
   There is little material in English or French on German information management 
during the First World War. The best starting point is David Welch’s Germany, 
Propaganda and Total War 1914-1918.107 Welch’s study is a thorough analysis of the 
effect of both propaganda and censorship on German morale from 1914 to 1918. 
Welch does an excellent job of outlining the chain of command linking the OHL and 
the press, sets out the OHL’s objectives regarding information management, and 
evaluates its successes in meeting them. Martin Creutz’s ‘Les Journalistes et la censure 
dans l’Empire allemande pendant la Grande Guerre’108, translated from the original 
German into French is an excellent and highly analytical appraisal of the effectiveness 
of the censorship system in Germany. Creutz like Welch argues that censorship in 
Germany was so effective that German citizens until the very end of the war did not 
realize the full gravity of Germany’s military situation. He further contends, however, 
that the failure to keep even Germany’s journalists informed of events at the front was 
symptomatic of an inflexible militaristic society. In German, the longest and most 
heavily referenced study of German state-media relations is Deutsche Pressepolitik im 
Ersten Weltkrieg by Kurt Koszyk.109 As a primary source particularly important are 
the memoires of Colonel Walter Nicolai.110    
   Research into the specific events covered in this study was essential before 
evaluating their influence on the operation of the French information management 
system. For the history of Nivelle’s rise to power, his tenure as France’s Commander 
in Chief and the disaster on the Chemin des Dames, Brigadier-General Eduard 
Spears’s Prelude to Victory111 is useful. Spears, as a British liaison officer to France, 
had met Nivelle as well as Haig, Robertson, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson and other 
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military chiefs who shaped Allied planning on the Western Front during the first half 
of 1917. Spears’s character descriptions are vivid and first-hand. Also as both an 
officer and a witness, his description of the Nivelle Offensive’s failure is particularly 
insightful. For a more detailed account of the Nivelle Offensive and indeed the entire 
French operational theatre during the First World War, helpful is Pyrrhic Victory by 
Robert A. Doughty.112 Another study which provides insight into the general 
relationship between the military and the state and discusses Nivelle’s influence on 
politicians in Paris is J.C.King’s Generals and Politicians. 113  Finally, for an overall 
history of the Nivelle Offensive, its background and its legacy perhaps the most 
thorough study is Pierre Miquel’s Le Chemin des Dames.114   
   The authoritative account of the French mutinies of June 1917 and that with which 
modern authors of the subject usually compare their own arguments is Pedroncini’s 
Les Mutineries de 1917.115 Pedroncini contended that the mutinies were primarily a 
result of the string of failed offensives by the French Army that culminated in the 
Chemin des Dames debacle, and that Pétain was personally responsible for restoring 
French morale at the front. Pedroncini’s book was ground breaking primarily because 
it was the first study of the mutinies based entirely on unpublished material from the 
French military archives at Vincennes which was released in 1967. Particularly helpful 
for future generations of historians, Pedroncini in addition to his monograph also 
published a book entirely comprised of the archival material which he used for his 
monograph.116 Published before Pedroncini’s study were two useful books on the 
mutinies written in English. Dare Call it Treason by Richard M. Watt117 and Mutiny 
1917118 by John Williams are both informative narratives which make extensive use of 
memoirs, newspapers and pre-existing secondary literature. Much of the post-
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Pedroncini historiography has been undertaken by historians associated with the 
CRID. The most notable of these has been André Loez’s study,119 which uses both a 
historical and a sociological approach to evaluate the reasons for which soldiers 
rebelled, and Denis Rolland’s highly revisionist La Grève des tranchées.120       
   Robert Bruce’s A Fraternity of Arms121, a study of Franco-American relations 
primarily in 1917 and 1918, provided useful background information. Bruce’s Chapter 
3122 discusses the arrival of the first American leaders and then troops in France. It 
presents a personal background to General John Pershing, who it is argued had an 
ambiguous attitude towards the French prior to the conflict. It also discusses in detail 
the mentality of the French leaders towards the Americans, whom they tried to impress 
with a great deal of fanfare. For other material on the United States during the war, 
David Kennedy’s Over Here123 is the best social account of the United States during 
the war but devotes only one chapter to the American experience in France. Written 
for a general audience but highly relevant to this study is Byron Farwell’s Over There 
124 which contains an interesting account of the arrival of the first American troops in 
France. Though not directly related to the subject of this thesis, How we Advertised 
America by George Creel125 is the authoritative account of American foreign 
propaganda.  
   The two most detailed accounts of the Stockholm Conference of 1917 are by 
Hildamarie Maynell126 and David Kirby.127 The former presents the Conference as a 
                                                          
119 A. Loez, 14-18: Les Refus de la guerre (Paris,2010).  
120 D. Rolland, La Grève des Tranchées : Les Mutineries de 1917 (Paris,2005) attacks Pedroncini’s 
argument that the Nivelle Offensive was the primary factor for the mutinies. Instead, Rolland argues that 
this was one factor among many. He emphasizes the heightened awareness of socialism amongst the 
troops, the bitterness felt towards the interior and the impact of external political events.  
121 R.B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War (Lawrence KA,2003).  
122 ibid.,pp.60-96.   
123 D. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (Oxford,1980).   
124 B. Farwell, Over There: The United States in the Great War, 1917-1918 (New York, 1999).  
125 G. Creel, How We Advertised America: The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on 
Public Information That Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe (London, 
2012).  
126 H. Maynell, ‘The Stockholm Conference of 1917’, International Review of Social History, Vol.5, 
No.1, (Apr.1960), pp.1-25 and pp.202-225.  
127 D. Kirby, War, Peace and Revolution: International Socialism at the Crossroads, 1914-1918 
(London,1986) and D. Kirby. ‘International Socialism and the Question of Peace: The Stockholm 
Conference of 1917’, Historical Journal, Vol.5, No.3, (Sept.1982), pp.709-716.  
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lost opportunity to engage with Russia and argues that the Western socialist parties 
gained momentum in this period, with consequences for domestic politics in the inter-
war period. The latter argues convincingly that the Stockholm Conference was a 
doomed endeavour from its outset. For information on labour militancy in France 
during the war, in addition to Horne’s 128 Labour at War (see above), Jean-Louis 
Robert provides a highly detailed account of the Parisian Midinettes strikes of Spring-
1917 in Les Ouvriers, la patrie et la révolution.129 Better on the 1918 French strike 
movement (about which very little has been written - see Chapter 6) is, because of its 
national rather than Paris centred approach, Becker’s The Great War and the French 
People.130  
   For the French interpretation of and reaction to events in Russia in 1917 and 1918, 
the first two chapters of Michael Carley’s Revolution and Intervention131 demonstrate 
how Paris immediately realised the threat posed to its alliance with Russia and to its 
financial interests in that country during the February Revolution and accordingly 
recruited the press particularly, on the left, to reassure readers that Russia would 
emerge a stronger ally from the turmoil. An interesting article which focuses on the 
French reaction to the February Revolution in the context of France’s own 
revolutionary heritage and discusses the press in Paris is Ioannis Sinanoglou’s article 
from 1980, ‘Frenchmen, Their Revolutionary Heritage and the Russian 
Revolution’.’132 For a general history of the February Revolution, perhaps the best 
secondary source is The February Revolution, Petrograd 1917 by Tsuyoshi 
Hasegawa.133 For a highly accessible narrative which outlines the period of Russian 
upheaval from 1891 to 1924 A People’s Tragedy by Orlando Figes134 is excellent.  
                                                          
128 Horne, Labour at War.  
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1919 (Kingston,1983).  
132 I. Sinanoglou, ‘Frenchmen, Their Revolutionary Heritage and the Russian Revolution’, 
 International History Review, Vol 2, No.4, (Oct,1980), pp.566-584.  
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    There are several good military histories of the Ludendorff Offensives from March 
to July 1918 and the following Allied counter-attacks, often known as the Hundred  
Days, which led to the Armistice. From a French perspective Doughty’s book 
mentioned above provides a detailed account of strategies and operations. For an 
international military history, the last two chapters of William Phillpott’s War of 
Attrition135 are highly informative. Finally the most in depth and up to date study to 
analyse the fortunes of war in 1918 is David Stevenson’s With our Backs to the 
Wall.136 In the first half of his book, Stevenson describes in detail the Ludendorff 
Offensives and analyses the reasons for their failure. This is followed by a similar 
account of the Hundred Days. The second half of this book is unique in its thematic 
approach and its chapters on manpower, shipping and the home fronts provided 
particularly useful material when researching the final two chapters of this thesis.  
   Unpublished primary sources and wartime newspapers comprise the vast majority of 
material used to gather information for this study. Three principal objectives directed 
the archival research behind this project. The first was to document what was 
prohibited from being published in the press. The second objective was to document 
what was permitted or encouraged to be written in the press and what was indeed 
published. The third and most difficult task was to discover the political and military 
motives for the establishment of the French information management system and for 
decisions to censor or permit material to be printed. Only after these three groups of 
information were collected, examined and cross-referenced was this study able to 
proceed analytically by evaluating the effectiveness and motives behind press 
censorship.  
   The archives of the French armed forces are located at the Service Historique de la 
Défense located at the Château de Vincennes in Paris. At the SHD, the most relevant 
materials to this study are the correspondence and internal circulated material of the 
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War Ministry located in series 5N and in the GQG’s137 papers, located in series 16N. 
Series 5N 332-337 contain the correspondence between the government and the GQG 
and the memoranda distributed to the various ministries regarding press control. These 
files illuminate the bureaucratic structure of the information management system, 
particularly in 1914. Some particularly interesting documents in these folders are 
Clemenceau’s orders to stamp out defeatists and the correspondence regarding AEF138 
censorship policies in 1918. 5N 338-358 is a continuation of the same material but 
contains more correspondence involving the Press Bureau. Of particular interest in 
these series are original copies of the Military Justice Code, Circular 1000, Nivelle’s 
instructions concerning the ‘Constant Delay’ (see Chapter 3), Pétain’s suggestions and 
memoranda regarding the measures to be taken in the wake of the June 1917 mutinies, 
material regarding rules and regulations for foreign war correspondents and a detailed 
list of all punishments administered to newspapers during the war for violating 
censorship. 5N 569 contains a great deal of correspondence between the Ministries of 
the Interior and of War regarding the accidental publication of forbidden material in 
the press, and contains copies of the articles in question. 5N 371 and 372 contain the 
specific instructions given to the police and to newspaper editors in the event of a 
journal’s seizure or suspension.  
   5N 423-428 is an extremely useful subseries that contains daily government press 
analyses outlining the main arguments and articles in every major Parisian daily from 
July 1917 to December 1918. These were designed to be read for quick consumption 
by the War Minister and perhaps the Prime Minister. During the Clemenceau tenure 
these were first inspected by Georges Mandel and were extremely detailed (see 
Chapter 4). These press analyses unfortunately do not exist prior to July 1917. 
Subseries 5N 445-550 covers July 1915 to September 1919 and also is of paramount 
importance to this study. These files provide the only major collection of final drafts 
(morasses) submitted to the Press Bureau for censorship and include the censor’s notes 
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and corrections in the original blue pencil markings.  
   The second most important archival collection is held at the Bibliothèque de 
Documentation Internationale Contemporaine in Nanterre, next to the University of 
Paris-X. The censorship files at the BDIC, F rés 0270, contain original censors’ 
registers from the Press Bureau. F rés 0270 C, CM and CG together document all of 
the orders given to the press by the Press Bureau prohibiting the publication of specific 
information. The first of these contains orders which were given several times a week 
and reveals the often highly specific nature of what was prohibited from publication.  F 
rés 0270 CG contains ‘general orders’ that were less specific and which were on 
average issued approximately every two weeks, though this depended on the current 
situation. General orders, for example, were issued to the press not to cover specific 
events while the government formulated its initial reaction. Specific orders were then 
given as the event unfolded, instructing the press how to proceed. Also in this 
collection are the lists of all telegrams which were either censored or stopped (F rés 
0270 TAC) and those which were allowed to pass (F rés 0270 TV and TI).  F rés 0270 
AVIS lists the ‘advice’ given to the press regarding what to propagate and F rés 0270 
ENF gives a lists of orders which were disobeyed but not a list of sanctions.  
   The final major sources of primary information for this study were the published 
Parisian newspapers dating from 1917 and 1918, and indeed this thesis contains a great 
deal of press analysis. Although material from well over twenty papers was examined, 
some were given special attention because of their large circulations or political 
influence. Firstly, whereas papers were usually published daily, weekly or monthly 
this study focuses primarily on the national daily press, published in Paris. These 
papers had circulation numbers far exceeding those of their regional counterparts, and 
even had départemental regional issues with added material concerning local news, 
though these were often more expensive than their Parisian counterparts. During the 
First World War these were the primary sources of news information even for the 
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village peasantry.139 Furthermore virtually all of the papers discussed in this thesis 
were freely available at the front. An attempt was made to study a range of papers 
which were representative of the entire political spectrum. For the mass-circulation 
centrist press particular attention was given to Le Petit Parisien, Le Journal and Le 
Petit Journal. Also in the centre, close scrutiny was given to Le Temps and Le Figaro. 
While these papers had far fewer subscribers (see Chart 2) they were highly influential 
in well-educated and political circles, Le Temps being considered the French 
‘newspaper of record’ (see Chapter 1).  
   On the left, L’Oeuvre and L’Humanité were given special consideration, the former 
because of its high circulation and the latter because of its status as the official organ 
of the French Socialist Party. On the right, L’Echo de Paris was the highest circulation 
daily and therefore was closely studied as was the highly influential L’Action 
Française. While these journals can all be accessed at the Newspaper Archives of the 
British Library in Colindale (London) the best source for French newspapers of the 
First World War is the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, whose website,140 provides 
free access to the majority of journals used in this study.  
   Together these sources provide the necessary information to analyse the policies of 
the French government towards the press during the First World War and to evaluate 
its effectiveness in controlling the media. When studying the communications between 
the government and the press and cross-referencing the orders given to newspaper 
editors against the final published copies a clear theme emerges. Both the government 
and the GQG were highly aware of the importance of the written press for citizen and 
military morale and attempted to control public opinion by dictating orders to the press 
and by using preventative censorship. This system operated efficiently as the vast 
majority of orders were followed. Not all newspaper audiences would have believed 
everything they read, and many would have been able to read between the lines during 
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periods of intense censorship.141 But successful manipulation of the written press by 
the government in Paris and by the GQG undoubtedly had a steadying effect on French 
morale, even if the extent of this effect is difficult to evaluate. In no other period of the 
conflict was this more important than during the crisis years of 1917-1918 when 
censorship contributed to preventing negative commentary or hysteria from enveloping 
the news media.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
141 Citizens and soldiers for example would have been aware of events through their mutual contact during 
leave and not all letters between the front lines and the home front were monitored or successfully 
censored.    
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Chapter 1: The Evolution and Organization of Censorship in France 1914-1916 
 
   The creation of a system to monitor the press during the First World War by the 
French military and government was in large part a reaction against the press’s 
perceived role during the Franco-Prussian War and in the first forty years of the Third 
Republic.  The first part of this chapter explains how the role of the media in France 
particularly after the legal implementation of press freedoms in 1881 led the government 
and the military to distrust journalists, whom they saw as opportunistic and unreliable. 
The discussion then moves to the legal framework for the French censorship system 
during the First World War. In addition to discussing the legal texts themselves this 
chapter outlines the major goals of French information management, a necessary step 
required before evaluating the system’s effectiveness, the primary focus of this study.     
   A curious phenomenon during the first few days of August 1914 was the willingness 
of the French press to immediately and entirely relinquish its freedoms. This chapter 
argues that this was largely due to combination of patriotic adherence to the Union 
Sacrée and a belief amongst journalists (and many others) that the war would be short. 
Many journalists and politicians resented the use of political censorship (censorship of 
domestic affairs) after this short-war illusion had been dispelled, and the government 
was forced to justify its use. An explanation is given how this was accomplished by 
discussing the debates that took place on the subject in both the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate in 1915. The chapter concludes first by demonstrating the way in which 
the French information management system ironed out its inefficiencies in 1915 by 
standardizing practices across the country and by making the orders to papers less 
complicated. It then presents the battle of Verdun in 1916 as a formidable challenge to 
which the new information management system responded by hiring full-time war 
correspondents and by augmenting its propaganda network. By the end of 1916 the 
information management system which later dealt with the heightened period of crisis 
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for the French in 1917 and 1918 was fully in place.          
 
1871-1914: Censorship and the Role of the Media in Early Third Republic France 
 
 
   The 43 years of peace on the European continent which followed the Franco-Prussian 
War constituted newspapers’ ‘golden age’142 throughout the Western world. 
Technological developments, an increase in literacy rates, prosperity accompanied by a 
sustained period of peace, the rise in popular political participation and the 
liberalization of state-media relations all contributed to this phenomenon. In France, 
the last ten years of the Second Empire were marked by an increasingly liberal attitude 
towards the press by the French Government. Napoleon III, however, continued to 
disdain the press and until the end of his reign threatened to imprison journalists or 
press leaders with whom he was displeased.143 In 1870, Napoleon III surrendered to the 
Prussian army at the Battle of Sedan.144 The Prussians notoriously had been informed 
of Marshal Patrice de MacMahon’s troops’ movements beforehand by an indiscreet 
article in the French daily, Le Temps. This unfortunate incident contributed to a distrust 
in military circles towards the press. Later it influenced the opinions of the French 
High Command regarding the press’s appropriate role in wartime. 
   The 1871 Communards were repressive towards those with whom they disagreed (Le 
Figaro and Le Gaulois were both seized), and both Adolphe Thiers, head of state 1871-
1873, and Patrice de MacMahon, President 1873-1879, did little to liberalize state-media 
relations. After the 1877 Seize Mai crisis and the 1879 presidential election which 
shifted political power to the republicans, the Third Republic’s assembly began to 
consider a single press law to replace the 300 articles divided into 42 legal texts which 
had previously legislated press freedoms in France.145
 
After four years of discussion the 
French assembly passed the 1881 Press Liberty Law on 29 July. It was among the 
world’s most liberal press laws, and is still used today, albeit with some modifications. 
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   The laws governing freedom of expression prior to 1881 were confusing and often 
contradictory. A result of this confusion was that the weight of their enforcement in 
individual cases depended heavily on the particular magistrates involved. The 
codification of laws regarding the press into one text ended much of this confusion. 
Some of the previous laws were kept. The 1819 and 1849 laws forbidding journalists to 
incite readers to break the law and those of 1848-49 prohibiting publications from 
attacking the principle of universal suffrage or from attacking individuals purely on the 
basis of their family ties or religion were all maintained (if not strictly enforced). Also 
upheld were the 1819 and 1849 laws forbidding the discussion of legal proceedings 
before their final verdicts had been made public.146  
   More important were the modifications to the existing legal system. The 1871 law 
forbidding previously unpublished quotations in the press was rescinded. Although full 
governmental censorship prior to publication had ceased since 1822, until 1868 papers 
had required ‘permission’ by the government to print their stories. This practice was 
eliminated under the 1881 law, as were the cautionary deposits papers had required to 
pay and which were often arbitrarily kept by the authorities who claimed rules had been 
violated. Only foreign owned papers which discussed politics or economics were now 
required to submit their material for prior examination. Whereas the laws of 1828 and 
1868 had permitted only men to manage newspapers or operate a printing press, this was 
changed to include all adult French citizens. 147         
     The central component to the 1881 Law was the freedom to publish, and its first 
article declared political freedom both for printing press publishers and for 
bookstores.148 The 1870 law which required written permission from the Ministry of 
the Interior to operate either was repealed, with a new clause requiring simply a 
monthly payment of taxes and registration of the address from which material was 
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printed.149 An 1852 law was repealed that required papers to present all documents, 
accounts and sources to the government at the latters request under the penalty of 
losing its above mentioned deposit. This practice had also been heavily abused by the 
government and was now under the 1881 legislation to be used only when a paper 
published false information. Finally, a bizarre feature of the law took the primary 
responsibility for the publication of libellous or false information away from the 
editors (1828 law) and placed it with the writers themselves. 150   
   Assembly members from all parties saw the potential for political propaganda in the 
law and because the French assembly had formulated it over the previous four years it 
passed without debate. While the law significantly weakened the state’s authority over 
the press in peacetime, it lacked a clause to indicate how it would be modified in 
wartime. Therefore, while the 1881 Press Liberty Law greatly influenced the 
relationship between the press and the government in the 33 years following its 
enactment, it was quickly replaced by the draconian wartime legislation introduced 
during the first week of August 1914. 
   During the 30 years after the 1881 Law was passed, French newspaper circulations 
grew rapidly. New innovations in printing (the linotype machine was invented in 
1886), speedier delivery methods, improved telecommunications technologies (the 
telephone and the wireless telegraph) and the further development of photography all 
contributed to the boom. Papers became cheaper to produce and distribute, and 
increased prosperity amongst an increasingly literate population made papers relatively 
cheaper. The 1881 Law provided politicians and businessmen (often the same people), 
with a new opportunity to gain political exposure and to profit through the printing 
press. 
   Many of the well-established Parisian dailies became increasingly politicized or 
sensationalized after 1881, as sensationalism and slander sold papers. Press owners 
became the centre scandals often entailing allegations of bribery or other unscrupulous 
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acts launched in the pursuit of advertisement revenue. A new type of newspaper 
emerged which was often owned and operated by influential French politicians, by 
special interest groups or religious denominations. These papers, known as the presse 
d’opinion, became especially important during the Panama Scandal (1882-93) and the 
Dreyfus Affair (1894-1906). In both cases, highly charged political papers exposed 
corruption in a socially polarizing fashion. Significantly, both the influential far-right 
L’Action Française (1898) and the socialist L’Humanité (1906) were founded in 
response to the Dreyfus Affair. The Panama Scandal had been exposed by the anti-
Semitic La Libre Parole, founded and edited by Edouard Drumont, who later became a 
staunch anti-Dreyfusard.  Georges Clemenceau in his paper L’Aurore, had published 
Emile Zola’s celebrated article of 1898 entitled ‘J’Accuse!’ and addressed to President 
Félix Faure. Clemenceau had already in 1888-89 used his previous paper La Justice to 
encourage General Georges Boulanger’s political downfall. Clemenceau was one of 
many politicians who used their own private media organs as personal mouthpieces in 
this period.  In 1906, Clemenceau was appointed Premier in the final aftermath of the 
Dreyfus Affair and it was his journalistic experience in addition to his oratorical talent 
and political contacts that raised him to the apex of French politics. Between 1900 and 
1910 numerous papers went bankrupt because of competition from larger journals with 
more political influence and greater ability to raise revenue through advertising. 
Several dailies therefore amassed extremely large readerships at their expense and 
polarized the French citizenry into more clearly defined political affiliations. By 1914, 
the largest French papers had wiped out much of their competition by charging less, 
printing more and by adopting political stances which appealed to broader groups in 
society. French society was deeply divided politically and religiously in 1914 and the 
press had done much to accentuate these fractures. 
   Papers from the political centre had the largest readerships. Those primarily designed 
for mass consumption were prone to sensationalist excess and bourrage de crâne151 
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during the war. The largest of these was Le Petit Parisien, edited and owned by Jean 
Dupuy. Other mass circulation papers included Le Petit Journal, Le Journal, and Paris-
Midi. Centrist Papers that were less sensationalist but more factual and more 
professionally written were Le Temps (the French paper of record)152, Le Journal des 
Débats (a foreign policy paper), Le Soir and slightly further to the right, the highly 
influential Le Figaro, L’Echo de Paris and Le Gaulois. The far-right press came from 
the anti-Dreyfusard tradition and was generally monarchist, Catholic and anti-Semitic. 
Examples included L’Action Française, run by Charles Maurras and Léon Daudet, La 
Croix, and La Libre Parole, a heavily anti-Semitic paper, run by Edouard Drumont. 
Finally, left-wing papers tended to represent either the French socialist party (SFIO)153 
or elements of French labour. The most influential left-wing paper was L’Humanité, the 
official organ of the SFIO. Also representing the SFIO were L’Oeuvre and La Victoire. 
Further left were La Bataille which was the official organ of the CGT, France’s largest 
trade union federation and La Bataille Syndicaliste, organ of the minoritaires (a group 
which did not officially adhere to the Union Sacrée) section of the SFIO. Generally 
papers that represented the political extremes were less read, less influential and more 
heavily censored during the war. 
   The mass circulation dailies almost all cost five centimes and were affordable to all but 
the destitute. This not only helped to augment their circulations but also reflected the 
fact that these papers were primarily directed towards the masses, specifically workers, 
artisans and the petty bourgeoisie.154 Also five centimes were populist papers on both 
                                                                                                                                                                           
consistently emphasized the glory of France’s soldiers, known colloquially as the poilus (the hairy ones). 
The most famous journalist to criticize the use of bourrage de crâne even by his own colleagues at Le 
Petit Journal and particularly in 1917 and 1918 was Albert Londres. see A. Londres, Contre le bourrage 
de crane (Paris,2008). Also highly critical of the bourrage de crâne was the satirical journal le Canard 
Enchaîné.    
152 A newspaper of record is one which is widely distributed and because of its high level of professional 
journalism is considered authoritative. Also, papers of record are often given information to publish 
directly by the government.  
153 Not to be confused with the Republican-Socialist Party, a centrist party, La Section française de 
l’internationale ouvrière was the name of France’s socialist party.   
154 Bellanger, Histoire de la presse française. Tome III p.142. Le Petit Parisien, Le Journal and Le Petit 
Journal, France’s three most highly circulated papers for example all cost five centimes. Le Petit Parisien 
in 1914 had a daily circulation of well over one million. For a comprehensive list of newspaper 
circulations in 1917 see chart 2.  
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the left and right such as La Bataille Syndicaliste and L’Action Française, as was 
L’Humanité, which was funded by the SFIO. Papers which were more academically 
written catered to the more educated middle or upper-middle classes and were more 
expensive (ten or fifteen centimes).155 The most expensive, such as the regional issues of 
Le Temps, cost twenty centimes.   
   By 1914, newspaper publishers and editors enjoyed an influence unequalled before 
1881 in shaping French public opinion, particularly in urban areas. Censorship of the 
written press during the First World War had a more dramatic political impact than in 
conflicts before 1881 when readership was lower and the peacetime press had been 
more heavily monitored. Furthermore, public opinion itself played more of a role in 
elite decision making during the First World War than in previous conflicts because of 
the public’s role in fighting ‘total war.’ 156 The French High Command had learned 
from its experiences during the Franco-Prussian War and the Dreyfus Affair that the 
press was unreliable and contained anti-military elements.157 The French political 
leadership and High Command both had reasons to silence the press in the event of 
war. Their rationales were in large part founded on their interpretations of the 
increasing influence of the media over French society between 1871 and 1914. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
155 Le Figaro and Le Journal des Débats each cost ten centimes and the Parisian edition of Le Temps cost 
fifteen.  
156 A term used to describe a conflict whereby the nations involved engage all of their available military, 
human, economic, natural and social resources.    
157 Many media owners and journalists who were anti-Dreyfusard during the Dreyfus Affair distrusted the 
military, seeing it as both dishonest and as posing a potential threat to French democracy.  
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Chart 2 – An outline of the Parisian mainstream press during the First World War.158  
 
       
 
      Paper 
Political 
Affiliation/ 
Concentration 
Circulation 
on 1 
November 
1917 
  Notable   
  Figures  
  Involved159   
     L’Action      
     Française  
Far-right, monarchist, 
Catholic, anti- 
Semitic  
 
156,000 (1 Oct. 
1917) 
Charles Maurras, 
Léon Daudet, 
Jacques Bainville  
   La Bataille Far-left, syndicalist, 
official organ of the 
CGT 
 
         11,000 
 
Léon Jouhaux 
    La Croix    
   Right, Catholic  
        
        142,000  
J.Mollet, G. Goyeau, 
J. Guirand, General 
Pétetin.  
 
L’Écho de 
Paris 
          
           Right  
         
        433,000 
‘Pertinax’, Maurice 
Barrès, Marcel 
Hutin, Gabriel 
Bonvalot,Welliver  
   
     
      L’Éclair 
       
 
        Centre-left  
           
 
            16,000 
René Wertheimer, 
Roujon, G.Motorgeuil, 
Admiral Degouy, 
Commandant de 
Civrieux,Maxime 
Leroy  
      L’Éveil                Left            20,000 Jacques Dhur 
      
      Excelsior 
Emphasis on 
photography. Centre- 
left  
 
         132,000  
 
Raoul Péret, Lémery  
      
      Le Figaro 
   
      Centre-right  
           
           43,500 
Gaston Calmette, 
Alfred Capus, 
Robert de Flers, 
Denys Cochin 
      
     Le Gaulois 
       
       Centre-right 
            
             22,000  
Arthur Meyer, René 
d’Aral, Colonel 
Rousset, François 
Mauriac  
      
       L’Heure 
 
 
Centre, Republican  
              
 
              20,000 
Marcel Sembat, Paul 
Aubriot, Léon 
Jouhaux, Alexandre 
Varenne. Léon 
Blum, Alphonse 
Aulard  
     L’Homme  
      enchaîné 
Centre, Republican               
             45,000 
Georges 
Clemenceau, Bittard, 
Nicolas Pietri, Léo 
Gerville-Réache  
      
 
 
 
  
  
              
              
 
Paul Renaudel, 
Marcel Cachin, 
                                                          
158 Circulation numbers for this graph are from Bellanger, Histoire de la presse française. Tome III p.428. 
Political affiliations and contributors can be found in Miquel, La Paix de Versailles et l’opinion publique 
pp.572-575.  
159 Some figures were involved with or owned more than one paper.  
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   L’Humanité 
 Left, Official organ   
   of the French   
  Socialist Party 
 
            66,000 
Marcel Sembat, 
Longuet, Mayeras, 
D.Renoult, Anatole 
France  
 
  L’Information 
      
         Financial 
         
           106,000 
Paul Adam, Léo 
Chavenon, Charles 
Omessa, Admiral 
Degouy, Jules Moch 
  
  
L’Intransigeant 
        
 
         Centre-right 
            
 
            255,000 
Léon Bailby, 
Colonel Fabry, 
Philippe Crozier, 
Georges Lecomte, 
Pierre Mac Orlan  
     
 
    Le Journal 
              
 
 
                  Centre 
           
 
 
         885,000 
Charles Humbert, 
H.Bidou, Saint 
Brice, Geo London, 
Binet-Valmer, 
Paisant, Damour, 
Pradier, Raoul Péret, 
Boussenot, Brousse  
 Le Journal des  
       Débats 
       Centre, Foreign  
               affairs  
            
           28,000 
Étienne de Nalèche, 
Gauvin, P. de 
Quirelle, H.Bidou   
 
 
 
  Le Journal du 
       Peuple 
          
 
 
       
       Far-left, Anarchist 
           tendencies 
           
 
 
 
         31,500  
Henri Fabre, 
Severine, 
A.Charpentier, 
Mayeras, Lucien le 
Foyer, Charles 
Rappoport, Bernard 
Lecache, Henri 
Torrès, Paul 
Vaillant-Couturier, 
General Percin  
  
 
La Libre Parole 
     
 
Far-right, Anti-Semitic 
        
 
          20,000 
Édouard Drumond, 
Paul Vergnet, 
Reverdy, Isoulet, 
Galli, General 
Petetin, Louis Marin, 
General de Saint-
Yves, Joseph Denais  
     
 
      Le Matin 
                    
 
                Centre 
       
 
         999,000 
Banau-Varilla, Henri 
de Jouvenel, 
Stéphane Lauzanne, 
J.Sauerwein, 
Commandant de 
Civrieux 
        
   
      L’œuvre   
                  
 
                   Left 
        
 
         108,000 
Gustave Téry, Jean 
Hennessy, Charles 
Saglio, Barthe, 
Admiral Degouy, 
General Verraux  
 
      Le Petit   
      Journal 
               
 
               Centre 
        
 
         515,000 
Albert Londres, 
Blumenthal, 
Fournol, Raoul 
Pérert, René Viviani, 
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Colonel Thomasson  
 
Le Petit 
Parisien 
            
          
          Centre-left 
      
 
         1,683,000 
Jean Dupuy, 
G.Lechartier,Landry, 
Cheron, Aulard, 
Colonel Rousset, 
Engerraand  
    La Presse        Centre, Republican              85,000 Escudier, André 
Lebey 
   
 
    Le Temps 
                
 
 
            Centre-left  
          
 
 
             58,500 
Adrien Hébrard, 
F.Mommeja, 
General de Lacroix, 
Lieutenant 
d’Entraygues, 
Charles Rivet, A. de 
Guillerville  
    La Victoire       Centre, Nationalist              67,000 Gustave Hervé, 
G.Bienaimé 
 
 
 
 
1914: The Establishment of the French Wartime Censorship System. 
 
 
   Though wartime information management was discussed by the French High 
Command in mid-1913160 and perhaps even earlier, it was not until June 1914 after 
Adolphe Messimy’s re-appointment161 as Minister of War that serious planning began 
on how to structure a future wartime press bureau. Between June and August 1914, a 
group of experts drafted a report analysing the French press’s role during the most 
recent European conflicts and outlined the framework of what became the French 
information management system during the First World War.162 Pre-war planning 
enabled the War Ministry to quickly establish the Press Bureau on 2 August (the 
telegraph section was set up on 30 July), and thereby ensure that France’s press was 
closely monitored from the outset of hostilities. 
   The fundamental structures and legal bases for wartime censorship in France were 
established at the beginning of August 1914. On 3 August the Government met with 
media owners and explained the structure of a new bureau designed to monitor the 
French telegraph163 and the nation’s newspapers. The bureau’s authority to control 
                                                          
160 Forcade, ‘La Censure politique en France’.  
161 Messimy had previously been War Minister from June 1911 to January 1912.  
162 Rajsfus, La Censure militaire et policière, p.29.  
163 The telegraph was transmitted by both cable and by radio. For this thesis the cable telegraph will be 
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information derived from both the 1849 Siege Law, activated on 2 August, and from 
the 5 August ‘Indiscretions of the Press Law.’ The 1849 Law allowed the military to 
disband public gatherings and prohibit publications deemed to threaten public order. 
The 5 August ‘Indiscretions of the Press Law’ was debated on 4 August in the 
Chamber of Deputies and passed unanimously. The wave of patriotism that coincided 
with the Government’s appeal for a Union Sacrée 164 and the widespread belief in the 
probability of a short war inspired media owners and politicians alike to curtail 
freedom of expression. The 5 August Press Law provided a list of topics that were 
prohibited from being discussed in the media. While most of the subjects on the list 
were of a military nature, there was also a general ban on any article favouring the 
enemy or harmful to the spirit of the army or population.165 Arbitrary enforcement of 
this last prohibition led to accusations of political censorship by media owners against 
the government, beginning in mid- September. In August 1914, however, the media 
fully supported the implementation of these two laws which together suspended the 
1881 Freedom of the Press Law. Freedom of the press was not restored in France until 
12 October 1919, after the German ratification of the Versailles Treaty. 
   While the War Ministry dealt exclusively with the Parisian press, censorship of the 
provincial press was conducted jointly by the War Ministry and the Ministry of the 
Interior. In 1914, the Parisian Military Governor was in charge of censorship in Paris 
while the government took refuge in Bordeaux. On 22 September War Minister 
Alexandre Millerand166 ordered prefects throughout France to monitor ‘articles 
covering domestic politics,’167 thereby including civilians in the censorship process. 
This move marked the apex of civilian involvement in French wartime information 
                                                                                                                                                                           
referred to simply as the ‘telegraph’, the radio telegraph will be referred to as ‘radio’.  
164 The term, meaning ‘sacred union’, was first used on 1 Aug by Premier René Viviani in an address to 
France’s Deputies and Senators written by President Poincaré. It referred to an unwritten truce between 
France’s political parties and religious denominations for the purpose of defending the nation and its 
principles against German aggression. The timing of the appeal was significant because it came the day 
after the assassination of Socialist leader Jean Jaurès. Jaurès had explicitly argued against France’s 
socialists contributing to a ‘bourgeois war’, but closer to his death his views became more nuanced. The 
Union Sacrée was adhered to by all but the minoritaire sections of the SFIO and the CGT. This group was 
small at first but grew significantly as the war continued, particularly in 1917.  
165 R.Collins, ‘The Development of Censorship’,  p.5.  
166 Millerand replaced Messimy as War Minister on 26 August.  
167 Circular signed by Millerand. Quoted in; Collins, ‘The Development of Censorship’, p.12.   
48 
 
management, as the prefects’ role became significantly reduced in February 1915 and 
then again in 1917 when civilians were removed altogether from the censorship 
process. It also officially institutionalized political censorship, which immediately 
became a source of political contention and remained so throughout the war. On 12 
August 1914 a Press Commission was established as a liaison between press leaders 
and the War Ministry. This commission was directed by Jean Dupuy, owner of Le Petit 
Parisien, and was designed as a vehicle for press leaders to communicate suggestions 
and complaints to the War Ministry. This commission could only prove useful if the 
War Ministry was able to provide the press with at least minimal information on 
frontline activities. The Commander in Chief of the French Army, Joseph Joffre, 
however, was determined to keep even the War Ministry largely uninformed of events 
on both the Western and Eastern Fronts. 
   The censorship system established in 1914 and early 1915 was operated jointly by the 
War Ministry and the GQG (see chart 1). The Press Bureau was responsible for 
overseeing censorship of the press in Paris and oversaw the regional censorship 
commissions in the départements.  Penalties for insubordination were decided by the 
Press Section of the Civil War Cabinet of the War Ministry and were carried out by the 
Military Government in Paris and other regions. Military information was 
communicated to the press through official communiqués from the GQG’s Information 
Section. The GQG along with all government ministries was permitted to provide the 
Press Bureau with new orders regarding press censorship. 
   Punishments for papers that violated orders from the Press Bureau ranged from 
warnings to seizures of particular editions and in more severe cases, suspension for at 
least one week and possibly indefinite suspension. The vast majority of punishments 
were warnings, and only when military movements or coordinates were published 
were seizures enforced.168 Suspensions were, with a few exceptions, imposed on 
                                                          
168 There were a total of 92 seizures during the war, 85 of which were in 1916 and 1917. 84 seizures were 
ordered by the Ministry of War for discussing military details, most notably during the Battle of Verdun. 
All of the papers seized were on the left with the exception of L’Action Française, which was seized 5 
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papers that had repeatedly been seized and disproportionately to papers whose editors 
had little political influence. 
   The censorship system in France operated on the assumption that papers would obey 
the Press Bureau. Papers were required to submit each edition to the Press Bureau prior 
to publication. The Press Bureau censored the articles and often did not return them 
until just before the papers were to be published, which resulted in large sections of 
articles appearing blank. These blanks were a regular feature of the French press 
during the war and papers often published articles with blanked material several times 
a week. It is difficult to ascertain the exact effect of these blanks upon newspaper 
readers but it is logical to assume that they created a certain level of suspicion. 
Ultimately, if a paper wished to test the system and publish forbidden material, it could 
do so. Minor offences were usually committed by editors with political influence, who 
often went unpunished. But in cases where papers were seized or suspended, the 
enforcement of this punishment was carried out by the Parisian Military Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
times. The papers seized most often were Le Bonnet Rouge (15 times) and Le Radical, L’Heure, and 
L’Oeuvre (all 12 times), Forcade, ‘ La Censure politique en France’, pp.883-884.  
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Chart 1 – The Functions of Press Control169 
 
                                                          
169 Collins, ‘The Development of Censorship’, p.20.  
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    The lack of information available to the press was compensated for early in the war 
through a consistent use of bourrage de crâne and exaggeration. War Minister 
Alexandre Millerand sent a report on 15 September to all censors insisting that false 
news be prohibited from publication.170 Particularly he forbade the publication of 
‘stories of German atrocities which, by terrifying the population, run the risk of 
provoking the most terrible exodus’.171 Millerand believed it dangerous to create false 
hope amongst the French citizenry and unnecessarily to incite public panic, and 
Messimy had been replaced on 26 August in part for his inability to combat widespread 
sensationalism in the press. 172  The order led to an immediate decrease in the level of 
journalistic sensationalism and a condemnation of such practices on 17 September in 
L’Humanité.173 While outright falsification in French papers largely disappeared by the 
end of 1914, exaggerations of Russian accomplishments and vilifications of the German 
character remained constant journalistic themes throughout the war. 
   More important for the Press Bureau and for the GQG during the first few months of 
the war was how the press interpreted telegrams and official communiqués regarding 
French frontline operations. During the first month of fighting the GQG provided little 
or no operational information even to its own government. 174The War Ministry in 
practice had little direct control over the GQG, and military leaders were highly 
apprehensive about civilian intervention in military affairs. Messimy, just before his 
replacement by Millerand, had ordered the High Command to issue daily 
communiqués to the Press Bureau which were distributed to the press. Prior to this 
order, newspapers under pressure to provide readers with frontline news even created 
their own fictitious accounts of battles. 175 Stories that covered the initial French 
operations in Alsace-Lorraine and in Belgium were inconsistent from paper to paper, 
and journalists were under increasing pressure to provide reliable coverage. Because 
                                                          
170  ibid.  
171 J.M.Horne and A.Kramer, German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial, (New Haven, 2001) p.184. 
172 Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory p.83.  
173 Becker, The Great War and the French People p.42. 
174 J-J Becker, 1914. Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre (Paris,1977), p.525.  
175 Collins,  ‘The Development of Censorship’, p.9.   
52 
 
the Battle of the Marne (6 to 13 September) took place after the army began to release 
official frontline information and because the press needed urgently to regain 
credibility amongst its readership, the battle was reported in a more sober manner than 
were previous operations. 
   The War Ministry provided newspapers during the Battle of the Marne with accurate 
though vague information. Joffre wrote to Parisian Military Commander General Joseph 
Galliéni (who ran the Press Bureau while the War Ministry was stationed in 
Bordeaux)176, admitting that, ‘I never make known the object of operations nor my 
intentions.’177 Rather than publish the daily communiqués and without comment, 
journalists followed official information with editorial analyses. Because the state 
censorship apparatus was still in its infancy, journalists had far more latitude to interpret 
official information than was the case once the Government returned to Paris in 
December. 
   Most of the major Parisian dailies, particularly the centrist Le Temps and Le Petit 
Parisien, provided an accurate assessment of the stakes involved at the Marne while 
constantly assuring the French citizenry of victory. Parisians were made aware of the 
real possibility that the city could be directly attacked as it had been in 1870 and the 
phrase ‘Miracle of the Marne’ later resonated with a population who realized the 
immediate danger as the battle itself ensued. Le Temps published an article which 
praised Galliéni’s past achievements and urged Parisians to have faith in him as 
Military Governor of Paris while the government relocated to Bordeaux. 178 Journalists 
from all political leanings united together around the defence of Paris and chose to put 
internal politics aside by adopting self-censorship. In the war’s initial stages, the press, 
denied detailed frontline information from the GQG and largely uncensored by the 
Military Government in Paris, could have caused widespread panic in Paris by 
                                                          
176 The French Government was headquartered in Bordeaux between September and December 1914. In 
fact Galliéni had little time for or interest in press censorship and delegated daily supervision duties to his 
subordinate Louis-Lucien Klotz.    
177 Renouvin, The Forms of War Government p.82.  
178 Le Temps, 4 Sept.1914.  
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predicting military failure. But at this particularly critical moment, the mass media 
demonstrated their solidarity with the Union Sacrée.  In the first two weeks of 
September 1914, the press served to both prepare and inspire the French citizenry. 
   After the victory at the Marne, both the GQG and the War Ministry began to 
intensify press censorship. In the third week of September newspapers of all political 
persuasions had an increased number of columns slashed from their articles, 179 and the 
first newspaper suspensions were imposed. Louis-Lucien Klotz, Galliéni’s second in 
command in Paris and future Finance Minister in the Clemenceau Cabinet, oversaw the 
press bureau and quickly became known as ‘the Scissors.’ Clemenceau’s L’Homme 
Libre was suspended on 29 September to 7 October at Interior Minister Louis Malvy’s 
insistence for publishing an article on the unsanitary conditions under which soldiers 
were returned from the front. Clemenceau and Le Figaro editor Alfred Capus had 
already begun earlier in the month to criticize the arbitrariness and inconsistencies 
inherent in the government’s censorship of the press. Clemenceau’s suspension only 
strengthened his resolve, and criticism of political censorship became one of his causes 
célèbres for the next three years. When Clemenceau became Premier in November 
1917, he not only instituted his own distinct form of political censorship but personally 
sought revenge on those who had slighted him. 
  The last three months of 1914 marked the beginning of several trends which 
characterized state-media relations throughout 1915. Pressure from writers and some 
politicians forced members of the French Cabinet to justify the use of political 
censorship180, as it became more arbitrarily imposed. The news section of the GQG181 
and the War Ministry’s Press Bureau increasingly censored official communiqués, and 
the periods first before the Battle of the Marne and then between mid-September and 
December after the Government was no longer immediately preoccupied with 
                                                          
179 Becker, The Great War and the French People p.51.  
180 Renouvin, The Forms of War Government p.44.  
181 The Section d’Information (SI) was under the direction of the GQG until May 1917. After this date it 
was nominally responsible to the War Ministry but in practice was still directed by the GQG. This agency 
provided daily communiqués from the front, handed out visas to war correspondents and gave special 
briefings to journalists. Collins, ‘The Development of Censorship’, p.20. 
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defending Paris, saw the most extensive applications of military censorship for the 
entire war (see graph 1). 182 On 16 December, the War Ministry circulated an additional 
list of subjects forbidden from publication which was significantly longer than the list 
included in the Law of 5 August. While again the list mostly consisted of military 
subjects, it also prohibited ‘articles which may anger the public or the armies, articles 
discussing warfare or diplomacy which may favour the enemy and all interviews with 
Generals.’ 183The Press Bureau became more organized as its bureaucracy expanded in 
December upon the executive’s return to Paris, but still no method had been found to 
standardize censorship throughout the country, an issue raised with the War Ministry 
by the National Press Union184 on 28 October.185 In 1914, the French Government had 
decided that wartime censorship would be applied from above rather than relying on 
the spirit of the Union Sacrée for journalists to self- censor. Indeed, the reliance on 
self-censorship during the Battle of the Marne was an accidental by-product of the 
government’s temporary lodging in Bordeaux and Galliéni’s relative indifference 
towards press censorship. Though the Union Sacrée gradually broke down as the war 
progressed, never again were journalists given the opportunity to comment on frontline 
events as independently as they had been during the Marne. The application of wartime 
self-censorship from mid- September 1914 onwards, rather than used out of patriotism 
alone, became increasingly applied to avoid the growing reach of Anastasie’s186 
scissors. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
182 ibid., p.16.  
183 Order issued by the Press Bureau. BDIC F rés 0270 C, 16 Dec.1914.  
184 Journalists and press owners, like virtually every other industry in France, had their own union. During 
the First World War, it had little power because mediation between the government and media was largely 
dealt with through a newly established ‘General Director of Press Relations’ at the War Ministry 
(abolished on 23 September 1917).    
185 Forcade, ‘La Censure politique en France’, p.82.  
186 Anastasie also referred to as Madame Anastasie was the nickname for the French censorship system. 
The image of Anastasie was one of an old grumpy woman with a large pair of scissors.    
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Graph 1 – Military censorship and censorship of the home front in France from 1914  
to 1918.187 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
187 Collins, ‘The Development of Censorship’, p.16. 
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1915: The Stabilization and Evolution of the French Censorship System. 
 
 
   Though the Chamber of Deputies met briefly on 22 December 1914 to vote in war 
credits for 1915, it was not until 12 January that it began to meet again regularly. The 
War Ministry now regained primary control over the Press Bureau. For most of 1915, 
M. Caqueray oversaw the institution. Caqueray, a naval officer, was described by those 
who worked under him as being vigilant and entirely dedicated to his job. 188 Though his 
tenure in office marked the highest point of tension between the military, government 
and the press over censorship policies in France during the First World War, it was also 
in 1915 that the Press Bureau became more efficient and censorship policies became 
standardized throughout France.    
   In February 1915, Millerand moved quickly to reduce civilian involvement in the 
censorship of regional newspapers. Though it is uncertain whether the impetus for this 
policy came directly from GQG, Millerand in general supported Joffre’s policy of 
keeping civilians out of the business of information management.189  Prefects were 
removed as direct censors and instead were to appoint local civilians (usually 
journalists, lawyers or teachers) to replace them on local Censorship Commissions, 
though these civilian censors had little authority over their military counterparts. When 
disagreements occurred between the newly appointed civilians and the local military 
censors, military representatives could override civilian appointees. On 3 April, 
civilians were prohibited (unless they had the approval of the local military 
representatives) from censoring articles that attacked the government or carried false 
information. 190 Later in 1916, this development would facilitate the dissemination of 
military propaganda. Millerand since late 1914 had been under increasing pressure to 
                                                          
188 Berger and Allard, Les Secrets de la censure  p.27. 
189 King, Generals and Politicians p.32. This was an example of Joffre’s secrecy towards the civilian 
government.  
190 Rajsfus, La Censure militaire et policière p.39. See also Malvy’s memoirs, L. Malvy. Mon Crime 
(Paris, 1921).  Civilians were later replaced altogether as censors, mostly by injured soldiers, by War 
Minister Paul Painlevé in 1917, though the replacement was never fully implemented. 
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defend political censorship, and with the removal of prefects from Censorship 
Commissions whose particular function was to censor articles related to internal 
politics, Millerand now claimed that there was now no ‘political censorship,’ only 
‘civil censorship.’ 191 But Millerand fooled no one and the rest of 1915 featured a 
heated debate between French politicians, journalists and intellectuals over the subject. 
   The debate which surrounded the legitimacy of political censorship in France pitted 
the War Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior and the right-wing press (led by Charles 
Maurras of L’Action Française) against deputies from the French left and radical 
republican journalists and politicians such as Georges Clemenceau. Because the term 
‘political censorship’ carried negative connotations in a country with widely ingrained 
republican values, Millerand and Malvy consistently claimed that political censorship 
did not officially exist. Malvy, in a typically convoluted statement on 15 April, wrote 
in Le Temps: ‘There exists only a military censorship, but it is true that it is applied not 
exclusively to military and diplomatic questions, but also to articles containing violent 
attacks on the Parliament and the Government, and to those calculated to disturb public 
opinion from the standpoint of national defence.’ 192 These types of comments 
infuriated many who wished to openly and honestly debate the issue of political 
censorship in France. In mid-1915, a campaign led by various press unions, 
Clemenceau and several socialist deputies, particularly Paul Meunier, was launched in 
the press against political censorship. 193The debate came to a head at the end of 1915 
when Meunier, with Clemenceau’s backing, proposed a bill to significantly alter the 
practices of the French censorship system. The Viviani Government had been replaced 
on 29 October in part because of its apparent inability and unwillingness to stand up to 
Joffre during the Sarrail Affair. 194 Aristide Briand upon becoming Premier argued that 
                                                          
191Though ‘political censorship’ and ‘civil censorship’ in practice meant the same thing, the latter term 
was considered more politically palatable. In an unconvincing fashion Briand claimed that since after 
February 1915 Prefects were no longer directly involved in censorship, it was no longer political. Rather it 
involved the monitoring of civilian affairs, Renouvin, The Forms of War Government pp.43-44.  
192 ibid., p.44.   
193 Meunier later founded the socialist daily La Vérité in 1917 and was imprisoned in 1919 for espionage. 
194 A scandal which surrounded the dismissal of a Republican General, Maurice Sarrail who was then 
appointed to lead the French expeditionary forces in the Dardanelles and Salonika. For more on the Sarrail 
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censorship of the press had not been imposed strictly enough, though he did not blame 
anyone personally. 195
  
Importantly, he vociferously argued in favour of political 
censorship. The Meunier Bill failed and political censorship remained an entrenched 
feature of French wartime information management even after Clemenceau’s 
appointment as Premier in November 1917. However, Briand’s condemnations during 
the debate of the government’s tolerance towards the media had been little more than 
conciliatory gestures to the political right. As Premier, he moved quickly to form a 
relationship with press leaders, promising them that he would personally attend to their 
suggestions and complaints while in office, and appointing Jules Gautier, a civilian, as 
the new Director of Press Relations. 
   Briand’s main achievement in information control management was to introduce the 
Maison de la Presse which created propaganda designed for readerships abroad. 
Briand’s equivocation in declaring his affinity for harsh press censorship while making 
conciliatory gestures to major press editors satisfied no one, and when he was finally 
replaced by Alexandre Ribot in March 1917, he was missed by few in the media.    
   Another, more technical issue in 1915 was the Press Bureau’s attempt to standardize 
censorship practices throughout France. Between February and September, the number 
of official orders given from the Press Bureau to regional Censorship Commissions 
multiplied. 196
 
The list of themes of prohibited material became so long that the mention 
of almost any information pertaining to international relations, domestic politics or to 
events on the frontline became officially forbidden. Decisions over which articles to 
censor became increasingly arbitrary, and regional commissions had varying standards 
of severity. Regional inconsistencies led to the publication of information or opinions 
which were banned in neighbouring areas. 197Though the Parisian Press Bureau 
officially had the final decision on such matters, several cabinet members and military 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Affair see J.C. Tannenbaum, General Maurice Sarrail 1856-1929 a Radical and Republican General 
(Chapel Hill, 1974), Chapter 5. See also King, Generals & Politicians.  
195 Briand and Viviani had simply changed places and Viviani was now the Deputy Premier.  
196 BDIC F rés 0270 C. 
197 Forcade, ‘La Censure politique en France’, Chapter 4. 
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officials tried to find solutions to the problem. Unfortunately, there was little agreement 
between the War Minister, the Premier and regional military commanders on how to 
resolve the dilemma, and the result was a series of confusing and contradictory orders 
sent to the regional press commissions. 198 The War Ministry at the end of September 
finally solved the problem by issuing a manual entitled Circular 1000, 199 which 
consisted of a series of general guidelines for censors. Circular 1000 was highly 
successful in standardising censorship throughout the country and also made journalists 
fully aware of the criteria according to which their material was being monitored. The 
introduction of Circular 1000 was the most significant step taken during the war to 
increase the Press Bureau’s efficiency. 
   The French censorship apparatus matured over a year of repairing its fundamental 
deficiencies. The horrific fighting in 1916 at Verdun put this system to the test. 
Whereas the establishment of full-time war correspondents in February resulted in 
more incoming news from the front, the heavy enforcement of military censorship 
under Circular 1000 had the offsetting effect of strictly limiting how journalists could 
interpret this new influx of information. Papers during Verdun were forced to stick to 
the accounts given to them by the GQG, and so many papers were censored for 
elaborating on communiqués that the Press Bureau eventually stopped giving official 
explanations for the slashing of specific passages.  Vague whitewashed articles 
characterized most of the reporting on Verdun because France was usually on the 
defensive during the battle. 200 France’s media however at the same time was able to 
turn the few moments where France was on the attack into sensationalist though 
effective propaganda stories. 
   Photographs were increasingly printed in French papers, and while the horrific nature 
                                                          
198 BDIC F rés 0270 C. 
199 An uninspired title, Circular 1000 was the 1000th order which had been given by the Press Bureau 
since the beginning of the war (September 1915). 
200 The high point of military secrecy towards the press during Verdun was during April when the 
Germans began a new offensive after capturing Fort Douamont. Any attempt even to make up for the lack 
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of modern war was often a key photographic theme, the Press Bureau deemed it illegal 
both to post images which could be used by enemy artillery outposts and, (in June), to 
represent the use of poison gas in photographs. Journalists deemed it less risky to report 
details of British military operations than those which primarily involved Frenchmen. 
One result of this was that even after the British offensive on the Somme beginning on 
1 July, papers in France still criticized the British for not helping France at Verdun. 201 
Complaints from British officials regarding practices in the French media had begun in 
April 1915 during the Gallipoli campaign, and increased in July 1916. As a result, the 
detailed mention and particularly the criticism of British operations by the French press 
or by news agencies became forbidden on 17 September. 202 Most of the Somme 
campaign was described only vaguely in French papers while the fighting raged. 
Verdun could not be so easily brushed aside in the French media. For Verdun, 
Briand had a distinctively new approach on how to use the media. In a prophetic letter 
addressed on 15 December 1915 to his War Minister and Interior Minister, Briand 
declared, ‘Since the beginning of the war, the necessity of a strong information 
services organization and of propaganda has highly influenced the information which 
citizens have received. We wish now also to manipulate public opinion by initiating 
both domestic and foreign propaganda campaigns.’203 Events in 1916 provided him 
with the perfect opportunity to implement his agenda. 
 
1916: The French Censorship System put to the Test.    
   Verdun (21 February to 18 December) and the Somme (1 July to 18 November) were 
the two most notable battles of 1916 on the Western Front, and are ingrained 
respectively in the collective French and British historical memories. At the beginning of 
1916, Briand established the Maison de la Presse, an agency controlled by the Foreign 
Ministry designed to direct French propaganda abroad. Military correspondents until 
                                                          
201 Navet-Bouron, ‘Verdun et la censure’.  
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1916 were officers who reported information to the GQG’s Information Service in 
addition to performing their duties as soldiers. This arrangement resulted in less 
information being transmitted to the Press Bureau and to the press as frontline fighting 
intensified. During the initial German attack at Verdun, French officers were so 
overwhelmed that they were rendered completely incapable of providing reliable news 
coverage. As a result, the capture of Fort Douaumont in February led to conflicting 
reports in several papers and was a shock to readers who had been completely 
uninformed of the attack on the fort. 204 Briand saw the danger that a news blackout 
might cause panic, and perhaps saw the opportunity to implement the use of full-time 
war correspondents. The extra time dedicated to reporting would enable the 
correspondents not only to record information but also to act as propagandists. Shortly 
after the Battle of Verdun began, the French military began to hire officers and enlisted 
men as full-time war correspondents working directly under the GQG’s Information 
Service. 
   The French citizenry by 1916 were more critical of their news providers and of their 
government than in August 1914. Debates surrounding political censorship had been 
made public and the patriotic zeal that had accompanied the Union Sacrée had begun 
to wane. A news blackout in February and March 1916 could have led to widespread 
panic and suspicion. On the other hand, it would have been inconceivable for papers to 
invent military events, as they had done during the operations preceding the Battle of 
the Marne. Newspapers during Verdun were provided with more information than 
prior to 1916, but the information they received was distorted and the latitude given to 
journalists to deviate from official censorship policy was virtually non-existent. 
   Jules Gautier, a soft spoken civilian,205 was expected to be capable of forging a closer 
working relationship between the press and the War Ministry, but in January 1916 he 
quickly acquired an unexpected reputation for operating with an iron fist as director of 
                                                          
204 Navet-Bouron, ‘Verdun et la censure’, Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporaines,  p.182. 
205 Gautier was a state prosecutor. Forcade, ‘La Censure politique en France’, p.318.  
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the Press Bureau in Paris.206 The Battle of Verdun, according to the Press Bureau’s 
censorship files located at the Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale 
Contemporaine, was the most heavily censored single event in France during the First 
World War. 207 Georges Clemenceau was one of the first victims of censorship during 
the battle. While Clemenceau’s paper L’Homme Enchâiné  had been censored 
repeatedly since 1914, it caused a minor scandal in March 1916 for attempting to 
publish an article entiled ‘The Capture of Douaumont,’ which was labelled ‘defeatist.’ 
Clemenceau did not in fact publish the article himself, but passed the censored text to 
Le Journal, La Victoire, Paris-Midi, L’Éclair, L’Echo de Paris and Le Petit Parisien. 
Le Petit Parisien as a result was forced to cancel 200,000 copies which contained the 
article. 208 Although it was not uncommon for Clemenceau to give censored articles to 
other papers which were less susceptible to punishment (Le Petit Parisien was seldom 
punished for offences) he must have taken particular pleasure in angering Jules 
Gautier, who was a personal enemy of his. 209 Clemenceau had connections in the 
telegraph office and had seen a report on 3 March which stated, ‘The Germans have 
managed to penetrate into the village of Douaumont where the fighting continues.’ 
Upon seeing the telegram he immediately wrote an article entitled, ‘The Capture of 
Verdun.’ Marcel Berger and Paul Allard, two ex-censors from the telegraph section of 
the Press Bureau, when making reference to this incident sarcastically referred to 
Clemenceau as ‘défaitiste en Chef. 210  
Military censorship during the Battle of Verdun was accompanied by an increase in 
propaganda. Because the new full-time military correspondents produced twice as 
much information as the previous breed, newspapers had more positive information to 
use which was less likely to be censored. While papers at first attempted to report on 
                                                          
206 He developed a particularly bad relationship with Jean Dupuy, editor of Le Petit Parisien, ibid., p.351.  
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military affairs, particularly on the few occasions when the French were on the 
offensive, by the end of the battle in December self-censorship on military affairs was 
in full effect. In fact, mention of Verdun had become so routine in the logbook of 
orders at the Press Bureau that the orders themselves began to become less specific. 
Whereas early in the battle, censors explained their reasons for censoring particular 
information or events, after a few months the orders simply read ‘nothing on Verdun’ 
and then closer to the end of the year ‘Verdun.’ 211 
   During the first month of Verdun, the government became more involved in creating 
bourrage de crâne. Added information from the GQG’s new war correspondents did 
not translate into more accurate reporting on events at the front. The Press Bureau used 
the orders in Circular 1000 to censor military news during the periods when France was 
on the defensive (most of the battle), but encouraged the press to emphasize the 
moments when the French were on the attack or when they were successful. Military 
specifics were heavily censored as they had been for the entire war. The most 
unpleasant aspects of the battle were hidden from the public beginning as early as 3 
March when an order was given by the Press Bureau that ‘nothing negative be 
mentioned concerning Verdun.’ 212 In addition to this general directive, papers were 
told not to mention the presence or execution of spies or injured soldiers213 (which had 
previously been allowed), or the use of poison gas by French soldiers, 214 or the general 
nature of trench warfare215 (which had also been previously allowed). While military 
information was heavily censored, papers were encouraged to create heroes out of the 
leaders at Verdun, particularly Pétain. 
   Although Pétain and Nivelle indeed were successful commanders at Verdun, several 
of the myths attributed to them such as the famous sayings ‘We shall have them’ 
(Pétain) and ‘They shall not pass’ (Nivelle) were heavily circulated by propagandists 
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and it is unsure to this day whether Pétain was responsible for the former remark. Ross 
Collins is correct when he hints that within weeks the political aspects of Verdun 
became more significant than the military ones in the French press.216 It was a 
combination of government directed propaganda and censorship that forced the press 
to characterize Verdun in this fashion. 
   Journalists would have been less likely to portray the battle of Verdun in the same 
way as they had the Marne two years earlier if left unsupervised. Journalists had been 
willing to self-censor whilst the army defended Paris, in 1914 at the height of the 
Union Sacrée. Getting the press to portray equally positively the government’s 
insistence on the French Army not being bled dry defending Verdun (a battle in which 
the stakes were less clear) required coercion. Because public information surrounding 
Verdun was so heavily manipulated, it is doubtful that French citizens were fully 
aware of the strategic importance of Verdun while the battle was waged, unlike at the 
Marne. Verdun proved a unique case for the French censors and for the press. Unable 
to report truthfully the nature of events at the front the press was forced to walk a fine 
line between vagueness and fictional exaggeration. The result was the creation of the 
‘Legend of Verdun.’217 
 
Conclusion 
 
   France’s freedom of the press, which it had enjoyed since 1881, suddenly 
disappeared in 1914 in the face of national emergency. Press leaders, who were 
particularly distrusted by France’s military chiefs were not included in the construction 
of the bureaucratic framework for press censorship in France but rather were presented 
with a new bureau and a list of orders in the first week of August 1914. The fact that 
there was little or no resistance from the press and that press leaders willingly gave up 
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their rights to publish demonstrates the pervasiveness of the Union Sacrée and the 
prevalence of the short war illusion during the opening phase of the war. The fact that 
many of these same editors and press owners began to openly complain about the 
rigidity and abuses of censorship by the end of 1915 suggests that by then the Union 
Sacrée had begun to deteriorate and the short-war illusion had dissipated. 
   Commitment to the Union Sacrée by the press was fundamental in ensuring the 
effectiveness of the French war-time censorship system. Although papers had to submit 
their copies for censorship prior to publication and had to obey the orders given to them 
to censor prohibited material under the threat of punishment, in the end papers printed 
their own material. Papers could in theory disobey the Press Bureau and risk the threat 
of punishment, and there was no guarantee that the Parisian or regional military 
governments would seize all copies before they went into circulation. Perhaps the most 
positive influence of the press’s adherence to the Union Sacrée was its effective use 
of self-censorship during the Battle of the Marne, which did a great deal to limit 
sensationalism and panic at a particularly dangerous moment.  
The French censorship system was again put to the test by the eleven-month battle of 
attrition at Verdun. In response to Verdun, the system matured from a tool designed to 
censor sensitive information into one that also propagated positive news. The result 
was vague coverage by the press for large periods of the war while Germany was on 
the attack and then overwhelming coverage of French successes. This became the 
standard model for French military censorship for the rest of the war.  
   1914 to 1916 marked the evolution of the French censorship system into an effective 
governmental tool by which to protect military secrets and to manipulate public 
opinion, its two primary goals. 1917-1918, however, witnessed the censorship system 
being placed under even heavier strain. At the same moment as France’s censorship 
system had become fully developed, combining censorship with the manipulation of 
public information, France entered into a two-year period marked by military failures 
and both civil and military unrest. French leaders had to alter the Press Bureau’s focus 
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accordingly. The events in 1917 and 1918 almost brought the Union Sacrée to 
breaking point. As French fortunes waned, the Press Bureau and the GQG attempted to 
apply the techniques of news manipulation that they had learned at Verdun, despite 
increasing cynicism in the interior. None the less, because of the bureaucratic 
developments in the French information management system in 1915 and 1916 the 
French censorship system was prepared to deal with the press as each crisis unfolded 
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Chapter 2: Spring 1917: New Partners218 and the Opening of a New Phase for the 
FrenchWar Effort 
 
Introduction 
 
   Two significant series of events took place for France in the late winter of 1916 and in 
Spring 1917. Each are helpful in explaining many of the fundamental motives behind the 
policies of the French information management system. The first involved changes in 
France’s leadership, both political and military. Nivelle replaced Joffre French 
Commander in Chief of the Western Front in December 1916 and three months later 
Alexandre Ribot replaced Briand as Premier. This chapter demonstrates how in both 
cases the press was pushed to protect all of the figures involved, particularly by 
maintaining Joffre’s status as a household war hero instead of explaining the reasons for 
his replacement, and by protecting Ribot after he made disapproving comments about 
the February Revolution. These are examples of how the Press Bureau chose to mask the 
mistakes made by public officials rather than allow newspapers to discuss them openly.  
   The frequent use of political censorship remained a constant theme between the 
governments of Briand and Ribot. The first three wartime Premiers (Viviani, Briand and 
Ribot), who had very differing political backgrounds and ideological focuses, all 
promised reform in the use of political censorship yet did little to change the high 
frequency of its usage. This chapter shows how Briand and Ribot were able consistently 
to defuse the debate over the practice of political censorship.        
   The second series of events discussed in this chapter took place outside France. The 
February Revolution is the first major example during the First World War of how the 
French information management system was able to manipulate the press into portraying 
potentially ominous news into a positive news story. In doing so the government 
allowed several specific rules from Circular 1000 to be broken on the condition that 
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papers towed the government line, namely that the February Revolution was a positive 
event for France. Enforcing the rules was less important than having the press accurately 
portray the government-approved message. As during Verdun, those in charge of press 
control followed a ‘grand design’ in their policies, in this case to limit panic and 
sensationalism. The other external event important to France’s war effort was the 
entrance into the war of the United States in April. This chapter demonstrates how 
France’s government managed the news of what was an entirely positive development.      
 
A. Nivelle Replaces Joffre as French Commander on the Western Front. 
 
 
On 13 December 1916, a presidential decree appointed General Robert Nivelle as 
Commander of the French Armies of the North and Northeast. Joffre’s replacement 
coincided with the formation of a new Briand government with a smaller cabinet. This 
cabinet reshuffle created its own minor incident at the Press Bureau when the Parisian 
daily Le Matin was allowed to publish unofficial details about the new ministry after 
Le Temps had previously been prohibited from printing identical information. 219 The 
article in Le Matin was in direct violation of an order from the Press Bureau 
prohibiting unofficial information regarding the ministerial re-ordering220. It had 
probably slipped past the censors because of an order given on 10 December, the day 
that the article was slashed from Le Temps, that ‘for politics we can loosen a little’. 221 
The Circular 1000, which was distributed to all members of the Press Bureau in its 
original form on September 30 1915, had been designed to prevent such mistakes by 
standardising censorship practices throughout the country, but was never fully 
successful in doing so. Frequent disputes between the Press Bureau and newspaper 
editors over the re-printing of banned information persisted until the end of the war. 222 
 The proceedings during the ten sessions of the Chamber of Deputies’ Secret 
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221 BDIC F rés 0270 AVIS, order issued by M.Peycelon, 9 Dec.1916. 
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Committee held between 28 November and 7 December accelerated Joffre’s downfall. 
Both Joffre and Briand were primary targets of attacks emanating from both the 
political left and right. Whereas Briand was criticised for his policies towards 
Romania and Greece, Joffre was accused of neglecting the ‘Armée D’Orient’ and its 
entire operational theatre. 223 The session ended with a governmental vote of 
confidence. Although Briand won the vote by 360 votes to 141, his influence had 
clearly diminished as six months prior he had won a similar vote on 22 June by 444 
votes to 80. 224 During these sessions in June, held during the middle of the Battle of 
Verdun, Joffre had already been harshly criticised for ‘mystifying the war of attrition.’ 
225 It now seemed a politically opportune time to replace Joffre with someone popular 
both with France’s citizenry and its politicians. 
   Briand, with backing from Poincaré, had prepared Joffre for his replacement at a 
lunch meeting on 3 December. 226 Joffre, who had been CGS227 of the French Army 
since 1911, was widely praised as the ‘victor of the Marne’ and was popular with the 
French citizenry, who affectionately referred to him as ‘Papa Joffre.’ But he also had a 
strained relationship with the government, towards which he was highly secretive, and 
was viewed by many in Paris as having been caught off guard at Verdun. 228 The Press 
Bureau was quickly informed of Joffre’s imminent replacement and the day after the 
General had been told to suggest a successor, an order was given by the Director of the 
Press Bureau ‘not to speak in any form whatsoever of possible modifications in the 
High Command.’229  
The Press Bureau firstly prevented this information from appearing because of its 
importance as a military secret. But Joffre’s popularity on the home front also 
necessitated caution over how the press would be permitted to comment. Some news 
stories regarding Joffre’s replacement could be dangerous in creating rumours, in 
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informing the enemy230 and in lowering public esteem fo France’s generals who had 
recently been praised so highly in the press during Verdun. 
   Though compared to Joffre Nivelle had little previous experience as a strategist,231 he 
was for many reasons considered an attractive replacement. He was a popular hero 
throughout France for his role in the successful recapture of Forts Douaumont and Vaux 
as Commander of the 2
nd 
Army at Verdun. He was comfortable with and well liked in 
political circles, was supported by Joffre without being overly attached to him, as a 
Protestant he avoided the Republican prejudice against practising Catholics, and he 
spoke fluent English. By simultaneously presenting a new, leaner cabinet with added 
authority over the military, by introducing Nivelle as the new Commander in Chief, and 
by promoting Joffre to the largely ceremonial role of ‘General in Chief of the French 
Armies, Technical Military Advisor to the Government, Consultative Member of the 
War Committee,’ Briand presented the press with little scope for immediate criticism. 
   Nivelle’s appointment was reported in the press by a few significant Parisian dailies 
on 13 December (Le Petit Parisien, L’Humanité, L’Action Française and Le Petit 
Journal) and by all other major dailies the next day. It is significant that the national 
press avoided directly contrasting Joffre with Nivelle because direct attacks on 
politicians and military leaders were routinely censored. The Press Bureau’s first 
official order regarding Joffre’s replacement was that no mention be made of the 
‘distribution of the command of the Armies of the North and Northeast or of their three 
groups’. 232 Restraint by the media and the Press Bureau’s primary concern with 
censoring military details allowed for a cautious yet relatively uncensored (self-
censorship excluded) discussion in the press regarding the change in the French High 
Command. Joffre still commanded great prestige and the government ensured that his 
public image would remain intact. 
                                                          
230For example an article that the Press Bureau prevented from reaching the newspapers in Marseilles, 
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   Between 13 and 26 December, when Joffre was named ‘Maréchal de France,’ most 
of the mainstream press praised Nivelle and promoted his image as the hero of Verdun. 
233 After 26 December, similar praise was lavished on Joffre for several days, with 
frequent references to his role as the hero of the Marne. A front page article in Le Petit 
Parisien on 13 December was particularly complimentary to Nivelle. It stated that the 
paper had sent a correspondent to Verdun to speak with him and that he was 
‘courteous,’ was ‘strong in both body and mind’ and ‘did not speak much, but that is 
his style.’ 234 The next day, both Le Temps and La Croix praised the new Commander 
in Chief. Le Temps, however, had a passage slashed from one of its two articles which 
discussed the degree of confidence the paper had in Nivelle’s abilities. The excision 
was probably a result of the Press Bureau’s policy of removing any comments which 
could be interpreted as exaggeration or creating false hope among the populace. La 
Croix, a Catholic paper, was more nuanced in its praise of Nivelle but in a surprising 
act of self-censorship did not criticise the new Commander in Chief for his Protestant 
faith.  
   It seems that none of the major papers attempted openly to criticise Joffre’s 
replacement with Nivelle. Joffre had a reputation for hostility towards the press and for 
secrecy towards his own Government. Press owners were probably optimistic that the 
new General, who had an amicable relationship with the media, would be more 
forthcoming in providing it with new information. This would indeed turn out to be the 
case when later Nivelle rashly made known to the media that a new major offensive 
with high expectations for territorial gain along the Chemin des Dames was in 
preparation.  Even had some in the press wanted one, it is highly doubtful that the 
authorities would have allowed an open debate over such a significant change in the 
High Command or for Joffre to be publicly humiliated. 
   The press emphasised Joffre’s ceremonial promotions over his ‘replacement’ or 
‘demotion.’ The major exception was an article in Le Petit Journal, which (on 13 
December), appears to have been the only major Parisian daily to state explicitly that 
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Joffre’s ‘active role had been terminated’ and that he had been replaced by Nivelle, a 
decision which ‘had been predicted already for several days’. 235 The article published 
a large photograph of Nivelle and praised him highly while giving little mention to 
Joffre. It is surprising that this article, which could have been perceived as being 
disrespectful to the ex-Commander in Chief, had not been censored by the Press 
Bureau. This censors’ neglect perhaps resulted from an order given by the Director of 
the Press Bureau that day which ordered censors to ‘stop slashing political articles.’236 
Le Temps on 14 December was careful to mention that the GQG would keep Joffre on 
as a technical advisor because they ‘will want to keep the services of the victor of the 
Marne.’ 237 Two days later, an article in Le Temps published a commentary from The 
Daily Telegraph which noted that Joffre would always be the one who kept the Allies 
together on the Western Front and remain the victor of the Marne,‘which history may 
prove to be the decisive battle of the war.’ 238 Though on 19 December Le Petit 
Parisien referred directly to Joffre’s replacement, it was careful to state that the he had 
been promoted. 239 Once Joffre was named ‘Maréchal de France’ he was praised in a 
similar manner to Nivelle. This praise would be the last time when Joffre would be 
frequently mentioned in the press. The reality of his practical demotion was largely 
hidden in the press by the government and Joffre was to remain a hero on the home 
front.     
The announcement of the re-constituted Briand Cabinet and of the new French 
Commander in Chief coincided with a period of change and confusion at the Press 
Bureau. This probably contributed to the relatively low number of orders given by the 
Bureau. Two contradictory directives were given on 13 and 15 December. The first, to 
‘stop slashing political articles,’ was followed two days later by another advising to 
‘not allow attacks against the regime, the President of the Republic or any pacifist 
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articles.’ 240 The discrepancy between the two orders may reflect the influence of a 
debate which took place on 14 December in the Chamber of Deputies, which 
demonstrated the growing disdain felt by the SFIO for ‘political censorship’ as well as 
the line taken by the Briand Government towards censorship. Finally, because Finance 
Minister Alexandre Ribot represented the Government in the session (Briand was at a 
Senate meeting), it gave clues to Ribot’s personal views on media control. This was 
significant because Ribot would replace Briand as Premier in March. 
   The debate was over two proposed amendments to the provision of war credits for 
the first trimester of 1917. Deputies Charles Bernard and Emmanuel Brousse, both 
socialists, proposed to withdraw 10,000 francs from the Press Bureau’s budget. 
Brousse proposed in addition to put an immediate halt to the practice of ‘political 
censorship.’ 241 However, Bernard did most of the talking during the debate, and was 
routinely applauded by his fellow socialists. 
  Bernard’s three central arguments were that the Press Bureau should not give certain 
papers preferential treatment, that the government should not be able to shield itself 
from criticism by censoring articles on domestic politics, and that ‘the exercise of 
censorship as it has been used for some time does not respond to the needs of the 
country which is eager for both controversy and clarity’. 242 He began with an article 
that had been allowed in L’Heure but not in the evening paper L’Intransigeant, which 
he described as ‘persona non grata.’ The article discussed a German prisoner of war 
who had accidentally hit a live shell while digging with a pick axe and had narrowly 
survived. The article commented in a way that was meant to be humorous, that he 
probably wished he had been given a less dangerous task than transporting shells along 
the Paris-Lyon railway. Bernard questioned the sensitivity of the article’s subject 
matter by asking ‘Gentlemen, could the Briand Ministry be placed in peril because of 
the publishing of such an article? Are the qualities or strategy of General Joffre being 
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put into question?’ He then cited another article that had been banned from publication 
in Le Grimace but had been printed in 1881 in the Journal du Peuple. After reading 
this polemic, which included such statements as ‘public opinion is a prostitute,’ ‘the 
best reasoning falls on the deaf’ and that ‘the words justice and legality’ were the 
‘preferred gargles of the Third Republic,’ he paused and said ‘signed Briand.’ Bernard 
commented that the media had the right to publish this article because it showed 
Briand’s disdain for the public. 
Ribot gave a prepared response agreeing with Brousse’s proposition to cut 10,000 
francs from the Press Bureau’s Budget but not to abolish political censorship. He 
stated that ‘there needs to be reforms concerning the exercise of censorship,’ and that 
‘freedom of speech need to be more respected than it has been in these past times’ but 
that ‘in the interest of national defence, it is indispensable that there is a 
censorship under the responsibility of the government.’ 243 These statements reflected 
Briand’s increasing concessions to the left but also his predisposition to seek a 
consensus. In fact by 1916 Briand was aware of the growing criticism of political 
censorship and had already begun to loosen restraints on articles related to domestic 
politics. 244 Bernard agreed to support Brousse’s amendment, and the proposition 
subtracting 10,000 francs from the Press Bureau’s budget but retaining the Bureau’s 
right to use political censorship passed. 
Though Ribot acknowledged that articles such as that written by Briand should be 
handled differently in wartime from in peacetime, strangely, he did not defend either 
the Press Bureau or even Briand. Because Ribot personally articulated the 
government’s position in the debate and would make statements in the same 
conciliatory vein at the beginning of his premiership, many in the media believed he 
would take a more lenient line than had Briand. But there was little in Ribot’s character 
or background to justify this belief. Ribot was politically to the right of Briand, had a 
certain deviousness to his character and was more interested in foreign than domestic 
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affairs. 245 Even during the debate on 14 December Ribot, perhaps unintentionally, 
demonstrated his true feelings towards political censorship by stating ‘we will not 
allow certain campaigns in the press to hide behind the rubric of politics which have 
other intentions’, which he along with Deputy Raffin-Dugens agreed was the behaviour 
of the ‘royalists in the past.’ 246 Ribot was personally less involved in the practice of 
censorship than was Briand but his tenure as Premier would reverse any liberalising 
tendencies which had begun in late 1916. 
   A report from 30 December adopted during a secret session of the Senate Army 
Commission247 placed further pressure upon the Government to address the issue of 
political censorship. Senator Jules Jeanneney’s report claimed that the censorship 
system was faulty and unrepresentative of France’s republican institutions. Contending 
newspapers should be seized only as a last resort, and he mentioned Ribot’s comment 
in the Chamber that ‘the system needs to be reformed and that freedom should be more 
respected that it has been these past times’.  The report considered that the public had 
lost its right to express itself. The five conclusions unanimously agreed upon by the 
committee were: 
1. The Government should use all means necessary regarding diplomatic or 
military news and do what it can to combat excitement or disorder 
instigated by the press. 
 
2. The only articles which should be censored are those which violate the 4     
               August Law and which go against the national interest. 
 
3. The only reason a paper should be suspended, even in the short term, is if it  
     is to prevent public disorder. 
 
4. It is unnecessary to implement new legislation to make censorship function. 
     Rather, it is the current legislation that must be applied properly. 
 
5. The French public opinion must be taken into as high regard as that in the Allied 
countries. The French populace have the ability to judge and the right to 
know.248 
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Political censorship was now being openly attacked in both the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate. Briand had kept few of the unofficial promises he had made to the 
press when his cabinet first took office to soften the use of censorship for political 
purposes. Now the burden of addressing such a volatile issue would fall upon his 
successor. 
 
B. A Change in the French Political Leadership: Ribot Replaces Briand. 
  
  On 20 March 1917, Ribot replaced Briand, thereby becoming France’s third head of 
government since the outbreak of hostilities. Briand’s resignation was prompted by a 
crisis which began on 14 March during the fifth secret session of the Chamber of 
Deputies249 and resulted in the resignation of War Minister General Hubert Lyautey. 
During a series of technical discussions regarding military aircraft, Lyautey refused to 
comment on the grounds that the discussion should take place in a public session. Once 
a public meeting had been granted, Lyautey delivered a prepared speech (previously 
undiscussed with Briand) 250 in which he maintained that technical details related to 
defence should not be discussed with parliament even in secret sessions. This was the 
first occasion during the war when a War Minister had not been forthcoming with 
Parliament about the military’s progress in reinforcing France’s armaments. 251 
Lyautey’s action created a commotion in the Chamber and sparked outrage particularly 
on the far-left. Several Socialist deputies shouted that ‘now all that is needed is to get 
rid of the Parliament’ and that ‘the Minister of War’s words constitute a 
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provocation’.252 As the decision was taken in the Chamber to reconvene in private 
(unanimously passed), Lyautey offered his resignation to Briand. Briand was unable to 
find an immediate replacement as War Minister and therefore offered his own 
resignation to President Poincaré. Poincaré’s first choice to replace Briand had been 
Paul Deschanel, President of the Chamber of Deputies. 253
  
Deschanel preferred, 
however, to retain his position in the Chamber and therefore Poincaré asked Ribot.  
   Though discussion of Lyautey’s resignation was at first officially allowed, the Press 
Bureau on 15 March insisted that the media be banned from launching ‘attacks against 
the Government or against the Parliament’, 254 and cited Circular 1000 which 
prohibited ‘violent attacks on the Government.’ Lyautey had stepped down during a 
public session of the Chamber and therefore the Press Bureau could not prevent the 
media from mentioning the event, but the orders given by the Bureau were extremely 
vague and articles discussing Lyautey were largely open to interpretation by individual 
censors. L’Action Française on 15 March published a heavily censored article highly 
praising the ex-War Minister, and the next day in an unusual article explained to its 
readers how it had not been seized. 255 It explained that the Press Bureau had failed to 
inform the newspaper’s editors until two o’clock in the morning about the offending 
material. It then had to print fewer copies than usual as it was forced to print them at 
the last minute, thereby explaining why many newsagents did not receive a copy. It 
referred to the episode as an accident and affirmed its support for wartime censorship 
of the media. The editors of L’Action Française probably sincerely held this view. 
However, they also were well aware of the inconsistent application of the occasionally 
ambiguous orders executed by the Press Bureau and thought it prudent to officially 
display the paper’s support for the Bureau. This approach appears to have worked as 
L’Action Française was rarely censored for its comments on Lyautey’s resignation, 
even when it challenged the Government’s authority by suggesting that it choose a 
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successor who ‘supports the military over the civilian Government,’ and praised 
Millerand as someone who did this between 1915 and 1916. 256  
During the next two days, first L’Oeuvre, and then L’Excelsior and L’Evenement 
were seized for reprinting an article on Lyautey that had originally been published in 
Le Figaro against the orders of the Press Bureau. These sanctions were part of a 
common trend whereby papers on the left were harshly reprimanded for reprinting 
material that was passed (supposedly by mistake) by the censor in the mainstream 
press. This marked the final act of political censorship under the Briand premiership. 
Briand upon becoming Premier had spoken against the abuse of political censorship 
and Le Journal du Peuple on 19 March suggested that his government had fallen 
partially because it had not abolished the practice. Ribot immediately addressed the 
issue of censorship in an attempt to calm an increasingly forceful attack on the 
government’s use of the Press Bureau to protect itself from criticism. 
   Ribot formed his new cabinet on 20 March. It consisted largely of highly 
experienced politicians already known to the public, and Ribot’s choices provoked little 
criticism. More important for the media was his first ministerial address to the 
Parliament on 21 March, which outlined his stance towards censorship. Ribot declared: 
In its relations with the press, which has as its role to 
inform and to support public opinion, the government must 
strictly use the power given to it by law to supress false 
news and tendentious information which is likely to 
mislead minds. It must stop campaigns which are 
obviously intended to discredit our republican institutions 
or to press for the dissolution of our national defence 
forces. But it will ensure that liberty of discussion is 
respected and the Government prefers criticism, even if 
unjust, to a feeble and enervating optimism. 257 
I have indicated here that I am speaking in the name of the 
government; Yes, we will repress all propagation of news 
that serves to trouble and unsettle the country: that which 
is false, even good news which exaggerates in a positive 
fashion is just as bad as that which is pessimistic and 
serves, involuntarily perhaps the interests of our enemies: 
we will not back down from the task at hand. We will also 
prevent campaigns against republican institutions………. 
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We will not allow for certain campaigns to exist within the 
context of liberty that obviously have as their goal, the 
weakening of the national defence or the dissolving of the 
national defence forces. Gentlemen, the limit can 
sometimes be difficult to trace: we carry out our 
responsibilities and do so in good faith. 258 
While this speech reaffirmed the Government’s commitment to censorship and its 
mention of the protection of republican institutions could be seen as directed towards 
editors on the political extremes, its underlying message was meant to be conciliatory. 
The press was encouraged to be honest and even openly to criticise individual 
members of the government. Furthermore, the press was reminded of its responsibility 
to keep its readers from holding unrealistic expectations or from panicking. Finally, 
Ribot’s statement that the government acted ‘in good faith’ implied that it would not 
stifle criticism of individual politicians. This was significant, as a growing tendency for 
the Press Bureau to shield powerful politicians had been a major grievance for the 
Socialist Party under the Briand Government. The speech was widely applauded by the 
Socialists in the Chamber, 259and Ribot appeared to have succeeded in placating the 
left. 
On 24 March Ribot’s speech was placed verbatim into the directives list used by the 
censors at the Press Bureau. The suggestions by newly appointed Minister of War 
Paul Painlevé to the censors on how to implement this speech were as indirect as the 
speech itself. 
The services of press control should in all circumstances 
draw upon these general directives. It is up to them to 
discern, in the most liberal sense, but by continuing to 
demonstrate firmness, critiques which constitute free 
discussion and to ensure that attacks against the 
institutions and notably the parliament will not be 
tolerated. Pacifist articles are those which primarily seek 
to weaken the national defence; censorship should 
redouble its vigilance in this regard. Finally, the morale 
situation needs to be envisaged day by day, without 
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pessimism but also without exaggerated 
optimism. 260 
 
Ribot and Painlevé had acknowledged that political censorship was a sensitive subject 
both in Parliament and with the press but had kept the Press Bureau’s instructions open 
to interpretation and little was changed in practice. Ribot, like his two predecessors, used 
the Press Bureau to shield the government from domestic criticism. 261  
   Two themes in the coverage of Ribot’s inauguration most concerned the Press 
Bureau.262 The first was the view in much of the media that the new Cabinet essentially 
constituted a reformed version of the previous wartime cabinets, composed of the 
politicians and bureaucrats who had run the government since the beginning of the 
conflict. This editorial line was permitted on the condition that the cabinet ministers 
were not personally attacked. 263 On 21 March, Le Temps took the lead in praising the 
new cabinet and commented that the editors had been hoping for a more coherent, firm 
and united leadership that was more moderate regarding censorship. 264It seems probable 
here that the editors of Le Temps were trying to court the new Premier. 
   Some papers acknowledged the lack of change in cabinet ministers but with little 
comment, such as Le Figaro. 265 Alfred Capus, the paper’s fiercely patriotic editor, 
wrote that in wartime it was unpatriotic to question the composition of cabinets. 266 
Such uncritical commentary was unsurprisingly welcomed by the Press Bureau and 
was practiced in this case by most of Paris’s dailies. Le Petit Journal seems to have 
been the only major Parisian paper censored for severely criticising the political 
makeup of the new Cabinet in its article ‘La Vielle Maison’ on 21 March. The 
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formation of the new Cabinet was not contested in Parliament, which had voted 
unanimously (though with 50 abstentions and 53 abstentions in absentia) 267 to 
support it. 
   The second issue with which the Press Bureau was concerned was Ribot’s speech on  
  
censorship. The Bureau’s instructions for examining the media’s criticisms  
 
of censorship practices were vague. The principal censorship handbook Circular 1000  
 
dedicated only one sentence to the subject. ‘Allow moderate critiques on the 
 
establishment and the operation of censorship but not those which are insulting or  
 
offensive to the censors, even if the article is a reproduction.’ 268 Consequently, the 
Press Bureau’s practice on the subject was often inconsistent. On 22 March La Croix 
had an article formally 269 censored for the obscure reason that it included ‘tendentious 
commentaries on the discourses of M. Ribot.’ 270 A few days later, Le Journal du 
Peuple had a larger article slashed for discussing whether Ribot would abolish political 
censorship. Ribot, who had begun his term as Premier by appeasing the press, had (in 
contrast to Briand and Clemenceau before and after him) therefore made no immediate 
impact on the application of political censorship. 
   Ribot’s tendency was to be fairly relaxed towards the opposition. But under his 
tenure the cabinet member who dealt with the Press Bureau most directly was the new 
War Minister, Paul Painlevé. Painlevé was particularly responsible for accelerating the 
implementation authorized on 24 March 1916 to shift all responsibility for hiring 
censors from the Ministry of the Interior to the military. This order had not been strictly 
enforced, particularly in the provinces, and Painlevé the day after becoming War 
Minister ordered that it now be executed immediately.271 He was successful in 
replacing all censors responsible to the Ministry of the Interior with those hired by the 
military within a month. Censorship of both military and domestic political affairs 
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therefore was now ultimately managed by the military. Whereas Clemenceau upon 
becoming Premier in November 1917 criticised Ribot, along with Painlevé and Louis 
Malvy, Ribot’s Ministry of the Interior, for their failure to stamp out pacifism,272 
political censorship tightened under Ribot. Ribot entered office when ‘the short war 
illusion’ had long faded and as a series of dramatic developments began to seriously 
harm morale.  
 
C. Chaos in Petrograd and the Prospect of a Weakened Alliance: The February 
Revolution in Russia. 
 
   By the beginning of 1917, war weariness had affected Russia more than any other 
belligerent. Since the outbreak of hostilities, Russia had suffered almost two million 
men killed, five million wounded and two and a half million taken prisoner. 273 In 
addition, shortages of domestic supplies of all kinds, particularly food, had created a 
high level of discontent. The February Revolution began on 8 March 274 when roughly 
100,000 protesters, mostly female textile workers and male metal workers, demanded 
bread, with some calling for the Tsar’s resignation. The next day, 150,000 workers 
took to the streets and many were armed. During these two days the Cossacks who 
were in charge of maintaining public order proved either unwilling or unable to 
disperse the crowds. 
   By 10 March roughly 200,000 workers were protesting in Petrograd and the Tsar 
that evening decided to end the movement by force. The next day, during which 75 
protesters were killed, has been referred to as the ‘Second Bloody Sunday.’ 275 On 12 
March, when ordered to march against the demonstrators, one group of the Petrograd 
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garrison shot their commanding officers and initiated a mutiny. The same day saw 
street battles between workers, soldiers, and policemen as well as drunken looting 
during which large numbers of civilians were killed or wounded. Policemen were 
hunted down and murdered. This sudden emergence of chaos in Petrograd instigated 
rapid political changes. 
On 12 March, the leaders of several major Russian political parties joined the 
revolutionaries and declared a ‘Provisional executive committee of the soviet of 
workers’ deputies’ and announced that a vote would be cast for its representatives. 
On 14 March a dual power system was negotiated between the Soviet and the 
Provisional Government led by Prince Lvov and composed of Duma deputies 
including the socialist Alexander Kerensky. Finally on 15 March, only one week after 
the revolution had begun, Tsar Nicholas II abdicated. This rapid succession of events 
ended the Romanov Dynasty and marked a new era in diplomacy between Petrograd 
and Paris. 
To French statesmen, the Franco-Russian Alliance was crucial to the Allied war 
effort. Russia fielded the world’s largest army and provided a second front. Though 
many in the French government, particularly the left and the Radical Socialists, were 
uncomfortable with France’s alliance with autocratic Russia, the partnership had been 
the foundation of French security against Germany since 1894. Therefore upon the 
news of regime change in Petrograd, the greatest concern in Paris was whether the new 
Russian government would continue the fight against the Central Powers. Some, such 
as the French Ambassador to Petrograd Maurice Paléologue, believed the alliance to be 
dead immediately following the Tsar’s abdication. 276 Others, such as Nivelle, believed 
the Germans would now sign a separate peace with Russia by July. 277 He and 
General Maurice Janin appealed to the French socialists to contact their counterparts 
in Petrograd. As a result, ex-Socialist Cabinet Minister Jules Guesde, Minister of 
Armaments Albert Thomas (also a Socialist) and editor of L’Humanité Paul Renaudel 
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all wrote to Kerensky in favour of continuing Russia’s war effort. 278 Many in Paris 
believed that the Revolution would revitalise Russia 279 and this was going to be the 
officially approved message to be propagated in the press.  
After being reassured by the new Foreign Minister Pavel Miliukov that Petrograd 
would continue to fight Germany, some hoped that Russia under the new government 
would be more effective than under the hopelessly inefficient Tsarist regime.  280 
Beginning in April, French statesmen became increasingly nervous about the 
growing power of the Petrograd Soviet vis-à vis the Provisional Government because 
of the former’s demand for a negotiated peace and insistence that it be made without 
annexations or indemnities. 281 But at first the prevailing sentiment in Paris was one 
of restrained optimism. This optimism was reflected in both the journalistic coverage 
of the February Revolution and in the relatively lax censorship of that reporting by 
the Press Bureau. 
   Though some in Paris suspected that revolutionary chaos was approaching 
Petrograd, 282 few had expected the Tsarist regime to collapse so suddenly. It was not 
until 12 March that telegrams began to reach the Press Bureau with ‘details on the 
troubles in Petrograd’ and all were immediately stopped.  283 They were the first news 
received from Russia at the Bureau in eleven days. 284 During the 10-day news 
blackout from Petrograd between 2 and 12 March, the most chaotic and violent events 
of the February Revolution went unnoticed and unreported in the French Press. 
The first news received at the Telegraph Section of the Paris Press Bureau from 
Petrograd on 12 March was stopped in its entirety. During the next two days however, 
the telegraph went relatively uncensored, though the press was mostly prohibited from 
reporting the incoming news. The news from Russia on 13 and 14 March outlined a 
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vague image of disorder.  The only telegrams that were stopped during these two days 
were those mentioning that the Duma had been placed under siege. Even news of the 
closure of the Petrograd Bourse was allowed to pass. 285  Many of the major Parisian 
dailies were censored on 13 March for discussing ‘interior politics in Russia’286 and it 
was not until 15 March that the press was permitted to begin reporting on events in 
Petrograd. The censors were particularly concerned about an article in Le Journal 
which attempted to print that ‘the troops in Petrograd have used their weapons.’ 287 It is 
unclear where the writers of Le Journal obtained such knowledge, as it had not been 
cleared by the Telegraph Section of the Press Bureau. In fact there is no evidence of 
such news ever being sent from Petrograd. It is possible that Le Journal obtained the 
information from a foreign, perhaps British source. 288 Though censorship of the 
telegraph was loosened on 13 March, and then two days later on 15 March, violence on 
the streets of Petrograd initiated either by the authorities or by the mob was and 
remained a particularly sensitive and highly censored aspect of the February 
Revolution. 
It is clear that the press before 15 March had little knowledge of the unfolding 
developments in Petrograd. Le Temps, for example, reported on 14 March (three days 
after Second Bloody Sunday) that ‘there had been no violent occurrences and that 
because soldiers were still being saluted, the events in Petrograd were only economic 
protests and represented a struggle between bureaucracy and nation.’ 289 In contrast, 
though on 16 March censors at the Press Bureau were instructed to ‘closely watch the 
situation in Russia,’ 290 from that day onwards virtually all aspects of the events in 
Russia were allowed to be reported. The main exception to this rule was the high level 
of street violence in Petrograd, which remained explicitly prohibited from 
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publication.291 On the home front, the Government’s main concerns were that the 
French Socialist Party should encourage the new Russian regime to continue fighting 
against Germany and that French soldiers and citizens not be discouraged by the 
potential weakening of or abandonment by France’s eastern ally. Once the revolution 
became a ‘fait accompli,’ the Press Bureau continued to encourage positive reporting 
emphasizing the willingness of the Provisional Government to stay in the war and 
condemning the inefficiency of the Tsarist regime. 
   After 15 March the Press Bureau allowed detailed articles on the events in Petrograd 
to be published on the condition that they were written in a neutral fashion, contained 
little commentary and did not spread false rumours. Furthermore, three particularly 
sensitive subjects remained, the reporting of which were heavily monitored. The first 
was the level of street violence in Petrograd. All telegrams from Fournier or Havas 
detailing this were stopped. The euphemism at the Press Bureau for telegrams that 
were censored for discussing the scale of violence in Petrograd was that they contained 
‘excessive details on the Russian Revolution.’292 The directors at the Press Bureau 
wished to downplay the violence on the streets and feared that reports of it could 
undermine public order in France. On 16 March, 16 papers were censored for this 
reason, including Le Petit Parisien, The New York Herald and L’Humanité. 293 The 
next day 11 papers were censored and telegrams stopped from Le Journal, Turadio, 
Havas and Le Petit Parisien. 294 Individual violent events were not to be detailed 
through comments such as ‘there has been spilling of blood’ 295 or references to the 
‘massacre of police officers’ 296 but could be mentioned in passing if they omitted high 
casualty figures. It seems that the only remotely detailed account of ‘Second Bloody 
Sunday’ in the Paris press of mid-March was in Le Figaro, which was able to sneak in 
a comment that many were murdered by the Tsar’s troops when ordered to fire because 
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‘the crowds were dense.’ 297  
In the minds of many French citizens, the word ‘revolution’ had the potential to 
 
evoke images of France’s own violent past, an association of which both censors and 
journalists were highly aware. One particularly interesting article from this period 
directly alluded to the French Revolution when discussing events in Russia. Published 
on 17 March in L’Action Française, it was entitled ‘1830 in Petrograd.’ It compared 
the events in Russia to those in France in 1830 by stating that the struggle was between 
‘nationalism and liberalism.’ It suggested that ‘monarchies like other forms of 
Government have to renew themselves,’ as when ‘Alexander III replaced the  
system of Catherine and Peter the Great’ 298 (and presumably when the Bourbon 
Charles X was replaced by Louis-Philippe of the House of Orléans). The article ended 
with the hope that the situation in Russia would not end up as a revolution, and 
portrayed the events in Petrograd as representing progress and being generally 
peaceful and progressive. It was probably for this reason that the article went almost 
entirely uncensored. A more mainstream example representing the comparisons made 
in the press between events in Russia and France’s own turbulent past was published 
in Le Temps on 17 March under the headline ‘New Regime in Russia’: ‘To those who 
are alarmed by the inevitable conditions surrounding these grave and necessary 
changes, let us recall our own example. At this hour when France performs heroically 
on the fields of battle, as the admiration of the world, she must not forget the historical 
origins of her own rights and liberties.’ 299 This quote not only reflected the patriotism 
of the centrist press but also only alluded vaguely to the violence of the 1789 
Revolution. This article was not censored, and the type of writing it represented was 
the preferred method of journalism for the censors at the Press Bureau. 
   The second particularly sensitive subject for the Press Bureau was the portrayal of the 
Government’s responses to the events in Petrograd. On 17 March, the Press Bureau 
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prohibited the media from claiming that ‘the Government is pre- occupied with events in 
Russia.’ 300 The same day, L’Humanité and Le Figaro301 published a salutation letter 
from the Socialist members of the French Chamber of Deputies to their counterparts in 
the Duma. L’Humanité along with Le Journal and Le Journal du Peuple had all been 
warned against publishing the letter. 302 L’Humanité had specifically gone against the 
Press Bureau’s orders and yet only received a warning for doing so. 303 This is 
particularly surprising as one of the last acts of the Briand Government was an attempt 
to prevent the letter from being sent. 304  
   On 18 March the Socialist ‘event’ was allowed to be discussed in the press,305 but 
the letter itself was prohibited from being re-published. Some right-wing papers such 
as L’Action Française and L’Echo de Paris used this opportunity to criticize the 
decision to send the letter. L’Echo de Paris criticised the response of the French 
Socialists to the February Revolution as being overly welcoming compared to that of 
the British Government. Andrew Bonar Law, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, was 
quoted as stating that ‘it is prudent to wait and see what is made of it’ when being 
asked whether he would officially support the Russian Revolution. 306 All papers 
which attempted to re-print the letter were prohibited from doing so and even the often 
leniently treated Le Temps 307 and Le Petit Parisien308 were formally censored on 18 and 
19 March respectively. Ironically, on 17 March both Le Temps and Le Petit Journal 
were censored for complaining that the letter itself had been allowed to be published, 
which officially it had not. 
   Shortly after news of unrest and revolution in Petrograd broke out, L’Humanité 
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praised the socialist aspects of the new regime (the right to strike, 309 the new 
uncensored Russian press310 and the autonomy granted to Finland),311 but did so in a 
manner designed to reassure its French readership that Russia would remain in the 
war. On 21 March, L’Humanité published a declaration from the Provisional 
Government to the Russian people arguing for a continuation of hostilities with 
Germany, and argued that the new ban on censorship in Russia was beneficial 
because it demonstrated the profound patriotism of Russian journalists.  312 
L’Humanité praised the February Revolution as a progressive step towards liberty in 
Russia but also, after being asked by several prominent politicians in Paris, urged the 
new government in Petrograd to continue fighting Germany. In addition to the fact that 
its editor had aided the government by using its contacts amongst the Russian socialists 
to encourage a continuation of hostilities, the paper was also mostly towing the Paris 
approved editorial line. Because L’Humanité served the Government’s and therefore 
the Press Bureau’s purpose of reassuring French readers that Russia would remain in 
the war, it was allowed to break certain rules which other major newspapers were not. 
The writers of Le Temps on 17 March were indeed correct when they complained that 
L’Humanité had been behaving as though it had special privileges.  
  Upon Ribot’s appointment as Premier on 20 March 1917, he was placed in the 
difficult position of having to portray the events in Petrograd as being less damaging 
than he personally suspected. At the same time however, he felt obliged to pay 
homage to Nicholas II whom he had considered a loyal and reliable French ally. On 
20 March, Ribot sent a letter to Miliukov. The letter, which was widely published in 
the centrist and right wing press, did not pass judgement on the revolution but hoped 
that the two nations could continue together to fight the war. Ribot also expressed his 
opinion in his closing remarks before his Government’s first vote of confidence in the 
Chamber on 21 March. He began with a tribute to the Tsar: ‘This admirable gesture 
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of the Tsar which shifts public opinion towards this dynasty which is proud of its 
past. There is nothing more beautiful. We should be inclined to believe that the Tsar 
has always been, is still and will be tomorrow, a loyal ally to France. This 25-year old 
alliance was our guarantee in peacetime; he wished it to be so, his father wished it to 
be so and he executed the wishes of his father with an indisputable loyalty. We owe 
him an homage in front of this tribune.’ (loud applause). 313 Then he briefly 
expressed his hope that the ‘noble Russian nation passes its evolution towards 
liberty without violence and profound troubles.’  314 It was clear that Ribot was 
unenthusiastic about regime change in Petrograd and the Press Bureau now needed to 
shield him from public criticism. Many republicans and socialists alike had long 
found the Third Republic’s alliance with the most autocratic regime in Europe to be 
hypocritical and distasteful. Many of these critics, furthermore, were prominent in the 
media. 
The Press Bureau acted quickly to contain criticism of Ribot’s speech. On 21 March, 
immediately after the confidence vote, it issued two directives. The first order stated 
‘do not allow newspapers to distort Ribot’s declaration on the Russian Revolution. It 
should not be shown that he is giving an example to the other Allied countries to 
support the monarchy.’ The second directive on the other hand stated that ‘Ribot is 
not to be shown to disfavour the Russian monarchy by supporting the socialist 
letter’.315 The next day, an order was issued that stated ‘do not allow talk about Ribot 
or his opinion on the Russian Revolution.’316 Notably, on 21 March, the Press Bureau 
also stopped all incoming telegrams discussing the recognition of the new Russian 
regime by neutral powers, particularly the United States. 317 Finally, on 31 March, all 
government opinions of the Romanovs emanating from either Paris or London were 
prohibited from publication. 318 The Press Bureau worked quickly to block criticism 
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of the new Premier from every angle.  
   Ribot’s reaction to possible regime change in Russia had the potential to be highly 
incendiary to public opinion and troop morale if mishandled by the media. The Press 
Bureau particularly wished to prevent left-wing and radical-socialist papers from 
condemning Ribot for praising the Tsar. But it was also possible that Ribot would 
backtrack on his remarks or even praise the Russian Socialists once it became clear 
that they supported the continuance of fighting. Either way, Ribot was vulnerable to 
criticism from the media, and the Press Bureau felt he was best protected from all 
sides if his opinions regarding Russia were entirely prohibited from publication. The 
Press Bureau was successful in preventing criticism of Ribot, though it appears that it 
was surprisingly not an issue over which the media was willing to fight. The only 
major paper that appears to have been censored for attempting to discuss Ribot’s 
reluctance to accept the socialists’ letter to Russia was La France on 23 March. 319 
This censorship order, however, which prohibited the media from discussing the 
French head of government’s opinions on the most significant international event 
affecting France at the time testifies to the willingness of the Press Bureau to silence 
open discussion in the media regarding information that was not of direct usefulness 
to the enemy on the battlefield. Political censorship was alive and well under France’s 
newly installed government. 
On 15 March, when news was first allowed to be transmitted through the telegraph 
and two days later on the radio320 that Nicholas II had abdicated, a directive was 
issued that ‘nothing is allowed to be said negatively of the Tsar.’  321 Between 15 and 
17 March, the Press Bureau silenced all news related both to the Tsar’s first decision to 
choose his son Prince Alexei as successor and then his final choice of Grand Duke 
                                                          
319 SHD 5N 492. 
320 BDIC F rés 0270 AFS, 19 Mar.1917, and BDIC F rés 0270 AFS, 17 Mar.1917. It always took longer for 
information to clear for transmission on the radio telegraph than the cable telegraph because the Germans 
could hear the former. 
321 BDIC F rés 0270 C, 15 Mar.1917. 
92 
 
Michael, by stopping all telegrams arriving from Russia on the subject. 322 On 17 
March, however, the Grand Duke’s manifesto which stated his desire to rule as 
monarch only if chosen democratically was allowed to be published, 323 although 
commentary regarding the future decisions of the Provisional Government on this 
subject was forbidden 324 as was any reference to the Grand Duke Michael as the 
‘Tsar.’ 325 In addition, direct commentary on the Grand Duke’s decision to accept the 
throne ‘conditionally’326 as well as the possibility of the Tsar’s moving to 
England327were subjects both prohibited from publication. Only once it appeared 
certain that the Tsar would not return and it was highly probable that the Romanov 
dynasty had been permanently replaced by a republican Government determined to 
carry on the war, was the press given carte blanche to attack Nicholas. 
Attacks on the Tsar in the media were usually accompanied by commentary 
suggesting that the new regime was better equipped to fight the Central Powers than 
he had been, a theme which appeared daily in the press. While there was no document 
which stated that attacks on the Tsar would be permitted in the press after 17 March, 
this was effectively the case. When on 15 March a directive had first been issued 
protecting the Tsar from attack in the French media, the future political status of the 
Romanov dynasty was uncertain. Once the threat of creating inter-allied discord by 
insulting the Russian head of state had subsided, it was considered even reassuring to 
public opinion if the press praised the new Russian republic as a liberal government 
and as a reliable ally.  
   The officially sanctioned line taken by the Parisian press continued to be that the 
new regime would be more effective in fighting the Central Powers than was its 
sluggish and bureaucratic predecessor. Although some centrist papers, particularly Le 
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Figaro, paid homage to the recently deposed Tsar, 328 and even said that ‘the most 
treasonous act a people can take is to make a revolution during wartime’329 the vast 
majority of the French press congratulated the Russian people for liberating 
themselves from autocracy and promoted the new Russian regime as capable of 
producing an improved fighting force. Even L’Action Française changed its position 
and wrote that bureaucratic inefficiency had made the Tsar ‘a traitor to the French 
cause.’ 330  
   Whereas L’Action Française was unlikely to attack the conservative Ribot, papers 
such as Le Petit Parisien and L’Humanité which would normally be less restrained 
obeyed orders by not mentioning the Premier’s sympathy for Nicholas II when they 
now denounced the monarch. An article written on 20 March in Le Petit Parisien best 
represented the officially sanctioned line of critical journalism aimed at the Tsar after 
his abdication. ‘France, this grand liberal nation, has joyfully received the news of 
these events which have in a few hours replaced and eliminated a power detested by all. 
This power at the same time tyrannical and weak, was incapable of providing for its 
people, of organising the rear, or of employing all the forces of the country to fight the 
enemy which occupied the national territory. Its power is no more. The Provisional 
Government which today has the destiny of Russia in its hands is energetically fixated 
on victory and has the unanimous consent of the nation. The problems that face the new 
Russia are immense. She must reconstitute her entire political structure. But by doing 
this she will double her moral forces to organise and obtain victory.’ 331 The goals of Le 
Petit Parisien’s editors were in perfect harmony with those of the War Ministry and the 
Press Bureau. According to the paper’s official history, it attempted to reassure its 
readers in two ways: ‘1.By confirming daily to its readers that no matter what, the 
Provisional Government would continue the fight alongside the allies. 2. To point out 
that one of the principal motivations of the new government is to reorganise the army 
                                                          
328 Le Figaro, 17 Mar.1917. 
329 Le Figaro, 19 Mar.1917. 
330 L’Action Française, 31 Mar.1917. 
331 Amaury, Histoire du plus grand quotidien de la IIIe République: Le Petit Parisien, 1876-1944 p.1066.  
94 
 
and to mobilise the participation of the Russian nation at war so to beat the enemy 
forces.’ 332 Once the Tsar had abdicated the press was allowed to disobey the 
government’s orders not to insult Nicholas II.  The Press Bureau however was far less 
lenient over speculations as to whether Russia would now remain in the war. 
The third particularly sensitive issue for the Press Bureau during the February 
Revolution was Russian war aims and capabilities.  Most important was the question of 
whether Russia would remain an effective ally or continue to fight at all. Any explicit 
suggestion of Petrograd potentially signing a separate peace was forbidden. Because of 
this there was no discussion attempted or permitted in the media over the repercussions 
of such a separate peace, most importantly the movement of German troops from the 
Eastern to Western Front. Similarly, the press made few attempts to question whether 
the new government would repay its large debt to the French Government. While the 
order prohibiting mention of a potential separate peace was not given by the Press 
Bureau until 25-27 March, 333 telegrams or articles mentioning any separate peace 
between Russia and the Central Powers had been censored or stopped at least as 
early as 18 March.334 Stéphen Pichon, Clemenceau’s future Foreign Minister, on 15 
March had an article censored in Le Petit Journal (he was its editor) for the mere 
mention of pacifists in Russia. 335 When the Press Bureau first learned of the Tsar’s 
abdication, it issued a communiqué to media owners that Russia would remain 
alongside its allies in their ‘war of sacrosanct law’. 336 This message was sent before 
Paris had received a concrete guarantee from the Provisional Government to that 
effect. Much of the press, however, needed little encouragement to give such an 
assurance. 
Hypotheses about the potential effects of the Russian Revolution on the autocratic 
regimes in Germany and Austria-Hungary were permitted but were not allowed to be 
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included in telegrams received from abroad. In other words, the commentators were 
permitted to speculate on this question but were not provided with any evidence. The 
central question in the ensuing articles was whether the democratic revolution in 
Russia would spread to the Central Powers and thus facilitate peace. The earliest 
example of this line of reporting in a major Parisian daily seems to be on 14 March 
when La Croix published an article insisting that ‘if the Germans were counting that 
destabilisation in Russia would lead to a separate peace, they were cruelly mistaken.’ 
337 While on 17 March an article in L’Humanité congratulated the Russians who ‘had 
finally liberated themselves from a weakening regime that sucked all of the nation’s 
immense riches (moral, intellectual and material).’ It referred to Germany as a nation 
where the ‘imperial system is wounded’ and asked ‘are its days numbered?’ 338  This 
line of reporting lacked details but had the ability to convince readers of the positive 
effects of the Russian Revolution not just for France’s allies but the potential negative 
consequences on its enemies.    
It is understandable why the Government wished to encourage unrest in the Central 
Powers. The implication, however, that if Germany became a democracy it would 
make peace with the Allies, potentially violated one of the Press Bureau’s most 
fundamental rules. Since the beginning of the war the Bureau had been determined to 
prevent discussion of war aims or the promotion of a premature peace. Newspapers 
could allude to this possibility only if they portrayed the Russian Revolution as 
assisting the fight against Germany. 
   It is ironic that at the same time a conservative minded Premier was appointed  
 
in Paris, it was the leftist press that best served the interests of the government during  
 
the Russian upheaval. Le Petit Parisien (centre-left), one of the least censored papers,  
 
unflinchingly supported the new regime from 15 March onwards. The paper’s agenda  
 
was to make the new regime in Petrograd attractive to the French public as an  
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effective and even improved ally. In doing this it unashamedly engaged in a great deal  
 
of government encouraged bourrage de crâne. Similarly, L’Humanité never wavered in  
 
its support for the new regime in Petrograd or in its condemnation of the defunct Tsar.  
 
The paper’s editor Renaudel had been recruited by officials in the Quai d’Orsay to help  
 
convince both the socialists in Russia and the socialists at home to support the new  
 
regime. 339 L’Humanité was able to get away with insulting the Tsar because the paper  
 
served the more important purpose of promoting the new regime in Petrograd.  
 
Censorship rules were flexible on the condition that papers followed the general  
 
narrative and goals set out by the Press Bureau.  
   The Ribot Ministry had a message it wished to communicate to France’s people. 
Many in Paris were concerned with the disagreement between the Provisional 
Government and the Petrograd Soviet over war aims. 340 
 
The Bureau, however, did not 
issue an order banning discussion of that subject and it appears not to have been of 
interest to the press in any case. In fact the February Revolution is an example of the 
Press Bureau proving highly flexible in enforcing its own rules. The only two 
directives that appear to have been enforced without exception were the ban on 
criticising Ribot and that on explicitly predicting a Russian exit from the war. All other 
rules were flexible as long as the media towed the government line and engaged in 
state sanctioned bourrage de crâne. The flexibility given to the media on what the 
Bureau deemed to be relatively minor issues was a means to a greater end, namely the 
projection of a united front in the press which reassured French citizens and soldiers 
that Russia was not leaving them as an ally against the Central Powers. 
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D. New Partners: The United States Enters the Conflict 
  
  On 6 April 1917, the United States of America declared war on Germany. The 
American declaration of war was primarily occasioned by two events in February 
1917. The German resumption of unrestricted warfare on 1 February, 341 Wilson’s 
receipt of the decrypted ‘Zimmerman Telegram’ later that month on the 24 th and 
then its publication on 1 March in the American media  342 (editorial commentary and 
specific details being heavily censored in the French media), 343 moved both the 
American press and President Woodrow Wilson personally towards a pro- war stance. 
Wilson had won re-election in November 1916 under the slogan ‘the man who kept us 
out of the war.’ Wilson’s ‘Peace without Victory’ speech on 22 January 1917 was a 
late example of Wilson’s intention to have the United States conduct a role as mediator 
rather than direct participant in the conflict. Before 3 April, stories related to public 
opinion in America had been closely monitored by the Press Bureau and negative 
reporting on Wilson in particular was strictly prohibited. On 3 April a telegram was 
stopped from The Chicago Tribune criticizing the American esprit de guerre. 344 
American opinion now was only reported as being entirely behind the war effort and 
American pacifists were either vilified, or reported as having shifted largely to a pro-
war stance. Because of the suddenness of America’s move towards armed involvement 
in the war, and because of its timing (shortly after the February Revolution in Russia), 
the reaction of the French press was one of surprise, delight and of high praise for 
America in general and Wilson in particular. 
   Wilson delivered his war message to Congress on 2 April 1917, and then quickly 
introduced the motion to declare war in both houses. News of both the House of 
Representatives’ and the Senate’s approval were immediately telegraphed to France 
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and went uncensored by the Press Bureau. 345 From 3 April the story was covered 
intensively in the Parisian press. The media from the entire political spectrum saluted 
the American decision and published the mutually flattering public correspondence 
between Washington and Paris. This praise was characterised by a series of stories 
which varied little from paper to paper and by descriptions of American flags flying 
throughout Paris346 and along the French front.347 Also highly flattering was the letter 
written by the ‘France-America Committee’ entitled, ‘In praise of the United States.’348 
The Press Bureau had no reason to censor praise for France’s new partners and 
therefore allowed it to go unchecked.349 
    The mainstream press’s praise for America in the two weeks following Wilson’s 
speech on 2 April seems almost coordinated. Le Temps and Le Figaro ran several 
articles that were practically identical. Perhaps the most common theme (and one 
which Wilson himself mentioned in his letter to Poincaré) 350 was reference to the 
French involvement in the American Revolutionary War. Nivelle’s letter to American 
General John Pershing was published on 11 April and stated that Wilson’s words 
‘evoked the fraternity between the two countries when La Fayette and Rochambeau 
were on American soil.’ 351 Painlevé’s address to the French troops, published the next 
day, reminded the soldiers of ‘the past when the two countries fought together.’ 352 
Some articles implied that the decision for American entry was influenced by France’s 
earlier aid to the United States. Le Temps published an article on 6 April, once it was 
imminent that the US would declare war on Germany, 353 which stated that, ‘The 
Americans have never forgotten how twice in their history, France has come to their 
                                                          
345 BDIC F rés 0270 AFS.  
346 For an example see Le Petit Parisien, 4 Apr.1917. This issue in fact had an American flag printed on 
its cover in the top right hand corner.   
347 L’Action Française, 6 Apr.1917, and Le Figaro, 8 Apr.1917. 
348 Le Petit Parisien, 12 Apr.1917. 
349 There are no records of orders given at the Press Bureau to control or dampen praise for the United 
States after 3 April.  
350 Poincaré, Au Service de la France. Vol IX pp.102-103. 
351 Le Temps, 11 Apr.1917. 
352 Le Petit Parisien, 13 Apr.1917. 
353 The daily news in general reported the events which transpired the previous day.  
99 
 
aid.’ 354 Le Figaro perhaps provided the most Franco-centric interpretation for the 
American declaration of war against Germany. On 12 April, the paper published an 
article declaring that Washington was joining the Allies not only because of ‘the 
amicable traditions and principles of civilization but also because of the admiration 
merited by our army in 32 months of heroic war, the noble attitude of our civil 
population and the inalterable correctness of our financial procedures.’ 355 While this 
type of commentary served and was intended to bolster French spirits, a more serious 
discussion also took place in the French press regarding American motives, war aims 
and capabilities. 
   Because the Press Bureau was a branch of the War Ministry it is safe to use War 
Minister Paul Painlevé’s statements issued to a group of American journalists and 
published on 7 April to determine which themes were encouraged in the French press 
regarding America’s motives for war. Painlevé told the group, 
President Wilson’s address today is one of the great 
feats of history. For the first time since the world has 
existed, a powerful nation has voluntarily entered into a 
terrible war which ravages a faraway continent not to 
defend its interests or for glory, not even for its right but 
for the rights of all people including those with whom it 
is preparing to fight. His words of war, so full of 
measure, nobility and disinterest, constitute the most 
moving homage that can be made for peace between all 
people and for the future League of Nations. Amongst 
the suffering and the blood a new conscience of 
humanity has awoken on the face of the Earth. It 
triumphs over the despotism and violence of all evil 
forces. The same call to liberty that raised the banners 
of Washington and La Fayette, healthier and more 
powerful than ever, will raise in triumph our united 
flags. 356 
 
Virtually all of the major themes given as motives for American entry to the war as by 
the French press in the weeks following 3 April can be found in this speech: American 
selflessness, world peace following the war along with the League of Nations, the 
portrayal of Germany as evil (several papers used Wilson’s 2 April address as proof 
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that Germany had started the war) 357 and the historic bond between France and the 
United States. Virtually none of the major Parisian papers strayed far from this 
narrative. On 4 April Le Temps printed an article which stated that 3 April ‘was a major 
date in the history of the United States and an important date in the history of 
humanity.’ It also framed the United States as a country which until very 
recently had wished to stay out of European affairs but was forced into the conflict as a 
response to German violence. Finally, it stated that the main aim for Washington in the 
war was the attainment of peace. On 6 April, Le Petit Parisien published a letter by 
Ribot in the same vein which asserted, ‘the United States is not fighting for its own 
interests but is contributing to the war between justice and violence.’ 358 Of all the 
major Parisian dailies, only L’Humanité even questioned Washington’s motives and 
then by answering its own question came to the same conclusion as the others. On 5 
April, the paper asked if the Americans were going to war to back up the war 
financiers and if Wilson was ‘fighting the war for Wall Street.’ The paper stated that 
the answer was no and that the Americans in fact added to the moral cause of the 
Allies.359 L’Humanité on 7 April published an article which on the surface questioned  
 
American motives but then claimed that the only American goal was international  
 
peace. ‘Those who believe that the Americans are fighting without interest are  
 
imbeciles. They are fighting for peace and for the League of Nations.’ 360 France and  
 
the United States were not the only democracies referred to in the press as being part of  
 
a new democratic alliance against the ‘despotic’ Central Powers. The newly  
 
democratised Russia was also discussed in conjunction with the arrival of the United  
 
States on the Allied side.  
    
  The February Revolution in Russia had been portrayed in the French media as an event  
 
which ultimately strengthened Russia’s ability to fight the Central Powers. American  
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entry was now paired with it and the two events were presented as dealing a double 
blow to Germany rather than the replacement of one partner by another.  The centrist 
press, led by Le Temps and Le Petit Parisien, defined the new advantage for the Allied 
powers as being military. One article published on 8 April in Le Temps was intended 
to be read as a news story regarding the future arrival of American troops in France. In 
fact, however, roughly two thirds of the article discussed Russian mobilization and 
was meant to show that Russia was still very much in the war. This approach was 
most exaggerated, as was often the case, in the populist daily Le Petit Parisien. On 4 
April, an article in Le Petit Parisien stated ‘The American intervention following the 
Russian Revolution is the supreme warning for the German people, if they are capable 
of understanding this double and formidable lesson.’ 361 The Government’s strategy 
of encouraging the press to sell the ‘new Russia’ as an improved fighting force, 
complemented the press’s proclivity to emphasize the future importance of France’s 
new American partner. 
   America’s military and financial contribution to the Allied effort was allowed to be 
discussed in detail by the French media. Most of it had been declared publicly in 
Washington and therefore would have been difficult to censor. Wilson’s decisions to 
implement general military service and to raise an army of 500,000 men by the end of 
1917 were widely circulated in the press beginning on 4 April. Two days later it was 
announced that 3,400,000,000 dollars had been allocated in war credits in Washington. 
On 8 April, it was announced that the Americans would now lend the Allied powers 
three billion dollars at a rate of no more than 3.5 percent. Two days later it was 
announced that American Secretary of the Treasury, William McAdoo, believed this 
sum to be insufficient, and that Washington would have to raise another five billion 
dollars as well as take a 25 billion dollar loan from the American people. America’s 
limited military strength in April 1917 went almost without comment in the French 
press. Instead, the focus was almost entirely placed on America as an economic giant. 
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No attempt was made by the Press Bureau to censor the exact figures surrounding 
American re-armament, loans or the allocation of war credits. Furthermore, because the 
press did not attempt to question America’s effectiveness as a military ally, the Press 
Bureau did not have to order the media to desist from doing so. The press sought to 
play up America’s role as a financial power rather than question its military might. The 
United States was the world’s largest economy and neither the press nor the Press 
Bureau had reason to downplay the figures America would invest in the Allied war 
effort. 
The press was prevented from making comments suggesting the proper course for 
future American actions or for creating a timetable for when the Americans should 
arrive in Europe. Although there was no specific order given at the Press Bureau to 
this effect, all papers that attempted to comment on how America ‘should’ help France 
in any way that was not officially declared in Washington were prohibited from doing 
so. Thus on 7 April, a telegram from Havas was stopped from London. It stated ‘The 
German forces will not be broken until the United States actually joins the fight.’362 
Such comments had the ability to simultaneously irritate Washington, insult French 
and British troops and cause panic on the French home front. Even worse, on   
13 April, The London Agency363 was censored for attempting to comment that the 
United States should adhere to the Treaty of London, 364 a secret and highly sensitive 
agreement signed by France, Britain, Russia and Italy in April 1915. Because the 
French telegraph service at the Press Bureau was able to catch this telegram and stop 
it, it is probable that most of France’s newspapers remained unaware of the text of this 
treaty until it was published in the Russian newspaper Izvestia in November. 1917 was 
a tumultuous year on the French home front and was characterized by the growth of 
internationalism, pacifism and what was referred to in the Parisian political 
establishment as défaitisme. Public knowledge of the treaty would have provided 
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added ammunition to the anti-war movement. 
   The press had several other concerns pertaining to military and naval affairs. Perhaps 
the Press Bureau’s main concern was to censor information regarding ships travelling 
between the United States and France. This included the names of ships, the ports from 
which they departed or to which they were destined and whether any vessel had been 
sunk by German torpedoes. The rule at first applied only to American warships but 
then was expanded to include merchant vessels. On 5 April the Press Bureau forbade 
mention of the torpedoing of American ships. 365 The next day, an order was issued to 
‘not mention the arrival in France of American warships.’366  Two American ships 
were sunk during this period. The first was the Aztec,367 sunk off the coast of Brest 
on 1 April and believed to have struck a mine. The second, The Missourian, was 
sunk on 5 April by a submarine with no casualties. The sinking of The Aztec was 
reported in the French media on 4 April,368 the day before the reporting of such 
incidents was banned. However, the Press Bureau successfully kept news of the 
sinking of The Missourian out of France’s newspapers. News related to the seizure of 
German vessels in American ports was allowed to be published on 7 April. Afterwards, 
the Bureau for the remainder of the war monitored all news regarding vessels and 
diplomatic missions travelling between the United States and France and attempted to 
ensure their details remained undisclosed in the media. Unfortunately mistakes 
occurred. The first was the unpunished reporting in the media of the sinking of an 
American steamship, The Seaward, in the Mediterranean, printed first on 8 April. 369 
Later in June when American troops began to arrive in France, censorship of troop 
movements became a point of contention between Washington and Paris. 
   Shortly, after the American declaration of war on Germany, Joffre and Justice 
Minister René Viviani were selected to lead a diplomatic mission to the United States. 
On 5 and 6 April the Press Bureau ordered ‘Do not allow mention of the mission to the 
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United States.’ 370 On 14 April, the press was allowed to mention the diplomatic 
mission but not the names of its participants,371 a fact some papers made clear.372 This 
order was then repeated on 16 and 17 April. (There was however on 14 April an article 
which went unpunished mentioning a separate French military mission to the United 
States, led by Paul Azan.373) On 17 April it was explained at the Press Bureau that ‘the 
Mission to the United States cannot be jeopardised by the official release of the names 
on the council. No commentary is allowed, nor are details of the voyage, the name of 
the vessel, the place of departure etc…’374Only the ‘official note’ was allowed to be 
published regarding the mission.375  News of the mission’s arrival in the United States 
was allowed to be reported in the press only on 25 April after the Press Bureau had 
first prohibited the news from being published the day before.376 The mission’s return 
to France in May was dealt with by the Press Bureau in an almost identical manner.377 
Shortly after, all news regarding the eventual installation of an American army 
headquarters in France was banned.378 Tightly controlled censorship of the French 
mission to the United States not only closely followed the order given on 6 April 
prohibiting the publication of all movements of vessels travelling between the France 
and the United States. It also, however, followed the pre-existing practice of 
prohibiting the media from detailing the exact movement of diplomats and politicians 
travelling between countries or publishing troop movements in general. This was the 
beginning of a sustained focus on naval censorship at the Press Bureau, which 
intensified in June with the arrival of American troops. The decision to censor news of 
ship movements simply expanded to the Atlantic the existing practice of prohibiting the 
publication of troop movements and of casualty statistics. 
The United States had a much longer and less contested history of press freedoms 
than did France. Upon America’s entry to war, censorship in the American press 
became an immediate hotspot for debate in Washington. Eventually Wilson, himself an 
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advocate of press control, with the help of George Creel, head of the United States 
Committee on Public Information (a propaganda organization roughly equivalent to the 
French Maison de la Presse) set up a voluntary set of guidelines for the press to 
follow.379 Washington after April 1917 sent a group of censors to France, led by the 
famous war correspondent Frederick Palmer (Theodore Roosevelt once called him ‘our 
best war correspondent’) 380 who were then trained by and in some ways beholden to 
the French Press Bureau.381                 
   The French information management system had two fundamental goals in dealing 
with the media’s coverage of the American entry into the First World War. The first 
was to ensure that the press present the event as positively as possible without 
sounding ungrateful by commenting on the lateness of the decision or seeming pushy 
in demanding specific American actions. The press coverage, in part orchestrated by 
the government, of the February Revolution in Russia which argued that the event 
would produce a more effective Russian fighting force, meshed perfectly with the news 
of the American arrival. The press was able now to present the Allies as a militarily 
powerful united democratic front against the Central Powers. As war weariness was on 
the rise in France, the Government, the media and the Press Bureau all sought to take 
advantage of a positive news story by portraying the news of the American declaration 
of war in the most positive light possible. The second aim of the French censorship 
system was to extend the strict ban on reporting the movement of military units in 
France to the Atlantic. Finally, the greatest feat for the censors in Paris following the 
American declaration of war was the prevention of the news of the Treaty of London 
from reaching French readers. By applying both positive reinforcement and 
preventative censorship, the Press Bureau was effective in ensuring that French 
newspaper readers were presented with an uplifting news story about the arrival of a 
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new ally, while preventing harmful or embarrassing information to both Paris and 
Washington from being published. 
 
Conclusion 
 
   From late winter 1916 to the first half of spring 1917, France was at a crossroads 
both morally and militarily. Though the Battle of Verdun which had ended in mid-
December had been portrayed in the press as a heroic victory of mythic proportions 
the battle had taken a large toll on French morale. Joffre, a popular war hero for his 
role at the Marne in 1914, was replaced at the end of Verdun and the press was 
prohibited from referring to his replacement as a demotion. Instead of playing down 
Joffre’s prestige among France’s citizenry, and perhaps prompting questions about the 
GQG’s performance, papers when reporting on Joffre were to follow a policy where if 
they had nothing pleasant to say, they were to say nothing at all. Instead his 
replacement, Nivelle, who had already been feted as one of the heroes of Verdun, was 
endlessly praised. By the end of 1916 French censorship policy had become clear - 
negative events were to be downplayed or ignored, positive ones were to be constantly 
featured.   
The period between December 1916 and April 1917 saw a tightening of control over 
the press by the French Government. Under Ribot the Press Bureau tightened its grip 
over the media through the use of both censorship and propaganda. When Ribot first 
replaced Briand as Premier, he made several public promises to loosen political 
censorship but was always vague on how this would be achieved. In fact he continued 
the same policy as his two predecessors of muzzling criticism of France’s political 
leadership. In December after the last major debate of the war on political censorship in 
the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate Army Commission launched a report which 
condoned the use of political censorship but at the same time stated that the main 
enemy was ‘defeatism.’ This marked the beginning of an era when left-wing politicians 
were increasingly attacked in the media that would climax under the Premiership of 
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Clemenceau. Political censorship remained in place in part to protect army leaders and 
right-wing politicians. Ribot was protected in this manner from a potential backlash 
against his comments on the February Revolution, in part because his comments 
deviated from the line to be officially propagated in the media.    
 Coverage of the February Revolution was vague at first. The press had obeyed the 
government’s wishes by publishing positive articles on the new regime and repeatedly 
suggesting that Russia would remain in the war. Indeed, by getting the left-wing press 
on board with the government’s agenda the War Ministry was able to present the 
February Revolution, a potential source of panic at home and at the Front, as a 
positive event for the future of the French war effort. During this period rules were 
relaxed particularly concerning L’Humanité’s commentary on the socialist nature of 
the new government in Petrograd. Papers were permitted to break minor rules if they 
followed the government’s narrative of events. The War Ministry and the Press 
Bureau were successful in preventing open discussion of war aims in the French press 
and in stifling any suggestion of a premature peace in the wake of the February 
Revolution. 382 This was a markedly different policy from that followed when the 
press had been more freely permitted to discuss war aims between summer 1916 and 
the Doumergue agreement with Nicholas in February-March 1917.383 Factory 
workers were not provided with many of the details of the violent acts committed by 
their equivalents in Petrograd. It is doubtful, however, that street violence would 
ever have erupted in Paris in 1917 on a similar scale.  Although some French strikers 
and demonstrators did use revolutionary slogans when a strike movement developed 
in May and June 1917, the strike leaders took little inspiration from the events of the 
February Revolution. Though it is impossible to gauge the possible consequences had 
the Press Bureau been more lenient with the Parisian press during the February 
                                                          
382 BDIC F rés 0270 C.  
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states under French occupation until the full execution of the peace treaty was concluded. Russia was 
given ‘complete liberty’ to fix its western borders with Germany and Austria-Hungary. D.Stevenson, The 
First World War and International Politics, pp.117-118.     
108 
 
Revolution, it is clear that the Press Bureau attempted to be as reassuring as possible 
about an event that could have had devastating consequences for the French war effort.   
  In contrast, the American entry into the First World War was a purely positive event. 
America’s main contributions were financial and industrial and therefore these aspects 
were heavily played up while commentary on the country’s relative military weakness 
was suppressed (though in any case little was attempted). Most important for the Press 
Bureau, America’s entry brought in a new period of heightened naval censorship. This 
policy was enforced more strictly after the arrival of the first US troops in June and, 
after a few hiccups, became a major focus of French censorship for the rest of the war.  
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Chapter 3: Crisis 
 
Introduction 
 
   Just as the media began to carry positive news stories covering the entrance of the 
Americans into the war, France entered several months of internal and external crisis. 
The next two chapters discuss a period that more than any other during the war tested 
the French information management system in its aim to maintain a positive picture. For 
the Press Bureau, Nivelle’s succession to Joffre posed a new set of difficulties. The 
government had normally censored all news of upcoming offensives, but found it 
impossible to do so while the country’s top commander himself discussed them freely. 
This chapter begins to shed light on the influence of the GQG in French press censorship 
during the war by examining Nivelle’s tenure, a theme which is continued in the next 
chapter when discussing Pétain.   
   Several themes from previous chapters are continued here. During the lead up to the 
Nivelle Offensive launched on 16 April the press loosely enforced its rules when it 
presented its readers with optimistic journalism, in this case with negative 
consequences. During discussions over the Stockholm Conference the same leniency 
was applied in an attempt to distract readers from more potentially volatile stories and 
to make the left appear isolated and weak. This period marked the beginning of a 
sustained and largely tolerated attack on the left by the mainstream press which 
continued until the end of the war. This chapter sets out to explain that occasional 
disobedience of the government by the press did not imply failure on the part of the 
Press Bureau but rather might be instigated by a deliberate neglect on the 
government’s side.    
   Finally, this chapter demonstrates how the Press Bureau dealt with governmental or 
military failures. While this theme was explored in the previous chapter in the 
discussion of Joffre’s replacement, in the case of the disaster on the Chemin des 
Dames, the Press Bureau had to monitor both battlefield defeat and a process of 
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backtracking in the press which had previously delivered high expectations for the 
attack. Significantly Nivelle was not only shielded from criticism but remained a 
popular war hero until after 1918.    
 
A. Disappointment in Champagne: The Nivelle Offensive on the Chemin des Dames. 
 
   After months of preparation and co-ordination with France’s British allies, the French  
launched an attack in Champagne along the Chemin des Dames on 16 April  
1917. The main goal was to break through the German defensive lines within 48 hours  
and then to battle with the German reserves in open territory. Nivelle orchestrated the 
plan as a major adaptation of another previously designed by Joffre. Nivelle was a 
respected commander, particularly for his role at the Battle of Verdun, and was a 
charismatic speaker. In his first two months as French Commander in Chief he 
convinced many in the government in Paris, including Briand, and the War Cabinet in 
London led by Prime Minister David Lloyd George, that he had discovered a path to 
victory in 1917. 
   The Nivelle Offensive failed to achieve its primary objectives. Although the French  
 
army captured 20,000 prisoners and advanced seven kilometres in the first five days of  
 
the attack, 384 these accomplishments did not result in the decisive blow to the German  
 
army which Nivelle had promised. French losses during the offensive numbered 130,000  
 
killed and wounded385 To most in the army and in Paris, these losses were unjustified by  
 
the limited gains of the operation. Nivelle’s failed attack led to his replacement by Pétain  
 
on 15 May 1917 and weakened the ‘cult of the offensive’ which had been prevalent  
 
within the French High Command since the outbreak of the war. 
   The offensive took place at a low point in French civilian and troop morale. First in 
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January and then in May, 386 industrial strikes took place in several of France’s largest 
cities. On the home front, war weariness and the influence of pacifist agitators had 
begun to threaten the union sacrée. At the front, the failed Nivelle Offensive added to 
the grievances of an army exhausted by three and a half years of relentless warfare. 
The strain on France’s soldiers imposed by the bloodletting at Verdun (February-
December 1916) had been exacerbated by the dashed hopes of victory. Nivelle’s failed 
offensive played a significant role in instigating the mutinies in the French army of late 
May-June 1917.387 It also convinced France’s leaders to wait until the arrival of the 
American army in large numbers before the French Army launched any new major 
offensives. 
Nivelle was not only more forthcoming with information towards the press than was 
Joffre but he even expressed his high expectations for the upcoming offensive to 
politicians and occasionally to ordinary citizens at home and abroad. 388 Although the 
press was forbidden from printing specific details of future operations, Nivelle’s 
optimism was reflected between February and April 1917 in major newspapers in 
France and particularly in Britain by references to ‘the next great Allied offensive.’ 
The Press Bureau’s Consignes Générales reveal a marked increase in orders given to 
the press forbidding the mention of future operations at the beginning of February. 
André Tardieu in Le Petit Parisien was singled out personally by Nivelle because of 
his indiscretions when writing on the upcoming Spring Offensive, which Nivelle 
claimed compromised national defence. 389 Tardieu had suggested that Nivelle’s idea 
to require a ‘constant delay’390 in the press when reporting upon the location of 
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French units was part of the preparations for a new offensive.391 As a result of the 
Press Bureau’s subsequent monitoring of Le Petit Parisien,392 France’s most heavily 
circulated daily wrote little on the upcoming offensive for the next two months. 
Tardieu was later proved correct in his assertion when Nivelle finally approved the 
constant delay on 15 April, one day before the attack on the Chemin des Dames. 
Nivelle’s official reason for implementing the delay was to ensure that those soldiers 
who were decorated for merit were publicised as contributing to a specific ‘glorious 
affair.’ 393 It is probable, however, that Nivelle wished to use the constant delay as a 
tool to prohibit the publishing of troop movements during offensives and to control 
information when operations were reported by the press retrospectively. Although 
Nivelle was replaced before the constant delay came into effect (after the offensive), 
the policy proved a useful tool in shaping the media’s portrayal of the events on the 
Chemin des Dames. 
Nivelle not only espoused optimism but also sought vehemently sought to eradicate 
defeatism. His attack on France’s growing anti-war campaign was twofold. First, he 
was concerned with the growing number of anti-war pamphlets being circulated on the 
home front and most importantly on the front lines. These were most often distributed 
at train stations to soldiers arriving from or travelling to the front while on leave, and 
increasingly at labour union meetings. In late December 1916 Nivelle began to press 
Louis Malvy, the French Interior Minister, to create a list of individuals who were 
known to be involved in antimilitarist propaganda and to send all information held by 
the Direction de la Sûreté Générale regarding those individuals to his office.394 He 
later wrote a letter to War Minister Hubert Lyautey which stated that ‘The volume of 
pacifist propaganda in the army is increasing.’ In this letter he listed ‘pamphlets,’ 
‘soldiers on leave at meetings’ and ‘soldiers in touch with the ringleaders’ as the 
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principal issues to be addressed. He proposed that ‘The pamphlets should be seized in 
the works where they are printed; meetings where discussion is not limited to strictly 
professional matters should be forbidden; the revolutionary paper Natchalo should be 
suppressed; Sebastien Faure, Merrheim, Hubert and the dozen or so agitators who 
support them should be vigorously opposed, the pacifist propaganda smashed and 
normal working conditions enforced in the war plants and arsenals.’ 395   
In addition to dealing with the proliferation of anti-war pamphlets distributed by 
soldiers at the front, Nivelle moved quickly to eradicate defeatist articles from French 
newspapers. His communications with Lyautey led the latter to order the Press Bureau 
to advise papers to be ‘more vigilant with pacifists.’ The scolding tone of the 
memorandum delivered to the censors as communicated by Maurejouls, the Chief of 
the Press Bureau, shortly after Joffre’s replacement, suggested a sense of urgency. 396 
Nivelle began also to restrict certain papers from circulation at the front, an action 
previously used only in extreme circumstances. Correspondence between the Under- 
Secretary of the Cabinet in the War Ministry, M. Besnard, and Nivelle in early March 
1917 suggests that Nivelle personally obstructed left leaning papers from reaching 
front line soldiers, though the archival material is unclear as to which ones. However, 
when asked if he wished officially to be charged with deciding which papers should be 
allowed to circulate amongst the troops, he declined. 397 He was asked this because of 
allegations that the current inspectors were treating certain papers unfairly. These 
allegations continued after 8 March398 and his unwillingness to change the status quo 
by taking personal responsibility for what press items reached the front could suggest 
that he believed the inspectors were doing a fine job in performing an unpleasant and 
politically sensitive task. More likely, however, it indicates that he had a lot of other 
more pressing things to do.   
   Nivelle did much to convey optimism in the press regarding his abilities. When 
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asked on 15 January by the Press Section of the GQG to comment on an article in 
which he was highly praised, he responded that while he was the enemy of all 
publicity, the morale of the country came first.399 Beginning in February, all of the 
major Parisian papers began to set the stage for an upcoming Allied offensive. 
Although no specific details were given as to when or where it would take place, 400 the 
articles mostly insinuated that it would be launched in the spring. Because the left and 
right-wing newspapers were preoccupied between February and April with events in 
Russia, labour disputes and America’s entrance into the war, it was the mainstream 
centrist papers in Paris, particularly Le Temps and Le Matin, that focused most closely 
on the upcoming offensive. These papers were among the worst offenders in raising 
expectations that France would end the war quickly through a spring attack. They 
presented the two months preceding the attack as a ‘calm before the storm,’ in which 
‘we get ready for the big battles that may lead us to the end of the war.’ 401 One of the 
first examples predicting the upcoming offensive was a heavily censored article 
published on 4 February in Le Temps. The author wrote, ‘The reigning calm on our 
entire front gives leisure to military writers to discuss future Allied operations.’ The 
article then stated that Germany’s one sensitive area was its army ‘and it is that which 
we must fight.’ 402 Eleven days later, the paper published an article which supposed 
that the Germans (but also their adversaries) were preparing for new large-scale battles 
for which the French were much better prepared than at the beginning of the war. 403 
This optimistic tone in the Parisian press was increased with the news of the 
German retreat to the Hindenburg Line between mid-February and March. 
   The main explanation given in the French press for the retreat was that the 
Germans were ill prepared for the coming battle and were unable to defend their 
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current positions. 404 Although it was acknowledged in French papers that the 
retreat was considered a stroke of strategic genius in the German media,405 French 
journalists portrayed it as an act of desperation. A typically bleak portrayal of the 
German position appeared in Le Temps on 4 March. It stated, ‘The enemy has 
working against him a growing number of desertions, the refusal of soldiers who 
do not wish to work, trenches under fire and finally the difficulty of managing the 
fear of a new offensive. In short, his retreat is complete.’  406 Even the more 
recently monitored Le Petit Parisien reported extensively on the retreat in March 
and celebrated the ‘liberation’ of towns such as Noyon and Péronne.  407 These 
negative portrayals of Germany’s military fortunes in early March were not based on 
solid evidence but rather typified the bourrage de crâne which always portrayed 
France in a favourable light relative to its adversaries regardless of the circumstances. 
This misrepresentation was encouraged by the Press Bureau through a lack of 
censorship.  
   It also was a reflection of the self-deception which existed at the top of the GQG 
leadership. Under Nivelle, France’s military leadership refused to acknowledge that 
the withdrawal would impede the upcoming offensive. Later Nivelle did little to adjust 
the attack accordingly.408 The Press Bureau from late February began to monitor less 
vigorously newspaper references to rumours of and preparations for imminent British 
and French offensives. As a result, the French public was aware of and had high 
expectations for an attack in April. 409  In late February and early March stories 
emerged which suggested that the upcoming Allied offensive would be delayed first 
because of the harsh winter410 and then because of the German retreat to the 
Hindenburg Line.411 The latter was portrayed as a defensive move against Allied 
attacks, undertaken from a position of weakness. In the month between the German 
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withdrawal and the 16 April offensive, the press portrayed Nivelle as a strategist who 
was adjusting his plans for the upcoming attack accordingly. On 5 March Le Matin 
agreed with Britain’s The Observer that ‘the Nivelle method requires minute care and 
a perfection of details. The enemy has perhaps caused delay in our plans but if they 
think they have taken the initiative from Field Marshal Haig and General Nivelle, their 
hopes are in vain.’ 412 It is ironic that the press chose to disobey the Press Bureau’s 
orders which prohibited it from discussing future operations,413 by portraying Nivelle 
as a flexible commander who altered his plans according to the circumstances. Nivelle 
in fact had stuck stubbornly to his original plans despite the unfavourable weather and 
the German withdrawal.  
   The majority of the Press Bureau’s orders forbidding the mention of future 
operations were given in January and February.414 In March and April however, 
articles referring to an Allied attack were published more frequently and went mostly 
unpunished. Nivelle was a well-known self-promoter and tended before the April 
offensive to withhold bad news from official communiqués.415 There appears to be 
little or no evidence, however, that France’s military and political leaders urged the 
Press Bureau to encourage optimism regarding Nivelle’s offensive. It is more likely 
that the Bureau became overburdened with censoring first the news of the February 
Revolution in Russia and then the American entry into the war.  
    Nivelle’s offensive on 16 April lacked the element of surprise. It had been discussed 
in Allied newspapers since the end of January416 and in late March, the French press 
also regularly published articles from German newspapers which referred to an 
approaching Allied offensive. Neither the press nor the Press Bureau, however, were 
primarily responsible for the failure to keep the offensive a secret. Between 15 
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February and 3 March,417 the Germans captured an order in Champagne dated 29 
January and signed on 16 December by Nivelle which outlined the orders, goals and 
conditions surrounding a general offensive in April on the Aisne. Nivelle was aware 
that the enemy had captured copies of the blueprints but this news (like that of the 
German withdrawal to the Hindenburg line) did not force him to radically change his 
plans. Responsibility lies with the press and the Press Bureau in Paris not for the 
disclosure of military secrets to the enemy but for the deliverance of false hope to 
France’s citizenry and its soldiers. Because the expectations for the upcoming offensive 
were so high, the resulting blow to morale from its failure was more severe. 
High hopes for future Allied fortunes in the months preceding the Nivelle Offensive 
climaxed in the French press during the first two weeks of April. The Press Bureau on 
5 April requested that L’Echo de Paris cut an article by Maurice Barrès which asked, 
‘Is it today audacious to talk of resurrection? The wind, is it not blowing along our 
fronts? I write these words while in the Chamber in an atmosphere of hope.’ Although 
the paper agreed to slash the article, in fact it did not do so and the offence went 
unpunished. 418 At this point it seems that the Press Bureau did not punish papers 
which published items on the upcoming offensive, because the offending articles were 
considered good for morale both at home and at the front. Papers for months had 
consistently been allowed to violate these rules and therefore it would be difficult to 
attribute the Press Bureau’s tolerance entirely to neglect. On 9 April, the British 
launched what was later known as the Battle of Arras. The attack achieved moderate 
tactical advances along the Scarpe and captured the heavily defended German position 
at Vimy Ridge. The French press, long starved for good news from the front, portrayed 
the British advances as victories which could potentially trigger the collapse of the 
German war machine. It also suggested that the success of the British offensive 
foreshadowed a similar positive outcome for the imminent French attack. Although the 
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Allied capture of Vimy Ridge was highlighted in French papers, the way in which 
setbacks related to the offensive were portrayed foreshadowed the style of reporting 
prevalent during the Chemin des Dames Offensive. Most notably, the slowdown of the 
British advance on 10 April was largely attributed to the weather as it was later in 
Champagne, and enemy counter-attacks were originally downplayed much as they 
were on 17 April after the first day of the Nivelle Offensive.  
   The preparatory bombardment for Nivelle’s offensive began on 12 April and was 
immediately reported in the press. Once the infantry attack was launched on 16 April, 
it was ensured by the GQG that the press was solely dependent upon the official 
communiqués for its information regarding events on the Chemin des Dames. At 
23:20 on 16 April, the Press Bureau was told to ‘stick to the communiqué.’419 This 
order was in reference to a communiqué sent twenty minutes earlier (23:10) which 
stated, ‘Between Soissons and Reims after an artillery preparation which has lasted 
several days we have attacked on a front of 40 kilometers…Fierce fighting, we have 
pushed until Lisières, west of Berméricourt and up to the canal of the Aisne. 10,000 
prisoners.’420 The press’s complete reliance on official communiqués for information 
on the offensive was established on the first day of the attack and lasted for at least 
the next five days.421 Because the communiqués were uniformly positive and omitted 
negative news, the press enthusiastically portrayed the attack as a major Allied victory. 
Only the most well informed, prudent readers would have deciphered the minor 
nuances within the communiqués and realized that the attack had failed almost 
immediately to achieve a significant breakthrough of the German lines. 422 
Military censorship was absolute during the first five days of the offensive. On 16 
 
April six papers, including Le Petit Parisien and Le Figaro, had articles slashed for 
providing ‘precisions on military operations,’ a code name for any details on the 
course of battle not specified in the communiqués. This number rose to ten papers 
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slashed on 17 April and nine on 19 April with the same official explanation given. 423 
Between 16 and 17 April every major Parisian daily with the exception of Le 
Temps was censored by the Press Bureau at least once and most several times.424 
The most common censored military information surrounded analyses of the 
communiqués. Because the communiqués were vague regarding the progress by 
French troops, so too were the details reported in the press. 
Censors were expected to allow certain journals such as Le Petit Journal to continue 
publishing bourrage de crâne even though information had been circulating at the 
Ministry of the Interior that the Germans had recaptured several lost villages. Since the 
battle of Verdun newspapers had had reporters at the front and some information had 
slipped by the telegraph censors at the Press Bureau.  A few papers attempted to 
describe the results of the attack as an ‘offensive balance,’ but even this was 
prohibited. 425 Everyone in charge of French information management – the GQG, the 
censors and even the better informed newspaper editors – were aware that they were 
presenting a misleading representation of the events of the first few days of the attack 
by omitting negative information. It was ultimately Nivelle and the GQG who 
orchestrated this deception by ensuring that only the optimistically vague 
communiqués released by the Section d’Information could be referenced when 
publishing news related to the attack. Until 30 May 1917, this was the agency 
responsible for all official briefings to journalists, visas to war correspondents, 
transmission of foreign press material, and daily communiqués. After this date, the 
agency was split into the Section d’Information and the Bureau d’Informations 
Militaires. The first was responsible for visas to war correspondents, military radio, 
photo/cine operations, correspondents of the Section d’Information, daily 
communiqués, and field correspondents. The second dealt with the briefings of 
journalists, material for civilian radio, the transmission of foreign press material and 
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the publication of the Bulletin des Armées. 426 
  The press was encouraged to maintain a positive approach to the events in 
Champagne. Whereas the importance of the battle for the war effort was often 
compared to the Marne or Verdun, only the moderate achievements specified in the 
communiqués could be published. Elaboration upon these official statements was 
forbidden. L’Action Française was censored when in an article that prematurely 
declared ‘French victory’ a claim was made that ‘all’ of the German lines were being 
pierced simultaneously. 427 Headlines which proclaimed ‘The Victorious Advance of 
France’s Troops’ (Paris-Midi)428 were matched with positive yet extremely vague 
communiqués that described the capture of enemy prisoners and the successful repulse 
of German counter attacks. In most Parisian dailies during the first few days of the 
operation, the sensational headlines were unjustified by the evidence given. 
   Because the GQG and the press had raised such high hopes amongst France’s 
citizens for positive results, there was tremendous pressure to put a positive 
perspective on events between 16 and 19 April. A perfect example of the mainstream 
press’s approach appeared on 18 April in Le Temps. The article stated that, ‘A large 
battle has begun, the largest since the Battle of the Marne. Neither in preparation nor in 
the attack were our troops favoured by the weather. Nevertheless, our soldiers 
launched towards the enemy positions with a spirit, an ardour and resolution which 
shows that the poilu knows perfectly well why he fights. The first day has been 
successful. We have advanced everywhere and we have taken a large number of 
prisoners. The French Army has placed its feet on positions that Napoleon himself 
proved to be difficult.’ 429 Before the battle, the press and the GQG had described it as 
potentially ending the war within days. During the first four days of the attack, the 
GQG and the press together had a vested interest in presenting the moderate results on 
the Chemin des Dames in a positive fashion with the hope that the situation on the 
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ground would improve both to encourage morale and to avoid them appearing foolish. 
Beginning on 18 and 19 April however, once it became clear that the situation on the 
Chemin des Dames was unlikely to improve, Nivelle, the War Ministry and the press 
began a new phase of damage control. 
Reports began to surface on 19 April which suggested that the French attack on the 
Chemin des Dames would not achieve the anticipated breakthrough. A common 
statement in the press was that the offensive was a significant tactical victory and 
should be acknowledged as such. French setbacks and losses remained unreported and 
the capture of enemy prisoners, guns and territory continued to be stressed. The 
tendency now was to avoid any mention of a ‘breakthrough’ and to praise the heroism 
of the French poilus in the face of adverse weather conditions and sustained enemy 
counter attacks. On 19 April, a letter was sent from the Section Presse,430 to the Press 
Bureau reminding censors that papers were bound by the Law of 5 August 1914 to 
present only information transmitted by official communiqués when discussing the 
‘Nominations and mutations in the High Command, military orders and the placement 
and movement of armies and detachments.’ The reminder was not unusual, as similar 
statements had been issued during previous battles. The letter, however, went on to 
insist that papers are ‘obviously’ not to judge for themselves whether the 
circumstances based on the indications given to them, real or not, posed an 
inconvenience from the point of view of secret operations or of national defence.431 
The War Ministry was aware that the press knew the situation on the front was worse 
than was being communicated officially by the GQG, and wanted to maintain strict 
control over reporting. 
   Between 19 and 22 April, censorship of the press hardened. On 19 April Le Gaulois, 
a centre-right daily, had an article slashed which detailed Pétain’s background. 432 This 
was an early example of what became the delicate monitoring of the press’s 
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commentary on Nivelle’s replacement by Pétain, a two-stage affair which came into 
full effect on 15 May.433 Papers now were censored or slashed for declaring an 
outright French victory.434 Whereas between 17 and 19 April German communiqués 
were published in French papers which described the German armies as being 
‘menaced by a formidable presence,’435 once the communiqués began to reflect the 
German tactical victory in repelling the French attack their publication became 
forbidden. Though enemy communiqués no longer appeared daily in the French press, 
they were still published if they mentioned French successes, regardless of their 
inaccuracies. French success on the Chemin des Dames after 19 April however was 
infrequent and therefore so was the appearance of German communiqués in French 
newspapers. 
From 20 to 29 April, when Pétain became Chief of the General Staff, the press’s 
coverage was increasingly vague and articles became shorter and infrequent. The last 
major article Le Figaro published on the offensive before 29 April was ten days earlier 
when an article declared that ‘Many do not recognise modern victory, certainly 17,000 
prisoners is a victory’ and that ‘even the Germans themselves are saying they have 
been beaten.’ 436 Such claims were easy to make because the German communiqués 
allowed to be published were chosen to convey the impression that the German army 
had been much more heavily worn down than was the case. Also, the claim that 
modern victory is difficult to recognise was typical of the lowered expectations from 
the offensive which became common as coverage of the battle slowed down. 437  
   Whereas several papers, particularly Le Matin, attempted unsuccessfully to discuss 
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the disappointing results on the Chemin des Dames after 22 April, 438 it was not until 
after 29 April with the announcement of Pétain’s appointment that an open discussion 
of what went wrong began slowly to emerge. Nivelle was still not allowed to be 
attacked personally and even the mention of Pétain was expected to be accompanied 
by praise for Nivelle. On 29 April, the Press Bureau ordered that ‘1. Nothing be 
mentioned on General Mangin. 439 2. General Nivelle remains in his function. Nothing 
negative is to be said on his subject. 3. For General Pétain, all praise is acceptable.’ 440 
The Press Bureau handled Nivelle’s replacement in a similar fashion to when Nivelle 
himself had replaced Joffre in December 1916. Like Joffre, and for many of the same 
reasons, Nivelle was shielded from immediate criticism in the press once he had fallen 
from power. Nivelle, like Joffre, had been a household name and a war hero and his 
disgrace could lead to a public questioning of the GQG’s efficacy. Havas had a 
telegram stopped on 29 April for suggesting that Nivelle’s replacement was 
imminent441 and on 1 May every major paper in Paris with the notable exceptions of 
Le Temps and Le Figaro was censored for discussing ‘modifications in the High 
Command.’442 Papers referred to the efficiency of the German defence and had even 
been encouraged to ‘talk up the Germans.’ Another common explanation given for 
the achievement of only modest tactical gains was the weather. This was an 
acceptable explanation for the Press Bureau because the assertion that the weather had 
suddenly difficult become moved blame away from Nivelle.  
   At the beginning of May, opinions emerged in the French press on potential 
lessons to be learned in the wake of ‘The Offensive of 16 April.’ On 1 May the GQG 
released an official communiqué in an attempt to explain the lack of surprise on 16 
April. The explanation was that a note captured by the enemy had revealed the plans 
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for attack in advance. 443 Though this was a significant factor in warning the Germans, 
the fact that this note provided no further explanation revealed a high level of cynicism 
on the part of the GQG. First, the British press had already mentioned the attack before 
the note had been captured. They had received the information from Nivelle in January 
while he was in London.444 Second, Nivelle was immediately aware that the note had 
been captured in February, two months before the attack, and did not alter his plans 
accordingly. Third, as April approached the French press mentioned the upcoming 
attack more frequently and by March even cited April as the date for the offensive. 
Although officially this was prohibited by the Press Bureau, papers were seldom 
punished for mentioning the plan and were even encouraged by GQG and the War 
Ministry to be enthusiastic about its outcome. Only factors which on the surface 
placed no direct blame on the GQG were allowed to be given as reasons for the 
meagre results in Champagne. 
   Some papers tried to state the obvious by revealing the glaring contrasts between 
Nivelle’s promises before the attack and the results achieved. L’Echo de Paris and La 
Bataille attempted to blame Nivelle and Mangin directly for their roles in the battle but 
were prevented from doing so. 445 Others, such as Le Petit Parisien and Le Journal, 
were permitted to discuss less politically charged aspects of the battle such as the effect 
of artillery fire. On 30 April, an article in Le Petit Parisien openly called for a 
government investigation into the ‘operation’ launched on 16 April. It argued that only 
the government had the means to conduct such an undertaking because ‘after every part 
of a battle, newspapers are given the news and then articles are not allowed to say 
anything against the actions. It is what it is and we must add that it is generally just.’ 
The author then went on to argue that the report should study the orders given, the 
results of the aviation and infantry reconnaissance and should question whether the 
weather conditions were appropriate for such an attack. 446 Four days later, the same 
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paper changed its opinion that only the government could conduct a proper 
investigation into the battle, and provided its own explanation. On 3 May, Le Petit 
Parisien published an article by Abel Ferry entitled, ‘The Lesson of the Last 
Offensive’447 saying that, ‘In this war, success is determined by the usage of the means 
at the disposal of the commanders. The genius of the chief is that he can do nothing 
against these mathematical necessities. The extent of the attack is limited to the number 
of cannons and the amount of munitions available. He is a prisoner of his materiel. A 
large amount of materiel on a small front means success is probable, little materiel on a 
large front means defeat and certain losses.’ He then went on to argue that, ‘The second 
important element is transport’ and ‘Surprise is the third. It is not possible that during 
every trimester, there is action based on organisation conducted during the previous 
trimester and focussed on a single battlefield. The enemy will know.’ The author 
continued ‘At the beginning of 1917 chances to rupture the front presented themselves. 
The enemy was menaced on 300KM and could potentially ignore a single principal 
mass of attack. The retreat neutralised three quarters of the line. This left 30 KM of 
front in Artois and 30 in Champagne. The attack was expected and the results were 
limited.’ Ferry went so far as to prophetically suggest that the negative effect on morale 
to the troops from the offensive could potentially lead to mutinies. 448 This was the first 
major, albeit indirect, criticism of the High Command in the Parisian Press which was 
allowed to be published in the wake of the Chemin des Dames Offensive and it 
appeared in France’s most heavily circulated daily. It is remarkable that this was 
published. 
The discussions in the press regarding the Nivelle Offensive had gone unpunished 
in March and early April by the Press Bureau, in part due to the Bureau’s 
preoccupations with censoring news of the February Revolution in Russia and the 
official American entry into the conflict. A similar situation now existed as the Bureau 
was primarily concerned with monitoring news of the May 1917 strikes in 
                                                          
447 Le Petit Parisien, 3 May 1917. 
448 Loez, 14-18 : Les Refus de la guerre p.129. 
126 
 
Paris. 449 The hectic environment at the Press Bureau 450 appears to have forced the 
agency to prioritise the censorship of certain events based on their political 
implications and how recently they took place. This was particularly the case when the 
censors were simultaneously faced with numerous potentially sensitive articles, as in 
early May. 
The GQG took notice of an increase of pessimism found amongst French troops in 
mid-May. In a letter sent to the Section d’Information on 14 May, the GQG again 
revealed a great deal of cynicism about its relationship with the press. The letter 
contended that French newspapers were giving too little space to French operations and 
too much to British ones because the French papers preferred to borrow articles from 
British papers rather than use the information transmitted by the Section d’Information. 
‘This produces a regrettable effect on the army. The apparent disproportion between 
our efforts and those of our allies, so contrary to the reality, can only have a troubling 
effect on the nation’s morale.’ 451 The press had chosen to neglect coverage of the 
Nivelle Offensive in favour of the British effort at the Battle of Arras in part because 
the latter achieved more significant results and had lasted two weeks longer. 452 But the 
situation was made more complicated for the French Press because of the enormous 
restrictions placed upon it by the GQG and the Press Bureau. Because the French press 
was reliant solely on vague and misleading official communiqués, it was severely 
limited in what information it could report and what opinions it could express. No 
negative information was communicated to the press by the GQG, and the 
achievements described were vague and devoid of perspective. 453 Therefore, the 
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French press was forced to portray the events in Champagne in a vaguely positive 
fashion and with little detail. 
   British communiqués were more informative than those released by the GQG. 
Furthermore, London had placed far fewer restraints upon the opinions which 
journalists in Britain were permitted to express.454 French reporters therefore were 
often better informed on the Battle of Arras than they were on the Nivelle Offensive. 
Responsibility for the French press’s reluctance to write about France’s own soldiers 
lay with the GQG which placed little faith in the French press to encourage public 
morale in the face of a tactical stalemate and strategic defeat. The GQG’s complaints 
that French military actions were being neglected in favour of British ones were 
seconded by War Minister Paul Painlevé and prompted the decision to split the Section 
d’Information into two agencies which became effective on 30 May. This eased the 
censor’s work load and allowed the two agencies to concentrate more on media tools 
such as photography and film which were previously neglected. 455  The division of the 
Section d’Information and the creation of the Maison de la Presse (at the beginning of 
1916) were the two most significant events in the development of the French wartime 
propaganda machine. The division was initiated by a debate over press censorship and 
by the limitations imposed on the French press when describing the poilus’ 
achievements. From May 1917, the Press Bureau was as involved in advising the press 
about what topics it should address as it was in ordering what topics the press must 
avoid. 456  
   After Pétain replaced Nivelle as France’s lead general, it remained prohibited for 
journalists to criticize Nivelle personally but there was a certain degree of leniency by 
the Press Bureau in allowing papers to imply that Nivelle’s replacement had been 
deserved. On 16 May, an article in Le Petit Parisien457 stated, ‘This decision will not 
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come as a surprise to the army, the parliament or anyone who in the past month has been 
able to read between the lines of the official communications from the High Command.’ 
The author then stated, ‘This is not the opportune moment to discuss the reasons for the 
replacement.’ ‘But, the choice could not be better.’ Though the author made a clear 
assertion that it was time to replace Nivelle, he finished, possibly in part to avoid 
censorship by writing, ‘Nivelle still deserves to be a commander of an army group. His 
compensation is just based on his role at Verdun and a general of his valour should 
continue to serve the country.’ The paper (which, because of the scepticism of its 
writers, had been amongst the most heavily monitored Parisian dailies in the two months 
preceding the Nivelle Offensive) was now permitted to engage publically in honest 
dialogue regarding the offensive’s legacy. 
   The writers at Le Figaro also took Pétain’s appointment as an opportunity to express 
their opinions on the offensive. In an article entitled ‘Origins and Results of the 
Offensive,’458 the author began by saluting Nivelle as ‘one of the most gallant men in 
the world and one of the proudest soldiers in the army... The victory of yesterday brings 
with it the foundations of victory tomorrow.’ Then the author changed tack and 
questioned Nivelle without referring to him directly. ‘We heard rumours that the 
German retreat would enable an offensive by us or the English, but this has not been 
the case….. Never has there been a battle launched without mistakes, but placing the 
objectives within a timeframe and then blabbing about it was the first mistake.’ In both 
articles, Nivelle was directly praised then indirectly criticised. The Press Bureau could 
not entirely conceal the defeat on the Chemin des Dames and worked to ensure that 
comments in the press were balanced while allowing critical commentary.   
Ribot addressed the Chamber on 22 May regarding the 16 April Offensive. His 
comments were brief but were heavily applauded by the majority of those in 
attendance, a rare occurrence in the Chamber of Deputies during the war. He pointed 
out that while France could always celebrate after a victorious battle, it must never do 
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so before one had been launched. 459 ‘The offensive could not have given all the 
results for which we were waiting. Without a doubt, hopes were excessively high 
and mistakes were made. But the accomplishments were significant.’460 It was 
acknowledged briefly by France’s political elite that Nivelle’s hopes were too high and 
that the country had engaged in premature triumphalism. This sentiment though was 
never wholly allowed to be echoed in the press and Nivelle remained largely beyond 
reproach in the media until after the war. Ribot’s comments were also intended to mark 
the final discussion over the consequences of Nivelle’s gamble. The media after 23 
May remained largely silent for the next two months about the Chemin des Dames. The 
press had stopped writing about the battle and was dealt with harshly when attempting 
to do so. Everyone wanted to forget Nivelle’s failed venture. 
   After three months, the ‘constant delay’ had expired and papers were in theory allowed 
to discuss the military details of the Nivelle Offensive. The GQG immediately informed 
the Press Bureau that it ‘saw no reason why the combat on the Aisne should not be 
portrayed as a great success.’ 461 While the wording from this order may be interpreted 
as somewhat equivocal, it was in practice a strictly enforced directive. No frank 
discussion took place in the media until after the war. The GQG feared that an 
uninhibited public inquiry into the event and its background might further damage 
morale at both the front and in the interior. During the summer an internal investigation, 
the Brugère Commission, presided by Generals Brugère, Foch and Gouraud was 
established to ‘study the conditions in which the offensive of 16-23 April took place in 
the valley of the Aisne and to determine the role of the general officers who exercised 
command’. Its final report, concluded on 30 September and 4 October, concluded that 
Nivelle had ‘not been up to the crushing task that he had assumed.’ Paul Painlevé who 
had become Premier in September described the report as ‘too much like rose water’. 462 
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The press agreed and condemned the report after it was released. Condemnation of the 
Brugère Commission’s findings however were quickly overshadowed by reports on a 
series of various political scandals headed by Clemenceau and L’Action Française.463  
The press chose, like the government in Paris, to forget Nivelle’s tenure at the GQG. 
The futile endeavour on the Chemin des Dames was largely forgotten in the French press 
until the end of the war. 
 
B. A Socialist International Peace Offensive: The Proposed Stockholm Conference. 
 
On 22 April 1917, an international peace conference was proposed by the Bureau 
of the Socialist International and was designed to be a follow-up to two previous 
socialist wartime meetings in Switzerland at Zimmerwald (5 to 8 September 1915) and 
Kienthal (24 to 30 April 1916).464 Although the SFIO had decided not to attend, its 
minoritaires faction began to rally in favour of the conference on 6 May. 465 Ribot and 
Malvy had in any case decided to prohibit passports for the conference466 and 
convinced the French cabinet also to forbid French members from attending.467 The 
Stockholm Conference, however, became an open point of debate again when the 
Russian socialists launched a new appeal on 15 May.468 On 28 May, upon the 
encouragement of two French socialists, Marcel Cachin and Marius Moutet, who had 
returned from Petrograd the day before, the SFIO after much debate unanimously 
resolved to accept the Stockholm invitation unconditionally. 469  
Ribot, who at first vacillated on whether to test the Union Sacrée by denying 
passports for Stockholm to the French Socialists, ultimately announced to the 
Chamber on 1 June that passports would be refused. 470 His decision was influenced by 
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the insistence of his Cabinet members and, most importantly, Pétain who on 31 May, 
at the height of the mutinies, declared that if passports were granted for Stockholm, he 
could not answer for discipline in the army. The Stockholm initiative and its rejection 
by the government had significant consequences for domestic and political unity in 
France for the rest of the war. The debate over whether to attend manifested itself in 
the French press between mid-April and late June, a period when France had been first 
bitterly disappointed on the Chemin des Dames and then affected by a series of strikes 
in Paris followed by a mutiny at the front. 
   Most Parisian newspapers began to report on Stockholm on 23 April, the day after 
the invitations for the meeting were first issued. It was not until 8 May, once the 
decision had been made at the Council of Ministers not to issue passports for the 
conference, that the Press Bureau declared that ‘no mention’ was ‘to be made of the 
refusal of all passports for Stockholm.’ This order, however, was followed up with two 
qualifications which confused the original and made it difficult to implement. The first 
was that ‘The refusal of the Council of Ministers to allow passports for Stockholm 
passes BUT do not allow the reproduction of news given by the agencies that there is a 
reason to suppose that the socialists want to go to Stockholm, but cannot acquire the 
passports to cross the border.’ The second was more specific, and ordered that ‘No 
reproduction be made of an article in L’Intransigeant471 concerning the refusal of 
passports to the Minoritaires. Also stop news that M. Brizon asked Ribot for a passport 
to go to Stockholm.’472 The Press Bureau therefore allowed reporting on Stockholm in 
all cases except by socialists who argued in favour of attendance, and even this latter 
was haphazardly enforced. Over the next two days, telegrams were stopped which 
discussed French invitations to Stockholm,473 particularly those which linked the 
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conference to the on-going strikes in Paris.474 The Press Bureau had acted too late and 
too indecisively to prevent the press from freely discussing Stockholm. By the first 
week of May, many newspapers, most notably Le Temps and L’Humanité, the two 
dailies which for the next month and a half most forcefully debated the conference 
proposal, had already clarified their positions. 
   Several papers engaged in a heated debate regarding Stockholm. The exchanges  
 
between papers were in fact public discussions between politicians who argued over  
 
the conference through the papers which they owned or for which they wrote. Le  
 
Temps, a paper usually admired for its unbiased factual analyses, covered Stockholm  
 
more closely than any other paper and argued forcefully against it. On 29 April, before 
the Press Bureau had passed orders on Stockholm, the paper published an article which 
dismissed the supporters of Stockholm as ‘Socialists who believe that the 
reconstruction of the International should be the supreme goal of the war and who 
sacrifice all ideals of justice and condemnation against those who have unleashed the 
scourge. ’ 475 Le Matin, another centrist paper, published articles even earlier in the 
month which referred to Stockholm as a ‘German, socialist plot,’476 an argument 
which was often repeated by that paper477 and later by Le Temps in late May after the 
French Socialist Party voted in favour of sending delegates to Stockholm. The centrist 
press was on the attack, placing socialist papers such as L’Humanité on the defensive 
for most of May. Unsurprisingly, the right-wing press opposed the Stockholm proposal 
from early on. Maurras in L’Action Française478 wrote on 24 April that the 
Conference was ‘a German attempt to get from the new Russian regime what they 
could not from the Ancien Régime. Namely, a separate peace,’479 and then on 9 May 
that the ‘preparations of the Minoritaires to go to Stockholm are an act of destruction 
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and anarchy.’480 Such accusations placed left-wing papers, particularly L’Humanité, in 
the difficult position of defending the socialist internationalist agenda while having to 
affirm the French left’s patriotism and commitment to France’s national defence and 
greater interests. 
   Paul Renaudel, editor of L’Humanité, was from the Majoritaire section of the party  
 
and personally opposed Stockholm, though not vehemently. 481 L’Humanité throughout 
May simultaneously published articles which represented the cautious Majoritaires’ and 
enthusiastic Minoritaires’ approaches to Stockholm. The latter increasingly featured in 
the paper after the Russian appeal for a conference on May 15 and in the lead up to the 
Socialist Party conference on 28 May. Renaudel’s articles were moderate, and generally 
defended the Socialist Party as a patriotic institution against attacks published in Le 
Temps and in the right-wing media. He also defended the Minoritaires as a group whose 
opinions were legitimate and were well intentioned, even if he did not fully agree with 
them.  
An article written by Renaudel on 9 May typifies L’Humanité’s journalistic 
approach that month. He wrote that he was not surprised by the negative reactions to 
the Socialist Party’s decision. ‘Bourgeois around the world see socialist unity as a 
grave threat.’ 482 While the ‘bourgeois’ would mostly have agreed with the socialist 
decision not to attend Stockholm, it was the unity of the party which Renaudel 
believed they perceived as threatening. Later in the article he argued that the 
Minoritaires group would not be ‘forced to define itself’ by outside forces. Renaudel 
defended the Minoritaires against accusations of unpatriotic leanings by stating first 
that ‘it is not simply a national crisis which currently needs to be resolved but also an 
international one.’ Then in response to accusations that the French socialists were 
being duped by German Social Democrats, he revealed his general editorial stance as a 
majoritaire socialist by arguing that ‘L’Humanité has always argued that the German 
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Social Democrats lie.’ He ended the article by declaring, ‘We will not give the 
adversaries of socialism the joy of declaring the death of the International. But the 
International must regenerate itself.’ 483 The French Socialist Party was being attacked 
from all sides and spent much of May reaffirming its patriotism and defending its 
intentions. 
In most cases, the Press Bureau lightly censored media coverage of the Stockholm 
proposal or chose to alter specific lines or words rather than slash entire articles. An 
order issued by the Bureau on 8 May was unspecific as to what socialist arguments 
were prohibited. No mention was to be made of news arriving from ‘agencies’ that 
socialists wished to attend Stockholm but were prohibited from doing so. Telegrams 
after this order were more closely monitored and often stopped or censored, 
particularly following the Soviet appeal on 15 May. On 17 May, a telegram from 
Havas in Rome was censored outlining the organisation for the proposed conference. 
By the end of May all telegrams discussing Stockholm were either censored or 
stopped. 484 But because the articles in the socialist press, particularly in L’Humanité, 
were based on opinion rather than analyses of forbidden information they were not 
specifically covered under the order. Only in late May after the appeal from Petrograd 
did the SFIO move towards accepting the Stockholm proposal. As a result, it was only 
in the days immediately preceding the Socialist National Council on 28 May that Pro-
Stockholm opinions began to appear unequivocally in the mainstream socialist press. 
   L’Humanité first began regularly to publish minoritaire-influenced articles on 
Stockholm with a short article on 14 May entitled, ‘Why we Must go to Stockholm,’ 
and then a much longer one the next day which outlined the socialist definition of a 
‘just peace.’ In an article on 15 May entitled, ‘The Liberty of the World,’ 485 Renaudel 
began by quoting Le Temps, which had declared that ‘It is not the job of the workers’ 
international to determine the conditions for a just peace, which is the task not of a 
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party or a group of parties but of the common effort of the Allied governments 
responsible before the nations which are defending their existence by defending the 
cause of liberty in the world.’ Renaudel retorted that L’Humanité did not accept Le 
Temps’ thesis. He argued the paper claimed the right for socialism, both national and 
international, to clearly state what it believes are the conditions for a ‘just peace’. 
‘Whereas Le Temps states that it is the job of the Allied governments to determine 
peace, we say it is the right of the people.’ Though the paper’s concept of a ‘just 
peace’ was clearly an international one, Renaudel stopped short of mentioning the 
German people or the German Social Democrats, who were hated and distrusted by the 
vast majority of French politicians and journalists. 
On 23 May L’Humanité began to run daily articles each written by a member of the 
SFIO. The paper now clearly violated the purpose of the orders given by the Press 
Bureau. Several of the authors including Paul Mistral, 486 the influential majoritaire 
socialist mayor of Grenoble, argued unequivocally in favour of Stockholm. The 
purpose of the Press Bureau’s orders was to prevent those in the Socialist Party who 
had been in favour of Stockholm, but who had been previously outvoted by the 
majority of their party, from proclaiming an injustice that they, as individuals, were 
being denied the right to travel to Stockholm. But L’Humanité had run articles since 
early May arguing both positions regarding Stockholm and had even provoked a 
heated debate with the right-wing press and the mainstream centrists, led by Le Temps. 
These articles increased in number after the Petrograd appeal and it became obvious 
that the party was moving towards accepting the Stockholm invitation. It was too late 
for the Press Bureau to act. 
There are several reasons why the Press Bureau might not have acted more quickly. 
The censors’ registers from May clearly demonstrate that civil unrest in Paris was the 
primary concern of the Press Bureau during that month. Another possibility is that the 
War Ministry was aware (the War Minister having taken part in the decision) that the 
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government was not going to grant passports to Stockholm in any case and therefore 
chose to concentrate censorship efforts on more immediate threats. Finally, because the 
shift had only begun after the Petrograd appeal on 15 May, it was seemingly 
unapparent to everyone until a few days before the Socialist National Council on 28 
May that the party was moving towards a unanimous decision to support Stockholm. 
On 29 May, the day after the Socialist Party voted to attend Stockholm, the 
Government acted quickly in attempting to prevent a further escalation. An order was 
issued by the Press Bureau which stated, ‘Do not allow the mention of a possible re-
issue of passports for Stockholm.’ 487 For the next three days, no significant mention 
was made in the press concerning passports, but the debate remained heated, 
particularly between the writers of L’Humanité and Le Temps. Renaudel, writing 
in L’Humanité, had previously argued against Stockholm, but now defended his 
party’s stance. In an article entitled ‘For a Just Peace,’488 Renaudel insisted that ‘It 
would be wrong to insinuate that the Socialist Party is unpatriotic.’ Two days later 
an article in Le Temps489 responded. ‘L’Humanité has published that it would be a 
profound error for France to judge that the Socialist Party’s belief in national 
defence has weakened. We do not make this insinuation because we do not 
believe that the socialist leaders have the power to weaken the will for national 
defence. We never have doubted the patriotism of good citizens regardless of their 
political stripes.’ After this disingenuous comment directed at Renaudel, the 
author went on to write about the dangers of recognising an ‘International’ and 
declared that to attend Stockholm would be a ‘criminal undertaking.’ The Press 
Bureau’s orders on 29 May had therefore failed to dampen the controversy.  
   On 30 May, the Press Bureau ordered that papers wishing to comment on 
passports for Stockholm must ‘wait for M. Ribot.’ Later that day, the Premier 
explained that the question would be examined at a Council of Ministers that 
Friday and the President would call to inform the Press Bureau of what path to 
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follow. 490 Two days later, Ribot announced at the Council that if passports were 
requested for Stockholm they would be denied. For the two next weeks, the debates in 
the press remained similar. Le Temps on 2 June attacked L’Humanité by stating that 
there was no excuse for its approach to Stockholm. The article argued that to enforce 
peace through a socialist international would amount to treason towards the peoples as 
it would supersede the authority of their governments. 491 On the same day, L’Action 
Française published a smug article which demonstrated its satisfaction that ‘The 
Grande Journée of yesterday did not result in what they (the socialists) were 
waiting for, or what they had planned.’ During the next two weeks, the writers of 
L’Humanité increasingly chose not to respond to the onslaught against them in the 
right-wing press and Le Temps. Until 16 June when the paper published the socialist 
declaration on Stockholm, 492 it gave little space to Stockholm.493 Its restraint during 
this period was admirable in the light of the attacks launched against it by the writers 
at Le Temps and echoed by dailies further to the right. On 13 June, in an article 
entitled ‘Illusion and Trickery,’ 494 an author for Le Temps complained that the 
socialist media, L’Humanité in particular, had continued to write about passports for 
Stockholm. This open debate in the press only came to end after 19 June495 when the 
Press Bureau finally decided to ‘Stop all articles and wires on Stockholm.’496 
Although discussion in the press continued after this date, it became less personal and 
more nuanced. The censors were now able to slash articles for the mere mention of 
Stockholm and even opinion pieces were more closely monitored regardless of the 
factual information they contained.  
   The refusal of passports for Stockholm had initiated the most sustained wartime 
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debate in the French Chamber over foreign policy. 497 The Stockholm proposal had 
similarly produced one of the most significant and least censored debates in the French 
press during the war. The debate had been relatively uncensored on the condition that 
the press refrained from attacking political personalities too blatantly or from linking 
the proposal to the strikes in Paris which took place at the same time. 498  Both 
Stockholm and the strikes received coverage in the press, but only with regard to   
Stockholm were papers allowed to debate publicly and suggest what course of action 
the government should follow. The initial leniency shown to the press over Stockholm 
was cited by several army officers as one reason for the outbreak of mutinies in the 
French army a month later. The subject of peace was listed in Pétain’s report on 23 
August 1917 as one to avoid in the future because of the risk to the morale of French 
soldiers. Stockholm was given as a specific example of the dangers of discussing 
premature peace. ‘Going to Stockholm is to make peace. For the trooper, if we can 
afford to go to Stockholm then we must make peace and this lowers military morale. 
’499 The extent to which the failure of the Stockholm proposal incited the troops to 
mutiny is debatable, however, some soldiers or citizens who read the discussion of 
Stockholm in the press might have been radicalized by the intense debate particularly 
between the writers of L’Humanité and Le Temps. Pétain and the GQG, as discussed in 
the next chapter, used the press as a scapegoat for the mutinies to divert blame away 
from themselves. 
   The government may have allowed the debate to take place because it diverted 
attention away from the strikes in Paris, but also because most of the press supported 
the government’s position in refusing passports for Stockholm. The attacks on the 
leftist press led by the usually objective Le Temps placed L’Humanité squarely on the 
defensive and forced it to defend the patriotism of the socialists who had argued in 
support of the Socialist International. This was the first major occasion during the war 
when newspapers were allowed to comment directly on government policy and make 
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suggestions for future action. The right-wing press was permitted to get away with 
personal attacks against prominent personalities on the left, whereas the left did not 
attempt to attack Ribot or others in the cabinet and would have been prohibited from 
doing so. This leniency towards personal attacks from the right foreshadowed what 
later transpired under the Clemenceau Ministry in its campaign against ‘defeatists.’ The 
press was allowed to conduct a debate on government policy over Stockholm because 
the majority of the coverage supported the government’s position.  
 
Conclusion 
 
   Beginning in April 1917, France entered a period characterised by disaster at the 
front and socio-political crisis in the interior. After Verdun, Nivelle had raised high 
expectations for an offensive that would quickly end the war on French terms. The 
press, with the intentions of raising morale in the interior, deceived itself, the French 
public and France’s soldiers into believing that the Nivelle Offensive would inevitably 
be successful and even devastating to the German war effort. The government’s 
allowance of such high hopes to manifest themselves in the press alerted even the 
Premier to the potential dangers when the media were improperly monitored or when 
the Press Bureau too loosely followed its own rules.  
   When the offensive failed, the GQG ensured that the press was kept as uninformed as 
possible and that no blame was attributed to France’s generals. Nivelle’s 
implementation of the ‘constant delay’ facilitated this process, and censorship managed 
to limit discussion in the media on the Chemin des Dames at the moment when it could 
have most harmed morale. The government decided a month later to no longer discuss 
the offensive, and the GQG waited another two months before ordering the press to 
portray the attack as a victory. Whereas bourrage de crâne had previously been the 
domain of the mainstream press and the War Ministry, the GQG now encouraged it 
also. Nivelle remained a hero after his replacement as had Joffre before him.  
     Nivelle had a different approach to the media from Joffre or Pétain. He was less   
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cautious than both when it came to censoring military information and even boasted 
about future operations. He also was aware of increasing pacifism in the interior and its 
effects on the troops. Unlike Joffre, who simply withheld all news when things went 
wrong, Nivelle under similar circumstances insisted that things were going to plan. One 
of the major lessons learnt by Pétain and which influenced his relationship with the 
press after his replacement of Nivelle was the negative effect of bourrage de crâne on 
an increasingly cynical readership at the front as in the interior. 
   The Ministry of the Interior also showed a certain cynicism in its dealings with the 
press during this period. The debate allowed to unfold in the press over the Stockholm 
Conference was unprecedented for its personal attacks, particularly on the left by 
L’Action Française and also notably by the usually restrained Le Temps. These were 
early examples of the type of attacks that later became common after the mutinies, 
particularly against Louis Malvy and Joseph Caillaux. The War Ministry also allowed 
the debates over Stockholm, not just because they distracted readers from the strikes 
that were taking place in Paris at the time and from the recent debacle on the Chemin 
des Dames, but also because they relieved pressure on an overburdened Press Bureau. 
The French information management system allowed minor rules to be violated when 
lenience suited greater purposes. 
   Though the environment at the Press Bureau in Paris was always stressful, the period 
between April and July 1917 was perhaps its busiest. Numerous setbacks happened 
concurrently during this period, and the Press Bureau needed to prioritise certain issues 
as more important than others. It was important above all else that the press not link the 
events together and portray them as constituting a national crisis. The Press Bureau was 
successful in this objective and was consequently was able to weather much of the 
storm until the crisis period was over.  
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Chapter 4: Crisis Continued 
 
 
Introduction 
 
   This chapter continues to explore how the French information management system 
operated during spring 1917, the low point for French military fortunes and for morale 
both at the front and in the interior. For the first time since 1914, large scale industrial 
strikes took place in Paris and in other urban centres. The Press Bureau had now to 
censor news of an event which manifested itself publicly and which large numbers of 
citizens witnessed first-hand. Furthermore the strikes, at first, were led by women. The 
government had to decide how the media should be permitted to interpret the presence 
of women in what was a very male dominated French labour movement.  
   Again the press was often allowed to disobey specific rules under the condition that it 
presented current events positively. This leads to the question of how and when 
journalists were able to judge whether their material would be permitted to pass even if 
it violated minor regulations. During the 1917 strikes, as with the censorship of other 
events concerning domestic affairs, the answer is found in the censor’s logbooks at the 
BDIC. At the beginning of the movement few orders were given, and they were not 
reissued when violated. Later, however, when news of the movement was heavily 
repressed, orders were given far more frequently and were more sternly worded. 
Indeed, the government used censorship to present the picture it wished to appear in the 
media rather than haphazardly enforcing the rules.  
    The spring 1917 French mutinies were extremely dangerous both militarily and for 
their capacity to incite panic and to encourage the anti-war movement in France. The 
chapter explains how self-censorship played the fundamental role in protecting perhaps 
France’s biggest wartime secret from the Germans when it was most important to do so 
and then how the Press Bureau later worked to contain news of the repression of the 
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mutinies. In the former case, the actions of France’s journalists demonstrated in a 
similar way to the Battle of the Marne in 1914 that the media could usually be trusted 
to keep military secrets. The GQG, however, still held a profound distrust of the media, 
particularly in reporting on political affairs.     
   The focus then turns to the legacy of the mutinies on press censorship, characterised 
by an increase in direct military involvement in policy formation. After the mutinies 
the GQG and particularly Pétain blamed careless journalism as a major cause of dissent 
in the army. The questionable legitimacy of Pétain’s accusations is evaluated in 
conjunction with the GQG’s growing role in press censorship and the development of 
propaganda. Under the short lived Painlevé premiership (12 September-16 November 
1917) the GQG regained much of the control over the publication of military 
information that it had lost under Nivelle.  Pétain personally designed the GQG’s 
policies towards the media and until Clemenceau’s appointment as Premier in 
November was briefly the most influential figure in French media censorship.  
   The French information management system also worked to censor another positive 
news story in the press related to the Americans. In June the first American officers and 
troops arrived to much fanfare in Paris but a slip up at the telegraph agency led to a row 
between the Press Bureau and the AEF, which led to the American decision to install 
its own bureau in Paris. The chain of events which were set in motion as a direct result 
of a mistake by one individual censor demonstrate the strain placed upon the Press 
Bureau to operate faultlessly especially when dealing with military information and 
illustrates the potential consequences of an inefficient censorship system. The French 
censorship system quickly adapted by focussing more heavily on naval censorship and 
did not repeat the same mistake for the remainder of the war.          
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A. The Midinettes on Strike. The French Labour Movement of May-June 1917. 
 
 The 1917 strikes occurred in two waves with the first taking place in January and the 
second in the spring. The former was centred largely in Paris and northern France, 
though there were strikes in other French urban areas too. The latter was more 
widespread and engulfed many of France’s provincial centres. 500 Women played a key 
role in both movements as they were paid much lower wages than their male 
counterparts and stood no risk of being sent to the front. Both 1917 strike waves began 
in the textile and clothing industries, though in the spring the movement also spread 
significantly into the armaments industry, making it more threatening to the 
Government. The government’s eventual reaction to this unprecedented level of 
wartime labour activity501 was a mixture of conciliation and legislative reform. 
   Both 1917 strike movements were at least partially successful in obtaining their 
economic goals. Armaments Minister Albert Thomas in January 1917 adopted 
minimum wages for workers in war production and ensured regular salary increases to 
combat the effects of inflation, but at the same time outlawed all strikes by war 
workers and imposed compulsory arbitration. This initiative was paired with a 
renewed attempt to ‘comb out’ munitions workers for front line duty. 502 The spring 
1917 strikes, though largely spontaneous and uncoordinated, were in direct defiance 
of Thomas’ January 1917 program. 
   The spring 1917 strikes were successful almost everywhere in obtaining wage 
increases. Their successes were due to negotiations between a conciliatory Malvy and 
the CGT whose membership had tripled to 300,000 in 1917. 503 In Paris there were 
133,000 strikers504,over 80% of whom were female.505 Some strikers showed early signs 
of pacifism or defeatism but these tendencies should not be exaggerated. They were 
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manifestations of a temporary lull in morale and patriotism influenced by the failure of 
the Chemin des Dames Offensive in April 1917 and the successful February Revolution 
in Russia. While many strikers sang the ‘Internationale’ and flew red banners, 
negotiations with the government and official demands were always presented as purely 
economic. 
   The most significant period of the strikes was between 11 and 30 May. During 
these three weeks the strikers were strongest numerically and were most successful in 
achieving their aims. The strikes were first led by women from the garments industry 
known as midinettes, 506 but these had largely ended by 23 May and were completely 
over by 28 May. In late May more industries followed suit such as the telegraph 
agencies, banks, domestic service and others. Though none of these workforces were 
so entirely involved in the strikes as were the midinettes in mid- May507 the total 
number of strikers in Paris was largest between 29 and 31 May, which later became 
referred to as ‘The Three Glorious Days.’ 508 During these three days, war workers 
became the driving force of the demonstrations and some strikes became violent, 
particularly those which involved or were directed by the CDS. 509 Though this 
comparison must not be exaggerated, these strikes along with those that lasted until 
mid-June were mildly reminiscent of the violent anti-war strikes which took place a 
year later. Specifically they were anti-war, male dominated and were less successful 
than the purely economic protests led by the midinettes two weeks earlier. Of the 
133,000 strikers involved in a total of 197 strikes510 in Paris during the May-June 1917 
strike wave, 390 were arrested by the time the movement faded out in late June. 511  
The strikes took place at the same time as the debate over Stockholm, one month 
after the Chemin des Dames débâcle and at the beginning of the high point of the 
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mutinies. Because of their timing, they were a sensitive topic for their ability to 
destabilize French public opinion. But whereas Stockholm was largely a political 
debate which could easily be monitored by the Press Bureau, the strikes were visible to 
on-looking citizens in Paris and in other urban areas. Instead, the Press Bureau sought 
to limit the information known to the press and any commentary which discussed the 
details of and motivations for the strikes. The government’s primary goal was to 
prevent the strikes being presented as anything more nefarious than simple demands 
for higher wages by a group of female clothing workers who were largely uninterested 
in politics.  It was only once the strikes became influenced by the CDS that the 
government hardened its control over their media coverage.  
   On 16 May, the Press Bureau first attempted to prevent the press from mentioning 
strikes in the clothing industry. 512 Although a few papers such as L’Heure513 and Le 
Journal de Peuple514 had articles slashed in the next few days for attempting to 
provide coverage, most of the mainstream papers obeyed.515 As the movement began 
to grow and to become more visible however, the War Ministry realized it was no 
longer realistic to censor reporting of the strikes altogether. On 21 May, the Press 
Bureau ordered ‘Not to mention the strikes except for the bare fact. Nothing on heated 
demonstrations, seditious cries or the extension of the movement.’ 516 It seems that the 
first mention of the term midinettes in the censors’ registers appeared the next day 
when Havas attempted to pass a wire on the ‘strikes of the midinettes.’ At first the wire 
was allowed to pass but then was stopped later that night. 517 Two days later on 24 
May, Havas was allowed to pass another wire about the midinettes518 and after this 
the term became commonly used in the press. Ironically however, the strikes in the 
garments industry had already began to wind down by this time. 
   During the height of the strikes led by the midinettes in mid-May, the topic of 
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female strikers was allowed to be dealt with openly in the press. Because the 
demands of the midinettes were largely economic, the government deemed them to 
be relatively unthreatening. Upon the success of the midinettes in being granted most 
of their demands on 19 May, L’Humanité published an article the next day entitled 
‘The Strike of the Clothing Manufacturers. It has finished with the triumph of the 
ouvrières.’ 519 The article stated that the strikers were getting a raise because of rising 
living costs (la vie chère) and had been granted the five-day work week (la semaine 
anglaise). At the end of the article, the author wrote that the ‘success of the 
midinettes has now led the hat makers to follow suit.’ Although the next day, the 
Press Bureau prohibited the press from claiming that the movement was expanding, 
this order appears to have been loosely enforced on the condition that the press only 
discussed female-led, economically motivated strikes that were outside the war 
munitions industry. On 25 May, L’Humanité published an article entitled ‘The Strike 
Movement has grown again.’ 520 The article began by stating that ‘Yesterday over 
twenty thousand women from over fifteen corporations were on strike. Today, their 
numbers have risen again. The movement launched by the female workers in the 
clothing industry has proved an example to all women that regardless of where they 
work, they have the same rights and needs.’ Although this article was moderately 
censored by the Press Bureau, 521 the paper was still permitted to demonstrate its 
support for the midinettes. This enlightened approach to female collective bargaining, 
however, was hardly expressed unanimously in the press. 
   Although L’Action Française was permitted to condemn the strikes, it was 
prohibited from taking aim specifically at female workers and therefore published 
little on the movement of the midinettes while it took place. On 22 May, in the wake 
of the overwhelming success of the midinettes movement in achieving its goals, 
L’Action Française attempted to publish a scathing report on the female strikers 
which included remarks like ‘why pacifists have to be feminists.’ 522 A vast amount of 
the article was slashed including this passage but it is unclear whether the Press Bureau 
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chose to censor the article because it condemned the midinettes or because it linked the 
strikes to pacifism. The fact that L’Action Française was one of nine papers censored 
that day,523 almost all of which were from the far-left or right, suggests the latter. 
   On 30 May the GQG launched a report on the press and its effects on morale in the 
Third Army which stated that soldiers were complaining that their ‘wives were being 
shot.’ It concluded that the press ‘needed to be watched’ and that the most pressing 
issue was the media’s coverage of ‘the movement in Paris’ because many soldiers 
believe that ‘peace will come through revolution.’ 524 This report did not immediately 
affect the way in which women were portrayed in the media (the female led phase of 
the movement had come to an end), but it did lead to a further hardening of censorship 
by the Press Bureau of the media’s coverage of the strike movement. Pétain later 
included strike movements as a subject to avoid in the press in his final report of 23 
August 1917 explaining the reasons for the French mutinies. 525 Clemenceau, who had 
spoken strongly against the strikes in the Senate on 7 July,526 strictly enforced the 
ban when he became Premier in November. Even before this the Press Bureau on 
the night of 24-25 August527 banned the word chômeuses528 from usage in the press. 
There were few examples of blatant sexism towards the midinettes in the media in mid-
May, because their goals were economic and were relatively moderate. In late May, 
however, when the strikes moved into war industries and became more political, the 
media’s interpretations of the strikes became more heavily opinionated and the Press 
Bureau became increasingly concerned over the tone of press coverage. 
   L’Humanité closely followed the rapid extension of the strike movement in late 
May. On 25 May the paper featured an article which commented on how the 
movement had spread into the hat makers and rubber makers unions. From then on, the 
paper published daily details on every new group that participated in the strikes. It 
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seems the paper was permitted to discuss the extension of the strikes because it 
continued to focus on the feminine aspect of the movement. On 27 May, an author in 
L’Humanité commented, ‘The movement has extended to the point that we may finally 
consider the creation of a central body to address the needs of women in corporations.’ 
529 Whereas the role of women still remained central to the articles in L’Humanité the 
paper did mention, in passing, the increasing role of male actors, particularly of Léon 
Jouhaux and the CGT. 
By this time, other papers had ceased pretending that this was still, in fact, a strike 
dominated by women from the clothing industry. On 27 May, an article in Le Figaro 
by Alfred Capus entitled ‘The Government and the Strikes’530 warned that ‘The 
strikes of the midinettes have produced unsavoury characters on the streets of which we  
 
need not warn the government. The people should ensure that these strikes remain  
 
about wage disputes between workers and bosses.’ Further to the right, L’Action  
 
Française condemned the strikes more forcefully and even suggested that they were  
 
orchestrated by German agents. In a 28 May article entitled ‘The Mongers of  
 
Disorder,’ 531 Leon Daudet wrote, ‘It has been indicated that the strikes of the midinettes  
 
and bodies of feminine workers are degenerating slowly under the influence of the  
 
Boches or the Pro-Boches and are being tolerated in Paris.’ The same article stated that  
 
‘German agents are pushing for a pro-Boche peace and are paying and influencing the  
 
public.’ Until now the Press Bureau had been lenient towards papers that reported on the  
 
strikes, but with the strikes growing and their media coverage becoming increasingly  
 
heated this tolerance was unlikely to last. 
 
Beginning on 26 May, newspapers were increasingly censored for comments on the 
strikes. Between 26 and 31 May the strikes grew rapidly in both size and intensity, and 
the Press Bureau issued several new orders prohibiting the press from including 
specific details on the movement. On 26 May, after a photo was published of the 
strikes in L’Excelsior, all photos of strikes were forbidden. The next day, papers were 
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prohibited from publishing any sanctions taken against functionaries because of the 
strikes in various services of the Ministry of War such as the telegraph agency. On 28 
May, it became prohibited to mention strikes of ‘war employees’ or to comment on 
violence or stone throwing. On 30 May, as the strikes moved more heavily into arms 
factories, a ‘formal’ order was given not to mention strikes in munitions factories. 
Finally on 31 May, the last of the ‘Three Glorious Days,’ an order was given by the 
Director of the Press Bureau to be ‘severe on strikes, no titles indicating that strikes are 
spreading, no mention of strikes in munitions factories.’ Finally the formal letter 
ordered journalists to ‘no longer make blanks or to indicate the number of lines 
censored.’ 532 Although the new orders specified what details on the strikes were 
prohibited, in theory they added little to the existing orders from 21 May stating that 
nothing be mentioned on the strikes except for the bare fact. Furthermore, it was 
acknowledged at the time by censors working at the Press Bureau that the final order 
regarding the omission of blanks in articles was impossible to enforce. 533 The result of 
these new orders, none the less, was a heavy increase in the number of articles 
censored between 26 May and the end of the strikes in June. 
On 26 May, three left-wing papers were censored for discussing the strikes: L’Eveil, 
Le Journal du Peuple, and L’Humanité. The next day, five papers were slashed, 
including the moderate papers Le Petit Journal and Le Petit Parisien. This number 
continued to grow steadily along with the intensity of the movement until a climax 
was reached on 31 May when 19 papers including all the mainstream Parisian dailies 
(with the notable exception of Le Temps) were censored for discussing the strikes (16 
were censored the same day for discussing Stockholm). 534 Although only one paper, 
Le Bonnet Rouge,535 was suspended during this period (for fifteen days),536 the 
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censorship was so rigorous that the Bureau was forced to consider how to limit 
the number of blanked paragraphs. Few papers decided blatantly to disobey the 
Press Bureau by continuing to focus on the anti-governmental elements of the 
strike movement. The forceful role of the Press Bureau succeeded in preventing the 
press from encouraging the May 1917 strikes at the point when they were most 
dangerous to public order. But for some, the government had not acted quickly 
enough. 
   A report from the Third Army on 30 May mentioned the strikes in Paris as 
influencing the ‘strikes in the army’ and explained that ‘all of the soldiers read the 
newspapers.’537 The referred to strikes in the army were the ongoing mutinies in the 
French front lines, most notably in the vicinity of Soissons. The apex of the mutinies 
occured between 20 May and 10 June. A postal control report from 5 June argued that 
the strikes were partially responsible for the mutinies and a letter written in response to 
this report named the ‘strikes in Paris’ as the most important element affecting troop 
morale. On 18 June, one week after the mutinies had largely subsided, a report from 
the GQG focused on the ‘cause of the disorder.’ 538The report stated that the soldiers 
‘are determined that there is a bourrage de crâne’ and that there is ‘a revolutionary 
movement in the interior that people would like to see soldiers join.’ Later the report 
described a belief amongst the soldiers that ‘the women in Paris are being massacred 
by Annamites539 and black troops’ 540 These reports had a strong impact on both Pétain 
and Clemenceau in their approaches to the media in dealing with strikes during the last 
year of the war. In July, the mere mention of strikes began to be disallowed by the 
Press Bureau, and Clemenceau on becoming Premier in November entirely prohibited 
the mention of labour activity in France or abroad. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
for German banker Marx von Mannheim. The paper went out of circulation on 18 July 1917. SHD 5N 
357.  
536 SHD 5N 357, list of sanctions taken against newspapers carried out by the Military Government of 
Paris.   
537 SHD 5N 438, 30 May 1917.  
538 SHD 5N 438.  
539 Colonials from French Indochina. 
540 SHD 5N 438.  
151 
 
The accusations by Clemenceau and later by Pétain in July and August that the 
press was partially responsible for the mutinies because of its reporting on the strikes 
in Paris were exaggerations. The mutinies began over a week before the press’s 
reporting of the strikes became negative. The press was forbidden to mention the 
arrest of women and did not do so. Fears involving Annamites were not grounded in 
the press’s reporting but were founded upon racist rumours circulated at the front. The 
Press Bureau was indirectly responsible for allowing a few alarmist reports to be 
published in the press during the second phase of the strikes in late May. The 
government had foreseen the dangers in the press’s reporting on a growing labour 
movement early on, but saw the news of a successful economically motivated 
movement led by women who were deemed to be largely apolitical to be harmless. 
When the movement became more politically motivated and dominated by the CGT 
and more specifically the CDS, censorship of the press was gradually increased. 
Another important factor was the increasing pressure placed on censors at the Press 
Bureau at this time as a result of the Stockholm debates and the monitoring of 
information on the repression of the mutinies. 
   Clemenceau and Pétain ensured from the summer of 1917 that strike activity became 
heavily censored until the war’s end. Both men had personal and political motives for 
exaggerating the negative effect of the press’s tolerance regarding the strikes of May-
June 1917 on public and military morale. On the one hand, Clemenceau later used the 
event to attack his political rivals Interior Minister Louis Malvy and Joseph Caillaux, 
both of whom he had arrested for treason in 1918. The 1917 strike movement in Paris 
marked the beginning of Clemenceau’s unwritten alliance with the right wing press, 
particularly L’Action Française, in attacking ‘defeatists’ and ‘pacifists.’ 541  On the 
other hand, Pétain partially used the press as a scapegoat for the mutinies in the French 
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army. More importantly, Pétain sought to retain for the GQG some of the power over 
the media which was lost with Joffre’s replacement by Nivelle in December 1916. The 
media and the Press Bureau reacted to the strikes as the events themselves unfolded. 
The Bureau would have been unwise to enforce too strictly its orders to report only the 
bare facts of the strikes since citizens in France’s urban areas who witnessed the 
events first hand would have viewed this move with suspicion. 
 
B. Crisis at the Front: The French Army Mutinies of May-June 1917 
 
 
    The exercise in futility on the Chemin des Dames had a devastating impact on the 
army’s morale. On 29 April, the same day that Pétain was appointed Chief of Staff of 
the French Army, the first true mutiny was reported. The soldiers of the Second 
Battalion of the 18
th 
Infantry Regiment refused to renew their attacks along the Chemin 
des Dames and took over their encampment. Just two weeks earlier, the battalion had 
lost two thirds of its men during the initial stage of the Nivelle Offensive and, rather 
than being disbanded, was reinforced with new draftees. 542 By 15 May, 26 similar 
incidents had taken place. In the second half of May, such incidents of ‘collective 
indiscipline’543 became more frequent, involved greater numbers of men and were 
better organized. Some even began to resemble the councils which were beginning to 
appear in the Russian Army. 
   During the apex of the mutinies in the first week of June, some incidents became 
violent544 and attempts were made to commandeer railway cars and take them to Paris 
to negotiate with the government. The vast majority of incidents involved refusals to 
attack rather than to defend established positions. By the end of June, the mutinies had 
affected up to 50 divisions and as many as 30,000 soldiers. 3,427 soldiers were 
convicted of offenses and 554 were sentenced to death. In the end, 55 soldiers were in 
                                                          
542A. Wiest, The Western Front. 1917-1918 (London,2008). p.48. 
543 A euphemism used by the GQG for the uglier word ‘mutiny’.  Watt, Dare Call it Treason p. 185. 
544 There were 80 acts of ‘collective acts of indiscipline’ in total, 21 of which (26.2%)  involved either acts 
of violence or suggested acts of violence such as explicit threats or shots fired. Loez, 14-18 : Les Refus de 
la guerre p. 332.  
153 
 
fact executed. 545 The mutinies were not only dangerous in their own right but also 
came at a particularly critical moment for the French war effort. The Russian 
Revolution and the appointment of the Ribot Government in March, a series of 
industrial strikes in France’s major cities (particularly Paris), and a failed offensive on 
the Chemin des Dames which resulted in a change in military leadership all 
contributed to the mutinies and were events which, when compounded, created 
uncertainty for France’s future. The successful prevention of the news of the mutinies 
during their most dangerous period from reaching both the enemy and the French 
public was one of French censorship’s greatest wartime accomplishments.  
   The mutinies also left a harsh and immediate legacy on wartime relations between 
the French military and the press. As the events transpired, several army commanders, 
including Pétain, complained to the Ministry of War that the men who were engaged 
in the acts of indiscipline had been under the influence of the press. Furthermore, 
postal control reports confirmed that all soldiers read the newspapers and a large 
number mentioned events such as the Stockholm Conference or the strike movement 
in Paris in their correspondence. 546 Pétain’s final report on the mutinies to the 
Ministry of War on 23 August 1917 provided a list of subjects for the media to avoid 
and another which the press should propagate. His suggestions were similar to those 
made by Clemenceau upon becoming Premier in November. The two men were 
entirely dissimilar in their backgrounds and in their personalities. But they 
were in full agreement (albeit for completely different reasons) when it came to 
imposing more governmental and military control of the media as a result of its 
sinister influence during the mutinies. For this reason, the legacy of the mutinies and 
their subsequent effect on press censorship in France until 1919 is in some ways a 
more complex and significant subject than the mechanics surrounding the censorship 
of the mutinies themselves. 
   One of the great mysteries surrounding the mutinies is how they were concealed 
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from both the enemy and the home front. While this remains obscure, there is enough 
evidence to enable a preliminary answer. Hopefully more information will be revealed 
in 2017 when a new series of archival documents at Vincennes on the mutinies will be 
released. The archival material currently available demonstrates that the news of the 
mutinies was largely concealed through a combination of factors. Intense monitoring 
of the press by both the censors at the GQG and the Ministry of War (Press Bureau), 
self-censorship by the mainstream press and press agencies, an increase in postal 
control and a constant barrage of complaints launched at the press by the GQG were 
all contributing factors. 
Archival material from the Service historique de la défense reveals a particularly 
intense period of press monitoring by both the Press Bureau and the GQG beginning 
on 21 May, just as the mutinies began their highest period of intensity. 547 On 21 May, 
Minister of War Paul Painlevé wrote a letter to the GQG and to France’s regional 
military commanders emphasising the importance of a previous note from 24 March 
ordering all civilian censors to be immediately replaced by military personnel. 
Although a higher percentage of military personnel functioning as censors in Paris and 
in the provinces perhaps contributed to a tighter control over information related to the 
mutinies (a military affair), there is no direct evidence that this was the case or that this 
order was implemented immediately. In fact, a follow-up letter by Painlevé sent on 30 
July which ordered that Prefects replace local civilian censors with almost any 
available soldier willing to perform the task suggests that this was a difficult order to 
implement. 548 The order did reflect, however, an increased interest in censorship at the 
highest level of the War Ministry just as the mutinies began their most intense period. 
   The publication of an article entitled ‘The Troops Rest’ which reached the front lines 
on 27 May initiated a barrage of letters from the GQG to the Press Bureau over the 
next few days about the negative effect of the press on troop morale. A letter from 
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General Prion which complained that the article made frontline service ‘appear 
pleasant’549 led Maurejouls, the Head of the Press Bureau, to send out a scolding 
memorandum to his staff the same day. Maurejouls stated that ‘The results of many 
seizures have been insufficient’ and that he now wanted ‘to be notified as quickly as 
possible when the orders for seizures have been given and how many papers have been 
seized.’ 550 On 30 and 31 May, reports were filed by Generals Ducher, Gounod, 
Franchet d’Espèrey and Humbert giving their explanations for the mutinies. All of the 
reports mentioned the negative effects of the Russian Revolution, Stockholm and the 
strikes in Paris on troop morale and specifically blamed the negative influence of the 
press. 551 Whereas Ducher552 and Humbert553 both stressed the need to monitor the 
press, Franchet d’Espèrey suggested themes which it should propagate. In his report 
on 31 May, Franchet d’Espèrey recommended that the mainstream media should stress 
four subjects in particular: ‘1.German aggression. 2. The Negative situation in 
Germany. 3. The intense advantage given to the Allies by the American intervention. 
4. That all they need to do is hold on to win and not become industrial slaves to the 
Germans.’ He then recommended that these be ‘repeated every day because they have 
been effective elsewhere.’ 554 These reports in addition to a series of postal control 
analyses filed by his staff greatly influenced Pétain’s report of 2 June. In the report, 
Pétain ordered that ‘what the army must do now is monitor potentially harmful 
organizations in the interior (ones that provoke indiscipline).’ His second 
recommendation was to monitor the press more closely. ‘Papers must be instructed to 
use the highest discretion when discussing the Russian Revolution, pacifist tendencies, 
reports between officers and soldiers, advice from soldiers, strike movements and the 
question of peace.’ In addition to the topics which should be prohibited from 
publication in the press, he also suggested that ‘The positive theme of the American 
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entry into the war should be encouraged.’ 555 Pétain stressed the importance of the 
press’s role in the mutinies more than did the other officers. Other officers had based 
their reports on evidence given to them by subordinates who had recorded the events at 
the front.  Pétain synthesized these reports and included postal reports which also 
appeared to demonstrate the press’s influence on troop morale. 
   During the mutinies, postal control doubled to a rate of 500 letters per regiment 
inspected daily. 556 On 30 May, two reports were released by the GQG analyzing 
troop correspondence.557 The report that came directly from the Postal Control 
Service was brief but pointed. The press was reported as being overly pessimistic 
regarding the Nivelle Offensive and it was demonstrated that soldiers were writing 
home about Russia and the strikes. In particular, the fact that women were striking 
made them most agitated.558 The second report, influenced by the first, came from the 
GQG and more heavily emphasized the negative influence that postal control reports 
were having on the High Command’s impression of the press. The report began by 
claiming that the press had given the impression to the troops that their failure on the 
Chemin des Dames was the fault of their commanders. It then explained that the 
press’s reporting of the Russian Revolution led to a widespread belief at the front that 
the government was considering making peace. As a result, the report stated, ‘tone of 
the press is responsible for depression.’ It then claimed that the media ‘wants to see the 
troops led by a directionless government.’ This statement was important because it not 
only demonstrated that the GQG believed the press to be irresponsible but also that 
there were papers that purposefully sought to weaken the war effort. It was this 
mentality found at the highest levels of the GQG that later found resonance with 
Clemenceau. The report concluded by naming two principal dynamics which most 
influenced the mutinies and stated that the two were related: ‘A. Local and unique 
reasons. B. More importantly the malaise caused over military and political events by 
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the press. Both dynamics are linked and the press needs to change its tone. This 
problem did not occur during either the Somme or Verdun.’ 559 Although it is unclear 
what exactly the report meant by ‘local and unique reasons’ it is clear that the GQG 
intended to divert attention away from its own share of responsibility for mutinies. 
This was particularly true in the case of the press’s coverage of the Chemin des 
Dames. The fact that the soldiers were writing to the home front about the failure of 
that offensive did not necessarily imply that they were influenced to do so by the 
press. Their opinions were also to a great extent influenced by first-hand experiences 
and through the spreading of rumours amongst the troops. Certain fears such as those 
surrounding the violation of Parisian women by ‘Annamites,’ had no foundation in 
media reports. The fact that soldiers read the news and discussed current events did 
not mean that all of the opinions they expressed (often while inebriated) during the 
mutinies derived directly from newspapers. This explanation, however, proved a 
convenient one for the GQG, and it changed little until the end of the war.  
   Self-censorship played the most significant role in preventing news of the mutinies 
from being published between 20 May and 10 June. It was not until 30 May that orders 
were given to censor all civil and military correspondence in the departments of the 
Oise and the Somme for indiscretions. 560 Before this date, when postal control had 
been doubled but was not absolute, it is highly probable that at least some messages 
concerning the mutinies were sent from the army zone to the home front. No papers in 
the interior, however, attempted to publish articles on the mutinies. Although in 
accordance with ‘Circular 1000’, 561 all press reporters were cleared from the army 
zone once the disturbances began, and even Deputies of the Chamber could not visit it, 
562 local reporters would have either been informed of the mutinies by witnesses or 
would have witnessed the disturbances, which were often in the centres of towns and 
villages. No attempts were made by the local presses in the areas affected by the 
                                                          
559 SHD 16N 298, GQG report on troop correspondence, 30 May 1917.  
560 SHD 16N 298, 30 May 1917.  
561 SHD 5N 346. 
562 Renouvin, The Forms of War Government Chapter 4. 
158 
 
mutinies to publish stories on the events. Finally, though there would have been 
reporters from Havas and Fournier (France’s two main news agencies) in the vicinity 
of the mutinies, no telegrams concerning them were sent to the telegraph agency in 
Paris. From 1 June an attempt was made by the Press Bureau and the GQG to maintain 
secrecy by limiting the number of telegrams regarding the censoring or seizure of 
newspapers. 563 Perhaps the clearest evidence for the effectiveness of this policy was 
that even the censors who worked at the Press Bureau’s telegraph agency were 
unaware of the full extent of the mutinies until after they had been repressed.564 
Undoubtedly then a great deal of self-censorship existed during the most dangerous 
period of the mutinies. Self-censorship it appears was practised not only by press 
agencies and national newspapers but also by citizens on the home front and local 
newspapers which chose not to publish the news. It would be cynical to assume that 
this self-censorship were based solely on the fear of reprisals, but it also would be 
naive to reject this motivation as a contributing factor. It was a combination of the fear 
of punishment by the government and national or patriotic interest which inspired such 
a large number of Frenchmen and women to keep secret what was perhaps the most 
sensitive military information of the entire conflict. 
   Although the national press began to enquire into the repression of the mutinies after 
the first week of June, there appear to have been only two instances when the press in 
Paris alluded to the mutinies before this time. On 4 June, an article was published 
against the Press Bureau’s orders in Rappel and in XIX Siècle entitled ‘I had a Dream.’ 
565 The article discussed a supposed dream by the author in which committees of 
soldiers made the tactical decisions for upcoming offensives. With a sarcastic tone, the 
tactics suggested by the soldiers involved the most rapid possible advance of infantry 
and the full scale forward thrust of men without regard for loss of life. Both papers 
were ‘severely warned’566 for their indiscretions but neither paper was seized or 
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suspended. Rappel was a medium to small sized daily and the readership numbers for 
XIXè Siècle were probably deemed insignificant. Both papers heeded the warnings 
given to them for the offence, and neither was sanctioned again for the remainder of 
the war.567 The second instance was an article by Henri Fabre in Le Journal du Peuple 
which commented on the censorship of the mutinies and their repression. On 15 June, 
this article described the ‘indulgence that governs the suppression of understandable 
nervousness’568 and was more easily recognized and censored by the Press Bureau. 
Censors became fully aware of the mutinies after the 9 June prohibition on the 
publication of information related to the military justice code. 
On 5 June, after the first two soldiers had been condemned to death for their actions 
in the mutinies, Poincaré decided that he would grant full powers to the GQG to carry 
out executions of prisoners without prior presidential approval. 569 On 7 June, the day 
before Pétain notified Painlevé of these changes of the Military Justice Code (Articles 
208 and 217), 570  L’Oeuvre published an article entitled ‘The Pardoning of Death 
Sentences.’ Although the publication of the article went unpunished, it prompted the 
Press Bureau to prohibit the ‘rumour’ in the article to be spread further in the media571 
and then on 9 June to give the order, ‘Do not allow discussion or commentary on the 
subject of the decree modifying the laws of 10 and 17 August 1914 and 8 June 1916 on 
the revisions of judgments of war councils that will be in the Official Journal of 10 
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June.’ 572 L’Oeuvre then attempted to publish an article entitled ‘Military Doctrine and 
the Powers of the State’ on 12 June and the Press Bureau successfully prevented it 
from doing so. 573 The final prohibition of public statements regarding the suppression 
of the mutinies or the delegation of Presidential powers to pardon death sentences 
appears to have been made on 3 July when the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, a highly 
active and influential civil liberties group, was prevented from reproducing a 
commentary on military justice. 574 The repression of the mutinies along with the 
events themselves, though they had inevitably become common knowledge within two 
months of their occurrence, remained entirely prohibited subjects for the press until the 
end of the war. 575  
   The principal legacy of the mutinies for press censorship was a gradual tightening 
of military control over the media between June and September 1917.  In June 
Pétain developed a close relationship with Poincaré576 and Painlevé which added to 
his influence over the Press Bureau. Pétain wished to regain some of the military 
control over the media that had been lost under Nivelle but had a starkly different 
approach from Joffre on what influence the military should have over the press. 
Joffre had been primarily concerned with the tight control of information related to 
battles and weapons and with glorifying French military achievements. By contrast, 
Pétain sought not only to prevent the press from publishing military secrets but also 
to control the editorial lines of newspapers writing on both military and domestic 
affairs. Pétain had been particularly concerned with the press’s editorializing of the 
Chemin des Dames Offensive. On 11 June a postal control report on the mutinies 
577 asserted that the most significant influence on the troops was negative reporting 
about the Chemin des Dames. The report went on to state that there had been a 
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systematic denigration of Nivelle, that the press was ‘anti-militaristic’ and that 
Stockholm and the Russian Revolution both encouraged soldiers to ‘push for 
peace.’ The report specifically accused Le Journal du Peuple, Le Pays, Le Petit 
Renois and Le Petit Parisien as being the papers most responsible for publishing 
pacifist or harmful material. In June Pétain established ‘press missions’ during 
which journalists and writers were taken on visits to units at certain points on the 
front. The resulting articles were then censored by the GQG before being submitted 
to the Press Bureau for further inspection. On 23 August, Pétain gave his final 
report outlining the reasons for the mutinies and suggested how the press could help 
prevent similar events from occurring in the future. 
   Pétain officially announced the end of the mutinies after the French capture of La  
Malmaison on 24 October. 578 His final report on the mutinies was, however, written two 
months earlier and focused heavily on the impact of the press on troop morale. During  
July the only significant incident in the press over the mutinies had been the publishing 
of an article in L’Echo de Paris on the 30th which described soldiers resting at the front 
and resulted in a scolding letter by the GQG to the Press Bureau.579 Pétain’s report from 
23 August to the Ministry of War580 is the most significant document demonstrating the 
effect of the mutinies on military-press relations in France for the rest of the war. Pétain 
outlined five subjects to be avoided in the press and then seven which should be 
stressed. Pétain argued that the press should be forbidden from discussing: 
 
1. Military Law. This included ‘theoretical hypotheses’ on the subject 
and all propositions which ‘in practice are unrealistic.’ Included in  
this section, he added ‘the demobilization of older, called up classes, 
probation and allowances, reparation of damages, bids for permissions  
and social projects after the war.’ 
 
2. Articles citing unjustified claims (rumours). 
 
3. Periods of instruction behind the lines and the maintenance of strict  
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discipline during rest time. ‘Papers too often cite the story of soldiers  
resting while taking leave from the trenches without taking into 
consideration the dangers of complete inaction and the obligation to 
constantly maintain through training the cohesion and warrior spirit  
of a troop without knowing what circumstances may force the high  
command to make the units suddenly end their rest time and re-enter the 
trenches.’ 
 
4. Articles which by nature create a divide between officers and men. 
He gave as an example an article by M. Mourier on 18 August in  
Le Journal entitled ‘Justice for the Combatants’ which produced a  
‘deplorable effect in the army.’ 
 
5. The systematic denigration of the High Command and the military  
leaders, critiques of the organization of the army and reports detailing  
certain sessions of the parliament. ‘All of these critiques are carefully 
remembered and commented upon by hard headed sowers of 
indiscipline. They are a powerful solvent of all confidence in 
military leaders.’ 
 
Pétain’s dramatic tone was intended to influence Poincaré and Painlevé during the 
mutinies and afterwards to tighten military control over the press. His letter revealed 
not just a politically conservative approach to free speech but also a legitimate caution 
towards the media in the wake of one of France’s most serious military crises of the 
war. 
Pétain’s report then described which subjects he believed should be encouraged for 
discussion in the media: 
1. Operations. ‘Articles related to an operation should be inspired by  
the following directives. A. The soldier must believe in the communiqué.  
B. The soldier is highly suspicious and speaks often of bourrage de  
crâne. C. The soldier is very sensitive to all comments mentioning his  
unit or actions in which he took part. D. Avoid long term predictions. 
Papers have a tendency to exaggerate the strategic advantages of  
tactical operations. This constitutes bourrage de crâne.’ ‘Absolute  
sincerity is necessary but papers should be sure to avoid: A. Reproductions 
 of articles that are intended to make readers believe a certain  
governmental action. B. Censorship through slashing.’ This  
procedure possibly presents more dangers than allowing full articles.  
Blanks allow the reader to imagine things that are otherwise unbelievable. 
 
2. Peace. There is no doubt that this is a question which preoccupies the  
troops. ‘The will to return home.’ It is important to show them that  
life in France under a paix blanche would be worse than under a  
victorious peace. Show them Germany’s postwar economic ambitions.  
These would be achieved with the help of its reconstructed merchant  
navy which would impose commercial treaties which would be ruinous 
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for France and its products and would condemn the French people to  
an irreversible misery. Insist on the gravity of the crimes committed, 
      disseminated constantly through images, cinema, talks by repatriated  
citizens, the systematic destruction, pillages and brutalities committed  
by German soldiers whether they are Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon or from  
Baden. Discuss often the treatment of our prisoners and the miserable  
state of those that have returned to France. For the soldier there are a few 
articles which inspire faith: We have been attacked, the unquestioned  
integrity of our territory, going to Stockholm means making peace.  
For the troops, to allow those to go to Stockholm signifies that we are  
obliged to make peace and this diminishes military morale. The soldier appreciates 
articles which appeal to his sentiment of revenge for historical  
or sentimental reasons. 
 
3. Articles dealing with the question of Alsace-Lorraine. Alsace-Lorraine must 
become French again. Make it known that that our rights over these    
provinces which were torn away by force and against the will of their  
populations have been recognized unanimously by our allies and that by 
claiming their return to France we are not fighting a war or conquest but one of 
restitution. 
 
4. Articles discussing foreign nations. Do not twist the truth. Make the  
soldier aware of the real difficulties of their situation. It would be a  
good idea to stress the disagreeable influence of the indiscipline which  
has overtaken the Russian regiments and to show the advantage the enemy  
has taken from the weakening in morale which has developed because of 
propaganda and intrigues. The soldier has little faith in America. We must  
show the effort of that nation by showing things as they are without  
exaggeration so as to avoid future disillusion. Re-affirm the strong interest  
taken by America in our operations, our finances and our future but insist  
on the idea that while France accepts the help of its allies581 it is not asking 
them to fight its battles in its place.  
 
5. Due respect towards leaders. In renditions of military events, do not separate  
the officers from their troops. The leaders have given up so much of their 
person that we cannot put them into question. Always exalt whenever possible 
l’esprit de corps by reciting the great actions executed together as a group  
and by exalting the bravery of troops and the conduct of leaders. 
 
6. The interior situation. The civil regime should always be shown at its best  
and it should be stressed that with few exceptions we are not suffering. The soldier 
whose life is in constant danger does not take well to reading articles 
on pre- war quarrels or stories on strikes. He is irritated to learn that his  
comrade detached and working in a factory is taking part in strikes for a  
raise in salary, already very high especially considering he is happy to work behind 
the lines for 0.25 Francs per day. It should be demonstrated that  
products from the soil are selling quite well and that women and children  
who are struggling are highly paid. It is advantageous to compare prices with those 
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from before the war but not repeat the claims in the German press of ‘famine 
prices.’ Soldiers look forward to the future situation when they  
can return home. All mention in the press that the soldiers who are currently 
most exposed will gain materially once they become civilians again will raise their 
morale. 
 
7. Miscellaneous questions. Everyone has a duty to serve the army, those in the 
interior as well. Just as the mines need to be filled with miners, and the fields 
with workers it is no less necessary that those in the High Command and the 
Services conduct their work to achieve the best results. Otherwise, it should be 
noted that the purely literary aspect found in newspapers – tales, stories about  
war or other subjects including history are always appreciated. They distract the 
soldier and his morale can only profit from them. They should be developed. 
 
8. Conclusion. Troop morale is directly influenced by the reading of newspapers.  
It is important that the reading of newspapers is not a source of scepticism or  
of rancour but of perseverance and enthusiasm. It is important that the soldier  
has confidence in plain sincere articles and that the country is on his side. It is 
important that well documented studies show him the real difficulties that exist and 
the efforts made to overcome them. It is important that through straightforward 
orders, the press becomes less critical and more documentary  
and not to forget that the blanks imposed by censorship have the serious effect  
of exciting the imagination. 
 
Pétain not only wanted to prevent the press from discouraging soldiers but he also 
wanted it to act as a positive force in maintaining troop morale. Under Joffre, there 
would have been no complaints by the GQG over the press’s negative handling of the 
Chemin des Dames because the press would not have been given such high hopes for 
the attack as they were under Nivelle. Joffre, rather than exercising positive control 
over the press, withheld information when things went wrong. Pétain, however, 
believed that this approach resulted in blind optimism and blanked articles, both of 
which damaged troop morale. 
   The next day, the Ministry of War issued a note ordering the end of a type of article 
in the press which Joffre himself had approved during his tenure. 582 Joffre had been 
less concerned with positive control over the media than Pétain and focused almost 
exclusively on preventative censorship. Ironically however, Pétain now sought to 
replace Joffre’s one attempt at positive control over the press. 583 In September 1916 
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583 Joffre near the end of his tenure had increasingly come under criticism for his unwillingness to share 
information with the press and for being secretive even with his own government. It is possible that this 
policy was offered to the press as a response to such attacks at a moment when the General felt 
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Joffre had asked that the rules (found in Circular 1000) prohibiting the publication of 
names of soldiers of all ranks and their unit numbers in the press become more flexible 
in the case of official accounts of battles. Joffre hoped such accounts could raise public 
awareness of the ‘grand feats’ of certain units or soldiers. These articles which usually 
featured uninspired titles such as ‘The recital of a military observation’ or ‘in the 
margins of the communiqué’, were first examined by the Maison de la Presse and then 
distributed to regional papers via local prefects. Pétain found that these reports gave the 
press an almost ‘complete liberty which can cause serious inconveniences.’ He 
reasoned that in the provinces, censors were less able to verify, in the absence of 
communiqués, the authenticity or accuracy of information and that ‘information of this 
type is only useful if the public knows exactly that it has come from an official source’. 
Pétain wanted to ensure that all news related to the front came directly from the GQG 
and that it alone was in control of editorial lines concerning the military. Pétain’s 
official reason for prohibiting these articles was illogical. If these articles contained 
information which had first been produced by the GQG and then re-examined by the 
Maison de la Presse it is highly doubtful that they would contain military details that 
differed from those in the communiqués. Pétain probably saw the potential for the 
Maison de la Presse to embellish into exaggeration the already positive news given 
to it by the GQG. He wanted it to be the military alone which recounted military 
heroism to French newspapers. Finally, Pétain established a column written by him 
for Le Matin entitled ‘Why we Fight’584 which served this purpose perfectly. Under 
Pétain the GQG reaffirmed its control over censorship of military affairs and inserted 
itself into the country’s propaganda apparatus.  
    The GQG gained further influence over the Press Bureau during the short lived 
Painlevé Ministry of 12 September to 13 November 1917. Censorship of the media 
hardened. On 22 September the Direction des relations avec la presse was scrapped 
and with it the main liaison between the press and the War Ministry. On 27 September 
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a note to the War Ministry complained that pacifist propaganda had not ended and La 
Vague, an anarchist paper published by Charles Brizon, had been stopped from 
circulation at the front.585 Finally, in October, trench papers became censored at the 
division level because of ‘the dangers that might be presented by a lack of supervision 
in the editing of trench newspapers.’ Pétain had first impressed himself upon Painlevé 
when the latter was War Minister, and was able to further gain influence when 
Painlevé became Premier and War Minister concurrently. But Painlevé’s successor, 
Clemenceau, was less impressionable and, being a journalist himself had his own 
agenda concerning press control. Although Clemenceau, like Pétain, wished to 
eradicate pacifism from the media, unlike Pétain he argued that the country’s leaders 
should not be exempt from personal attack by the press. Pétain, under the Clemenceau 
Ministry, lost a great deal of the influence he had gained over the media in the wake of 
the mutinies.586 
 
C. Not All Bad News: The Americans Arrive in France. 
 
    The United States officially entered the war against Germany on 6 April 1917. But 
it was not until two months later that the first troops alongside America’s military 
chiefs arrived in France. American entry into the conflict was lauded in the media and 
was immediately perceived by both the GQG and the government as a potential war 
winning advantage for the Allies. Though the American entrance was hardly a 
substitute for the collapse and subsequent loss of France’s Russian ally (by January 
1918, only 150,000 American troops had arrived in France),587 it is highly probable 
that the war would have ultimately ended under circumstances far more favorable to 
the Central Powers had the United States not joined the Allied cause.588 The AEF’s 
arrival in France proved a difficult subject to censor for the Press Bureau. The press, 
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long starved for good news, was over-enthusiastic in its descriptions of American 
landings in French ports and the subject caused some early tension between the Press 
Bureau and the American Government. Soon, the Americans installed their own Press 
Bureau in Paris under the supervision of Frederick Palmer, a journalist once described 
by Theodore Roosevelt as ‘our best war correspondent.’589 It was not until the 
Clemenceau Ministry that the two press bureaux began to work together with few 
disputes.   
   The Press Bureau closely monitored all information in the press in late April and 
May on the eventual transport of American troops to France and of a French mission 
headed by Viviani and Joffre to the United States which left France on 15 April and 
arrived ten days later.590 On 14 and 17 April the Press Bureau ordered the media to 
publish only the official communiqué on the Viviani-Joffre Mission and specifically 
prohibited papers from publishing the ‘17 names of those on board the French 
mission to the US’.591 Once the mission arrived, the press was allowed to mention its 
safe arrival and even to speculate as to the discussion topics between France’s 
representatives and America’s leaders. The high acclaim with which the mission was 
received in the American Midwest (the area of the United States which had most 
resisted America’s entry into the war) was stressed as a subject to be often repeated. 
The War Ministry was cautious not to offend the Americans by appearing ungrateful 
or overly demanding and on 3 May a telegram from the London Daily Mail on 
Joffre’s discussions with Wilson about sending troops to France was stopped in Paris. 
On 4 May the Press Bureau ordered that all telegrams insisting that the Americans 
send materiel to France be stopped.592 The next day, Le Journal had a telegram from 
New York stopped which had suggested that the French mission should ask the 
Americans to send locomotives and railway cars.593 The French Government’s 
attempt not to appear exploitative towards the Americans was understandable but also 
ironic. One of the main failures of the Viviani-Joffre Mission was that its constant 
                                                          
589 Farwell, Over There p.88.  
590 E. Greenhalgh, ‘The Viviani-Joffre Mission to the United States, April-May 1917: A Reassessment’, 
French Historical Studies, Vol. 35, Number 4, (2002), pp.627-659.  
591 BDIC. F rés 0270 CG 14 and17 Apr.1917, SHD 5N 334. 17 Apr.1917.    
592 SHD 5N 438, 4 May 1917.  
593 BDIC F rés 0270 TAC, 5 May 1917.  
168 
 
competition with the British mission visiting America at the same time (led by British 
Press baron, Lord Northcliffe)594 for material sapped American confidence in the 
solidity of the Franco-British alliance.595 News of the mission’s return to France was 
censored in the same way as was its arrival.596   
     On 20 May, the Press Bureau ordered that all news mentioning the eventual 
installation of an American GQG in Paris be prohibited.597 Eight days later Pershing 
sailed from New York on The Baltic with forty regular army officers, seventeen 
reserve officers and sixty-seven enlisted men. On board also were civilians, clerks, 
and journalists, among them Frederick Palmer. Ten days later they arrived in 
Liverpool, then travelled to London to visit King George V, David Lloyd George, 
Field Marshall Sir John French, General Jan Smuts, General Sir William Robertson 
and Winston Churchill among others. Then on 13 June they sailed for France and 
after docking at Boulogne, travelled to Paris.598 Pershing’s voyage was widely 
reported in the press though its details were kept secret. The Press Bureau had not yet 
begun to heavily censor the details of naval passages or the coordinates of German 
submarines, so this secrecy was accomplished through a series of general orders 
given by M. Cacquerey and by the French Naval Ministry between 5 and 12 June. No 
mention was to be made of American vessels in France except for the official naval 
communiqué released on 5 June which excluded names, numbers and docking 
locations.599 An article published in Le Matin on 6 June, however, forced the Press 
Bureau to prohibit all mention of American vessels arriving in France,600 and on 7 
June to instruct the press to ‘not give any more numbers for the American troops 
arriving in France regardless of what has been published in Le Matin already.’601 The 
next day this order was repeated ‘for the reason of possible torpedoing.’602 Finally, 
the press was forbidden from mentioning Pershing’s arrival in Europe (particularly 
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the date), an order which L’Oeuvre was sharply reprimanded for disobeying on 11 
June with its article ‘Towards an American Victory.’603  While the Press Bureau took 
an interest in Pershing’s arrival, the media were content to print triumphal reports on 
how American entry would bring France to victory. Pershing’s voyage was kept a 
better secret in France than in either the United States or Britain.  
   When Pershing boarded The Baltic on 28 May, he and his crew wore civilian 
clothing in order to avoid detection. But the attempt at secrecy proved futile, much to 
Pershing’s chagrin. Thirty members of his crew had not received the order to dress in 
mufti and boxes marked ‘General Pershing’s Headquarters’ had sat on Pier 60 for two 
days in the open. Finally, as the tugboats which transported them to The Baltic left the 
harbour, an artillery salute was fired from Governor’s Island. After ten days, when 
the ship had reached Liverpool, a report was sent by Floyd Gibbons of the Chicago 
Tribune that Pershing had been given ‘a hearty welcome by the Mayor of 
Liverpool.’604 It is difficult to imagine such carelessness taking place in France at the 
same time. The GQG and the War Ministry, which were successfully keeping the 
mutinies a secret, would probably have taken more precautions when sending the 
nation’s top military commander across the Atlantic. The news of Pershing’s arrival 
in France, unlike that in Britain, was kept out of the media through strict monitoring 
of the press and the telegraph. That the Chicago Tribune was allowed to message 
back to the United States that Pershing had arrived in Liverpool is an example 
demonstrating that Britain and the United States had a more relaxed approach to 
media control than did France.   
   It was not until 13 June, the day Pershing came to France that the Press Bureau 
allowed his arrival to be announced in the media. The previous day it was ordered 
that ‘nothing be allowed on Pershing’s arrival’605 and a radio transmission mentioning 
it was stopped.606 Pershing on 13 June after arriving in Boulogne travelled to Paris 
where he was met by cheering crowds.607 At 11:30 that day, the Press Bureau allowed 
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the media to begin its commentary on Pershing’s arrival. The Bureau’s first steps 
were to authorize for radio transmission the tribute to Pershing which had already 
been circulated in the American media, and for Havas and the Parisian Telegraph 
Agency to pass telegrams containing the information that Pershing would arrive at 
18:30.608 Pétain’s policy of encouraging the press to report on the arrival of the 
Americans609 was now in full effect. Papers were allowed to publish interviews with 
Pershing (though not his subordinates) and they were strongly encouraged to 
comment on his arrival in Paris (and the crowds which awaited him) because 
‘Parisians will be happy’.610  Over the next few days, Pershing gave several 
interviews,611 which were freely transmitted to and then published in the French 
media as were his daily schedules,612 which included his visit to the GQG.613 
America’s top general had arrived safely in France and both the War Ministry and the 
press sought to capitalize on a rare opportunity to publish an entirely positive war 
related story in the press.  
   The mood at the Bureau soon became tense after an incident on 27 June in which Le 
Soir had named the arrival port of St. Nazaire the day after the first contingent of 
American soldiers landed and was still in the process of disembarking. The Bureau 
successfully kept the details of Pershing’s voyage across the Atlantic out of the 
French media, but was less successful in monitoring the coverage of St. Nazaire. This 
mistake triggered the first major complaint by the American Government against the 
French Press Bureau and provided a major impetus for the Americans’ decisions first 
to install an American censor at the Parisian Press Bureau and eventually to set up a 
Press Bureau of their own. 
     The AEF had reminded the Press Bureau on 19 June not to allow the media to 
publish news of the St Nazaire landing.614 On 22 June, the day before the American 
troops arrived, the Press Bureau instructed the media that ‘regarding the arrival of the 
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Americans in our ports, names of boats, dates of arrival, names of arrival ports and 
histories of confrontations with submarines are forbidden. Only the lists of the 
Americans arriving are allowed to be published.’615 The next day, an order was issued 
‘not to publish on the American base at St. Nazaire.’616 These messages were 
repeated daily for the next five days. The message though is not recorded as having 
reached the telegraph agency.617 But it is unlikely that the telegraph agency was not 
informed by the newspaper section of the Press Bureau of this important order since 
Palmer had personally informed Captain Ribouillet, Director of the Press Bureau, of 
it on 26 June618 and reminded the Press Bureau again the next two days.619 
Furthermore, all of the Press Bureau’s sections were located in the same building on 
Rue de Grenelle in Paris. It seems probable that Captain Ribouillet did inform the 
telegraph agency but that the individual to whom he gave the information neglected 
to note it down. The recorded explanation for the 41 orders given to censor telegrams 
on 28 June was that they violated the order from 26 June.620 This suggests that the 
order not to mention the naval base at St. Nazaire was given by Captain Ribouillet to 
the telegraph agency and was then communicated orally rather than in writing to the 
telegraph censors. 28 June was a particularly busy day for the telegraph section at the 
Press Bureau. With so many incoming telegraphs the individual censor who neglected 
to stop the telegram which reached The Times and possibly Le Soir was probably 
overburdened. The event demonstrates the importance of the work conducted at the 
Press Bureau, all of whose members often often performed under pressure, and how 
the error of only one censor might allow the enemy to obtain important information. 
     In fact the danger posed to the American troops who disembarked at St. Nazaire 
was slight. The efficiency of the unrestricted German U-Boat campaign had reached 
its climax in April but by May it had become overly extended621 and was to a certain 
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extent hampered by British mine laying in the North Sea, the Strait of Dover and off 
the coast of Flanders.622 Most importatnt, St.Nazaire was at the limit of many U-
boats’ range. Submarines were still an infant technology and their radius of action 
was short. 623 Furthermore in May, the British had begun to use the highly effective 
convoy system of accompanying merchant ships as well as those containing 
passengers or troops with armed vessels. The Americans converted to the idea of the 
convoy a month after the British624 but by the time of the St. Nazaire landing they 
were also using it. In June 71 ships using 5 convoys left from the American naval 
base at Hampton Roads and while one ship was torpedoed in the Channel, none were 
lost.625  The convoy system helped to insure that not one ship carrying American 
troops across the Atlantic was sunk by a German U-boat for the duration of the war. 
At the beginning of June, Josephus Daniels, American Secretary of the Navy 
explained to the American Commander of American naval forces in Europe, Admiral 
William Sims, that ‘The paramount duty of American destroyers in European waters 
was the protection of American troop transports and that everything is secondary to 
having a sufficient number of escorts to protect those troops.’626 Washington wanted 
to protect its troops at all costs and perhaps believed that while the risk of danger was 
small on this occasion, the French censorship system might prove to be incapable of 
keeping secrets at a future time when a higher number of troops might be involved 
and the situation more dangerous.         
     The French telegraph let slip a Reuters wire to London which was then used by 
The Times as the basis for a major story. Reuters was recorded in the telegraph 
censor’s logbook as having been censored for ‘specifications regarding the American 
landings’.627 In France, Le Petit Bleu had attempted to publish the number of 
American troops that had arrived but was successfully stopped from doing so by the 
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Press Bureau.628 Le Soir, however, had obtained the story and published it on its front 
page, naming the port of arrival against orders from the Bureau.629 Although the 
paper was seized on 28 June630 and punished with a three-week suspension (later 
shortened to 12 days), the indiscretion damaged Franco-American relations over 
censorship. As a result of constant American reminders, the censorship of stories on 
merchant and naval vessels became a major priority for the Press Bureau until the end 
of the war.  
      On 30 June, the restrictions on the news of the US arrival were lifted. Some 
specifics, however, remained prohibited from publication. The press was forbidden to 
discuss the location of the landing, the name of the port and the types and numbers of 
units involved. This order was repeated on 5 July, with the additional stipulation that 
no future operations be mentioned. The press was then given permission to discuss 
the American arrival but with no details involving names, places or numbers that had 
not first been transmitted by official communiqués. Immediately papers were 
censored for violating these rules. Most of the violations were minor, such as that by 
L’Intransigeant which had written an article naming officers other than Pershing,631 
or La Depêche du Berry from Bourges which was seized for giving the ranks of the 
American soldiers that had recently arrived in France. Ironically, the only paper that 
was censored for criticizing the silence imposed on the media regarding the arrival of 
American troops was the American New York Herald, censored by the Press Bureau 
on 1 July for writing that ‘The censor for reasons known only to himself, for we hope 
he at least knows them, does not allow us to give the names of the ports in question. 
But his prohibition is not of much consequence. Everyone, especially the enemy, 
knows which are the ports in France where Americans have arrived, are arriving and 
will arrive.’632 According to Circular 1000, papers were allowed to criticize the 
regime of censorship as long as they did not personally insult the censors.633 But since 
the Press Bureau was still being reprimanded by the Americans for its failure fully to 
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censor the news of the American arrival at St. Nazaire it was in no mood for leniency.  
    Poincaré inspected the American troops for the first time at the 4 July Parade in 
Paris. That day, the American General Headquarters issued its longest letter to date 
regarding censorship of the press in France. The letter contained five points: ‘1. That 
no information be given on the route that the vessels take from France as this 
information could endanger them. 2. No mention of the point of arrival or the location 
of US troops or information that may allow the enemy to locate them. 3. Only 
General Pershing, Sibert, Admiral Cleaves and Colonel Allaire [because he was in the 
4 July parade] can be named. 4. Names, numbers and places outside Paris cannot be 
named as the location of US troops. 5. That no mention be made of future operations, 
known or fictional, depictions of defence systems, techniques etc…’634 Though there 
was little new in this message its length and timing suggested a new assertiveness by 
the American GHQ in the realm of press control. It was during this time that Palmer, 
who had been put in charge of AEF censorship by Pershing, hired Joseph C. Green to 
monitor at the Press Bureau in Paris all telegrams and articles written by American 
reporters for American audiences.635 All papers, however, that were published in 
France, even if they were French editions of American journals such as the New York 
Herald or the New York Times, were ultimately subject to French censorship.636 On 
13 July, another set of orders was transmitted by Palmer to the Press Bureau. ‘1. No 
information to be given on American training camps. 2. Following not to be 
mentioned: A. Methods to be employed by airplanes. B. New types of cannons and 
shells. C. All references to the mechanisms of aiming. D. Types of armaments for 
airplanes. E. No photographs of French or American cannons.’637 Including an order 
that had been given the day before forbidding mention of the movement of American 
troops within France,638 the directives which oversaw French censorship concerning 
the Americans were now essentially all in place.   
   Before the Americans had dictated to the Press Bureau the conditions by which 
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information related to the AEF would be censored, the War Ministry had ordered on 
23 June that ‘Until further notice, American troops will be dealt with in the same way 
as the Russians and the Portuguese. Also, American troop movements will be dealt 
with in the same way as French troops movements.’639 Censorship of French troop 
movements was strict and therefore the American directives did little to change the 
status quo, with one major exception. Until the Americans insisted because of the 
French slip up over the arrival at St. Nazaire on full prohibition not just of the naming 
of landing ports but also of the routes taken by naval and merchant ships, French 
censorship of the latter had been fairly lax, much to the chagrin of the British earlier 
in the war. Naval censorship became from this point onwards a significant priority at 
the Press Bureau. American influence forced the French to censor all news of German 
submarine activity in addition to descriptions of routes taken by commercial vessels, 
though, it should be noted, that the former was increasingly being censored by this 
time.640 French and American censorship of information regarding the arrival of 
American naval transports was highly successful. The German U-boat campaign was 
a remarkable failure for its inability to stop the transport of American troops to 
Europe in 1917 and 1918 and this was primarily because of actions taken by Allied 
Naval forces, such as the implementation of the convoy system in May 1917. 641  
Though it is impossible to know whether events would have changed if naval 
censorship had been less thorough, the vigilant containment of naval secrets by both 
the French and the American Press Bureaux surely played a positive role in this 
achievement. 
     In August, Palmer instructed the American press to avoid exaggerations and 
‘boastful comments.’642 This was a new concept for the American press, which until 
now had been prevented only from publishing geographical locations and military 
details. A censored article in The Chicago Tribune (reproduced in L’Epreuve) from 
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11 August typified the frustration of many American journalists who had had their 
flexibility restricted. The author of the article, which was entitled ‘Wilson Refuses to 
Put a Gag on US Newspapers’, assumed that the new American rules were imposed 
on Americans by ‘foreigners’; ‘in some foreign countries, some hard and fast rules 
are censoring editorial lines which would be beneficial to the morale of the country’. 
‘The American people are too intelligent to be affected by the truth.’643 Whereas the 
Americans had just begun to censor news which could harm morale, the French had 
been doing so since 1914.  
     A postal report on 8 July named the American arrival in France as one of the eight 
major subjects mentioned in letters from the front.644 Both the GQG and the War 
Ministry had agreed that to raise troop morale and spirits on the home front, 
journalists should be encouraged to write about the American arrival in the press and 
strongly discouraged from insulting the United States or appearing ungrateful for its 
aid. They also acknowledged the dangers of allowing the press to exaggerate the 
numbers of troops and materiel being sent to France and the immediacy of their 
impact on the battlefield. After a radio telegram from New York was censored for 
indicating that the number of troops being sent from the US was higher than 
expected,645 an order was issued three days later to ‘not let papers embellish on 
American aid. The details which are to be for documentation and not to be 
commented on are 125,000 troops before winter and 300,000 by April 1918.’646 Ten 
days later the numbers were modified to 125,000 troops for the fall and 900,000 for 
the spring.647 Though these orders helped the censors to slash articles which 
contained exaggerated predictions, the fact that these numbers were far inferior to the 
actual number of troops which arrived (220,000 by March 1918, 139,000 of which 
were combat troops)648 made these particular specifications somewhat counter-
productive. 
   The Press Bureau censored news of anti-war sentiment in the United States.  From 
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late June to late July, telegrams were stopped each week containing information or 
statements such as ‘riots in Chicago against conscription’ (Havas),649 ‘until now 
recruitment has not gone well in the United States’ (Le Petit Parisien),650 ‘The United 
States’ long neutrality’ (Havas),651 ‘Strikes and troubles in the United States’ (Le 
Petit Parisien),652 ‘Strikes in St. Louis’ (Daily Mail),653 ‘Negative comments on the 
opinion in the United States on the war. (Le Petit Parisien),654 or ‘The possible 
political crisis in the United States’ (Le Petit Parisien).655 Telegrams sent from the 
United States discussing unrest and pacifism in America rose in number in early 
August, when they were stopped by the Press Bureau almost daily.656 The Press 
Bureau was highly successful in keeping negative opinions towards the United States 
out of the French press. Only a few French papers attempted to demonstrate antipathy 
or condescension towards France’s new American partners. Perhaps the most 
outrageous example was an article in L’Epreuve which not only was formally 
censored for mentioning Cherbourg as a port of arrival for American troops but also 
was instructed to revise a passage which was heavily condescending towards the 
American arrivals and to American culture. ‘In Paris even, those who have lived in 
the United States, those who remember the vagabond orgies of sailors, are those who 
know how loud and infantile are the soldiers of the Union, are those who cringe when 
thinking of the manners of these new arrivals. But many thousands of ‘sammies’657 
have already passed through the large towns of France and have only left agreeable 
memories of their infantile traits, their disingenuous joy and their fresh appetites, 
befitting a young race.’658  Though this article may have been intended to appear 
hopeful about the Americans, it would be interpreted by American readers as highly 
condescending. Luckily the vast majority of French journalists either admired the 
Americans or at least were grateful or sensible enough to keep this type of 
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commentary to themselves. Pétain’s advice to the media to stress the importance of 
the American arrival without too much exaggeration had worked. On 21 August, a 
report from GQG stated that the ‘troops are much happier than before and much of it 
has to do with the arrival of the Americans.’659 It is probable that the press would 
have stressed the significance of the American arrival in any case. But it was the 
Press Bureau under advice from Pétain and the GQG and then later in August from 
the American Press Bureau which ensured that expectations in the press concerning 
the timing and significance of the impact of the new arrivals remained high yet 
realistic.  
    Shortly after Pershing and Palmer arrived in France, Palmer visited the Press 
Bureau in Paris. Unimpressed, he found it to be autocratic and stale.660 Over the next 
two months however, the American censorship system under pressure from the 
French War Ministry moved gradually towards the French model. The French had 
pushed the AEF to be stricter with its war correspondents in part to suppress the news 
of the mutinies and in part because they rightfully believed the AEF to be 
inexperienced in such matters.661 Though the Americans wanted to base their 
censorship system on the British model662 the one they had developed by the end of 
the war was far stricter. The final order given to the American Press Bureau by the 
American military headquarters before the armistice was delivered on 12 August 
1918.663 It listed nine points but mostly only added details to the existing orders. The 
note was specific in discussing geographical locations in France (separating the zones 
of American operations into the advanced zone, maritime bases and the interior) and 
included for the first time an official order not to exaggerate American efforts.  
    After the armistice the Americans became far more concerned with censoring 
material that could affect troop morale. Perhaps this was because AEF headquarters 
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believed that the troops would be more influenced by negative reporting once they 
were no longer distracted by combat or because they believed that once the war was 
over, there would be pressure in the United States to return the troops home quickly. 
On 21 November 1918,664 American censors for the first time were told that there 
could be ‘No articles which could lower the morale of our troops or those of the 
Allies.’ And ‘No articles which can embarrass the United States or its allies.’ As for 
the repatriation of American troops the press was told not to complain that they were 
staying in Europe and not to insinuate that they were coming home any earlier than 
the date given by the United States Government.’ Descriptions of the social and 
economic conditions in Europe were to be dealt with showing ‘extreme reservation.’ 
The final summary of the article stated that ‘We will print nothing that is capable of 
miring the position of the United States in the ‘Congress of Nations’ or the position of 
American military personnel in Europe.’ The Americans, who had been under less 
pressure to maintain the morale of a fresh army and a nation which was distant from 
and less directly affected by the war, now felt it necessary to control news which 
could make idle soldiers agitated and families at home demand the immediate return 
home of their loved ones.  
   In 1918 the American and the French Press Bureaux, now re-located from Rue de 
Grenelle to the top floor of the Paris Bourse, worked together more closely. 
Correspondence between the two, and particularly between Pershing and 
Clemenceau, was more amicable and cooperative than it had been previously. Rather 
than communicate with the Chiefs of the Press Bureau in Paris, Pershing did so 
directly with Clemenceau (who was both Premier and War Minister and therefore 
officially oversaw the functioning of press censorship) and his Cabinet Chief Georges 
Mandel. Clemenceau pushed the Americans to develop and expand their own Press 
Bureau in Paris and was more willing than his predecessors to take American advice. 
On 25 July 1918, at the end of a letter addressed to General Pershing on the co-
operation between the two nations in media censorship, Clemenceau wrote, ‘Any 
suggestion that you may make to ensure a closer collaboration between the two 
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censorships in order to obtain a better result will be accepted by us at once and in this 
matter as in all others you may count on my most devoted cooperation. PS. As I close 
my letter, my attention is called to the fact that you possibly have not the necessary 
personnel available to ensure the permanence of the censorship. I merely mention the 
suggestion.’665 Clemenceau’s tone was more cordial and less dictatorial than that of 
his predecessors in their communications with the AEF and demonstrated his 
proficiency in English (he had lived in the United States and had briefly had an 
American wife). The American Press Bureau rapidly expanded under Clemenceau, 
further relieving some of the burden from its overworked French counterpart.  
     Even if the February Revolution in Petrograd and the Battle of the Chemin des 
Dames had been represented by the press and the Press Bureau as positive news 
stories, the AEF’s arrival in France was the first genuinely good news for France 
since the victory at Verdun in December 1916. Pershing’s arrival had successfully 
been kept a secret by the Press Bureau (if not by the Americans or the British). One 
mistake, however, by the telegraph section of the Press Bureau had allowed the 
location of St. Nazaire to be revealed in the French press before the first American 
troops had finished landing. Still, the War Ministry learnt from its mistakes and, in 
conjunction with the Americans, successfully censored the news of arriving American 
troops for the rest of the war.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The crisis in French morale, which began with the failure on the Chemin des 
Dames, worsened in late May 1917. In mid-May, the second strike wave of the year 
was unleashed, especially in Paris. The female-led strikes were largely over wages and 
were successful in obtaining both the five-day workweek (semaine anglaise) and 
salary increases. The press portrayed the strikes in a positive fashion until the end of 
the month when they became larger, more political and male-dominated. As the 
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movement became more dangerous, the Press Bureau had simultaneously to monitor 
news of the Stockholm debates and the strikes. The average censor was unaware that, 
in addition to these two events, a major mutiny in the French army was taking place at 
the front. The combination of these events – failure on the Chemin des Dames, the 
Stockholm proposal, the May-June strike movement in Paris and the mutinies at the 
front – made this the most dangerous moment for the French effort of the entire war 
apart from the opening phase and the Battle of the Marne. France’s censorship system 
was simultaneously tasked with downplaying the disappointing results on the Chemin 
des Dames, monitoring the political debates over Stockholm, censoring the 
increasingly violent and politically motivated strikes in Paris and covering up the 
repression of the mutinies. After the mutinies ended the press was blamed by the GQG 
for being too liberal during this critical period and the GQG sought to strengthen its 
power over the media vis-a-vis the War Ministry. 
   The spring 1917 strike movement was at first encouraged by both the press and the 
Press Bureau because it was female-led and its demands were economic. This 
enthusiasm for the movement did not derive from an affinity for feminism. Rather, 
strikes led by women who could not be called up to the front and who were seen as 
politically inactive were interpreted as non-threatening. Also, the success of the 
movement in achieving moderate pay raises and benefits for women workers could be 
used in the press as a much-needed positive story. The movement, however, did not 
remain led by women and increasingly showed signs of pacifism and anti-war 
sentiment. Once the strikes moved in this direction, the Press Bureau began to censor 
their coverage more vigilantly.  
   Pétain had made the implicit accusation that all political discussions which took 
place amongst the troops were influenced by what they had read in the press. He told 
Poincaré that the troops were upset because they believed their wives were being shot 
by Annamites. This rumour had absolutely no foundation in the press’s coverage of the 
midinettes movement. The press had encouraged the midinettes and then later 
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described in factual terms the suppression of the later male dominated movement. The 
press was even forbidden from discussing the arrest of women. Unfounded rumours 
spread rapidly at the front, and Pétain unfairly blamed the press for this phenomenon. 
   The feminist movement was still very small in France during the First World War. 
With the exception of L’Humanité, no major paper seems to have encouraged the 
midinettes movement specifically because it was led by females. Indeed L’Humanité 
was permitted to discuss the strikes in detail partly because it emphasized the feminine 
influence. The Press Bureau encouraged an emphasis on this aspect of the movement 
because the story of hard-working women from garment factories gaining moderate 
salary increases through well behaved demonstrations was thought to be potentially 
uplifting for the morale of husbands fighting. This approach backfired when troops at 
the front combined the news of the midinettes with the repression of the later 
movement and came to the conclusion that their wives were being arrested. The lesson 
taken by Pétain was that there was no mention to be made of female strikers in the 
press. Unfortunately, the consequence of the episode was a severe repression of all 
things politically feminine in the press for the rest of the war.  
    The press and the Press Bureau were unfairly blamed for influencing the soldiers to 
mutiny. It is difficult to imagine a more prudent course of action that the Press Bureau 
could have taken during the strikes. It would have been highly unwise to censor all 
news related to the movement. Parisians knew about the strikes because they witnessed 
them first-hand in downtown Paris. Condemnation of the midinettes would have 
encouraged hostility and sexist outbursts against the movement by the right-wing press 
and other labour workers666 and would have prompted fears at the front that soldier’s 
wives were being imprisoned or mistreated. The Press Bureau was under immense 
pressure during this dangerous period, but it learnt from its mistakes and evolved as the 
war progressed. A year later when a more dangerous strike movement erupted, the 
Press Bureau acted quickly and its actions were a significant factor in the movement’s 
successful repression by the Clemenceau government.  
   The mutinies were kept a secret from the enemy and from the French public until 
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after they had largely subsided. Perhaps the most important reason for this remarkable 
feat was the widespread practice of self-censorship. The War Ministry then imposed 
strict rules on the press coverage of the repression of the mutinies but again most 
editors chose not to risk having their papers seized or worse, and largely complied with 
orders. Self-censorship was significant not just in keeping the mutinies a secret but 
also in concealing their repression. 
   The only entirely positive news story during this period was the arrival of General 
Pershing on 13 June and then the first American contingent to France thirteen days 
later. The French press was universally enthusiastic about the arrival of the nation’s 
new comrades-in-arms. This enthusiasm was encouraged by the Press Bureau and the 
GQG. Everything went smoothly until a mistake by one censor at the telegraph section 
of the Press Bureau allowed an article to surface mentioning St. Nazaire as the arrival 
point for the first American troops. The incident led the AEF to distrust the French 
censorship system. As a result the Americans insisted that the Press Bureau sharpen its 
focus on naval censorship, and moved quickly to set up a bureau of their own in Paris. 
The Press Bureau was heavily overworked at the time of the American arrival. The 
War Ministry encouraged the installation of an American Press Bureau and probably 
welcomed the relief the American censors brought to their overworked French 
counterparts. Washington was encouraged by Paris, which believed the AEF to be 
inexperienced and naïve, into developing rules for the American censors which were 
similar to those in place for the French. The rules put in place for American censors 
immediately after the armistice were almost identical to those given to the French. As 
the AEF matured so too did the American Press Bureau which increasingly resembled 
its war-hardened French counterpart. 
     Revolution in Russia, strikes in Paris, domestic debates over a negotiated peace 
settlement and mutinies at the front all coincided. The French war effort survived this 
period but it had been heavily strained. After the mutinies, the Press Bureau was 
strongly criticized by the GQG and the implementation of press censorship in France 
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entered a new phase from June to November 1917, which was characterized by the 
implementation of a new series of orders given by Pétain. Pétain was the most 
important person in influencing the priorities of the Press Bureau between the end of 
the mutinies and the beginning of the Clemenceau Premiership. 
    The importance of the concealment of the mutinies from both the enemy and the 
French media is hard to overstate. Although the soldiers did not refuse to defend their 
positions if attacked, the Germans could have taken advantage of such information by 
assaulting a disorganized front if they had known early enough. If the news had 
reached the French press, it could have spread panic and unrest in a society already 
suffering from deteriorating morale. Self-censorship played an enormous role in an 
environment of secrecy where news of the mutinies was kept even from the censors at 
the Press Bureau. No expressions of gratitude or even acknowledgement appear to 
have been made by the GQG or the War Ministry after the mutinies. Instead, the lesson 
from the mutinies learned by Pétain and the GQG was that the press had helped cause 
the crisis of indiscipline because of its cynical news coverage of several events since 
the February Revolution. The GQG, already skeptical in its dealings with the press, 
now became openly hostile. 
   Though self-censorship played the greatest role in keeping the mutinies a secret, the 
Press Bureau was effective in preventing the news of their repression and of the 
accompanying changes to the Military Justice Code which facilitated it. The War 
Ministry formally ordered the press to not mention the repression or to repeat articles 
that did. When two papers disobeyed the order, the Bureau wisely chose to deal with 
the offenders leniently as they both had relatively small readerships and seizures would 
have resulted in added attention. This was a sensible and successful course of action by 
the War Ministry but did not save the Press Bureau from blame by the GQG. The job 
of a censor at the Press Bureau was as stressful and thankless as it was significant to 
the success of the French war effort.  
   The mutinies influenced state-media relations more than any other event of the war. 
As insubordination at the front continued, the GQG blamed the press for its critical 
coverage of every major news story since the February Revolution. The GQG’s 
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concerns over France’s censorship system were in part understandable given the 
emergency situation. But once the mutinies were over, the GQG used the media as a 
scapegoat to deflect attention away from the mistakes made by the High Command, 
particularly under Nivelle’s leadership, which had done a great deal to cause the crisis. 
Between June and November, the GQG’s influence over the press grew and as a result 
military censorship hardened. During these six months, Pétain not only had a large 
influence on what was censored by the Press Bureau but also dictated to the War 
Ministry which subjects and arguments the media should stress. For Pétain, the media 
in a time of ‘total war’667 was a tool to be used to fight the enemy rather than just a 
news service to inform the public. 
   Naval censorship, forced on the French by the Americans, was a success. But this 
particular pressure by the Americans was nothing more than a strong reminder to 
strictly ensure that a topic already on the censor’s list of prohibited themes was in fact 
prohibited. In contrast, the French influence on the American censorship system 
changed the entire way in which the Americans approached wartime media control. 
Immediately after the Americans arrived, the French, afraid that inexperienced AEF 
correspondents might leak information about the mutinies, forced the AEF to tighten 
its rules on all articles discussing the United States which were printed in France and to 
first run them by the French Press Bureau. Slowly the American system began to 
censor stories which could harm morale in the United States and, by the end of the 
war, the censorship rules in place for French and American censors were very similar. 
   As the American fighting force matured so did its censorship system become more 
developed. Though Frederick Palmer and the AEF censors were unimpressed with the 
‘staleness’ of the French system and wished to copy their own model from the British, 
the American system increasingly resembled the one in France. The cooperation 
between the two bureaux increased from Clemenceau’s appointment as Premier until 
the end of the war and after. By the end of June, the greatest crisis period for French 
morale had largely subsided and the Press Bureau had done much to keep it from 
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derteriorating further. The Press Bureau now entered a new phase characterized by the 
monitoring of political attacks against those on the left.   
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Chapter 5: Autumn 1917-Winter: New Leadership and a Modified Approach to 
Censorship  
Introduction 
 
      This chapter analyses the censorship policies of Georges Clemenceau, an iconic 
figure in the history of the French Third Republic, and their implementation by his 
Civil Cabinet Chief Georges Mandel. Clemenceau was appointed in November 1917 
and was met with good faith at first in most of the press. Already a controversial 
figure, he had been ruthless in his attacks on left-leaning politicians and personal 
enemies in the months preceding his appointment.  Yet surprisingly the left-wing press 
did not immediately attack him, even though Clemenceau almost taunted them to do so 
by officially allowing personal attacks on his character. In any event, he used this new 
waiverin order to continue persecuting his enemies.  This chapter will examine the 
motives for the press’s complacency and obedience, greater than at any other point 
during the war, during Clemenceau’s tenure. 
   The most significant world event in late 1917 was the October Revolution. Its impact 
was immediate on the course of the war, yet like Wilson’s 14 Points it was discussed 
very little in the French press, though for different reasons. The censorship system had 
been established to protect military secrets and to prevent sensationalism.  Previous 
chapters have demonstrated that the press could indeed be relied upon to keep 
important military secrets. But between November 1917 and February 1918, the press 
continued to demonstrate its affinity for scandal and sensationalism. Caillaux’s and 
Malvy’s trials and tribulations were the headline news stories while one of the most 
significant moments in twentieth-century history unfolded in Petrograd.  
      
The Tiger in Power: Clemenceau Becomes Premier. 
   
   France witnessed several scandals in the summer of 1917, all of which were played 
out in the media. Since the debate over the Stockholm initiative, the right-wing press 
had increasingly been on the attack. Between July and October it exploited cases of 
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espionage and of shady business dealings with Germany to conduct a witch hunt 
against deputies, senators and ministers who were in any way associated with the 
individuals implicated. The two highest profile victims were Interior Minister Louis 
Malvy and Senator Joseph Caillaux. The two primary benefactors were L’Action 
Française and Georges Clemenceau. In the summer of 1918 L’Action Française and 
Clemenceau, previously antagonists, were able to co-operate in attacking their mutual 
political enemies.  
   In July, Emile-Joseph Duval, the business manager for the leftist paper Le Bonnet 
Rouge, was arrested at the Swiss border with a check for 150,857 francs668 signed by a 
German benefactor. On 12 July the paper, which with sixteen seizures since the 
beginning of the war669 was one of the papers most censored by the Press Bureau,670 
was suspended indefinitely.671 The check had been financed by a German agent in 
Switzerland and the scandal came to national attention. In early August, the editor of 
Le Bonnet Rouge, Eugène Vigo (pen name Miguel Almereyda), was arrested ,and later 
found dead in his cell on 18 August. Duval’s arrest on 3 July was allowed to be 
mentioned in the press five days later and only the official account given in the 
Chamber could be published.672  Until late August no specifics were to be mentioned 
or names given. Any suggestion that Almereyda had died under mysterious 
circumstances was forbidden. But this rule was loosely enforced and the Bonnet Rouge 
affair turned into a major scandal.673  
   Malvy was implicated in the Bonnet Rouge affair because as Interior Minister in 
1914 he had helped to finance the paper to keep it in the Union Sacrée. This subsidy 
lasted until 1916 when the paper began to be clandestinely financed from sources in 
Germany.674 Although Malvy was first directly questioned about Le Bonnet Rouge on 
5 July by Maurice Barrès in the Chamber,675 what became known as ‘the Malvy 
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Affair’ began on 22 July when Clemenceau attacked the Minister at a session of the 
Army Senate Committee. Clemenceau’s speech lasted for over two hours676 and was 
openly discussed in the media. He began it by stating that Malvy had maintained close 
relations with anti-patriotic anarchists like Almereyda. He criticized Malvy for not 
arresting those in the Carnet B677 in 1914 and then for not properly fighting the rise of 
defeatist propaganda. When Malvy responded, ‘If I have not brought you heads, I have 
brought you results,’ Clemenceau retorted, ‘I reproach you for betraying the interests 
of France.’678 This incident marked the beginning of Malvy’s downfall. On 24 July, an 
article by Clemenceau in L’Homme Enchâiné had a passage censored in which he 
asserted that he was ‘becoming a man who is beginning to demand heads’ and insisted 
that investigation would find a letter linking Almereyda to Malvy.679 Malvy had made 
a powerful enemy of Clemenceau by suspending his L’Homme Enchâiné from 29 
September to 7 October 1914, an event which was referred to at the time as l’Affaire 
Clemenceau. Two days earlier an entire article had been slashed in the far-left Journal 
du Peuple, which argued that after three years of weakness the working class needed to 
stand up to Clemenceau.680 The comments in both papers were prophetic. Clemenceau 
began immediately to destroy the reputations of his opponents using little or no proof 
(such as the promised letter linking Malvy to Almereyda which never appeared) to 
justify his accusations. Just as Malvy had angered ‘the Tiger’681 by creating l’Affaire 
Clemenceau, now Clemenceau would be, along with Léon Daudet, the principal actor 
in engineering l’Affaire Malvy. The socialists, if not the leftist press, resisted 
Clemenceau until he became Premier and then refused to take part in his cabinet.  
   Another scandal in which the press implicated Malvy was an alleged affair with the 
arrested Dutch spy Mata-Hari. This accusation had been made by Léon Daudet in 
L’Action Française.682 Mata-Hari was arrested in February and executed on 15 
October 1917. Mata-Hari’s execution itself was censored more heavily in the press 
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than the executions of other spies because she was a woman.683 No mention was 
allowed in the press of her execution for a week prior to the event.684 The day of her 
execution, the official communiqué was permitted to be published but the photographs 
of her death and mention of her Dutch nationality (she was to be described as 
‘foreign’) were forbidden.685  On 10 October the Paris Daily Mail was censored for 
attempting to publish that Mata-Hari had warned the Germans of the British tank 
attack on the Somme.686 On 15 October when Mata-Hari was executed, Le Petit 
Parisien was slashed for giving a background of her life and L'Intransigeant for 
claiming that she had ‘died instantly.’687 L’Heure was prevented from going even 
farther by reporting that ‘she died with a smile on her face.’688 Later that day the Press 
Bureau was told to instruct all newspapers that the accusations made by Léon Daudet 
in L’Action Française against Malvy were false.689 The letter in question had been 
published in L’Action Française on 5 October against the orders of the censors and the 
paper had been suspended for eight days as a result.690 L’Action Française’s attacks 
against Malvy, which began in early summer of 1917, had intensified into a full-blown 
witch hunt after Clemenceau’s public attack on the Interior Minister in July.  
   Léon Daudet’s letter to President Poincaré on 4 October directly accused Malvy of 
treason by claiming that he had passed on the plans of the Nivelle Offensive to the 
Germans.691 Although L’Action Française was suspended for eight days as a result,692 
the letter was reprinted in all of the major Parisian dailies.693 It had been read in the 
Chamber of Deputies694 but because this had taken place during a secret session the 
defence presented for Malvy by Briand and Viviani went unreported by the media.695 
The government, in an effort to avoid further commentary, not only formally banned 
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comments on Daudet’s letter but also refused to tell journalists why L’Action 
Française had been seized696 making the accusations appear more legitimate. Attempts 
by moderate papers such as Le Temps to draw attention to the dangerousness of 
Daudet’s claims by stating that he was ‘pursuing excitations that could lead to civil 
war’ were censored.697   
   The Press Bureau had hardly punished L’Action Française during the summer and 
autumn of 1917 as it increasingly attacked its enemies on the left, hunted 
‘defeatists’and created scandals through unjustified accusations. Between June and 
September, L’Action Française was given one suspension and one warning.698 This 
was a normal number of punishments during this period for a major Parisian daily,699 
but L’Action Française was not a common paper. It did not conceal the fact that it was 
little more than a political mouthpiece for its two principal writers, Daudet and 
Maurras, who regularly slandered their enemies without evidence. The lack of 
punishment given to the paper encouraged it to intensify its attacks, particularly on 
Malvy and Caillaux. Once an offending article was published, it was likely to be re-
printed in papers which had even larger circulations, causing vicious rumors to spread. 
L’Action Française was suspended again twice in October700 for implying that 
Almereyda had been killed while in prison because he had important knowledge 
regarding some of France’s top politicians. Malvy resigned on 31 August (the Ribot 
Government fell a week later) to prepare a defence and clear his name, but the opposite 
happened.701 Malvy, who willingly gave up his parliamentary immunity from being 
tried for treason, was arrested by Clemenceau two days after the latter became Premier 
on 18 November.702 By this time the centre-right press had jumped on the band-wagon. 
Le Figaro, which had previously been silent on the Malvy Affair, now called for his 
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immediate trial.  
    Malvy was later sentenced to five years in exile for ‘failing to oppose enemy 
propaganda’703 and later wrote a memoir pleading his innocence.704 The government 
had not done enough to prevent the slanderous attacks of the far right which unjustly 
led to the disgrace of one of France’s top ministers. According to Berger and Allard, 
censors had been told not to overly censor L’Action Française so as not to ‘dim the 
lights’,705 and all of the Press Bureau’s records at the BDIC show that papers which 
defended Malvy and Caillaux were more heavily censored than their accusors. 
Ironically Malvy, who had been one of the two ministers present (along with Messimy) 
at the first meeting on 3 August 1914 between the government and the press,706 was a 
major proponent of a strong censorship system attacking defeatism.707 Malvy, who had 
told Jean Dupuy in October 1914 that ‘papers were allowed to attack politicians but 
not to the point where they are discredited in the public view,’708 became subject to the 
most vicious forms of media attacks. A particularly unsavoury though not uncommon 
type of article was published (for which it only received a warning) on 7 August 1917 
in Le Courrier du Maine (published in the area of Laval, near Le Mans). The article 
was entitled ‘M.Malvy et l’Anarchie complice de l’ennemi’ and argued that ‘M.Malvy 
is an Israelite who for only inexplicable reasons has remained a minister since the 
beginning of the war.’709 Although the Malvy Affair led Painlevé to promise Caillaux 
that a new law would be passed to replace the 1881 Law and protect politicians from 
slander, the Council of Ministers voted against the idea.710 Painlevé, in this scandal-
ridden environment, was unable to save even his own supporter Louis Turmel from 
prosecution.711 However it is also probable that the Turmel Affair was largely kept out 
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of the press because of the possibility of Turmel implicating other politicians under 
questioning.712 The War Ministry’s laxity in dealing with the right-wing press, and 
with L’Action Française in particular, along with the GQG’s desire to stamp out 
defeatism, created the framework for the selective form of political censorship which 
later characterized press-state relations under the Clemenceau Premiership.  
   Joseph Caillaux , a Senator from the centre-left, was the leading French proponent of 
a negotiated peace. As a result he was a target for the jusqu’au boutistes,713 the right-
wing press in general and Clemenceau in particular. Caillaux had gained public 
attention not only because of his often made claim that he could have prevented the 
war in 1914 had he been appointed by Poincaré to do so but also for his defence of the 
Bonnet Rouge and for a treason suspect named Bolo Pasha who was executed the next 
year.714 Caillaux defended the Bonnet Rouge and Bolo Pasha in part because he was 
indirectly implicated in a minor way in both scandals. After Almereyda’s death, a letter 
was found in his cell by Caillaux thanking him for all his services and stating that he 
was in debt to Almereyda for the contribution of his paper in defending his wife during 
her murder trial in 1914.715 Bolo Pasha and Caillaux had been personal friends since 
1915.716     
   The Bolo Pasha Affair involved a financial rescue of Le Journal, owned by Senator 
Charles Humbert, by Paul Bolo who had granted himself an Egyptian title.717 It turned 
out the funds had come from the Deutsche Bank and were laundered through New 
York. 718 Bolo Pasha was arrested on 29 September 1917719 and was executed for 
treason in April 1918. During his trial, Caillaux was questioned about his relationship 
with Bolo Pasha. Humbert was also arrested on 13 November but was acquitted on 18 
February 1918. Only the official communiqué on Bolo’s arrest was allowed to be 
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mentioned and any description of his past was strictly forbidden.720 In early October, 
articles which implicated high level personalities in the Bolo Affair were prohibited,721 
as were attacks launched in the press against Charles Humbert.722 Most of the attacks 
came as a result of a letter written by M. Bonzon to Captain Bouchardon, the 
prosecutor at the Bolo trial which named Charles Humbert as having direct knowledge 
of the German source of income given to Le Journal. L’Oeuvre had published the letter 
on 3 October and had been suspended for eight days as a result.723 Perhaps the most 
bizarre article published on the Bolo Pasha Affair was in La Lanterne on 6 October.724 
The article claimed that Bolo was an agent of the Pope whose allegiances were with 
Catholic Austria.725 The paper was not punished for disobeying the Press Bureau 
perhaps because the claim was unlikely to be taken seriously.  
   In October and early November, attacks against Caillaux in the press and reports of 
increasing hostility to him by L’Action Française were strictly censored but so too 
were his attempts in the press to defend himself. Immediately before Clemenceau’s 
first vote of confidence in the Chamber, he was asked by M. Barthe what he would do 
about Caillaux. He answered, ‘I have more to do than occupy myself with the pursuit 
of this or that person. It is none of my business and if I did it I would not deserve to be 
in this position.’726 Clemenceau’s proclaimed indifference to Caillaux’s fate was 
misleading. Clemenceau as Premier personally saw to it that Caillaux had his 
parliamentary immunity revoked on 11 December and, using a series of letters between 
Caillaux and both Bolo and Almereyda as evidence, had him arrested in January.727 
After Caillaux had his parliamentary immunity stripped, the Press Bureau on 15 and 16 
December set a number of rules for the media to follow which dictated the press’s 
coverage of the ‘Caillaux Affair.’ The order stated, ‘All opinions on the Caillaux 
Affair are allowed but there are special rules concerning wires on the subject sent to 
other countries: 1. Press revues which are not tendentious are allowed to pass but they 
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must list the papers from which the articles mentioned have come. 2. Passages that 
give sensationalist articles must state from where they originated. 3. All articles from 
Germany which are favorable to Caillaux are allowed. 4. All articles from Germany 
that suggest there is insufficient proof against Caillaux are to be deferred. 5. Return to 
Captain Nusillard728 all telegrams which have been stopped and which were to be sent 
abroad regarding Caillaux.’729 These orders were clearly designed to make Caillaux 
appear as guilty as possible in Allied countries. The French press was forbidden from 
discussing the demonstrations led by L’Action Française against Caillaux in 
December730 and January731 and from insulting either him or his wife by discussing 
their new regimes in prison in January.732 But by this point any further slandering of 
Caillaux in the press was overkill. Caillaux was arrested and spent the next two years 
in jail. He was finally fined in February 1920 for ‘damaging the external security of the 
state.’733  Clemenceau called for Caillaux’s head and he got it.  
   Clemenceau was appointed Premier on 16 November 1917. He was a controversial 
figure. He had an uncomfortable relationship with Poincaré and had few friends among 
France’s political elite. He was detested by the left for his role as a strike-breaker 
during his premiership of 1906-1909 and for his antipathy towards international 
socialism. Not one Socialist deputy would take part in his cabinet. Yet because of his 
anti-clerical beliefs and his staunch republicanism (and therefore anti-monarchism), he 
had few natural allies on the right. So when on 16 November it was declared at the 
Press Bureau that ‘all commentary discussing Clemenceau is allowed to pass,’734 the 
potential for Clemenceau’s many enemies to take advantage of the situation to slander 
the new Premier was great. However, the opposite happened.  
   Clemenceau had plenty of political enemies but he was also a charismatic leader with 
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a popular and loyal base amongst France’s citizenry. The press realized, as did 
Poincaré, that Clemenceau was a powerful figure who could potentially repair the 
broken Union Sacrée through his staunch jusqu’au boutisme. Unsurprisingly the right 
and centre-right papers, particularly L’Echo de Paris, Le Figaro and Le Gaulois735 
gave Clemenceau the most enthusiastic support. An article in Le Figaro, in reference 
to the fact that Clemenceau had filled his cabinet with men fiercely loyal to himself, 
reported that ‘The fate of the government is now in one man, rather than a ministry. 
But he has the unanimous morale of the nation behind him.’736 Further to the centre, Le 
Rappel agreed that ‘Clemenceau’s Ministry consists of his old supporters’737 and 
argued that it was unfortunate that the Socialists were isolated, but Clemenceau 
extended his hand and they did not accept738 and that if ‘parliamentarians oppose a 
man who can win the war, they are acting against the nation itself.’739 Clemenceau’s 
regular allies in the press were triumphant upon his appointment. More surprisingly 
however, he received almost universal, if less enthusiastic support, from the rest of the 
media.  
   Le Temps, which had never shown much enthusiasm for Clemenceau earlier in the 
war, now wrote that ‘under Clemenceau, the nation will no longer be beholden to the 
minority’740 and that rather than putting faith in Clemenceau individually, they would 
judge him by his actions.741 The paper had turned heavily against the SFIO after its 
unanimous decision to support the Stockholm Conference and now saw potential for 
the left to be crippled for the remainder of the war. On the far-right, L’Action 
Française, which had only recently been allied with Clemenceau in his pursuit of 
pacifists (previously he had been one of their greatest enemies), wrote that it was only 
because of the hard work of the right that Clemenceau was in power and (like Le 
Temps) they would judge him as if he had not existed previously. Even the leftist 
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papers L’Oeuvre and Le Journal du Peuple742 showed unqualified support for the new 
government in the name of national unity and perhaps in an attempt to gain favour with 
the new leadership, which consisted of a new group of individuals and a leader known 
for repressing socialists. The only major paper which criticized the new government 
was L’Humanité, and it did so indirectly. Renaudel argued that although fighting the 
war was a matter of the highest importance ‘we need a government that is capable of 
talking with other nations.’743 Though the article did not attack Clemenceau 
specifically, this comment criticized Clemenceau as the archetypal jusqu’au boutiste. 
Clemenceau’s reception by the media was mostly positive. A journalist himself, 
Clemenceau would have been impressed by the good faith shown to him even by his 
enemies in the press.   
   Upon being appointed Premier, Clemenceau made an immediate impact on state-
press relations and on the focus of press censorship. During the first few weeks after 
his appointment, there was a great deal of optimism in the media that Clemenceau, a 
journalist and until now an influential critic of government policy, would abolish 
political censorship.744 While several dailies such as Le Petit Parisien,745 Le Matin746 
and Le Gaulois747 stated explicitly that he would do so, only Le Journal, scandalized 
by the Bolo Affair, complained. On 18 November Le Journal declared that ‘neither 
military nor political leaders are now safe from criticism.’748 This statement was false 
for several reasons. Firstly, political leaders, particularly on the left, had not been safe 
from criticism in the press since at least early summer 1917.  Secondly, although he 
paid lip service to the elimination of political censorship and himself had been one of 
France’s most heavily censored journalists, he had no intention of allowing criticism of 
France’s military leaders, its diplomats, his close personal allies or the President any 
more than did Viviani, Briand or Ribot.749 During his first meeting with France’s 
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military censors as Premier, he declared ‘Suppress censorship? Never! I am not a 
complete idiot. You are my best gendarmes.’750 In fact, because of Clemenceau’s 
attacks on defeatism and his insistence on the censorship of all news related to labour 
unrest (themselves forms of political censorship), the percentage of press censorship 
that was political was higher under Clemenceau’s government than during any other 
period of the war.751  Clemenceau’s impact on censorship was profound but it was 
different than what was anticipated by the press.  
    Clemenceau placed Mandel in charge of the daily functioning of the Press Bureau 
and gave him carte blanche over media-related matters.752 Mandel was efficient and 
was highly trusted and respected by Clemcencau,753 but his direct and impersonal 
methods made him unpopular with many among whom he interacted, including 
censors at the Press Bureau. In the first three days of Clemenceau’s Premiership, 
Mandel made it known that the direction of press censorship was about to change and 
that he was in charge. The first series of orders given by the new government to the 
Press Bureau implemented Clemenceau’s policy of rooting out defeatism and labour 
unrest. On 17 and 18 November censors were ordered to be ‘very strict for pacifist 
articles, apply as usual all orders given by the military and give a wide berth to the 
publication of political news and articles.’754 On 18 and 19 November new orders were 
given concerning the reporting of strikes. On 18 November the order was given that 
‘concerning strikes, we can speak of those that are at their finishing point and of those 
that have little importance. For those that are in the military or are in militarized 
establishments (national defence) be very strict.’755 This order was passed by Captain 
Nusillard, head of the Press Bureau, and did not differ much from the existing policies. 
Mandel, however, gave two new orders the next day, one of which outlawed the 
discussion of strikes altogether. He told the Press Bureau to ‘not allow announcements 
which are meant to organize strikes’ and that ‘no articles or polemics or discussions on 
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strikes’ were allowed.756  Mandel also chose this opportunity to dress down Nusillard 
in front of his subordinates (the first time such an event occurred during the war), by 
complaining that La Liberté had not slashed its passages on syndicalist agitation and 
possible strikes in war factories, then by instructing all censors that ‘Captain Nusillard 
should in the future not allow articles of this nature to be published.’ The next day 
Mandel, either because he had received a flux of new phone calls from censors who 
realized where the power at the Press Bureau now rested or because he wished to 
communicate his orders more efficiently, instructed Nusillard to tell censors not to 
‘send any articles or documents directly to the PM’s office or his cabinet at the 
Ministry of War for advice without first referring said items to Nusillard. Also, do not 
phone the PM.’ The next day, Nusillard explained to the censors that ‘Mandel only 
wants to know me.’757 After the war Mandel was described by Berger and Allard as a 
‘bilious, suspicious, peremptory, vindictive secretary made vice-director of France by 
the caprice of an old man.’758 Mandel as de facto head of the Press Bureau openly used 
threats and gave subsidies to papers which followed his orders. He also canceled the 
deferment from the draft which newspaper directors had been given.759 From the 
viewpoint of Berger and Allard, it is not difficult to see how they came to have such a 
negative perception of Mandel’s character and it was no mean feat that Mandel was 
able to keep all criticisms of himself from reaching the press until after the 
armistice.760    
   Clemenceau delivered his first major speech as Premier in front of the Chamber on 
20 November. He declared that military censorship accompanied by a censorship 
regime that will ‘continue to maintain public order’ would remain in place.761 Over the 
next two weeks all of the principal orders which dictated the censorship regime in 
France for the rest of the war were given. The first was directed at the provinces. On 
22 November a letter was sent from the War Ministry to France’s regional military 
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commanders, to be then passed on to Prefects and regional Censorship 
Commissions.762 The letter stated that ‘The greatest liberty and discussion is allowed in 
all political matters, including attacks on specific people. Concerning pacifist articles, 
papers will be told after publication that they are neglecting their responsibilities. All 
pacifist articles will be signalled out for particularly careful examination by the Press 
Bureau. There should be nothing which could trouble public order specifically on 
strikes, on union preparations for strikes or on meetings of workers preparing to strike. 
Polemics on strikes should be avoided. Military and diplomatic news must be 
vigorously censored using the rules already in place.’ The new government in this 
order took direct aim at the news of strikers both potential and actual, but still at least 
officially upheld its policy of allowing criticism of politicians and of attempting to 
curb political censorship. Two orders given to the Press Bureau six days later, 
however, made Clemenceau’s policy appear far murkier. The first order began without 
the preamble given to the provinces acknowledging the right to attack politicians,  
        Orders concerning military or diplomatic censorship are  
        carried out as in the past. Just as important as diplomatic  
        or military censorship is the monitoring of information or  
        publications which could cause civil unrest (Ministerial  
        declaration) or which touch upon pacifism, strikes or mention  
        the President of the Republic.  
        Civil Order – All information or publications which touch  
        upon pacifist propaganda must be slashed.  
        Strikes – It is necessary to slash all information related  
        to strikes all news of meetings, announcements of meetings 
        for the purpose of striking and all articles or polemics for or  
        against a specific strike.  
        In addition to the formula described above, allow 
        for revision of all articles which from a theoretical perspective    
        concern moderate economic demands by the working 
        class. 
        President of the Republic - Review all articles which discuss his      
        personality or his political role.  
        Be generally concerned with all publications which   
        do not fall under the above categories but are still inappropriate.  
        They will not automatically be slashed but signal to the offending  
        journalists that they will only be published under their personal    
        responsibility. 763 
 
Instead of reiterating that newspapers could criticise politicians, this order re-enforced 
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the form of political censorship which had begun after the Stockholm affair when the 
Press Bureau first allowed political attacks from the right but censored those from the 
left. Now censorship was becoming more arbitrary as it was in the period before the 
introduction of Circular 1000. Leftist articles could easily be labeled as defeatist, 
dangerous to public order, or inciting strikes. Finally, the order ended with a threat. 
Journalists were responsible for the inappropriate material they published. Mandel 
revoked the exoneration from the draft enjoyed by newspaper directors, and 
Clemenceau was not afraid to have ‘defeatists’ arrested.764 Directors were warned that 
they took chances at their own risk.  
   Clemenceau reversed Pétain’s unsuccessful policy of encouraging the Press Bureau 
to ensure that as few blanks appeared in newspaper articles as possible. An order was 
given on 4 December which stated that ‘In all cases, when censors must decide 
between large suppressions, those of one paragraph, of a whole article or even if it is 
the suppression of one word, a number of sentences or one sentence or even if the 
context of a certain article could be deemed inappropriate, it is better to avoid error by 
erring on the side of caution even if this means the excessive implementation of a 
specific censorship rule as outlined in the censor’s guidelines.’765 After the Chemin des 
Dames, Pétain had significantly tightened the use of censorship and the control over 
distribution of newspapers that reached the front, even to the occasional consternation 
of Clemenceau.766 Now Clemenceau had set up a Jacobin system to monitor the 
interior where under the guise of allowing freedom of the press, ‘patriotic’ papers were 
encouraged to attack ‘internal enemies,’ and ‘defeatists’ were to be silenced.  
  Clemenceau’s legacy for press censorship was complex. He, along with Mandel, 
influenced state-media relations more than had any other individual. Not only did he 
make the system more draconian but he also chose to keep the system in place until 12 
October 1919, after the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. Under Clemenceau, the 
Union des Grandes Associations contre la Propagande Ennemie (UGACPE), an 
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already influential association set up in early 1917767 to fight enemy propaganda at 
home, worked more closely with the government in expanding France’s propaganda 
operations.768 More importantly, Clemenceau’s appointment and his policies were 
responses to the increasingly fragile state of French politics and labour relations. He 
censored the news of labour movements so heavily that by the end of January 1918, 
after a large strike wave in Germany, not even strikes in enemy countries were allowed 
to be discussed.769 Whereas previously the press had used examples of foreign strikes 
to convince readers of the poor morale in the Central Powers, now Clemenceau was 
afraid that the growing pacifist, international socialist and minoritaire movements 
might take inspiration from events and actors abroad. This was especially the case 
when it came to reports on France’s troubled eastern ally, which had just witnessed its 
second revolution and change of regime in one year.   
 
The October Revolution 
 
   On 7 and 8 November, the Bolsheviks led by Lenin conducted a mostly bloodless 
coup against the Provisional Government in Petrograd. Although the Bolshevik 
conspiracy to take power before the Soviet Congress on 7 November had been public 
knowledge in Russia for at least two weeks,770 the event itself came as a surprise even 
to most Russians as the Bolshevik leadership decided to seize power only at the last 
minute.771 Alexander Kerensky, head of the Provisional Government, had grown 
unpopular and weak at home and had even lost the faith of most of the Allied 
Governments after the Kornilov Affair in August.772  As a result, few were fully 
committed to defending the Kerensky Government, and the significance of the 
Bolshevik insurrection was widely misunderstood. On 6 November the Military 
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Revolutionary Committee (the armed wing of the Bolshevik Party) in a response to a 
threat by Kerensky to send it to the front, seized the Petrograd garrison, Petrograd’s 
railway lines, the blockades surrounding the city, the local police stations and the 
telegraph.773 That night, Lenin ordered the Winter Palace to be taken the next day, 
which was accomplished with little resistance. This, in conjunction with a walk out by 
the Menshevik and Socialist Revolutionary Parties at the Soviet Congress, placed the 
Bolsheviks in charge of the government in Petrograd.  
   The effects of the October Revolution significantly influenced the course of the war, 
though they were misunderstood at the time. The Bolshevik seizure of power opened 
the door immediately for a separate peace.774 On 21 November, German radio 
announced that Russia had made a peace overture to the Central Powers.775 On 23 
November Izvestiya published the secret treaties between Russia and the Allies776 and 
on 15 December an armistice was signed in the East. As a result, that winter the 
Germans had numerical superiority on the Western Front for the first time since 
1914777 and launched a major offensive the following spring.778 The French 
Government, though it despised the Bolsheviks and was concerned over the future 
status of the loans given to Russia in the pre-war period,779 maintained diplomatic 
contacts in an attempt to keep Russia in the war. The French Government’s policy of 
interpreting events in Russia entirely based on their effect on the Allied war effort led 
it to abandon the Volunteer Army in Russia in February and to offer military support to 
the Bolsheviks, helping to keep them in power when they were at their most 
vulnerable.780 
    The news which arrived in France about the events in Petrograd through both 
official channels and media organs was unclear. On the morning of 6 November, the 
Military Revolutionary Committee took over the telegraph and supervised all news 
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sent abroad.781 The French Government was informed of this, and reports that the 
wires had been cut were sent by a radio telegram from Petrograd to Reuters on 8 
November.782 Cossacks under Kerensky’s orders controlled the telegraph at Tsarskoïe 
Selo between 12 and 14 November,783 but little appears to have been sent from this 
location. Havas was able to send four telegraphs to Paris on 6 and 7 December, all of 
which were censored.784 The only detailed message sent was on 6 December, which 
had stated that there had been an ‘appeal of the Soviets at the Petrograd garrison,’785 
and that the special commissars have taken over principal points of the city with a view 
to a possible seizure of power.’786 On 7 November, messages referred vaguely to 
‘pessimistic interpretations on the interior situation in Russia,’787 ‘disorganization in 
the army’788 and ‘antagonisms between soldiers and officers of the Provisional 
Government.’789 For the next two weeks all of the information arriving through the 
telegraph to Paris was confusing and at times contradictory. Some news arrived 
concerning the opinion of the American and Japanese governments towards Lenin’s 
revolution,790 and rumors circulated of armistice negotiations between the new Russian 
Government and the Central Powers, mentioning the possible annexation of Lithuania 
and Courland from Russia and referring to the ‘desire of the Poles.’791 Because of the 
Bolshevik blockade on information leaving Petrograd, little concrete information left 
Russia concerning its internal political situation. On 13 November an uninformative 
telegram from Le Petit Parisien in Petrograd was censored which stated that ‘opinion 
of Kerensky is low.’792 Another telegram sent by Havas which was censored two days 
later in Stockholm clearly demonstrated the international confusion over events in 
Petrograd. The vague telegram was censored because it ‘exaggerated Bolshevik forces 
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in Petrograd.’793 This was eight days after the revolution had ended. Information which 
arrived in Paris from political channels was more accurate but still unclear.794 
    Information also arrived from Petrograd through Joseph Noulens, the French 
Ambassador to Russia. He reported on 8 November that the Winter Palace had been 
taken and that Kerensky’s Ministry had been arrested. At the same time, however, he 
stated that Kerensky was ready to march on the city and the Bolsheviks were 
increasingly depressed and had limited support.795 During the next two days radio 
reports contradicted Noulens by describing the position of the Bolsheviks as being 
much stronger.796 Immediately after the Bolshevik coup, few in the French 
Government really knew who the Bolsheviks were or the full extent of their peace 
agenda. One French agent sent a particularly prudent message to Paris which suggested 
that events in Russia since the February Revolution gave little reason to suppose that 
there would be a ‘satisfactory’ resolution to the crisis.797 On 21 November, Trotsky 
sent a letter to the Allied Embassies proclaiming the new government had proposed 
talks for an immediate armistice, and even this news was misinterpreted through the 
telegraph.798 Clemenceau responded the next day by officially refusing to recognize 
the new regime.799  
   Because the Petrograd telegraph had been cut, the French Government’s most 
detailed sources of news on the events in Russia were telegrams intercepted from 
Nauen800 and messages received from French press agents in neutral cities, particularly 
Stockholm. On 12 November a letter from Philippe Gaiger informed the War Ministry 
that the news coming from Scandinavia was the most accurate in regards to the 
situation in Russia.801 Three days later another message reached the War Ministry 
suggesting that there were contrasting media reports in Stockholm and Copenhagen 
being given by supporters of Kerensky on the one hand and supporters of the 
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Bolsheviks on the other, since everyone acknowledged that the Petrograd telegraph 
was under military occupation.802 This suggests that while there was frequent 
discussion in Scandinavia of Russian affairs, much of it was mired in propaganda.  On 
7 November, the French intercepted a message from Nauen discussing the Bolshevik 
plan to release information about the secret treaties.803 On 10 November, The Chicago 
Daily News804 had a telegraph stopped which declared that Lenin had already had 
peace talks with the Germans and three days later Le Matin had another stopped which 
claimed that socialist papers in Germany were advising the Germans to accept ‘Lenin’s 
peace.’805 While these reports were more detailed than those which arrived in Paris 
through French channels, they were not always accurate. On 30 November for 
example, The Daily Mail in Paris was censored for declaring ‘the fall of the 
Bolsheviks.’806 The vagueness and confusion which characterized the news emanating 
from Petrograd, particularly between 7 and 21 November but also afterwards, 
influenced both the press’s coverage of the October Revolution and the actions taken 
in response by the Press Bureau. 
   Before November 21, there were few large articles published in the Parisian press on 
the events in Petrograd both because there was little information available and because 
the media was preoccupied with the Bolo and Bonnet Rouge Affairs and the Battle of 
Caporetto. Most of the Parisian dailies mentioned on 8 November that the Kerensky 
Government had been deposed but gave no commentary. In the next few days, papers 
were vague on events in Russia but a few, most notably Le Matin, Le Journal and 
L’Echo de Paris, claimed (apparently without proof) that there was an ‘energetic 
reaction against the Bolsheviks in the capital and that the situation would stabilize.’807 
In the final preoccupied days of the Painlevé Government, there were almost no rules 
given by the Press Bureau controlling the media’s treatment of the October Revolution. 
Papers were allowed to discuss the insurrection in Petrograd as long as they did not 
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refer to a separate peace,808 either imminent or eventual (see image 1), or discuss a 
recent interview given by Kerensky in which he stated that the Russians had already 
sacrificed too much in the war.809 These rules were also arbitrarily enforced and were 
applied more heavily on some days than others. On 12 November for example, every 
major paper announced the Soviet peace proposition. Le Petit Parisien was permitted 
to write that Austria had already approved the idea, whereas L’Eveil, Le Journal and 
Le Petit Journal all declared that the Germans had made it up.810 With little 
information available and the most obvious implications for France prohibited from 
being mentioned, the Parisian press chose to focus on internal French politics instead 
of events in Russia for the first two weeks following the October Revolution. 
Image 1: Censorship of the prevailing French attitude towards the Russian 
Revolution.811 
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    The provincial press, further removed from the scandals in Paris, made more of an 
attempt to focus on Russia. The resulting articles were ludicrously uninformed and 
appear to have contained some news invented by the editors. On 15 and 16 November, 
for example, Le Petit Dauphinois stated that there was a rift between the revolutionary 
leaders and then that both Lenin and Trotsky had been condemned to death and were 
fleeing Russia. Two days later the paper claimed that Russia was ‘in a state of 
anarchy,’ which was followed the next day by a proclamation that the Bolsheviks were 
triumphant.812 Le Droit du Peuple, a socialist paper also based in the Isère, called the 
Bolsheviks ‘Russian Jacobins’ and guessed that Russia would stay in the war.813 This 
paper, however, like every other media organ of the left in France, turned against the 
Bolsheviks by December when it seemed increasingly unlikely that Russia would 
remain in the war.  
   There were almost no attempts by the mainstream press to give unqualified support 
to the new government in Petrograd. Though not written specifically in the censors 
logbooks, the unwritten rule in dealing with Parisian papers between 7 and 21 
November appears to have been to encourage caution until the situation in Petrograd 
and the intentions of the Bolsheviks vis à vis Russia’s allies became clear. After 21 
November the Press Bureau’s intentions were explicit. The Soviet peace offer was 
allowed to be published in the French media, but only if it was communicated in the 
article that the information was itself a public communiqué.814 La Bataille and L’Eveil 
were censored that day for mentioning a German espionage mission to Russia and 
were told by Mandel that they were ‘neglecting their responsibilities’815 (the 
euphemism for a warning under the Clemenceau Premiership). The next day, a 
message from Clemenceau to the Press Bureau ordered that ‘No titles or sensational 
headlines are to be allowed on the events in Russia.’816 The press was forbidden from 
editorializing on the October Revolution, but there is little evidence to suggest that it 
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was particularly interested in doing so.  
   The press decided not to focus on the situation in Russia because events at home 
were more scandalous and journalists, after Clemenceau ended political censorship (in 
theory), probably preferred to cover events about which they knew all the details. But 
another reason why the press chose not to concentrate on Russia was the lack of 
support for the Bolsheviks even amongst the French left. Unlike during the February 
Revolution, there was no positive spin that could be encouraged by the government or 
argument in favor of the movement that could be supported by a significant section of 
French society. French public opinion had grown increasingly exhausted with the 
Russians.  
   Since the February Revolution French opinion towards Russia had become 
increasingly negative, particularly after the failed Kerensky Offensive in July.817 The 
reaction of the press to the October Revolution mirrored that of the French population, 
which postal reports showed was angered by the news but did not regard it as their first 
concern. Indeed for many, the shock of losing Russia had worn off by November and a 
more immediate concern was what would happen to the money which had been loaned 
to Russia in such large quantities.818 There was a significant increase in hostility to 
everything Russian, and soldiers on leave in Paris (who more than anyone understood 
the significance of France losing its eastern ally) accused the press of trying to conceal 
the importance of the Russian defection.819 The press, however, was not trying to 
conceal the significance of the defection but rather did not fully grasp it.820 Like the 
French citizenry,821 the press watched the events in Russia not with revolutionary zeal 
but with concern as to how they would impact on the French war effort. After 7 
November, not one single remark on Russia was recorded by informers as being heard 
on the streets of Paris.822 Not even the socialists in France, particularly the moderate 
ones who felt threatened by the Bolshevik insurgency,823 supported the Bolsheviks and 
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those who did dared not say so publicly.824 Censorship did not play the same 
significant role in France after the October Revolution as it had after the February 
Revolution because the press was uninformed, pre-occupied and, even on the political 
extremes, was unwilling to take the controversial stance of arguing in favour of the 
Bolsheviks.  
   There was never an intense period of news coverage of the Bolshevik Revolution in 
the French press. Articles increased in number in November after the armistice in the 
east and then again after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. By the beginning 
of 1918 any positive commentary from the left towards the Bolshevik Revolution 
(there was very little) had entirely evaporated.825 The separate peace encapsulated what 
French observers considered the revolution was all about.826 The more French citizens 
of all political affiliations learned more about the Bolsheviks, the less they liked 
them.827 The result was that one of the most significant events in twentieth-century 
history was one of the most under-reported.  
 
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points 
 
   On 8 January 1918, American President Woodrow Wilson delivered his famous 14 
Points speech to Congress. The speech was a direct response to events in Russia828 and 
was aimed at his progressive base at home, the Bolsheviks, the opposition in Germany 
and the socialists and progressives in the Allied Countries.829 Wilson called for an end 
to secret diplomacy (the Bolsheviks had published the secret agreements over the 
future of the Middle East, the Straits, Poland and the Adriatic in late November 1917), 
freedom of the seas, free trade, the reduction of national armaments, the readjustment 
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of colonial claims based on sovereignty and the interest of the concerned populations, 
the evacuation of Russian territory, the restoration of Belgium and the restoration of 
Alsace-Loraine to its pre-1871 status. Wilson also declared that the re-adjustment of 
the frontiers of Italy should be determined by ‘recognizable lines of nationality,’ that 
the populations of Austria-Hungary should be allowed ‘autonomous development’ 
while maintaining the integrity of the Habsburg Monarchy and that Romania, Serbia 
and Montenegro should be freed from occupying forces and restored with Serbia given 
free access to the sea. The Ottoman Empire was to be dismantled with the ethnically 
Turkish portion remaining under Turkish rule. An independent Poland was to be 
established and a League of Nations would be set up after the war. The speech was met 
with a lukewarm response by America’s partners,830 Clemenceau sarcastically 
declaring that ‘God needed only 10’831 and was all but ignored by statesmen and 
soldiers in Germany.832 Though its immediate results were disappointing833 the speech 
later proved to be the basis for the conditions under which the Germans surrendered in 
November 1918. 
   Three days before Wilson’s speech, Lloyd George had delivered another at Caxton 
Hall in front of a group of trade union representatives. The two speeches contained 
some similarities. Lloyd George, like Wilson, called for the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire, the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian state, and gave support to France’s 
claim to Alsace-Lorraine. It is important that the two speeches were not designed as 
immediate calls for peace, which neither country felt was opportune, but rather were 
intended to shore up public opinion in the Allied Countries, encourage Russia to stay 
in the war and encourage the opposition in the Central Powers.834  
   Like Lloyd George’s,835 Wilson’s commitment to Alsace-Lorraine was not absolute. 
Whereas Wilson declared that Belgium ‘must’ be restored, the invaded territories he 
suggested only ‘should’ be restored to France. Furthermore, the speech was a clear 
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repudiation of the French claim to the east bank of the Rhine, which had been called 
for in the right-wing press (and was featured in the Doumergue Agreement, which the 
Bolsheviks had published), most notably in L’Echo de Paris and L’Action Française, 
since 1916.836 The 14 Points helped shore up French morale by appealing to the left837 
and began a well-publicized affinity for ‘Wilsonian idealism’ on the part of the 
progressive left in Europe. Much of the sympathy for the 14 points from the left in 
France, however, disappeared in the next three months because of the punitive treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk imposed on Russia by Germany and signed on 3 March 1918.838 
Although Wilson’s speech indirectly challenged Clemenceau’s policy of jusqu’au 
boutisme,839 Clemenceau believed that France in the short run had got much of what it 
wanted in the speech, particularly in regard to Alsace-Lorraine, and thought it placed 
the onus of negotiation on the Central Powers.840 He therefore chose to embrace the 
statement with the intention that the details would be reworked after the war.  
   News of the 14 Points arrived at the Press Bureau by telegram on the night of 8 
January. Immediately Mandel was telephoned and read the speech twice. After being 
asked his opinion by the telegraph censor (either Berger or Allard), Mandel said he 
would ask Clemenceau immediately what to do.841 Clemenceau decided to suspend the 
article for the first night.842 What happened at the Press Bureau over the next 11 days is 
not entirely clear. Besides a ban on all articles published in German papers843 there 
appear to have been no specific orders to the press on the speech844 yet the press only 
published large stories on the 14 Points for four days after the speech was given. The 
censors themselves were astonished by the press’s lack of interest, as most papers 
devoted only four to seven columns and Le Temps wrote only 26 lines.845 It is possible 
that Mandel phoned in orders directly to papers not to editorialize too heavily on the 14 
Points, but it is more probable that the media were distracted by the Brest-Litovsk 
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peace negotiations between Russia and the Central Powers which had begun on 21 
December, and by Caillaux’s arrest on 4 January. The latter was overwhelmingly the 
main story in the press at the time and also the event which took up most of the 
censors’ time.846 
   The reports in the press during the four days after the speech were surprisingly 
uncontroversial. The speech generally achieved its purpose of shoring up the left and 
centre-left, which praised Wilson for trumpeting an ‘internationally agreed upon 
peace’847 and bringing ‘the world a message of justice and liberty.’848 Le Radical 
praised the discourses of both Wilson and Lloyd George for providing a counter-point 
to the deliberations at Brest-Litovsk and for ‘taking the initiative away from the 
Germans.’849 Wilson was also praised by several papers on the right which saw his 
speech as offering a guarantee of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France. L’Echo 
de Paris declared that Wilson had added substance to what Lloyd George had said 
earlier because he believed that ‘the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine is essential to world 
peace.’ Also the paper argued that Wilson’s speech was in direct opposition to 
Germany’s post-war goal of Mitteleuropa.850 Le Gaulois claimed that the socialists 
would never fully comprehend the meaning of Wilson’s wonderful speech whose 
fundamental message was that Germany must give up its territorial conquests.’851    
   Though the speech was overwhelmingly popular in the press, it also brought with it 
some criticism both of Wilson and of Clemenceau. The speech was criticized by a 
small section of the French press for being unrealistic. La France wrote that both 
Wilson and Lloyd George’s speeches failed to ‘grasp the reality of the international 
situation’,852 and La Libre Parole dismissed the former as ‘utopian.’853 La Petite 
République echoed Clemenceau’s sarcastic comment abount the length of Wilson’s 
outline, stating ‘we have too many war aims.’854 Although these were direct criticisms 
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of the 14 Points, they were made by papers with small readerships and little influence. 
The decision not to punish them was typical of Mandel’s tendency to allow smaller 
papers to get away with ‘unfortunate’ comments but to threaten them with large 
penalties if their articles might harm the French war effort. More important were the 
attacks which were launched at Clemenceau, including suggestions for his response. 
An article in Le Pays by M. Aulard began by asserting that the speeches by Wilson and 
Lloyd were ‘touching’ but asked why Clemenceau, ‘who has been a champion of ideas 
and is admired for his energy,’855 had said nothing. Both L’Humanité856 and La 
France857 criticized Clemenceau for refusing to send delegates to Petrograd. Whereas 
the former suggested that Clemenceau had missed an opportunity and asserted that ‘if 
he thinks he can reverse time, he is wrong,’ the latter argued that France should send 
delegates to Brest-Litovsk who ‘represent French interests.’  Five days after the 14 
Points speech, commentary in the press had started to become less frequent and the 
government chose tolerance towards the press rather than to repress criticism. 
Clemenceau in this instance had kept his word that he would allow attacks in the media 
on political personalities, himself included. Luckily for him, the press was more intent 
on attacking Joseph Caillaux, to whom it quickly turned within a week of the 14 Points 
and Caxton Hall speeches.      
    On 11 February, Wilson delivered another address. His appeal was again designed 
to keep Russia in the war but because it was made in the name of the Allied coalition, 
it alarmed both France and Britain.858 The speech gave the left-wing press a new 
opportunity to speak out against the war. Two days before, the government had 
clarified its position on articles discussing Alsace-Lorraine. Mandel on 20 January 
ordered that there be a clear distinction between two types of pacifist articles on the 
subject. ‘They should be separated into: A. Those that envisage the necessity of a 
plebiscite859 and B. Those that express the wish that the question of Alsace-Lorraine 
not become a cause of continuation of the war. The first of these is left up to the 
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responsibility of the journals, the second needs to be formally slashed and the prefect 
of police be given notice in advance.’860 In other words, papers which supported a 
plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine would be given a warning issued probably by Mandel 
himself, and those which argued that Alsace-Lorraine was not worth fighting for would 
be seized or suspended.  
  The Press Bureau’s records at the BDIC reveal that it did not issue any orders 
censoring Wilson’s discourses in January 1918 because the newspapers themselves 
chose to discuss the story only in minor articles. The press did not engage in a 
vociferous debate as it had after Stockholm, even though as over Stockholm the orders 
given were not particularly severe or strictly enforced. The media frenzy in the United 
States which followed the 14 Points or the frequent comments published in Petrograd 
in Izvestiya861 were not matched in France because the French press judged 
international affairs by how they affected the French war effort. Events in Russia 
trumped in importance those in the United States for most French citizens. Just as the 
news of the October Revolution had been sidelined by the press because its 
significance was misunderstood and underestimated, now Wilson’s declarations of 
January 1918 that later heavily influenced the peace process were overshadowed by 
Caillaux’s arrest (a juicy media scandal) and the deliberations at Brest-Litovsk which 
were themselves a product of the October Revolution.        
 
Peace in the East: The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
   
   On 3 March 1918, the Bolsheviks signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers. 
Russia, in one of the harshest treaties in European history, signed over Poland, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Livonia and Courland. Both Finland and the Ukraine were ceded, 
and Turkey regained its pre-1878 frontiers. Russia lost a million square miles of 
territory, 55 million people (a third of its population, though mostly non-Russian),862 a 
third of its agriculture, half of its industry, almost all of its coal and oil and three-
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quarters of its iron ore.863 The punitive measures imposed on Russia did much to 
consolidate support for the war effort in France and to put an end to what was left of 
the debate over whether to sign a negotiated peace. 
   Russia first appealed to the OHL for an armistice on 13 November 1917, a move 
which was publicly announced on 21 November. Over the next month, Petrograd 
published the secret treaties on 23 November (much to the embarrassment of its allies) 
and stopped paying interest on its foreign debts five days later.864 Russia and the 
Central Powers then concluded a one-month armistice on 16 December which was 
followed up four days later by the commencement of peace negotiation and then by a 
declaration by the Central Powers on Christmas Day that they would agree to a peace 
without annexations or indemnities if the Allied Powers would do likewise.865 When 
the one month armistice was about to expire, on 13 January the Central Powers and the 
Russians re-opened peace negotiations and the Bolsheviks declared that all debts owed 
to ‘bourgeois nations’ were cancelled.  
   As negotiations dragged on at Brest-Litovsk, the OHL rightly assumed that the 
Bolsheviks were playing for time either for the military situation to improve in 
Western Europe (the Russian army had all but disintegrated) or for revolution to take 
hold in Germany, which was severely plagued by a strike wave in January. On 9 
February, Germany signed a separate peace with the Ukraine, prompting Trotsky to 
storm out of the unfinished negotiations the next day declaring ‘No war, no peace.’ 
Trotsky’s move proved to be highly unwise. On 13 February the Germans decided at 
Bad Homburg to resume hostilities against Russia, which began five days later. The 
German army met no resistance and advanced 150 miles in five days.866 At Lenin’s 
insistence867 the Bolsheviks signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty on 3 March. 
   Russia’s departure from the war directly affected France perhaps more than any other 
belligerent. Paris was desperate to keep Russia in the war. Though the French 
Government despised the Bolsheviks, it was willing to help then financially and 
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militarily in February after the Germans resumed the offensive. But once Russia made 
peace with Germany, it supported the resistance by the Whites against the 
Bolsheviks.868 Not all of the effects of the October Revolution on France were 
negative, however, particularly when it came to domestic politics. Russia’s humiliation 
at Brest-Litovsk eliminated most calls for a compromise peace by France’s socialists 
and did much to boost support for Clemenceau’s policy of jusqu’au boutisme. On 8 
March Clemenceau, in one of his most memorable moments of the war, declared ‘The 
attempt at a democratic peace by the effect of persuasion on the German 
revolutionaries has now been made. Yet however hard they listened for a cry of protest 
in Berlin, nothing replies except silence.’869  
   On 21 November 1917, news of the Kirilenko Proclamation, the official 
announcement by Russia that it was seeking an armistice with the Central Powers, was 
stopped on the telegraph870 but was allowed to appear in the press as an official 
communiqué on the condition that it followed the proclamation to the letter and that the 
paper stated that the French government was aware of a German espionage ring in 
Petrograd.871 The next day, Clemenceau ordered that ‘no sensational titles or 
headlines’ be allowed on the events in Russia.’872 The press mostly obeyed the Press 
Bureau’s orders. The government wanted newspaper readers to feel that they were 
fully informed, but newspapers were routinely censored for declaring that they had 
received their information on the Russo-German deliberations from foreign sources. 
On 5 December alone eight papers, including Le Petit Parisien, Le Petit Journal, 
Victoire and L’Echo de Paris, were censored for declaring that they had received news 
from Zurich or Berlin.873 The news came in the middle of the Caillaux Affair and it is 
possible that press owners on the right believed that the implications of the 
proclamation were self-explanatory whereas those on the left deemed it an inopportune 
moment to pick a fight with the newly appointed Clemenceau Government.   
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   The government’s handling of press coverage of Russia changed little between 
November and the following March. Few orders were given by the Press Bureau, but 
warnings were frequent, arbitrary and accompanied by loosely veiled threats. Still, the 
system worked. Perhaps content with Clemenceau’s policy of allowing attacks on 
selective political figures, the media chose to obey the new government in the more 
sensitive realm of foreign affairs. It is also probable that Mandel’s straightforward 
manner and his policy of contacting newspapers directly contributed to this 
phenomenon, though because his personal papers were destroyed in Rouen in the final 
days of the Second World War this is difficult to confirm. Papers under the 
Clemenceau government were rarely punished, because few blatantly disobeyed 
orders. Gone were the days when the largest dailies (Le Petit Parisien in particular) 
acted with impunity.   
   The main goal of the Press Bureau during this time was to encourage the media to 
portray the Bolsheviks in a negative light. Because of the rapidly diminishing 
estimation held of Russia in France, the selective publication of material related to the 
deliberations between the Germans and the Russians was enough to accomplish this 
task while keeping editorials to a minimum and political debate out of the papers. 
Articles which made the Bolsheviks look bad were permitted and those which were 
more ambiguous were prohibited. This policy was carried out with few official orders 
and was directed under Mandel’s close supervision. On 27 November Le Journal was 
censored for an article which discussed Lenin and Trotsky’s backgrounds. The censors, 
who believed that the article was written in a neutral fashion and simply constituted 
‘news,’ asked Nusillard why the article had been slashed. Nusillard responded that ‘we 
are in the process of developing an attitude towards the new masters of Russia, who 
have given that nation a new policy of intransigence. This attitude is that they are 
committing an injustice towards Europe. Mandel reads these papers and jumps straight 
to these Russian reports which make apologies for Lenin.’874 In early December the 
news of Trotsky and Lenin’s nomination for a Nobel Peace Prize was banned. 875 
   Perhaps the only news story that was heavily censored at first and certain to incite 
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hatred against Russia was the Bolshevik decision on 28 November to stop paying 
interest on Russia’s foreign debts. This issue was eventually addressed in an official 
communiqué by Finance Minister Louis-Lucien Klotz on 7 December. ‘The French 
Government considers that all financial engagements made before the war in Russia’s 
name are independent of the regime change in that country and they are applicable to 
whoever represents Russia. We can announce that payments towards the Russian debt 
will be paid off in January 1918, just as they have been in the past.’876 The 
memorandum had the desired effect on the press, which insisted that ‘the debts will be 
paid’877 and ‘we must occupy ourselves with the debt owed to France.’878 Klotz’s 
message was reassuring if unrealistic. A month later the Press Bureau allowed the 
media to publish the news of the official cancellation of all debt owed to ‘bourgeois 
governments’ by the Russian Government. Later in January, the news of the 
cancellation of public debt was prohibited from publication879 but the devaluation of 
French capital in Russia was permitted ‘under the responsibility of the papers.’880 
Finally on 24 February, the government re-established the policy of only allowing 
official communiqués to be published on the subject of French finances in Russia. 881 
   All stories or information favorable to the Bolsheviks was slashed as was false news. 
L’Intransigeant was censored heavily on 29 November for attempting to explain the 
Bolshevik position. Though much of the article was censored, the offending passage 
which was formally slashed stated that ‘Not all Bolsheviks are German agents and the 
Bolsheviks actually believe the Russian people want peace.’882 A similar article in Le 
Temps was heavily censored on 3 December for publishing a query by Lenin as to 
whether ‘peoples’ opinions are influenced by reactionary politics or if they wished to 
use the opportunity offered by the Russian Revolution to initiate an open peace.’883  On 
21 November a premature announcement that an armistice had been concluded was 
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stopped884 on the telegraph as was another from The Daily Mail nine days later that 
announced the ‘fall of the Bolsheviks.’885 Only a heavily abridged version of the secret 
treaties was allowed to be published and the papers that chose to do so were severely 
warned of the potential consequences by Mandel himself.886 Le Temps appears to have 
been the only paper which attempted to publish the treaties in their full texts, but was 
prohibited from doing so.887 All editorializing on the subject was strictly prohibited.888      
   On 2 December Pétain told the Press Bureau to inform papers that soldiers at the 
front were easily influenced by the events in Russia and to warn them of this fact. The 
next day Mandel told the censors that he wanted to be advised which papers were 
given warnings regarding pacifist or inopportune articles. ‘These papers will be 
warned at the moment of submission of their drafts that they run the risk of not being 
circulated at the front.’ According to Berger and Allard, this was typical of Mandel’s 
threatening style.889 The threats, however, were not empty. Pétain had now decided, 
with Clemenceau’s blessing, to severely intensify censorship of press material at the 
front. The Military Government of Paris’s list of sanctions, found at the SHD,890 
reveals that from the beginning of December until the end of the war there was an 
enormous increase in the number of papers which were seized either en route to the 
front or at the front lines themselves. At the same time, however, there was a 
significant decrease in the number of papers that were seized in the interior, although 
the frequency of suspensions remained comparable to the period before the 
Clemenceau Premiership. Mandel’s approach used both the carrot and the stick. It 
allowed papers to publish more (particularly regarding internal affairs) and punished 
them less frequently for minor infractions. But warnings under the new system were 
accompanied by threats and the percentage of punishments under the new system 
resulting in suspensions rather than seizures was much higher.891 Under the 
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Clemenceau regime, censorship became more selective in the interior and less so at the 
front.  
   News about Russia was increasingly censored in December and January as the press 
began to attempt to write more on the subject. On 4 and 7 December the Press Bureau 
ordered again that ‘no major headlines be allowed on events in Russia’.892 In January, 
the implications for a separate peace in the East for France became more apparent and 
Russia and Germany appeared to be moving closer towards making a deal. By this 
point, only Le Journal du Peuple still consistently praised the Bolsheviks and argued 
for a negotiated peace. However, the paper, according to Berger and Allard, was not 
considered a threat by censors at the Press Bureau because it only had a circulation of 
12,000 copies and Fabre (the editor) had a congenial relationship with Nusillard.893 For 
the government it was most important to contain alarmism. On 9 January, the Press 
Bureau ordered that ‘no mention be made of the sending of 70 German divisions to the 
French front.’894 Not only did censorship have to counter the influence of Bolshevism 
in France (of which there was very little) but also it had to prevent the news of an 
imminent German offensive from creating alarm. On 15 January, two days after peace 
negotiations had recommenced in Brest-Litovsk, a general order was given to ‘not 
speak of the interior situation in Russia.’895 The order was overwhelmingly obeyed and 
not one paper was seized or suspended in the interior for writing on Russia for the rest 
of the war.  
     During February, a month when the Bolsheviks were in frequent contact with the 
French Government to appeal for aid after Trotsky left the deliberations at Brest-
Litovsk and Germany advanced again into Russia, the government took a hands-off 
approach towards the media. From this point forward fewer than 10 orders were issued 
to the Press Bureau’s censors each month.896 The media continued to follow the Press 
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Bureau’s orders to only publish official government statements when discussing 
Russian affairs, and had become increasingly pre-occupied with reporting on the Gotha 
bomber raids over Paris, which had begun in January, and the increasingly militant 
declarations of the CGT regarding a new strike movement planned for May.  
Negotiations between the French and Russian governments at the end of the month 
were entirely censored, as was the sending of French envoys to Petrograd which papers 
were told was false information.897 Papers were told in advance that all commentary 
denouncing the Franco-Russian Alliance would be strictly censored and again, the 
press obeyed. 898 Particularly important for the government was that no news be 
mentioned of the substantial German territorial gains between 18 and 23 February.899 
When news finally arrived in France of the signature of the Treaty of Brest- Litovsk, 
the press was shocked and the French Government allowed the full weight of French 
hostility towards the Bolsheviks to be voiced.  
  The only items that were censored regarding the signing at Brest-Litovsk were 
declarations by the Bolsheviks to the Russian population.900 The full text of the treaty 
was allowed to be published on 5 March.901 Not one paper even attempted to justify 
the settlement, and the Bolsheviks were universally criticized by the French media for 
two weeks after it was signed. Besides insults launched at the Bolsheviks (many papers 
referred to them as traitors), the two major themes reported were the shamefulness of 
the peace imposed on the Russian people902 and the impact the treaty would have on 
European socialism. The first was sounded most loudly by the right but was echoed as 
well on the left. L’Humanité on 6 March, for example, naively declared that the terms 
of the peace were such that ‘both Lenin and Trotsky should prepare to resign.’903 
L’Humanité as well as the other leftist papers were now again pushed onto the 
defensive. A day earlier, the paper had declared that ‘Now people will blame the 
Socialists in France who were simply trying to purge Russia from the sins of the 
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Tsarist Regime’. L’Humanité was right that the Socialists were now being heavily 
criticized by papers not only on the right but also on the centre. Gustave Hervé in La 
Victoire declared the treaty a lesson for all European socialists.904 After this intense 
period of denigrating the Bolsheviks and demands for an explanation from the French 
socialists, the issue was sidelined because of the launch of the German Spring 
Offensives on the Western Front which began on 21 March. The country needed to 
come together now more than at any other point during the war.   
  
Conclusion 
   
   Clemenceau, who had benefited much from the government’s increasing lenience 
towards political attacks in the media, officially discontinued the practice of political 
censorship. However, he did not eliminate political censorship but rather 
institutionalized a more selective version of the practice. By censoring all articles that 
could be interpreted as defeatist, pacifist, or dangerous to public order and by allowing 
attacks on politicians, he silenced the left and gave the right carte blanche. Though 
Clemenceau allowed himself to be attacked (thereby avoiding accusations of blatant 
hypocrisy), he protected his unpopular Cabinet Chief Georges Mandel, army generals 
and Poincaré. Clemenceau was hated by the left and intended to use censorship to 
repress it. Nevertheless during his tenure, anti-war sentiment in France declined and 
the left did not even attempt to challenge France’s new press regime. As the leftist 
press largely moved closer to the centre, and the centre moved to the right, the press 
largely obeyed the orders given to it during the last year of the war.  
   The Press Bureau was also increasingly obeyed by the media because it was now 
more directly supervised by the government. Mandel immediately asserted his 
dominance over the Press Bureau by relegating Captain Ernest Nusillard’s position 
from chief supervisor of press censorship to messenger for the Government’s orders to 
the censors. Not content with simply giving orders to the Press Bureau related to 
individual events, Mandel’s style was more to threaten than to punish. When 
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punishments were enforced, however, they were severe. Mandel used intimidation at 
the Press Bureau to foster obedience.  
   News in France of the October Revolution was murky because the Bolsheviks 
quickly commandeered the Petrograd telegraph. The fact that both the government and 
the press received much of their early information regarding events in Russia from 
third-party sources, particularly Germany and Scandinavia, was concealed. But 
because the press was only allowed to publish government communiqués, which were 
vague in nature, it was not until February when it began to focus heavily on Russia. By 
this time almost all sympathy towards the Bolsheviks in France had disappeared and 
the anti-war faction of the socialist party, which favored a negotiated peace, had been 
largely discredited. The press toed the government line on Russia. Although Pétain 
stepped up censorship at the front, resulting in an increase of seizures, not one paper 
was given more than a warning for commenting on events in Russia during 
Clemenceau’s premiership.   
   The press not only influenced interests and public opinion in France but also 
reflected them. French citizens interpreted events mostly in terms of how they affected 
France directly. The French press concentrated on events at home first, then on 
international affairs. In reporting on foreign affairs, events in Russia took priority over 
those in the United States. As a result, news of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points speech 
alongside that of David Lloyd George’s Caxton Hall speech was significantly 
underreported in the press. The media’s heavy focus on internal affairs in France at the 
expense of international diplomatic news during the first few months of 1918 perfectly 
suited a censorship system that monitored and selectively permitted political attacks of 
France’s politicians and engaged heavily in diplomatic censorship.  
   Finally, it was official government policy to encourage the press to be disdainful of 
the Bolsheviks in Russia as the chief advocates of a negotiated peace settlement. This 
again was accomplished through selective political censorship. Arguments in favour of 
the Bolsheviks were banned, papers which were neutral towards them were severely 
warned and threatened by Mandel, and articles arguing against them were permitted if 
not explicitly encouraged. Mandel’s policy was to allow the officially released news of 
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the Russo-German peace deliberations to speak for itself. This was a prudent policy as 
French public opinion towards Russia dramatically hardened beginning in December 
1917. By the time Brest-Litovsk was signed on 3 March, the news of the treaty merely 
consolidated the hostility of almost the entire French media towards Russia. The 
German spring offensives against France later that month completed this process. 
    Reactions in the media to events in Russia mirrored those held by the French 
populace. They steadily shifted from confusion and consternation towards anger and 
hostility. The issue of the Russian financial debt to France was particularly sensitive 
and comment on it was censored particularly severely. Had freedom of discussion been 
allowed on this subject earlier it is highly probable that public sympathy towards the 
Russians would have diminished far more rapidly. Mandel’s careful control of this 
topic was useful in combatting alarmism.  
   Finally, the socialists were blamed somewhat unjustly by the media after the Treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk. Though the SFIO had supported Stockholm and much of it argued 
for a compromise peace, enthusiasm for this position had significantly waned by the 
beginning of 1918 and after Caillaux was out of the picture neither the SFIO nor the 
socialist press argued in favor of the Bolsheviks. Those who did, like Henri Fabre, 
were so marginalized that they were not even taken seriously by the Press Bureau. The 
first three months of 1918 saw a depolarization of politics in France which was 
reflected in the media. Now the country united together to face perhaps its most 
significant military threat of the war, the German spring offensives.     
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Chapter 6: Spring-Summer 1918 : The Challenge of the Ludendorff Offenives 
 
Introduction 
 
   In 1918 Germany, after defeating Russia in the east, focused its full attention on the 
Western Front. Beginning in January, Germany launched air raids on Paris and 
London905 using Gotha Bombers and attempted unsuccessfully to break the resolve of 
the populations there. In March, Germany launched a massive series of offensives 
which lasted through the summer but were unable to sustain their original territorial 
gains. During this period France, it appears, had begun to recover from the fracturing 
in the Union Sacrée which characterized much of 1917. Germany’s actions did a 
great deal to bring the French together against a common enemy and weaken the left 
anti-war movement. Censorship played a part in helping to limit alarmism and to 
prevent the spread of labour unrest in this period, but its job was made easier by a 
general upswing in French morale.  
   This chapter deals with a common theme throughout the study – namely how the 
French information management system dealt with events which played out in the 
open. The Gotha bombings, the Paris Gun attacks and the 1918 strike movement were 
all impossible to censor in their entirety, yet the Press Bureau under Mandel’s 
direction dealt with each using a comprehensive strategy to avoid panic and to avoid 
the spread of rumours or potentially incendiary information.   
   During the Ludendorff offensives again the difficulty was raised of how to censor 
news regarding the Americans, who were untested and highly sensitive to negative 
criticism. In many ways the Ludendorff offensives were approached by the Press 
Bureau in a similar fashion to the Nivelle offensive the previous year. The strategy 
for the censorship of battles which was developed during Verdun – vagueness in 
reporting negative information, detailed description of the positive- was used until the 
end of the war. However while the strategy remained the same, the press itself had 
matured by becoming less prone to sensationalism.  
                                                          
905 Gotha raids in London started in summer 1917. Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall, pp.185-187.  
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     This chapter offers a glimpse into provincial censorship through its discussion of 
the spring 1918 strike movement in the Loire. Little was known in France regarding 
its build up in part because of the secrecy of the more militant factions of the French 
labour. Once the strikes began, however, the Press Bureau helped to prevent their 
spread. Some comparisons are made between the censorship of the 1917 and 1918 
spring movements, though the differences are much more numerous than the 
similarities. The objectives of the movements, the governments in Paris involved and 
the level of their popular support differed entirely. Clemenceau’s approach to the 
1918 strikes was entirely successful and a large portion of this chapter examines the 
reasons for this success.  
 
France Under Siege: Gotha Raids, the Paris Gun and the Spring Offensive. 
    
  After victory in the east, the OHL under General Erich Ludendorff’s direction 
decided to take an all-or-nothing gamble against the Allies on the Western Front. The 
Germans were able to shift 33 divisions over to the Western Front from Russia906 
where they now had 192 concentrated against the Allies’ 178.907 The goal was to 
penetrate deep into weak points along the Allied lines using heavy concentrations of 
storm-trooper units equipped with new mobile weapons and meticulously trained to 
use new infantry tactics. The attacks came in five waves: Operation Michael between 
21 March and 5 April near St. Quentin, Georgette from 9 to 29 April near Ypres, 
Blücher-Yorck from 27 May to 6 June between Soissons and Reims, Gneisenau from 9 
to 12 June along the Matz River, and the final German attack resulting in the Second 
Battle of the Marne from 15 July to 7 August. The attacks at first concentrated 
primarily on the BEF under the assumption that if they were soundly beaten or ‘driven 
into the sea’ 908 French morale would collapse. The OHL had a short window of 
opportunity to break through the Western Front before American troops arrived in 
large enough numbers to tip the scale in favour of the Allies.  
                                                          
906 The Germans were in March 1918 were still forced to keep 47 divisions in the east. Ibid., p.36.   
907 ibid.p.135.  
908 ibid. p.129.  
228 
 
   The German Army achieved significant tactical successes in each attack and during 
the Second Battle of the Chemin des Dames which began on 27 May the Germans 
reached within 56 miles of Paris after four days of fighting.909 The rapid pace of 
advance quickly exhausted Germany’s soldiers, particularly the storm-trooper units 
upon which much of the success depended. By June the Germans were attacking with 
diminishing returns.910 Ludendorff had no operational or strategic plan for what to do 
after puncturing the Allied lines911 and after April he shifted his attention away from 
the British and towards the French. Indeed, Ludendorff  consistently shifted the spring 
campaign according to circumstance and events.912 This proved to be ineffective and 
the Germans were forced back on the defensive by late July. The Germans had missed 
their chance to beat the Allies before the American troops, who were arriving at the 
front at a rate of 250,000 per month by June,913 could alter the balance against them. In 
May and June the Allies, under the new General-in-Chief of the Allied Armies 
Ferdinand Foch, were able to better co-ordinate their operations and became more 
adept at anticipating and reacting to German attacks. Exhausted and deprived of 
irreplaceable manpower, the Germans had lost their gamble and now were subjected 
themselves to a series of attacks which would lead to Allied victory. The first and one 
of the most notable of these attacks was launched on 18 July as part of the Second 
Battle of the Marne in which the Germans sustained 170,000 casualties. 
   The Germans began to launch air raids over Paris on 30 and 31 January using Gotha 
Bombers. By September 664 bombs had been dropped in 14 raids killing 266 people 
and wounding 603.914 The raids peaked in the spring and the single worst episode 
occured when a panic caused 70 people to be trampled to death at the Bolivar Metro 
station on 11 March.915 Of the 483 Gothas sent to the city, only 13 actually reached 
their destination. More devastating to the city, if only slightly so, was the German 
development of a ‘Paris Gun,’ a modified 15-inch naval gun designed as a terror 
                                                          
909 ibid., p.156.  
910 Philpott, War of Attrition, p.316.  
911 When asked to define the objective of the Spring Offensive Ludendorff  that ‘it is enough to punch a 
hole and that the rest will follow’. ibid.,p.312. 
912 ibid., p.313. 
913 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall p.159.  
914 ibid., pp.187-188.  
915 ibid., p.187.   
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weapon which could hit the city from a distance of 80 miles.916  The gun shelled Paris 
371 times between 23 March and 8 August killing 256 people and wounding 62.917 The 
raids and bombardment were a failed German attempt to break civilian morale in Paris 
and resulted in the opposite effect; they brought the city together in the face of an 
indiscriminate danger posed by a common enemy. 
   It was impossible to fully censor news of either the Gotha raids or the shelling of the 
city by the Paris Gun. As with the 1917 Parisian strike movement, censoring all news 
of events that were witnessed by many bystanders would arouse suspicion and distrust 
in newspaper readers. The most important censorship rules were that no mention be 
made of the location of where bombs or shells had landed and an order first given on 
31 January also stated that no photographs of debris were permitted918 and that there be 
no mention of the exodus of Parisians or anything that would imply panic in the city.919 
Also important was that no mention be made of German communiqués discussing 
bombs or the physical dimensions thereof.920  Papers were allowed to mention that 
bombs had been dropped, they could vaguely refer to the geographical locations of 
their landings, and they could publish the number of resulting deaths or injuries.921 The 
order concerning locations was strictly enforced as it was believed to be useful 
information for the Germans.922 On 3 March, a bomb dropped directly in front of the 
headquarters of Le Gaulois, but the request by the paper’s director, Arthur Meyer, to 
publish the news was denied by Nusillard.923 Following the Bolivar incident, the 
director of Paris-Midi was forced to promise over the telephone that not one single 
issue would mention the name ‘Bolivar.’ Instead papers were permitted to mention the 
opening of a judicial inquiry into involuntary deaths, which was to be launched against 
an anonymous party.924 
                                                          
916 Wiest, The Western Front 1917-1918 p.157.  
917 Stevenson, With our Backs to the Wall pp.187-188.  
918 BDIC F rés 0270 C, 31 Jan.1918.  Photographs showing the debris of shot down Gothas, such as that in 
Le Journal on 17 March, were permitted. BDIC F rés 0270 C, 17 Mar.1918.    
919 Berger and Allard, Les Secrets de la censure p.295.  
920 SHD 5N 523, 20 Mar.1918.  
921 On 31 January an official communiqué informed the press that bombs had landed in the suburban areas 
of the West Bank and that there were over 50 people injured. BDIC F rés 0270 C, 31 Jan.1918.  
922 L’Echo de Raincy, a paper from the north-east of Paris, was censored for one month on 27 April for 
mentioning the landing point of bombs. SHD 5N 357, 27 Apr.1917.  
923 Berger and Allard, Les Secrets de la censure pendant la guerre, p.290.  
924 ibid., p.294.   
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   On 22 March, when shelling by the Paris Gun began, Clemenceau released a notice 
to the citizens of Paris to be aware and to have an ‘alert ear.’925 At 8:30 that morning, 
Paris-Midi and Le Petit Parisien called in to demand an explanation for the explosion. 
The papers were told that the cause was unknown. Later that day, the Press Bureau was 
forced to make an order regarding the new attacks when Le Temps called the office and 
explained that there had been an explosion at Gare de L’Est and that ‘blood and pieces 
of brain were everywhere’. The order was immediately sent that ‘Absolutely nothing 
be mentioned on the bombs in Paris’.926 Later that day, the Press Bureau was informed 
of the new gun and instructed papers to be sober and not publish messages from the 
German or Austrian radios.927 Two days later all mention of the Paris Gun was 
suspended and papers which violated the order were threatened with suspension.928 
   As with the news of the Gotha raids, mention of the Paris Gun could not be 
prohibited indefinitely. Over the next few days, more news was allowed to be 
published on the shelling and by 2 April papers were even allowed to publish lists of 
victims, though not their addresses.929 In late March and early April the telegraph 
censors were busy censoring telegrams detailing the locations of shell landings. On 11 
April alone, 20 telegrams were censored to this effect.930 Beginning on 25 March, the 
papers began to speak about the new raid on Paris, even if they were not allowed to 
mention the gun itself. The type of comments expressed in this early period by the 
right-wing press characterized those made by the Parisian media as a whole a few 
weeks later. L’Action Française commended the ‘sang froid’ of Parisians,931 and 
L’Echo de Paris and Le Petit Journal wrote that the Parisians were taking the aerial 
attacks ‘with good humour.’932 The German attempt to terrorize Paris and to weaken 
its morale had failed. The press, and it appears the citizens of Paris, responded to the 
air raids and shelling of Paris not with alarm but wit determination. These reactions 
mirrored those which developed in response to the German Spring Offensive.  
                                                          
925 ibid., p.295.   
926 ibid., p.299.  
927 Radio telegraphs were far easier to intercept than their written counterparts. 
928 Berger and Allard Les Secrets de la censure, p.299.   
929 BDIC F rés 0270 C, 2 Apr.1918.  
930 BDIC F rés 0270 TAC, 11 Apr.1918.  
931 SHD 5N 426, L’Action Française, 25 Mar.1918.  
932 SHD 5N 426, L’Echo de Paris and Le Petit Journal, 26 Mar.1918.  
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    Military censorship during the spring offensives followed rules already in place. The 
most important of these were that officers not be named, French casualties not be 
given, no details be given of weaponry used and no mention be made of specific 
locations on the battlefield. On 22 March the Press Bureau was reminded of the 
importance of maintaining a strict military censorship regime. ‘The eventuality of an 
enemy offensive has been communicated to the government which has put in place 
strict rules which the press must obey particularly at the beginning of the attack. 1. The 
only reports that can be given regarding these events are A. Official communiqués 
coming from the GQG. B. Articles coming from official war correspondents accredited 
by the GQG and which have been verified by the War Ministry. 2. Articles which 
comment on the events must be written in a way which would not instruct the enemy. 
The publication of all news or of articles which have not been previously authorized 
exposes offending papers to the most rigorous sanctions.’933 On 7 April papers were 
reminded of the two month ‘constant delay’ when mentioning names in particular.934 
   Military orders regarding French actions were closely followed by the media. Special 
attention was paid to the censorship of American actions during the offensives. Orders 
were given on 1 April that mention of American troops on the front lines was 
permitted.935 Any details about the Americans, however, were strictly forbidden and 
this order was rigorously enforced. On 27 May news of the first American offensive 
action at Chatigny was censored and L’Excelsior was seized and then suspended 
indefinitely936 for disobeying the order.937 The Americans were quick learners on the 
battlefield but their lack of experience hampered the US contribution for the remainder 
of the war.938 The French were cautious and the Americans were sensitive as to how 
their war efforts appeared in the press. Whereas most telegrams sent to the Press 
Bureau on French or British actions at the front were censored, those discussing the 
                                                          
933 BDIC F rés 0270 C, 22 Mar.1918.  
934 BDIC F rés 0270 CG, 7 Apr.1918.  
935 BDIC F rés 0270 C, 1 Apr.1918.  
936 This particularly strict punishment was meant as a warning for other papers not to disobey the Press 
Bureau. Having learned its lesson, the paper was allowed to begin publication again on 1 June. SHD 5N 
357.  
937 BDIC F rés 0270 CG, 27 May.1918.  
938 R.H.Zieger, America’s Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Lanham, 2000),  pp.92-
97.  
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Americans were usually stopped outright. As a result, the press was not only restricted 
through official orders on what could be written about the Americans but also was less 
informed about their actions at the front.939 
   During the first days of Operation Michael, while suffering enormous losses (39,629 
killed and wounded on 21 March alone)940 the Germans were able to advance 20 
kilometers in three days of fighting and captured 40,000 prisoners.941 Later in April 
and May, the message remained the same:  the Germans were fighting hard but were 
being held by the Franco-British troops who demonstrated ‘their usual valiance’942 and 
‘heroic resistance.’943 However, there were nuances in the communiqués which 
accompanied positive remarks but permitted the careful observer to read between the 
lines. These included describing of the German attack as ‘determined’ and reporting 
that Allied troops had to face ‘an enemy with superior numbers.’944 The press, which 
had grown more astute in interpreting communiqués, responded to the news of the 
Spring Offensive with encouraging sobriety.  
   The censorship regime under Mandel was obeyed far more closely by the press than 
under previous administrations. Furthermore, the press was becoming less prone to 
exaggeration and since January had been less immersed in political battles. Although 
during the first few days of the German attacks the press followed the communiqués 
almost to the letter by asserting that ‘all of the German attacks have failed and had not 
met their objectives,’945 media reports soon became more perceptive. Almost 
immediately several papers, such as La Victoire, Le Petit Journal946 and Le Petit 
Parisien, commented that that the German attacks which began on 21 March were the 
first of a series of offensives. Later in April several papers including Le Temps 
discussed whether the German attacks were an attempt to lure the French Army 
north947 (not mentioned in the communiqués) and Le Petit Journal discussed the 
                                                          
939 BDIC F rés 0270 TAC.  
940 Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall p.55. 
941 ibid., p.56.   
942 SHD 5N 417, 27 May 1918.  
943 SHD 5N 417, 31 May 1918.  
944 SHD 5N 417, 28 May 1918.  
945 SHD 5N 426, Ministry of War press analyses, 22 Mar.1918.  
946 SHD 5N 426, 23 Mar.1918.  
947 SHD 5N 426, 14 Apr.1918.  
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importance of Amiens for the Germans.948 But as of 26 March the media’s general 
message according to Mandel was, ‘While the situation on the front is serious, we have 
reason to be confident.’949 Retreats and setbacks were allowed to be reported in vague 
terms in the media (a major difference from the guidelines imposed during the Nivelle 
Offensive) but were always accompanied by phrases meant to inspire confidence. 
Indeed the press really was confident about the Allies’ prospects of defending 
themselves against the increasingly costly German attacks and even in the most 
confusing or desperate circumstances did not falsify information, exaggerate or panic. 
The press had not only become more self-censored but had also evolved 
professionally. Over the past three and a half years the press was accustomed to 
working with the Press Bureau and the GQG. Editors knew what would be allowed for 
publication by the government and were familiar with the GQG’s practices regarding 
the disclosure of information. The press furthermore had learned also that not only 
would exaggerations usually be censored but that they could be harmful to morale if 
they were later proven to be groundless. It was now able simultaneously to follow 
orders, accurately interpret communiqués, present accurate news and reassure France’s 
population when it needed it most.  
   Although suggested by Lloyd George on 30 January, it was not until 2 May that Foch 
was named General-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Rumors surrounding Foch’s 
appointment were prohibited from publication950 but references to the potential 
efficiency of a joint Allied command were permitted. Le Temps on 11 April was 
allowed to publish that ‘the Germans have been successful since 21 March because of 
their unity of command.’951  It was important for the press to obey orders regarding the 
potential nomination of a French Commander for all the Allied forces. In Britain the 
issue was sensitive because Lloyd George had long supported the new appointment, 
partially to undermine Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig and General Sir William 
Robertson, the latter of whom he replaced by General Sir Henry Wilson in February. 
                                                          
948 SHD 5N 426, 25 Apr.1918  
949 SHD 5N 426, 26 Mar.1918.  
950 Berger and Allard, Les Secrets de la censure pp.302-303.  Newspapers were first allowed to discuss 
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Britain. ibid., p.303.  Clemenceau, however, would not confirm the news until 4 May.  SHD 5N 426.  
951 SHD 5N 426, Le Temps, 11 Apr.1918.  
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Keeping the discussions surrounding Foch’s potential appointment out of the media 
was important for Allied unity and the press responsibly followed government orders 
on the matter.  
   The Press Bureau in March 1918 was directly controlled by the Premier’s office and 
in many ways its priorities had changed even if military censorship had in practice not 
been much altered. Both the Nivelle offensive and the Ludendorff offensives were 
moments of heightened crisis but they were reported by the press in entirely different 
fashions. It is true that the press was provided with optimistic forecasts in the lead-up 
to the Nivelle Offensive and had a vested interest in presenting the battle in a way that 
would prevent their predictions from appearing foolish. During that offensive, which 
was albeit much briefer than the Ludendorff offensives, no bad news, even if it could 
have been interpreted through vague communiqués, was reported until it became 
impossible to interpret the offensive positively. During the Spring Offensive, the press 
responded to events as they took place without a fixed agenda. It was honest about the 
difficulties faced by the Allied soldiers and even mentioned setbacks. The press 
increasingly realized its role was to re-assure France’s citizens rather than to cause 
alarm by providing false hope.  
 
The 1918 Strike Movement in Paris and the Loire 
 
     A series of anti-war strikes took place in France between 18 and 29 May 1918. 
After beginning in Paris, the movement spread into several key French industrial 
regions. In the department of the Loire, the strikes were particularly violent. The 
official policy of the Clemenceau government regarding strike activity was clear to 
everyone. Between December and April the mainstream press in the Loire reported 
consistently on local labour activities but practised a great deal of self-censorship by 
only vaguely describing the motivations of the strike leaders. Locals in the Loire were 
shocked after the strikes broke out in late May by the violence perpetrated by the 
strikers and did not agree with many of the strikers’ demands, which were seen as 
being extreme and unrealistic. During most of the period between November 1917 and 
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May 1918 the Parisian press demonstrated little interest in covering events in the 
Loire. When it did report on events in the Loire, the left-wing press in particular was 
heavily censored. The centrist press increasingly self-censored in this period by being 
as vague as possible, and the right-wing press in Paris almost without exception chose 
to completely ignore events in the Loire. The censorship of articles discussing the CGT 
intensified at the end of December 1917 and during the next few months. Censorship 
of the press was so severe by early May, and during the less violent and more 
economically motivated strikes in Paris between 13 and 18 May, that the Parisian press 
shied away almost completely from reporting on the strikes in the Loire which began 
immediately afterwards. Strict censorship of the press and of the telegraph, combined 
with a vigilant approach to postal control, was essential in facilitating the 
government’s swift and successful repression of the May 1918 strikes.      
   In the months leading up to the strikes, both the press in Paris and the censors at the 
Press Bureau were pre-occupied with the Gotha raids and the shelling of Paris, along 
with the various political scandals and trials (the Malvy and Caillaux Affairs, the trial 
and execution of Bolo Pasha and the Bonnet Rouge Affair). During this time the 
Parisian press paid little attention to the increasing radicalism within the French labour 
movement. In the provinces, where the press had a greater interest in local affairs, 
papers were allowed to report only superficially on labour meetings. As in Paris, they 
were only permitted to document speakers’ lists and official meeting agendas and were 
forbidden from quoting pacifist or internationalist speeches. Beginning on 1 May, the 
Press Bureau along with the Departmental Commissions ensured that information 
relating to the strike movement in the Loire appeared at a minimum in both the foreign 
and the French civilian press, especially in Paris. They allowed no information on 
strike activity to enter the trench papers and made sure that no letters sent to soldiers at 
the front mentioned strikes or championed the revolutionary principles around which 
the strikes in the Loire rallied. The task was made easier by the refusal of the Loire’s 
union leaders after 1 May to allow members of the press to attend union meetings in an 
attempt to combat their infiltration by undercover government agents. With few 
exceptions, the government was successful in keeping the strike movement in the Loire 
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and most information pertaining to it confined to the region. The government ensured 
that citizens in the rest of France and soldiers fighting at the front had little information 
regarding the strikes or of their forceful repression by the police.  
    The French strikes in spring 1918, most notably those in the Loire, have been 
generally overlooked by historians because they coincided with the crucial Ludendorff 
offensives and the Gotha raids on Paris. They have also been overlooked because, 
unlike during the Parisian strike movement of 1917, the Loire’s labour leaders in 1918 
were unsuccessful in forcing the government to negotiate. The 1918 strikes, though, 
are of great historical significance. They were launched during a time of emergency at 
the front. Whereas in 1917 labour leaders demanded little more than salary increases 
for workers, those who led the Loire’s strike movement in 1918 made specific 
demands regarding the government’s conduct of the war effort. The French 
government in spring 1918 was led by a far less conciliatory cabinet than it had been a 
year earlier. Clemenceau had been an ardent critic of the concessions made to the 
strikers in 1917 and the government had to forcefully repress the strikes not only to 
protect the armaments industry, but also to maintain its own prestige. Clemenceau had 
been appointed partly to restore morale, both in the interior and at the front after the 
crisis year of 1917. The 1918 strike movement was fortunately less successful in 
obtaining its objectives than was the movement in 1917, because its objectives more 
directly threatened the legitimacy of the French Government.          
    The Minoritaire faction of the CGT, which had opposed the Union Sacrée since 
1914, grew rapidly and gained considerable influence in the months after 
Clemenceau’s appointment as Premier. On 25 December, at a federal CGT conference 
in Clermont-Ferrand, a resolution passed which praised the Russian Revolution and 
President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points. The resolution called for a peace without 
annexations, an international conference to discuss peace and for a clear statement by 
the Clemenceau Government declaring its war aims. This was the first time that the 
CGT had voted in favour of a major proposal put forward by the Minoritaires. The 
resolution also foreshadowed the demands and the aggressiveness that later 
characterized the spring 1918 strikes in the Loire.    
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     The CDS was able to take advantage of the widening rift within the federal CGT. 
Departmental union leaders also benefited from the disarray in Paris by gaining 
considerable authority in France’s regional labour unions. Many of these departmental 
union leaders and all those who led the May 1918 strike movement in the Loire were 
either members of or directly influenced by the CDS. The Loire’s labour movement 
was led by the Departmental Secretary of the Metal Workers Union, Clovis Andrieu 
and his associate Charles Flageollet, head of the Loire’s association of trade unions. 
Flaggeollet was an anarchist and Andrieu had already instigated a strike in the Loire 
from 27 November to 6 December 1917 and was under close surveillance for being a 
suspected pacifist by the Sûreté.952 Between January and May 1918 Andrieu and 
Flaggeolet were able to outmaneuver their more moderate opponents at the bourse953 in 
St. Etienne. Cries of ‘long live the Russians’ and ‘long live peace’ became regular 
features at the meetings there during this period.954 The movement became too radical 
even for the leadership of the federal Minoritaires in Paris.  
     Alphonse Merrheim, Secretary of the federal Metal Workers Union and leader of 
the minoritaires, had argued throughout the war for a compromise peace and for a 
general strike in France if necessary to achieve it. But after the Ludendorff offensives 
began in March, he agreed with the CGT’s Majoritaire counterpart that strikes 
scheduled for 1 May should be postponed until the emergency at the front had 
subsided. The Loire labour leaders never officially split from the CGT, but on 25 
March with Péricat’s encouragement,955 they broke off their working relationship with 
Merrheim and the Minoritaires in Paris by declaring a departmental strike in the Loire 
for 1 May. The federal CGT submitted its official refusal to support the 1 May strikes 
on 15 April.956 It later openly condemned the 18 to 29 May strikes in the Loire. The 1 
May strikes lasted one day and were considered a moderate success by the Loire’s 
union leadership.957 The revolutionary fervour at the almost daily meetings held at St. 
Etienne’s bourse grew in intensity between 1 and 18 May. At this time the Ministry of 
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the Interior became increasingly concerned with the situation in the Loire, which 
contained France’s second highest population of munitions workers after Paris.958 The 
department’s union leaders seemed to be preparing to launch a wave of anti-war strikes 
in the armaments industry and to be headed for a direct confrontation with the 
Clemenceau Government.  
     On 13 May, the CDS launched a strike movement in Paris. These strikes lasted until 
18 May, the same day on which the first strikes in the Loire began in Firminy. The 
Parisian strikes were not characterized by the same level of violence as those in the 
Loire and workers’ demands in Paris were more economically motivated. Ironically, 
Péricat, who had encouraged the union leaders in the Loire to follow their Parisian 
comrades by initiating strikes, became disillusioned with the Loire’s labour leaders, 
particularly those from Firminy who consistently called for an armed rebellion against 
the government. Péricat began to think of the movement as a political liability. The 
strikers in the Loire had very little support from outside labour unions and diminishing 
support even from the CDS between 18 and 29 May 1918. 
     Andrieu instigated strikes in Vienne and Chambon-Feugerolles on 18 May. He 
sensed that the strikes in Paris were losing steam and wanted to encourage the rest of 
the Loire’s union leadership to initiate strikes throughout the department before they 
missed their chance. His plan worked. On 19 May the congress of the Minoritaires in 
St. Etienne voted overwhelmingly in favor of a department-wide general strike.959 The 
group’s specific demands, though, remained unclear. Some of the more radical 
delegates argued for armed rebellion against the government, or for the establishment 
of a workers’ council.960 Péricat, who seemed to be losing control of the movement’s 
ideological direction, insisted that the strikes had no other motives than to get the 
government to state its war aims clearly and to get authorization for the CGT to attend 
an international conference.961          
     By 22 May the strikes had taken a violent turn throughout the Loire. In Roanne, 
Firminy and Rive de Gier there were railway stoppages and several acts of industrial 
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sabotage. Early in the morning on 23 May in St. Etienne the strikers attempted to 
prevent a group of soldiers from boarding trains headed for the front. When the police 
intervened, roughly 2,000 protesters, including many women, began to charge the 
police barricades and to throw rocks, seriously injuring one officer. Later in the day 
there was a shootout between protesters and the police followed by a scuffle in which 
one dragoon was beaten with a club and the police commissar, M.Chassing, was 
stabbed twice. Flaggeolet declared at a meeting that day that ‘a large step towards 
peace had been taken’ and that ‘the munitions transports will no longer function’.962 23 
May was also a particularly violent day in Roanne. Police officers were assaulted and 
an elderly man was severely injured. The seriousness of the violence committed by 
strikers throughout the Loire and especially in St. Etienne on 23 May ensured a 
forceful governmental retaliation.  
     On 24 May the government officially announced its intention to end the strikes. 
Flaggeolet fled to Nîmes in the middle of the night. The next day, 43 individuals were 
arrested, including Andrieu and Péricat. All meetings at the St. Etienne bourse were 
banned. The effects were immediate. The strikes began to peter out and finally ended 
on 29 May in Firminy and Chambon-Feugerolles. The strikes had ended in the same 
two towns in which they had begun. Flaggeolet was found and arrested in Marseilles 
later that night. Once the movement had been deprived of its leadership, there was no 
one willing or capable enough to replace the arrested leaders. It was not until after the 
armistice that members of the federal Minoritaires began to once again launch strikes 
under the pretext of inciting revolution.   
     The repression of the strikes in the Loire by Clemenceau’s Government was made 
easier because of their unpopularity with the local citizenry, who feared the violence of 
the strikers and generally did not share their revolutionary principles. The CGT had 
openly condemned the strikes and made no attempt to save the leaders from being 
arrested, but the strike movement was not necessarily doomed to failure. It could have 
lasted longer had it not been quickly deprived of capable leadership. It is also uncertain 
whether the strikes would have remained isolated in the Loire had there not been strict 
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governmental control of information being sent out of the department. The 
neighbouring city of Vienne in the Isère where regional union secretaries shared the 
same revolutionary ideals, authoritarian dispositions and lack of concern for public 
opinion as in the Loire, experienced strikes in the same period that were influenced 
directly by the unions in St. Etienne. The strikes in Vienne, though, were characterized 
by a lesser degree of violence. The government was able to act swiftly and effectively 
in ending the strike movement in the Loire because the movement was isolated, locally 
unpopular and unknown to the rest of France. Censorship played a key role in 
influencing all three of these factors. 
       It was only after the federal CGT conference on 25 December in Clermont-
Ferrand that Mandel began to use censorship to combat the growing influence of those 
within the CGT who advocated a compromise peace, a general strike or even a 
revolution. The Press Bureau’s strict censorship of news related to the Clermont-
Ferrand conference foreshadowed the approach later used to censor information on the 
Loire’s more pacifist Minoritaire conferences in March and April. Telegrams 
mentioning the conference in Clermont-Ferrand were all either censored or stopped.963 
Some dailies, particularly Le Temps and L’Humanité, dedicated large portions of their 
26 December issue to the conference. Le Temps vaguely referred to the split within the 
socialist party and the CGT, as well as to the extremism of the internationalists who 
proposed the resolution. This approach became increasingly typical of how the 
Parisian centrist press reported on union activities. L’Humanité had sections of its 
articles slashed,964 though it is unclear exactly what the paper was forbidden to publish. 
Stripped of all analytical maneuverability, Le Temps and L’Humanité published very 
similar articles on the events in Clermont-Ferrand. No mention was made in either 
article of the support at the conference given to Wilson’s 14 Points or to the Russian 
Revolution. Uninformed readers of the articles would have perhaps sensed little more 
than growing disunity within the CGT. They would have had no sense, however, of the 
causes for this disunity and would have been uninformed of the specific issues over 
which the CGT debated. Le Temps published more on the French labour movement in 
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this period than did any other significant Parisian daily because it was always 
extremely brief when doing so. The only specific message that the Press Bureau 
allowed papers to convey on the subject was that extremists within the French labour 
movement were weak and were responsible for the infighting within the CGT.    
     During the next few months, Mandel showed extreme caution in ensuring that no 
mention was made in the press of preparations for strike activity within France. 
‘Menaces de grèves’965 became the code word censors used when they slashed 
information in articles or censored telegrams that even mentioned the word ‘strikes.’ 
The Press Bureau also began to prohibit papers from reporting on issues that 
Clemenceau and Mandel believed could potentially provoke strikes. Examples of 
themes that were considered threatening included: talk of bread shortages,966 the 
possible increase of foreign workers in French war factories,967 workers’ demands for 
salary increases,968 the capture of spies working in France969 and, increasingly, strike 
activity in Allied, neutral or enemy countries.970 One particular episode during this 
period provides a good example of Mandel’s authoritarian methods. In a letter on 16 
January to the Prefect of Police in Paris, Mandel mentioned that a provincial paper (it 
is not stated which one) had been permitted to publish a comment supporting the 
augmentation of salaries for workers. Mandel told the prefect that all provincial press 
leaders must be rounded up and lectured by the police in their areas on the dangers of 
such statements. The prefect was then told to report back to him once this had been 
done.971 Before Mandel, when the censorship of domestic affairs was taken more 
lightly, a similar situation would have been dealt with within the Press Bureau in Paris 
by reprimanding the offending Provincial Censorship Commission, rather than by 
ordering the police to intimidate local press owners throughout the entire country.      
   Before Clemenceau’s Ministry, it was considered beneficial to publish reports on 
strike movements or labour discontent in Germany and Austria-Hungary. After 
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December, in contrast, the Press Bureau began to stop telegrams972 and to censor 
articles973 which reported on strike activities in enemy countries. Whereas strikes in 
enemy territory were previously seen as opportunities to portray weakness on the 
enemy home fronts, they were now seen as potentially providing ammunition to the 
growing internationalist movement within the CGT. Between 1 and 3 February alone 
there were 28 stopped telegrams discussing strikes in Germany.974 As labour activities 
intensified in Germany and Austria, the Press Bureau became increasingly concerned 
with censoring them. The overall effect was that articles on German and Austrian 
labour activity published in major Parisian dailies became shorter and less detailed as 
the movements on which they were reporting intensified.                               
     Between January and late April the Parisian press and its correspondents paid little 
attention to the inner politics of the CGT and even less attention to events in the Loire. 
The Press Bureau’s registers contain almost nothing conveying eagerness on the part 
of the major Parisian papers to report on the increasing radicalism in the Loire.975 
Havas seems to be the only agency which attempted to send telegrams on almost every 
departmental union meeting in St. Etienne. All of these were stopped or strictly 
censored.976 Both the press and the Press Bureau during this time were preoccupied 
with the fighting at the front, the Malvy Affair, the Bonnet Rouge Affair, Bolo Pacha’s 
treason trial and the Gotha raids on Paris. In March, leftist papers, particularly 
L’Humanité, began to feature Sam Gompers’ trip accompanied by a delegation of 
American union leaders through Britain and France. Only a few small left-wing papers 
such as Le Journal du Peuple, La Bataille and Le Plèbe attempted to report specific 
details on the proceedings in St. Etienne’s bourse. Until April, many of these papers 
supported the unions in the Loire and their articles were almost always either banned 
outright or reduced to lists of speakers’ names and meeting agendas. Their published 
articles appeared similar to the self-censored articles in centrist papers like Le Temps.    
    The Press Bureau suspected leftist papers of being predisposed to supporting the 
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Loire’s labour movement unless they explicitly were critical of it. It therefore censored 
the leftist papers more harshly than it did centrist papers, which were already heavily 
self-censored on the subject. Whereas when centrist papers reported on the radical 
labour meetings in the Loire, they had to be vague, leftist papers reporting on the same 
events had to be both vague and critical. Because the mainstream Parisian press was 
distracted with events in Paris and at the front and the papers which did attempt to 
report on the pacifist tendencies in the Loire were strictly censored or self-censored, 
Parisians were largely unaware of the extremism of the Loire’s union leaders. The little 
information they did receive on the region was superficial.  
     The only widespread Parisian press coverage given to the Loire’s union leaders 
before late April was in late February and in early March, after accusations had been 
launched in the right-wing press and by Clemenceau that the St. Etienne bourse was 
influenced by German agents. On 25 February the departmental worker’s union of the 
Loire published a note condemning those who had launched the accusations and 
denied any German influence in its organization.977 The next day, L’Humanité 
mentioned the note and Le Petit Journal was permitted to report an edited interview 
with Flaggeolet. In the article, Flaggeolet was quoted as saying, ‘We are called 
pacifists as a pejorative term. We are pacifists in the sense that we wish as soon as 
possible for a just and lasting peace. But we do not wish this peace to be as a result of 
the defeat of our country. Pacifism and defeatism are far from each other in our 
interpretations of things.’978 Clemenceau had retracted the accusations after it had been 
quickly established that they were false. The Press Bureau usually blocked quotes from 
anarchists like Flaggeolet, but in this case jumped on an opportunity to convey even 
France’s most militant labour leaders as willing to fight for a victorious France. Le 
Journal du Peuple was allowed to republish the same report on 6 March.979 Although it 
stopped all telegrams related to the affair,980 the Press Bureau allowed those papers 
that were interested to come to the defence of the Loire’s labour unions. The Press 
Bureau was more inclined to allow papers to report on the labour movement in St. 
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Etienne if their articles conveyed unity on the home front rather than revealing the 
actual extremism of the movement’s leadership.     
   In the Loire, the censor’s task was to carefully monitor and control information 
pertaining to revolutionary strike movements. This required more vigilance than in 
Paris. Papers in the Loire were more interested in local affairs and labour activity was 
front page news. The Loire’s two highest selling papers were the Radical Socialist La 
Tribune and the Loire Républicain, known locally as the Loire,981 both of which were 
centrist. Also important was the bi-monthly Syndicaliste, the official paper of the 
Departmental Workers Union of the Loire.982 Unlike in Paris, it was impossible for 
papers in the Loire to ignore local union activities. As a recurring theme, La Tribune 
praised unions for helping workers acquire benefits and advocated the spread of union 
activity throughout the department,983 but when it reported on the increasingly radical 
labour meetings in St. Etienne, it limited itself mostly to reporting speakers’ lists and 
meeting agendas. The Loire censored itself in a different way. It reported on the 
meetings in St .Etienne and elsewhere in the department, but only recorded speeches or 
published meeting agendas that focused on salary increases.984 While this had been 
officially forbidden by the Press Bureau in Paris, the Provincial Press Control 
Commission (see Chapter 1) generally allowed these articles to be published. Citizens 
in St. Etienne would have been aware of the meetings at the bourse and would have 
been curious as to their proceedings. It was preferable to have them believe that labour 
leaders in the Loire were mostly concerned with salary increases rather than with more 
political demands. The reports from the Sûreté on the proceedings at the bourse in St. 
Etienne demonstrate that violent strikes had been called for by some in the Loire’s 
union leadership as early as late 1917.985  Citizens in St. Etienne, deprived of this 
information, were later shocked by the violence which characterized the strikes in late 
May. Self-censorship of the mainstream press in the Loire greatly contributed to this 
lack of knowledge. Because average citizens in the Loire were appalled by the 
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violence in late May, the government faced little domestic criticism when they 
repressed the strikes.  
     La Syndicaliste was the official paper of the worker’s unions of the Loire. For the 
censors, dealing with this paper posed its own set of challenges. The combined 
circulation for the Loire’s two main papers was high – roughly 130,000 (July 1st 
1917),986 while La Syndicaliste was probably read only by those directly involved with 
local labour activity and by some radical factory workers. Its bi-monthly issues 
focused almost exclusively on local union activities while also giving some mention to 
union activities in neighbouring departments such as the Isère and the Rhône. The 
drafts it presented to the Press Control Commission gave full details of the union 
meetings in St. Etienne and praised their increasing radicalism.  Unsurprisingly, it was 
heavily censored. Had it been a daily paper, it is probable that many issues would have 
been prohibited from being published or potentially even seized. But because it was 
published only twice a month and had a small readership the commission chose to 
slash large sections of the paper instead. After the false allegations over espionage 
were launched in late February, many workers in the Loire were encouraged by their 
union leaders to believe that the Clemenceau Government had singled their department 
out for unfair treatment. La Syndicaliste often attempted to argue this point but was 
prohibited from doing so by the Press Control Commission.987 Banning La Syndicaliste 
would have risked provoking outrage among the metal workers in the Loire, who were 
crucial to the French armaments industry. Still, more than half of the articles in La 
Syndicaliste were banned from publication and the prohibited articles were usually 
crossed out with an ‘R’ for revolutionary or a ‘D’ for defeatist written next to them.988 
In censoring La Syndicaliste  the censors chose almost always either to allow articles 
to be published in their entirety or to completely prohibit them. As a result, La 
Sydicaliste was able to sneak in some pacifist passages into its less political articles on 
rare occasions. Clemenceau, told about the articles by Mandel, demanded to know the 
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names of those who wrote an article that attacked him personally.989 The Departmental 
Press Commission hid the pacifist trend in the Loire Labour movement’s official paper 
by banning half of its articles.  
     Between January and May, soldiers at the front had little to no access to 
information regarding the increasing influence of pacifists within the CGT. On 28 
November 1917, the GQG sent a telegram to the Press Bureau to ‘stop all information 
relative to strikes in the Loire.’990 The strikes referred to in this telegram were led by 
Charles Flaggeolet and were peaceful and small in scale compared to those in May. In 
February the GQG informed the Press Bureau which papers it believed were having 
the most adverse effects on troop morale.991 Among the papers included in the 
telegram were Le Journal du Peuple, La Verité, L’Oeuvre and L’Humanité.992 Two 
themes the GQG mentioned as having influenced troop morale were sympathy for the 
Russian revolutionaries and the arguments for a compromise peace.993 As a result of 
this report, Mandel reminded censors to be vigilant on both themes. On 24 March, a 
report was sent from the front to the Ministry of War commenting on the state of 
morale amongst the French troops. It stated that there were no apparent signs of 
defeatism or of pacifism resulting either from propaganda or from indiscretions of the 
press.994 During the later strikes in May, there appear to have been no telegrams sent 
from the front to the Press Bureau asking to censor information coming from the Loire. 
This suggests that Mandel and Pétain’s policy of closely monitoring the information 
reaching the front had been successful. It must also be noted, however, that soldiers 
after 27 May were engaged in heavy fighting on the Aisne sector and were probably 
less inclined to concern themselves with events in the interior. The GQG encouraged 
the Press Bureau to focus on censoring the most influential and subversive papers in 
the first few months of 1918 and encouraged it to censor information regarding labour 
militancy in the Loire. 
   The announcement on 25 March that the Loire would strike on 1 May was almost 
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completely ignored by the Parisian press. The next day, 30 papers in Paris were 
censored for providing precise numbers of those killed in a Gotha raid on Paris. Not 
one paper mentioned the decision taken in the St. Etienne to strike on 1 May.995 
However, after the CDS decision to strike caused a split within the minoritaires in 
Paris, the Parisian press became more interested in events in the Loire from mid-April 
onwards. By the same time they renewed their interest in the region, local union 
leaders decided to ban the press from their meetings. As a result, the interest was short-
lived.  
   Between 15 April and 18 May, two major events directly influenced how the press 
would later cover the strikes in the Loire. The first was 1 May, the traditional day set 
aside to celebrate workers. The Loire was one of the few departments that had broken 
with the CGT’s Minoritaires and decided to conduct a general strike for that day. This 
turned out to be the press’s last chance to comment specifically on the increasingly 
violent nature of the now almost universally unpopular union leaders in the Loire. 
After 1 May, the press was banned from attending union meetings in St. Etienne and 
the Press Bureau prepared itself for the upcoming strikes in Paris by further hardening 
its policies on the censorship of information regarding strike activities. The second 
significant event was the CDS-led strike in Paris, which lasted from 13 to 18 May. 
Censorship of the press during this week was so severe that the Parisian press shied 
away completely from reporting on the events in the Loire which began immediately 
after those in Paris ended.      
     The Press Bureau’s policies on censoring information remained consistent on union 
activities during most of the month between the CDS’s split with the minoritaires and 
the beginning of the strike movements in Paris. Many papers during the last week of 
April commented on the factionalism within the French labour movement but the Press 
Bureau, as it had done in the past, only allowed articles on the subject to be published 
if they were extremely vague or if their comments served as useful propaganda. With a 
few exceptions, the centrist press in Paris and in the Loire either continued their policy 
of providing few details or ignored 1 May all together. Almost all of the major left-
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wing papers sided with the federal Minoritaires against the CDS in the debate over 
whether to strike on 1 May, and continued to do so until the end of the month. The left-
wing press, although still under heavy surveillance, was, as in February, briefly given 
some latitude in reporting on events in the Loire because their articles attacked 
jusqu’au boutisme ouvrièr. The right-wing media with few exceptions continued to 
publish nothing on the CGT or on the Loire during the entire month of May.   
    The only Parisian daily that attempted to publish the CGT’s official refusal to 
support strikes for 1 May on the same day as it was issued was La Presse, and the 
article was almost completely slashed because it specifically discussed the CDS’s 
plans to disobey the CGT rather than being about the general significance of 1 May.996 
The few Parisian centrist papers that did provide articles discussing 1 May used the 
opportunity to give their impressions of the CDS and even of the movement in St. 
Etienne, but were only permitted to do so by alluding to ‘a particular dissident faction 
from the provinces.’997  On 29 April, the Press Bureau reminded its censors of the ban 
on all articles mentioning strike activities or preparations for strikes.998 That day, the 
centre-right La Revue Parisienne had an article banned from publication entitled, ‘The 
Opposition between Soldiers Dying at the Front, and Workers who go on Strike.’999 It 
obeyed the Bureau and the article was never published. In May it became common 
practice for the Press Bureau to ban or censor articles without giving official 
explanations.                    
   In the week before 1 May, support for Merrheim and the Minoritaires against the 
movement in St. Etienne became a recurring theme in the left-wing press. L’Humanité 
on 23 April published a copy of the CGT resolution condemning any strikes scheduled 
for 1 May, and La Bataille published the same resolution three days later. Both 
commented on the importance of solidarity between workers. Whereas in February the 
Press Bureau had found it useful for the left-wing press to portray leaders in the Loire 
as patriotic, now it felt the left’s condemnations of the Loire’s leaders and of the CDS 
were useful. The condemnations became stronger during the strikes in Paris. Only La 
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Plèbe, to which Péricat was a regular contributor, attempted to praise the Loire’s union 
leaders. Its first and seemingly last article focused specifically on St. Etienne and was 
published on 25 April with 12 long sections that were cut, including the entire 
conclusion.1000 On the same day La Verité had an article almost entirely slashed that 
supported strikes in general and praised the Russian Revolution but did not attempt to 
give specific support to the CDS or to the movement in the Loire.1001 The leftist media 
continued to be only allowed to comment on labour movements if the comments were 
in line with government policy towards the CGT.              
   On 1 May, the Press Bureau censored six articles, all from leading leftist papers 
written on the strikes in Paris and in the departments that had chosen to strike. Four of 
the papers (L’Oeuvre, l’Humanité, La Bataille and L’Eclair) disobeyed the censors and 
published the articles in their entirety.1002 Also that day, Le Petit Parisien attempted to 
send a telegram regarding strikes in Firminy and Unieux, but the telegram was 
stopped. The Press Bureau, probably after being informed by the Sûreté of the radical 
speeches in St. Etienne on 1 May, felt it was necessary that night to order officially 
that the press publish ‘nothing on the 1 May troubles in St. Etienne.’1003 The order was 
given on 3 May that no mention be made of union activities in the Loire.1004 The 
Bureau, however, never had to enforce these orders because of the decision taken by 
the union leaders in St. Etienne to ban the press from their meetings.    
      In the past, union leaders in the Loire had attempted to justify themselves in the 
press. Now they chose to be uncooperative and secretive. After 1 May representatives 
of the Parisian and local press were banned from attending meetings at St. Etienne’s 
bourse.1005 Had they been able to attend these meetings during the next two and a half 
weeks, they would have witnessed a clear lead up to a violent department wide 
strike.1006 The press would have almost certainly been prohibited from publishing 
much of what was going on in St. Etienne but perhaps would have attempted to 
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anyway as they had on 1 May. Because all reporters were banned from the St. Etienne 
bourse, the local press had to rely on vague second-hand accounts of the increasingly 
secretive meetings held there. The accounts were particularly difficult to obtain 
because the Loire’s union leaders had told its members not to speak to the press.1007 
The Parisian papers, banned from reporting on events in the Loire and frustrated with 
the difficulties in obtaining even second-hand information on the region’s union 
activities, completely stopped all coverage of events in the area and focused instead on 
the upcoming CDS-led strikes in Paris. A thorough examination of the Press Bureau’s 
telegraph register suggests that all but a few Parisian press correspondents returned to 
Paris shortly after being banned from the union meetings in St. Etienne.1008  
   Mandel saw the CDS strikes in Paris coming and prepared the Press Bureau. Many 
papers had gone against the bureau’s orders on 29 April 1009 not to mention any 
specific strikes planned for 1 May, and it seems were not punished for doing so.1010 
Between 1 and 13 May the Press Bureau issued several specific orders in preparation 
for the upcoming CDS strikes in Paris. Daily orders were given forbidding papers from 
publishing anything related to strike preparations, and this time the Press Bureau 
intended to strictly enforce its orders.1011  Only minor papers disobeyed these orders 
and had the offending issues seized.1012 The Press Bureau’s vigilant efforts to censor 
all information on labour activity frustrated press owners. Many sent letters to 
Clemenceau and appealed to his past career as a journalist and as an advocate of 
freedom of the press.1013 All of these letters appear to have gone unanswered and were 
perhaps in fact read by Mandel. The press’s frustration further intensified during the 
strikes and this factored into the later decision of most Parisian dailies to avoid 
coverage of the more violent strikes in the Loire.  
     With the outbreak of the CDS led strikes in Paris on 13 May, press censorship 
reached a new level of intensity. On 12 May, six Parisian dailies (Le Matin, Le Petit 
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Journal, La Bataille, Le Journal du Peuple, Oui and Pays) were heavily censored for 
mentioning the announcement of strikes by the CDS for the next day.1014 The next day 
the orders given to the papers on the reporting of the strikes in Paris and on the sending 
of telegrams could not have been clearer. ‘Nothing, nothing, absolutely nothing on the 
strikes!’1015 Next to the order was an instruction written for the censors that the Press 
Bureau would continue to repeat this order and that its enforcement would become 
more important with each day.1016  
     As the strikes continued, the number of papers attempting to report them 
diminished, as did the number of telegrams sent. On 16 May the nine largest Parisian 
papers attempted to circumvent the Press Bureau’s orders by commenting on 
Clemenceau’s agreement to meet with the strike leaders without actually referring to 
the strikes. These articles were all banned in their entirety.1017 By the end of the week 
only Havas and a few papers with very small readerships attempted to announce, 
unsuccessfully, that the strikes were over.1018 Throughout the week the leftist press had 
promoted worker solidarity and had condemned those who caused splits in the labour 
movement without mentioning specific names. Parisians would have noticed the 
strikes and wondered why they were not being mentioned in the press. Many would 
have realized that censorship of the press and of the telegraph was preventing papers 
from reporting on them. Some might even have interpreted the left’s condemnation of 
those who fractured the CGT as also being condemnations of the strikes.  
   The strikes in the Loire broke out on 18 May, the same day as those in Paris ended. 
They then spread throughout the department over the next two days. The press had 
been heavily suppressed in the previous week and was never again during the war 
allowed to report even superficially on strike activity in France or abroad. When the 
strikes in the Loire broke out, the Parisian press was incapable and also unwilling to 
report on events in a department they had seemingly washed their hands of almost 
three weeks before.  
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     Considering the Press Bureau’s severe censorship of information during the strikes 
in Paris between 13 and 18 May, it is unsurprising that there was little mention in the 
national or local presses of the more violent strike movement in the Loire one week 
later. All attempts to report on the movement were censored as severely as were items 
investigating the strikes in Paris but such attempts were few and far between. Even the 
left-wing press ended its articles on the importance of union solidarity. Mandel and the 
Press Bureau’s strict censorship of information on events in the interior, and 
particularly of the strikes in Paris, had been successful. The press was now discouraged 
from spending time and money investigating and reporting on events upon which they 
would not be able to publish. The Parisian press had not paid much attention to the 
Loire since being banned from the department’s union meetings at the beginning of 
May and now focused on more economically motivated strike movements in other 
departments. Reports from the Ministry of the Interior1019 and the Ministry of War1020 
demonstrate that the government and military both took events in the Loire very 
seriously because of their potential to impact on war production as well as inspire other 
industrial regions to strike. That readers of the national press would have no indication 
of what was going on in the Loire and that citizens in the Loire would only have first-
hand knowledge of the strikes attests to the success of Mandel’s plan, beginning in 
January, to control all information related to union activity within France.               
    Havas, the one media outlet which had never ceased to report on events in the Loire, 
attempted, along with Fournier, a smaller news agency, to send telegrams on 19 May 
regarding the announcement in St. Etienne of a department-wide general strike. The 
telegrams were stopped.1021 On 23 May, the most violent day of the Loire strikes, there 
were three sent telegrams, all stopped, which mentioned strike activities in France. 
Amazingly, none of them mentioned the Loire. Two mentioned an economically 
motivated labour rally in Grenoble and one mentioned strikes ‘near Lyon’.1022 The 
press was more hopeful of being allowed to report on these areas than it was about the 
Loire. These strikes were more peaceful, their leaders were forthcoming with 
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information and as in Paris the strikers aimed at obtaining little more than salary 
increases.1023 Even so, the press was never able to report on strikes in these areas 
either. An examination of the mainstream press in Paris and in the Loire during the 
strikes reveals that little to no information was published on strikes anywhere in France 
between 18 May and 1 June. All reports from the Ministry of the Interior suggest that 
the violence perpetuated by the strikers as well as the radical demands of their leaders 
took the citizens of the Loire completely by surprise. The strikes as a result never had 
more than marginal popular support in the region.1024 Even the small leftist papers that 
attempted to report on events in Paris the week before did not attempt do so about the 
Loire.  
   It is possible that L’Humanité attempted to report once on the violence in the Loire 
but had the articles seized. While there are no official records of the seizure, the paper 
published an article on 27 May entitled, ‘Censored,’1025 in which Paul Renaudel 
complained of having two articles seized the previous day. He wrote that L’Humanité 
‘had always agreed not to publish military or social information that could be 
damaging to the country but that the paper would not accept orders by Clemenceau 
that attempted to control all thoughts and place papers in a political servitude to the 
government.’1026 This article is a good example of the frustration the press felt as a 
result of the increasingly wide range of information prohibited from publication at a 
time when papers could increasingly be trusted to obey the Press Bureau. When the 
strikes ended and the leaders were arrested, two papers attempted to report on the 
arrests. L’Humanité was allowed to publish the arrests but not recite the charges, 
whereas Le Journal du Peuple was not allowed to mention the arrests at all.1027 On 27 
May, the day before the strikes in the Loire ended, the German military made a major 
breakthrough on the on the Chemin des Dames. Because of the Ministry of War’s 
vigilant censorship policies and coordination with the GQG, the French soldiers at the 
front, who now faced a state of emergency, would have known little about the events 
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in the Loire.  
   The postal control section of the War Ministry was instructed to be particularly 
vigilant in controlling all mail being sent to the front from the Loire and from 
neighbouring Vienne. The War Ministry produced a special report for the GQG on 29 
May showing exactly which letters (69 in total during the strikes) had been censored 
and the official reasons behind these acts of censorship. Diagram 1 shows from where 
the censored letters originated and Diagram 2 shows the official reasons why the letters 
were censored.1028 The report shows that proportionally few letters were sent from St. 
Etienne and Roanne, by far the two largest cities in the Loire, and also the two which 
experienced the most violent strikes. Vienne and Firminy, which experienced less 
violent strikes, were the cities with the highest number of civilians who supported the 
unions enough to mention them in their letters to the front. The other observation that 
can be obtained from the report is that there was a serious attempt by some to send 
letters to the front with the intention of informing soldiers that the citizens of the Loire 
were striking for peace. Unlike in November 1917, there appears in May or June 1918 
to have been no reports from the military command that mentioned soldiers discussing 
strikes in the Loire. Postal control was effective during the Loire strikes in preventing 
information from leaving the department. At such a dangerous moment for the French 
military effort this was crucially important.           
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Diagram 1: Postal Control in the Loire during the Strikes. Provenance of Letters 
Seized.  
 
 
 
Diagram 2: Postal Control in the Loire during the Strikes. Official Reasons for 
Letter Seizures.    
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strikes in May.1029 The strikes in the Loire were not mentioned in the press because of 
both government-imposed censorship and self-censorship. The Press Bureau was 
successful in containing information on events in the Loire and once it moved to 
repress the strikes swiftly, it seems that no one noticed.   
     Under Clemenceau’s orders, Mandel was responsible for shifting much of the Press 
Bureau’s focus towards events in the interior. He continued to use the Press Bureau in 
this capacity until after the Treaty of Versailles had been ratified and the State of 
Emergency laws which gave the War Ministry special powers had been lifted. Not 
only were strikes a forbidden subject, but so were all subjects routinely discussed by 
the labour leaders in the Loire and elsewhere. As a result, it was almost impossible to 
report on the Loire labour movement’s increasing radicalism in the period leading up 
to the spring strikes. The centrist and right-wing presses adapted by adopting a strict 
self-censorship when reporting on events in the interior. The left-wing media was 
heavily censored unless its articles could be used for propaganda purposes, particularly 
on the occasions when it criticized left-wing extremists. Clemenceau’s policies were 
responsible for the press’s reluctance to report on the strikes in the Loire. The press 
had not been permitted to report on the more peaceful strikes in Paris one week earlier 
and a precedent had been set as to how the Press Bureau would treat papers attempting 
to report on strike activities. This precedent was the logical culmination of 
Clemenceau’s policies towards the press since his ascent to power.   
     Olivier Forcade has argued that the prevalence of self-censorship in the French 
press by the end of the war proves that the government’s wartime censorship policies 
were effective.1030 The press was indeed self-censored in not reporting on the 1918 
spring strikes in the Loire, but this does not fully explain the situation. The national 
press never had been specifically interested in the Loire unless departmental union 
leaders interacted in some way with their Parisian counterparts. When they did become 
interested in the Loire, they, along with the local press, were rejected by the Loire’s 
union leaders. This rejection encouraged them to go elsewhere to attempt to report on 
union activities. During the strikes one week earlier in Paris, the press had repeatedly 
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been thwarted in its attempts to report on the events. By the end of these strikes they 
had given up their efforts to do so. The press had no intention of returning to a 
department where the leaders were uncooperative and secretive, and where attempts to 
mention what they did witness were in vain. Between December 1917 and late May 
1918, the Press Bureau, eventually with the help of the union leaders, was able to 
isolate the radical labour movement in the Loire, even from the local citizenry. 
Citizens in the Loire were shocked when they realized the violent tendencies and 
extremism of their local union leaders and therefore did not oppose the government 
crackdown against the strikes. Soldiers and the majority of French citizens outside the 
Loire would not have even been aware that the strikes existed. This situation was a 
tribute to Clemenceau and Mandel’s successful efforts.                            
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
   From March to July 1918, the Germans attempted one final all or nothing attempt to 
break through the Allied lines on the Western Front. Their armies achieved tactical 
gains everywhere but their attacks soon lost momentum and by July, after both 
inflicting and suffering enormous casualties, the momentum of the offensive had failed 
and Germany was forced back onto the defensive. Though Germany’s failure to 
achieve a rapid victory provided the opportunity for a series of Allied counter-attacks 
which would later win the war, the attacks themselves proved to be a major moment of 
crisis for France and for Allied unity.  
   Neither the offensives nor the terror raids on Paris were able to shake French morale. 
Calls for a negotiated peace in France had become rarer in early January, and 
particularly after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March. The Union 
Sacrée only strengthened by the spring offensive and the press stood behind the 
Government in re-assuring France’s citizenry that the outcome to the war would be 
successful. 
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   As the French left shifted towards the centre, the radical far-left became increasingly 
marginalized. Unions, that under the influence of the CDS maintained the call for a 
negotiated peace, went unsupported by both the SFIO and eventually even the CGT. 
Labour meetings were heavily censored in the press, so when in May several groups in 
Paris and more importantly in the Loire launched a series of violent anti-war strikes, 
public opinion was overwhelmingly against them partially because only a few people 
were aware of the extent of their radicalism. When the strikes were finally suppressed 
and their leaders arrested, few felt sympathy for individuals who were relatively 
unknown and considered dangerous.  
   Finally, the labour unions in the Loire had prevented their message from reaching the 
rest of the country by banning the press from their meetings. By insisting on secrecy, 
the Loire’s labour leaders ensured that very few people expected the strikes to be so 
politically motivated. The Parisian press ended all attempts to cover the movement and 
even the local press in the Loire became uninterested. Without coverage in the Parisian 
press, the movement had no chance of gaining momentum in neighbouring 
departments. Effective policy by the Press Bureau, in addition to self-censorship by the 
Parisian press, further isolated both politically and geographically an already 
marginalized anti-war group within the French labour movement.   
   In the year before the spring offensive, both the Press Bureau and the French media 
network had evolved significantly. The press had become more self-censored, less 
prone to sensationalism and able to report bad news without causing alarm. Mandel 
realized during the Gotha raids and the shelling of Paris by the ‘Paris Gun’ that total 
censorship was not only impossible but also undesirable when dealing with events that 
were witnessed by citizens first-hand. The press was encouraged to be honest with its 
readers regarding the danger of the circumstances but also to appeal to Parisian ‘sang 
froid’ in the face of attack. The exact degree to which the press helped maintain order 
and raise spirits in Paris during this particularly unpleasant period is unclear. What is 
clear though is that the city’s morale did not suffer dramatically from the attacks and 
perhaps its citizens became more united and determined. The press encouraged this 
phenomenon by refusing to engage in alarmism and by re-assuring Parisians of a 
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successful outcome to the war. 
    The press’s self-censorship regarding both the terror raids on Paris and the spring 
offensive was accompanied by a growing disinterest in anti-war arguments from 
segments of the left. Between January and May 1918, the Minortaire section of the 
CGT, which had previously argued in favor of a negotiated peace, split, making anti-
war proponents in French politics extremely isolated. In the Loire, this isolation was 
magnified by the Press Bureau’s successfully implemented policy of keeping citizens 
in the department ignorant of the intentions of the strikers until they were manifested 
on the streets. When the Loire labour unions conducted an anti-war movement in the 
middle of a French military crisis, citizens were shocked and support for the strikers 
was extremely low. Clemenceau had come into power promising to attack pacifism. 
Part of this policy was to censor all news related to pacifist labour movements. By 
implementing this policy early in Clemenceau’s Ministry, Mandel was able to ensure 
that the press was unable to report on the growing militancy of the far-left section of 
the CGT. By the time that movement decided to strike, media opinion (a reflection of 
and contributor to public opinion) did not care enough about the strikers to disobey the 
Press Bureau and risk severe punishment in the middle of the Spring Offensives. The 
Press Bureau and the media together contributed to making the 1918 strikes somewhat 
of a forgotten movement.     
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Chapter 7: Summer to Autumn 1918: Censoring the War’s End1031 
 
Introduction 
 
   During the war’s final phase, characterized by a string of successful Allied attacks, 
the dynamics of the relationship between the press and the government were much the 
same as they had been during the spring Offensives. Censoring the press during this 
period became easier, however, because events on the frontlines were going well for 
France and its Allies. The Press Bureau’s tasks changed from monitoring and 
censoring defeatism and pacifism and controlling bad news, to preventing 
exaggerations and the release of false information. Controlling exaggeration was a 
difficult when the press could sense an impending Allied victory. As a result the Press 
Bureau was kept busy. But at no other time in the war did the press work more closely 
with the government. This dynamic made even a usually dour figure like Mandel 
behave more pleasantly towards his subordinates. As the Americans arrived in large 
numbers and increasingly contributed to the Allied victory, they also became highly 
sensitive over their portrayal in the press, both in France and America. Dealing with 
Pershing, the AEF and the new American censorship bureau became a delicate task 
though Clemenceau was the right man for it.  
   When the armistice was finally signed, it was a moment for elation in the French 
media. The press over the next few weeks routinely published tributes to the poilus, 
France’s citizenry and its great political leaders for leading France to victory. 
Clemenceau however foresaw the return to politics as usual after the armistice and had 
                                                          
1031 As mentioned by Maurice Rajsfus this period has less archival material for which to examine when 
researching press censorship Rajsfus. La Censure militaire et policière p.112. Seemingly there are four 
main reasons for this. Firstly, Mandel during this period often dealt with newspaper editors directly over 
the telephone and there are no records of these conversations. Secondly, Mandel’s personal papers and 
books were seized by the Germans in 1940 and were never recovered. Probably they were destroyed 
during the Second World War,  Sherwood,Georges Mandel and the Third Republic. p.viii. Thirdly, 
military censorship practices during this period of intense fighting at the front largely remained 
unchanged. Finally, the press was heavily self-censored during this period, thereby leaving less of a paper 
trail at the Press Bureau.  The chapter is significantly shorter than others in this thesis because of this lack 
of material and because the Hundred Days can be seen as one long event during which press-state 
dynamics remained relatively static. Furthermore, the Armistice is included in the same section as the 
Hundred Days because again, there is too little archival material on the censorship of the subject for it to 
merit its own sub-section.  
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Mandel issue several orders in the two weeks after 11 November while the government 
was distracted. Clemenceau kept in place the wartime censorship regime under after 
the Treaty of Versailles had been ratified a year later and these new orders would help 
censor the discussions in the press over the shape of the peace.  
 
The Road to Victory: The War’s Final Phase and the Armistice.  
 
      The Germans launched their last offensive on the Western Front, (Marneschutz-
Reims), on 15 July. Between 15 and 17 July they advanced five kilometers south-west 
of Reims and crossed the Marne River. Prior to the offensive, which lacked the 
element of surprise, Pétain and Foch had prepared a massive counterattack for 18 July 
under a great deal of secrecy.1032 During the German advance Pétain attempted to 
divert troops from the French 10th Army, which was to spearhead the counterattack, for 
defensive purposes but Foch forbade him from doing so. By 17 July the attack had 
stalled and the Allied counterattack proceeded according to plan the next day.1033  The 
counterattack at Soissons achieved remarkable results. Between 15 July and 2 August, 
the French captured 29,000 prisoners of war and the German army suffered 110,000 
casualties.1034 By 3 August the Germans were cleared entirely from the Marne salient 
and on 5 August Clemenceau appointed Foch a Marshal of France.1035 At the Second 
Battle of the Marne (15 July-6 August) the Germans lost the initiative on the Western 
Front and would remain on the defensive until the armistice. On 24 July, Foch met 
with Pétain, Haig and Pershing at his headquarters where his chief of staff Maxime 
Weygand, read a memorandum on the future conduct of the war. Its main thrust was 
characterized in one sentence: ‘The moment has come to abandon the general 
defensive attitude imposed upon us by now by [our] numerical inferiority and to pass 
to the offensive’. 1036 The was characterized thereafter by Allied attacks and German 
retreats.   
                                                          
1032 Greenhalgh, Foch in Command p.401.  
1033 Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory pp.467-468.  
1034 Greenhalgh, Foch in Command, p.403.  
1035 Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory, p.473.  
1036 ibid., p.474.  
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   Foch first wanted to clear the Germans from the three remaining salients. In the 
middle, the Marne operation led by the French would continue forward (Foch believed 
that here he would have to constantly push Pétain to stay active),1037 in the north the 
British with French assistance would attack the Montdidier –Amiens salient and 
American forces in the south would attack at St.Mihiel with the French waiting to 
exploit a rupture in the German lines. Next, the plan was to clear the mining region in 
northern France and to drive the Germans from Dunkirk and Calais. The operations 
were to be launched with only brief intervals in between them so that the enemy would 
be unable to effectively deploy its reserves or rebuild its depleted units.1038 
   By 8 August, when the Allies launched a major Allied attack on Amiens, they had 
already recaptured 28 miles of French soil and had eliminated the Marne Salient.1039  
The Battle of Amiens marked the beginning of a 100-day period characterized by 
repeated victories and German retreats with the British armies taking much of the 
lead.1040 After the major Allied victory at Amiens which inflicted 27,000 casualties, 
and resulted in the capture of 12,000 prisoners and an advancement of four miles,1041  
(referred to by Ludendorff as ‘the black day of the German army’ in his memoirs), 
Ludendorff and Hindenburg told Austrian Commander Arz that ‘the possibility of a 
decisive blow or of decisive victory does not exist’1042 and on 14 August the Kaiser 
authorized the secretary of state for foreign affairs to initiate peace feelers through 
diplomatic channels.1043 Foch (who declared on 16 August that the Boches were ‘dans 
la purée’)1044 and Haig decided to press their advantage on the back of the Second 
Battle of the Marne in July and the Battle of Amiens and launched a series of 
unrelenting attacks over the next two weeks. The Allies continued to capture large 
numbers of prisoners and weapons particularly at the Battle of Albert where General 
                                                          
1037 Greenhalgh, Foch in Command p.418.  
1038 Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory pp.474-475.  
1039 These gains were largely achieved during the Second Battle of the Marne which began on 18 July. M. 
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Sir Julian Byng’s forces captured 10,000 men.  
    In August Germany suffered 228,000 casualties with 131,000 killed or missing. 
Furthermore by early September all of its gains since 21 March been reversed.1045 In 
late August and early September the Allies engaged in a series of semi-mobile attacks. 
On 30 August Foch met with Pershing and explained that the Allies were to push in a 
converging direction towards the Meuse River. On 3 September he published a 
directive on how the enemy was to be driven back from the Hindenburg Line. The 
British were to attack with support from the left of the French armies towards Cambrai 
and St.Quentin, the French were to continue the drive beyond the Aisne towards Laon 
and the Americans after reducing the St.Mihiel salient with the support of the right of 
the French armies were to attack in the general direction of Mézières. The exhausted 
French army therefore would be involved in all three prongs of the attack.1046 At the 
beginning of September, the Allies captured Péronne and forced the Germans to retreat 
to the Hindenburg Line. After some disputes particularly between Foch and Pershing 
about how to integrate the American Army into the upcoming attacks closer to the 
Hindenburg Line, the Americans attacked at St. Mihiel on 12 September. St.Mihiel 
was the first battle of the war planned and conducted by the independent American 
Army which captured 13,000 prisoners.1047 The Germans had already been evacuating 
the sector, however, when subsequently they chose to stand and fight. On 26 
September the Americans attacked again at the Battle of the Meuse-Argonne but were 
met with much stiffer resistance and made little gain.  
   Further north, the BEF achieved a much greater level of success outside Cambrai on 
27 September where they were able to capture 10,000 prisoners and drive a twelve -
mile wide and six-mile deep wedge in the German lines. 1048 In the next two days the 
BEF seized the entire Passchendaele Ridge and at the end of September Ludendorff 
suffered what was perhaps a nervous breakdown. The Allies now fielded 211 divisions 
to the German’s 125 and were able to replenish their losses with fresh American 
arrivals.  
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   On 29 September a combined British, Australian, American and French force 
attacked the Hindenburg Line. By noon, the Americans had taken Bellicourt and were 
behind the Hindenburg Line. The British 46th Division, part of Fourth Army led by 
General Sir Henry Rawlinson, was able to break the Hindenburg line at the canal of St. 
Quentin and were able to capture 5100 prisoners.1049 For Germany, the end was near 
and morale was flagging amongst the troops. On 29 September, Ludendorff declared to 
the Kaiser and the civilian administration that and that the war was lost and that 
Germany should request an immediate armistice.1050 Unlike the British advance 
between Arras and Soisons, the French in late September advanced slowly between 
Soissons and Verdun against almost half the density of enemy divisions and often did 
so because of German retreats.1051 The French at the end of September made the least 
progress. They were did little to support the British, they were slow in their advance 
and could do little to help the Americans whose attack had completely stalled by 29 
September.   
   On 3 October Max von Baden became German Chancellor and within 48 hours sent 
a note to Woodrow Wilson asking to begin ceasefire negotiations. The note cited 
Wilson’s 14 Points as the basis for negotiations. Wilson’s answer was to ask the 
Germans to clarify their acceptance of the 14 Points, a reply which angered the French 
who feared an early American departure from the conflict. On 14 October Wilson 
allayed French fears by demanding that armistice conditions would be determined 
exclusively by Allied military advisers and that any arrangement must guarantee the 
supremacy of the Allied armies on the field. The note ended with the implication that 
the peace process would depend on German democratisation.1052 
   In the meantime, the Allies continued to advance. Re-invigorated, the Allies now 
went back on the attack. On 8 October the British and Dominion forces captured over 
2700 prisoners near Cambrai and 4000 at Méricourt and Serain. On 14 October 
General Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army again broke through the German lines and 
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was met with little resistance. On the same day, Franco-American forces captured 
Romagne. The Allies then continued to advance against heavy resistance in the Meuse-
Argonne.  Here, though the Allies were advancing Foch was disappointed by the slow 
progress of the Franco-American armies. On 10 October Foch acknowledged the 
significant gains made by the British in comparison to those by the French or 
Americans by stating that of the three ‘converging attacks’ underway (the Flanders 
Army Group ‘s drive toward Ghent, the British advance toward Maubeuge and the 
Franco-American drive towards Mézières), that the second was the most importatnt to 
exploit.1053 Originally he had believed that the drive towards Mézières would yield the 
most significant results.  On 15 October, the French First Army under General Marie-
Eugène Debeney launched a key assault between St. Quentin and Laon. On 19 
October, the Allies began to move towards the Meuse River and by 26-27 October had 
driven the Germans back another three miles. Significantly, by 26 October the Allies 
had broken through the Herman and Hunding positions of the Hindenburg Line.1054  
Between 18 July and 31 October, the Germans had suffered over 250,000 casualties 
and had lost over 4000 captured guns.1055 
   On 23 October Wilson sent a note implying that Germany needed to become a 
parliamentary democracy before an armistice could be signed. Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff considered the note a demand for unconditional surrender, and wanted to 
reject it, but the Kaiser dismissed Ludendorff. In early November the Allies succeeded 
in another attack along the Scheldt River and were rapidly advancing. Between 1 and 7 
November Franco-American forces advanced 24 miles along the Meuse. On 4 
November Rawlinson’s forces launched another attack which gained 10 miles and 
captured 10,000 prisoners.  
   On November 4, later referred to as ‘Red Monday’, a naval uprising led to a surge in 
revolutionary activity in many northern German cities once the sailors found common 
cause with munitions workers.1056 Germany now faced both military defeat on the front 
and revolution at home. Wilhelm fled into exile in Holland on 10 November and the 
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next day an armistice was signed with Foch as the Allied representative in a railway 
car in the forest near Compiègne. After four years of horrific fighting, the war had 
finally ended earlier than most had expected only months before.  
   Military censorship during the Hundred Days remained the same as before. 
Newspapers were still forbidden from naming officers, specific units, and casualty 
figures, and from discussing the bombardment of cities. These orders were very rarely 
challenged by the press and when it was told to censor items, the orders were obeyed. 
Orders were applied even when papers attempted to publish positive news items. Le 
Temps, for example had an article censored which discussed American operations at 
St. Mihiel and disclosed that ‘The attack is 50 kilometres wide and the first objective is 
St. Mihiel. The Americans have made attacks and have achieved favorable results. 
They have progressed with little or no resistance.1057 There was now little bad frontline 
news to censor but rigorous regulations remained in place nonetheless. Censorship 
during the offensives remained important not only for morale at home but also to keep 
potential secrets from the enemy and to maintain troop morale. 
   The Americans increasingly insisted on strict censorship, a trend that had begun 
during the spring offensives. They rightfully were sensitive as to how they were 
portrayed in the media. In July, telegrams criticizing the American war effort were 
stopped throughout the entire month1058 and German communiqués which were 
routinely disdainful of America’s fighting abilities were kept out of the press.1059 By 
August, however, even the American censors working in the Press Bureau found the 
censorship orders given by the American High Command to be excessive.1060 Even 
though all mention of future operations or of Allied and American movements during 
ongoing battles was automatically banned, Pershing often personally called in orders to 
ensure that these rules were followed when dealing with American operations. From 
12 to 16 August, the press was reminded daily that ‘nothing is allowed on American 
troops moving towards the Belgian front’ and that ‘American locations are not to be 
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revealed.’1061 On 24 September L’Heure was given one of the only suspensions during 
this period outside the front lines for ‘reporting on the Americans.’1062 Pershing was 
sensitive to criticism of America’s fighting ability. But also this was the first time in 
the war that the Americans were engaged in such heavy fighting, and he had no reason 
to trust the Press Bureau to keep sensitive information from reaching the press. 
Perhaps he remembered the debacle in June 1917 when the French press had let slip 
the news of the American landing at St. Nazaire.   
   In October Wilson’s reply to the German request for armistice talks based on the 14 
Points was strictly prohibited from publication, as was discussion of this highly 
sensitive subject. On 13 October Havas was prohibited from passing a telegram stating 
that Wilson had received a letter from Germany.1063 Five days earlier the press had 
been instructed that ‘all mention of Wilson’s response to the German letter is 
forbidden’.1064  On 15 October L’Echo de Paris, however, was allowed to violate this 
order first by warning Wilson that ‘it is dangerous to distinguish between the German 
Government and its people’ and then by publishing the accounts in the American press 
of Wilson’s response. According to Berger and Allard, Clemenceau upon learning of 
the letter sent by Germany to Wilson wished to protect the latter from criticism.1065 But 
once Wilson had given his reply Clemenceau, irritated, ordered Mandel to allow 
reporting on the subject.1066 This story, if true, does not explain why only L’Echo de 
Paris was allowed to publish this material. The only explanations could be that either 
they were told privately by Mandel that they could do so or the paper had decided to 
take a chance in publishing this material and submitted it on a lucky day. After the 
Wilson note to Germany claims in the press that the Germans would capitulate and that 
there was a revolution under way in Germany were more heavily censored.1067  
   Though Mandel was known for his ruthlessness in carrying out Clemenceau’s orders 
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he also had a genuine belief that the press was supposed to keep citizens well 
informed. On 5 October he gave the Press Bureau the order which would keep it the 
most occupied for the rest of the war.1068 Censors were ordered that the press should 
not be ‘overly enthusiastic or exaggerate.’ Not only was this order extremely vague 
and open to interpretation, but during a period of intense fighting and consistent Allied 
victories which were bringing the war to an end, enthusiasm and exaggeration took 
many forms. As a result newspapers had to be called daily by the Press Bureau to warn 
them not to publish ‘exaggerated headlines.’1069   
  Regarding the Americans, exaggeration of the effect of their growing numbers was 
censored just as was criticism of their fighting abilities.1070 Although the Germans 
were still denounced in the media, Mandel outlawed ‘violent attacks against the 
Kaiser.’1071 Whereas references to deteriorating morale in Germany and amongst 
German soldiers were allowed, those mentioning revolution in Germany were 
prohibited. On 13 October a telegram from The Daily Mail was censored for reporting 
that ‘declarations of German prisoners of war insist that revolution is imminent in 
Germany.’1072 Virtually no articles were censored during this period for being pacifist 
or defeatist. Rather, it was exaggerations with which the Press Bureau was now most 
concerned.  
   Mandel was perhaps more diplomatic and congenial because the media and the Press 
Bureau worked together better than during any other period in the war. Although one 
censor was arrested in early October for espionage, after which all censors were 
required to sign every article draft which they had reviewed under the threat of 
indefinite suspension, 1073the Press Bureau was virtually mistake-free in enforcing the 
Government’s directives. Furthermore the media seemed to be unanimously focused 
on keeping readers’ spirits high both in the interior and at the front and of informing 
them of the military successes. Indeed the media was so uniform in its reporting that 
censors at the time found it easy to forget the vicious political battles within the media 
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which had taken place only one year before over the Stockholm Conference. 1074  
   Beginning on 20 July, the overall theme in the media was ‘the commenting on and 
appreciation of the Allied counter-offensive.’1075 Journals followed communiqués more 
closely than during the spring offensives in part because they were more realistic than 
before.1076 One of the first statements by a major newspaper which suggested that the 
string of Allied victories was perhaps leading to the war’s end (without mentioning the 
forbidden words ‘armistice’ or ‘peace’) was on 19 August when Le Journal declared 
‘La victoire est en marche’.1077 By early October the press commonly referred to the 
period as ‘The days of victory’.1078 This was a perfect theme for newspaper editions 
which since August had more or less reported solely on one string of Allied victories 
after another, praising the ‘triple success of the British, French and Americans.’1079 As 
long as the press continued to report good news without going into military specifics, 
Mandel was happy.  
   In early November, news of revolutionary activity in Northern Germany was banned 
from publication and particular stress was placed on making no mention of Bolshevism 
in Germany or comparisons with the Russian Revolution.1080 Even references to the 
one year anniversary of the October Revolution were banned.1081Strict censorship of 
publication of news related to the Bolsheviks was instituted at this time in part to 
prepare for the post-war period. Olivier Forcade has in fact argued that Clemenceau 
kept the wartime censorship regime in place until October 1919 mostly to combat the 
influence of the Russian Revolution.1082 A false alarm at the Press Bureau on 7 
November nearly resulted in the press being permitted to publish news of an armistice 
with Germany four days before one was actually concluded.1083 On 10 November news 
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of the Kaiser’s abdication was allowed to be published,1084 but another false news item 
was prevented from reaching the press when on 11 November news of Wilhelm’s 
assassination reached the Press Bureau.1085  As the armistice drew nearer, the press was 
informed not to mention the subject of demobilization1086, sensitive to so many 
families who had been without their husbands, sons and brothers for the past four 
years.  Demobilization and Bolshevism were incendiary topics both at the front and in 
the interior and continued to be heavily censored until 1919.1087   
   It was not until the night of 11 November that the news of the Armistice was 
communicated to the press.1088  The next day, the press was allowed to discuss it 
freely. 1089 While Mandel on 16 November slightly loosened the restriction on 
exaggeration by ordering censors that ‘if you do allow exaggerations, make sure the 
paper is aware of the potential consequences of its actions’1090 he also issued new 
commands over the next two weeks prohibiting mention of demobilization,1091 
soldiers’ leave times, 1092 the arrival of foreign leaders in Paris1093 and the change of 
currency from the mark to the franc in Alsace-Lorraine.1094 The newspapers, however, 
after the armistice appeared to have little interest in publishing such information 
anyway, and filled their pages in the days following 12 November mostly with 
homages and tributes to the citizens, soldiers and politicians in France and the Allied 
nations who had contributed to Allied victory.1095      
 
Conclusion 
 
   The French press was rightfully joyful in the weeks following the Armistice. France 
had proportionally suffered as much or if not more than any other belligerent, losing 
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over 1.6 million men, sustaining substantial damage to its infrastructure and industrial 
complexes in the north and northeast of the country and losing the enormous financial 
debt owed it by the Russians. Even so, the press was so enthusiastic during the final 
months of the war that the Press Bureau had to prevent serious exaggerations and false 
rumours from reaching the public domain.  
      Mandel had an easy time managing information control during the final phase of 
the war because the nation’s media had gradually come to accept their role as a tool 
not just to inform newspaper readers but also to sustain morale.  Indeed operations at 
the Press Bureau by the end of the war operated like clockwork and were characterized 
by a low level of tension. Even Mandel was well liked by his subordinates.  
   Although fighting came to an end on the Western Front on 11 November, the Press 
Bureau’s job would not be over for another year. On 11 November, a group of 93 
socialist deputies proposed that the government put an end to the Siege Law that had 
governed free speech in France during the war.1096  The motion was struck down and 
Clemenceau went on to keep the wartime censorship system in place by maintaining 
this and the Indiscretions of the Press Law of August 1914 until after the signature of 
the Treaty of Versailles. Even while the fighting continued, he began to implement 
censorship policies which were intended for the post-war period.  
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Conclusion: The Limitations of Liberty in a Republican Democracy at War 
 
   This thesis argues that censorship of the press was a useful tool in helping France to 
emerge victoriously from the First World War. Throughout the conflict, censorship 
prevented military and diplomatic secrets from reaching the enemy and helped the 
government to manage public opinion during times of crisis by preventing alarmism 
and sensationalism. Censorship played its greatest role in 1917 and 1918 because by 
this time serious fractures had emerged in the Union Sacrée and during these two years 
national unity was tested by a series of internal and external events that gravely 
threatened the French war effort. In 1914 the French wartime censorship system was 
established to protect military secrets and to prevent  alarmism. It was largely 
successful in accomplishing both of these tasks.   
   1917 was the most important year for press censorship. By this time the press was far 
better informed by the government and military than it had been before General 
Joffre’s dismissal, but it was still prone to exaggeration. During the first half of 1917, 
those who advocated a negotiated peace settlement short of total victory were more 
influential in national politics than at any other time in the war, and they were 
occasionally able to use the press to propagate their ideas. As a result, it is in 1917 that 
the press had the greatest endanger to worsen the increasingly faltering morale both in 
the interior of the country and on the front lines. During the second half of 1917, after 
the debates over Stockholm, the government became increasingly draconian in its 
censorship of the left. Indeed, although Clemenceau is remembered as being a leader 
who attacked war dissenters at home he merely institutionalized existing practice.  
   The period between November 1917 and March 1918, however, witnessed a series of 
external events which galvanized French support for the war effort and made coercion 
less necessary.  German actions rather than those by the French Government were 
responsible for this upturn in civil and military morale. As the press evolved it also 
moved further to the right. Whereas in 1917 political debates played a substantial role 
in press journalism, in the following year the press largely responded to external 
events. As the press became more united in the common goal of encouraging France’s 
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citizens and soldiers while also keeping them accurately informed it was able to work 
better alongside the government in managing morale. Voluntary self-censorship of the 
press played as much of a role as if not more than did Mandel’s usage of threats and 
bribes in influencing the press’s reporting style in 1918.  
   This thesis has taken a new approach to the study of censorship in France during the 
First World War. The only other studies on the subject of comparable length, those by 
Forcade, Rajsfus, and Collins, differ entirely in their approaches to the subject but 
comparisons can be made between theirs and the one put forward here. This thesis 
agrees with Collins’s findings that the introduction of Circular 1000 was critical in 
standardising censorship practices throughout France and that censorship in the 
provinces was more restricted than that in Paris.  
   Forcade’s central argument is that the main proof that the government’s censorship 
policies worked was that by the end of the war papers were largely self-censored. This 
thesis agrees by arguing that Mandel’s policy of only punishing papers for major 
offences led them to disobey the government less frequently when serious orders were 
issued. Adding to Forcade’s conclusion, this thesis further has argued that the press’s 
less combative attitude towards the war effort in the last year of the conflict also 
resulted from the decreasing influence of those who argued for a negotiated peace and 
from an increasing antagonism towards Germany on the part of journalists. Finally, 
Rajsfus, whose conclusion is entitled ‘Under the Supervision of Perverts’, makes a 
polemical judgment rather than an evidence-based in his monograph on the subject. To 
him, all censorship was immoral, regardless of the results. Censorship, however, was 
part of a ‘total war’ programme that mobilized the nation’s entire manpower to save it 
against a larger and more powerful aggressor. At the beginning of the war, the vast 
majority of France’s political, social and religious groups agreed to the Union Sacrée. 
It was only natural for the government to expect that these vows were made for better 
or for worse.  
   The historiographical debate in France over the legitimacy of the state during the 
First World War between the Historial and the CRID is only partially relevant to this 
study. Censorship, of course, was a part of the war state which the French Government 
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developed at the beginning of the conflict to be able to combat dissension. But it is 
difficult to gauge the level of censorship’s unpopularity in the interior or on the front. 
Whereas propaganda in the form of bourrage de crâne frequently appeared in postal 
reports particularly on the front, censorship itself did not. Some aspects of censorship 
would have been accepted by the vast majority of the population, particularly that 
which kept French soldiers safe by guarding military secrets. The degree of acceptance 
of political censorship on the other hand is more difficult to ascertain. Certainly while 
some citizens supported press censorship, others believed it to be contrary to 
democratic values. But France, it must be remembered, was not intended to be the 
democratic state in wartime that it had been in peace time, a fact of which those who 
adhered to the Union Sacrée in 1914 were aware.  
   Finally, some mention should be made of what can still be added to the study of 
press censorship in France during the First World War. This thesis is the first study to 
have examined the effectiveness of information management control in France during 
the First World War on a case by case basis. But the study only focusses on 1917-
1918. A larger study covering 1914-1919, though too broad in scope for a thesis, 
would help contextualize censorship efficiency during these crisis years into the 
broader narrative of French information management control during the entire conflict. 
In addition, though this thesis includes a case study of the Loire, it focuses largely on 
the Parisian press. While Ross Collins1097, Patrick Flood1098, Olivier Forcade1099 and 
others have contributed to media studies in Provincial France there is still much to be 
done in this area. Finally, comparative studies with other wartime censorship systems 
could provide insights into how various cultures conducted ‘total war.’  Comparisons 
between France’s censorship system in the First World War and that in Britain, 
Germany, Italy or Imperial Russia would all provide interesting results. A novel way to 
approach the subject would be to compare censorships in the capital with that in the 
provinces. Finally, a comparison between censorship and propaganda in occupied 
France in the First World War with that in the Second would pose an interesting study. 
                                                          
1097 Collins, ‘The Development of Censorship’.  
1098 Flood, France 1914-1918  
1099 Forcade, ‘La Censure politique en France’. 
275 
 
The study of censorship in World War One France as well as other wartime cultures 
provides historians and lay readers with an insight into the values of those societies 
and the motives and strengths of their democracies in times of crises. For this reason it 
is applicable when not only studying the past but also in the evaluation of current 
affairs.  
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         en France 9 Juin 1917, action pacifiste et défaitiste à entreprendre en Autriche 9 
         Déc. 1917.    
257 - Télégrammes expédiés aux représentants français à l’étranger civils et militaires. 
          La lutte antibolchevique, la collaboration franco-américaine 1917-1921.   
259 - Communiqués à la presse du ministre de la guerre 1914-1915.  
264-268 - Groupe de l’avant de l’E.M.A. Bulletins des fronts extérieurs. Etudes des 
                 renseignements de presse et des radiotélégrammes des pays ennemis et 
                 neutres 1917-1918.  
272 - Synthèse de renseignements journaliers reçus, classés par pays ou par fronts.  
282 - Bulletins de renseignements de 2e bureau du G.Q.G. Quotidiens. Avril 1917- 
         Nov 1918.  
283 - Comptes rendus de renseignements du 2e bureau du G.Q.G. Mar 
         1917 – Nov 1918.    
285 - Correspondance et notes expédiées principalement par les généraux, propagande 
          bolchevique allemande sur la rive gauche du Rhin. 1917-1919.  
290 - Télégrammes concernant les problèmes internationaux, l’armistice. 1917-1922.  
 
 
7 N – E.M.A. 2nd Bureau 
   
170 - Service de santé. Contrôle postal et télégraphique 1918.  
394 - USA 1917-1918. 
726-728 - Correspondance reçue du Bureau de Recherche de Renseignements et 
                 d’Etude de Presses Etrangères.  1915-1916.   
755 - Propagande Française dans l’armée russe sur le front roumain Sept 1917-Apr 
         1918. 
757-762 - Attachés et Missions Militaires en Russie 1914-1918.  
763-770 - Russie. Presse 1914-1918.  
792-793 - Coupures de bulletins de renseignements et de radiotélégrammes de presse 
                 concernant la Russie et les pays voisins 1916-1919.  
851 - Textes des lois et décisions. La propagande en Autriche pendant la guerre 1914- 
         1918. 
853 - Correspondance reçue des 2-e bureaux et 2e bureau E. Registres de 
          communiqués et d’informations de presse, France, Russie, Italie 1914-1919.  
854 - Missions françaises a l’étranger, dossiers de candidats interprètes de langue 
          allemande, pouvant être utilisés dans les commissions de contrôle postale.   
859 - Mission de la presse départementale sur le front, articles soumis à la censure 
         Déc.1914.  
862-865 - Bulletins quotidiens d’informations 1915-1918. 
883-885 - Documents de principe, organisation, personnel 1915-1920. 
897-902 - Correspondance reçue du ministère des affaires étrangères 1914-1919  
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936-942 - Allemagne 1914-1919 
944-958 - Contrôle télégraphique et postal 1914-1921  
958-959 - Listes de journaux et de publications interdits, listes de tracts de propagande, 
                 listes des principales sociétés.1916-1919.  
969 - Divers incidents avec les Affaires Etrangères, notamment à propos du contrôle  
         postal, historique du contrôle postal 1915-1919  
972-973 - Questions ouvrières, sociales et industrielles 1917-1919. 
974-975 - Affaire ‘Louis Dreyfus’ 1914-1918.  
979-1001 - Commissions de contrôle postal. Régions 1916-1918     
1001 - Rapports reçus de contrôle postal des armées Déc 1915-Jan 1916 
1002-1003 - Renseignements divers et cartes reçus du service de renseignements 
                    d’Annemasse 1917.  
1023-1038 - Revues de presse étrangère et traduction d’articles de journaux 1915- 
                    1918. 
1039-1043 - Bulletins quotidiens de presse étrangère publiés par les ministères des 
                    affaires étrangères et de la Guerre 1916-1920. 
1044-1046 - Bulletins périodiques de presse étrangère publiés par les ministères de la 
                    guerre et des Affaires étrangères. 
1047-1048 - Analyses générales de la presse étrangère reçus des ministères des 
                    affaires étrangères. Fév-Nov 1915. 
1049-1057 – Section du courrier 1915-1921.  
1058-1078 - Renseignements expédiés 1917-1919.  
1449 - Pologne. Bulletin périodique de la presse polonaise, bureau de la presse 
           polonais.     
1588 - Propagande militaires des puissances centrales. 1917.  
1590 - Renseignements sur les individus, espionnage et propagande allemandes.   
1591 - Caillaux en Suisse, espions, agitation socialiste Avril-May 1918  
1592 - Extraits de presse, situation politique en France Juin 1918. 
2102 - Renseignements parvenus dans les 24 heures concernant principalement 
            l’Allemagne, l’état de l’opinion Mai-Juin 1916  
2105 - Agissements anti-français en Afrique du Nord : propagande panislamique et 
           bolchevique 1914-1923. 
2107 - Rapports de la commission militaire de contrôle postal de Tunis 1916-1918. 
2244-2245 - Extraits de presse, communiqués à la presse et informations diverses 
                    1918-1919.  
2246 - Bulletins de l’union des grandes associations françaises contre la propagande 
            ennemie Jan-Juin 1918-1919.  
2251 - Propagande, conférences diverses faites notamment dans les milieux ouvriers 
           américaine 1917-1919. 
2471 – Mobilisation. 
2463, 2571, 2573 - Censure de la presse.       
 
 
14 N – Fonds Joffre 
 
24 - Russie, situation politique 1917-1920.  
25-31 - Mission du maréchal Joffre aux Etats-Unis 1917-1921.  
 
 
16 N – G.Q.G. 2e Bureau.  
 
9-10 - 68e R.I.T (détachement du G.Q.G.) personnel et matériel, police générale, 
           censure de la presse, ordres de saisie de journaux 1914-1919. 
292-297 - Service du contrôle postal 1914-1919.  
298 - Mutineries de 1917 et incidents : extraits du contrôle postal 1917-1919.  
299 - Plan de protection en cas de grève 1917-1919. 
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300 - Service de renseignements aux armées, comptes rendus sur l’état moral 1918 
         -1919.     
1317 - Radiotélégrammes de presse de sources allemande, anglaise et française 1915.  
1318-1334 - Radiotélégrammes étrangers: renseignements militaires et généraux, 
                     revues de presse principalement sur la situation en Allemagne 1916-1919.  
1335-1337 - T.S.F., service d’information Nauen 1917-1919.  
1338-1340 - Etudes des renseignements de presse et des radiotélégrammes des pays 
                     ennemis et neutres 1917-1918. 
1341 - Renseignements divers sur la vie et l’état moral de l’Allemagne et de l’armée 
            allemande 1915-1917.  
1342-1353 - Renseignements militaires, politiques et économiques, état de l’opinion, 
                     situation financière et sociale des pays alliés, neutres et ennemis  
                    (notamment Russie et Allemagne) 1917-1919.  
1357-1360 - Bulletins quotidiens d’informations reçus du 5e bureau de l’E.M.A.1915- 
                    1919.  
1361-1366 - Bulletins quotidiens de presse étrangère, bulletins périodiques de presse 
                    étrangère, communiqués 1916-1918.  
1367-1368 - Renseignements extraits de la correspondance des prisonniers allemands 
                    et des rapports de commissions de contrôle postal de Dieppe et de 
                    Pontarlier Sept. 1917-Mars 1919. 
1369 - Renseignements économiques et diplomatiques, extraits de presse concernant 
           l’Allemagne et l’Autriche : situation économique, financière et morale 1914 
           -1915.     
1372 - Situation économique et mesures sociales en Allemagne 1916-1917. 
1374 - Aperçu sur la situation ouvrière en Angleterre Nov 1917.  
1380-1381 - Organisations et fonctionnements des commissions de contrôle 
                     postal. 1914-1919.  
1382-1387 - Personnel des commissions de contrôle postal 1916-1918.  
1388-1447 - Rapports des commissions de contrôle postal des armées I-VII. 1916 
                    -1919.   
1448-1470 - Rapports des commissions de contrôle postal : correspondance civile et 
                    militaire 1916-1919.   
1473 - Bureau central militaire de Paris : mouvements de lettres, journaux, paquets, 
           consignes des gares régulatrices 1914-1916. 
1474 - Plaints, réclamations adressées au contrôle postal, pour les lettres interceptées, 
           caviardées, perdues 1918.   
1483-1484 - Contrôle télégraphique et téléphonique 1914-1919.  
1485 1486 – Service morale. Rapports généraux de quinzaine puis mensuels sur 
                     l’état moral de l’armée, établis par le service du morale 1916-1918.  
1489-1509 - Comptes rendus des chefs d’unités relatifs au morale des troupes 1917 
                     -1918.  
1510-1518 - Fiches sur le morale des unités combinant les renseignements des 
                    comptes rendus des chefs de corps et ceux du contrôle postal 1917-1918.  
1519-1527 - Actes collectifs d’indiscipline et incidents divers 1916-1918.  
1528 - Comptes rendus sur le morale des troupes 1917-1918.  
1529 - Collaboration entre les ministères de l’intérieur et de la guerre. Service de la 
           morale, lutte contre la propagande ennemie 1917-1919.  
1536-1537 - Etat moral à l’intérieur 1917-1919.  
1540-1542 - Comptes rendus de la sûreté et de la gendarmerie sur la morale de la 
                     population civile 1917-1918.  
1543-1544 - Mouvements sociaux, réunions syndicales, grèves á l’intérieur et dans la 
                    zone des armées 1917-1918.  
1545 - Copies de lettres de militants pacifistes et révolutionnaires ou adressées á eux.    
            1915-1918. 
1546-1548 - Menées pacifistes, propagande défaitiste ou révolutionnaire. Surveillance 
                     des individus 1916-1919.  
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1549-1550 - Enquêtes diverses, suspects de pacifisme 1916-1918. 
1551-1559 - Documentation diverse provenant du contrôle postal 1915-1919. 
1560-1568 - Presse 1915-1918.  
1571 - Propagande alliée 1917-1918.  
1574 - Propagande ennemie 1917-1918. 
1631 - Radiotélégrammes et revues de presse diffusés par la section d’information ou 
            reçus du G.Q.G.  
1645 - Contrôle parlementaire : correspondance générale, documents confidentiels 
            1917-1919. 
1775-1785 - Renseignements reçus du 2e bureau du G.Q.G. 1914-1919.  
1795-1823 - Correspondance reçue des groupes d’armées 1914-1919.               
2542 - Espionnage, journaux interdits et censurés 1914-1917.  
2698-2699 - Correspondance expédiée par service postal 1914-1919.  
2701 - Historique du service postal 1914-1918.  
2702 - Service postal. Organisation et fonctionnement : correspondance générale 1914 
           -1919.  
2703-2704 - Bulletins des armées. Cartes postales 1914-1918.  
2705-2706 - Commissions de contrôle postal 1915-1917. 
2953-2965 - Russie: documents de la mission militaire française et de l’attaché 
                    militaire, l’opinion publique.     
 
 
18 N – Groupes d’Armées 
 
77 - Police de la circulation : séjour des étrangers, contrôle des journaux et censure 
       1914-1918.  
177 - Photographie aérienne : notes sur l’exploitation et l’interprétation méthodique 
         des photos 1916-1918. 
189-190 - Discipline et justice militaire : vols, enquêtes, vente de l’alcool: contrôle 
                 postal-punitions, condamnations, conseil de guerre 1916-1917.  
191-192 - Service des renseignements. Organisations : circulaires et documents de 
                 principe; état d’esprit, contrôles postal-télégraphique et téléphonique 1917- 
                 1918.    
193-194 - Prisonniers de guerre : correspondance et rapports divers 1915-1918.   
197 - Propagande morale 1916-1918.  
198-199 - Justice militaire et discipline 1917-1919.  
218 - Instructions sur le contre-espionnage, contrôle de la presse, contrôles 
         téléphonique, télégraphique et postal 1917-1918.  
225 - Radios étrangers reçus au G.A.C.: allemands, autrichiens, bulgares, turcs, 
         anglais, italiens, russes et roumains 1915-1918.  
226 - Service des écoutes; sûreté générale, saisies de journaux et brochures; rapports 
         de la Ve armée sur le contrôle de la correspondance 1915-1917.  
430-431- Bulletins de renseignements extraits de la presse allemande, dépêches Havas. 
                1918-1919. 
438 - T.S.F. : activité radiotélégraphique ennemie Avr- Oct 1918.   
   
 
19 N – Armées 
 
51 – Service de renseignements : traductions de communiqués allemands, 
        renseignements d’agents 1914-1916 
52 - Observations terrestres : comptes rendus divers, exploitations des photographies 
       1916.  
58 - Section d’information : correspondance expédiée et reçue 1917-1918. 
59 - Rapports des commissions de contrôle postal. 1914-1918. 
364 - Affaires diverses : police de la circulation, communications télégraphiques et  
283 
 
         téléphoniques ; atrocités allemandes 1914-1915.   
545 - Renseignements des postes d’écoute 1916-1918.  
546-550 - Renseignements sur l’organisation ennemie, les objectifs de bombardements 
                1914-1918.   
551 - Etat moral de l’armée 1915-1919.  
571-572 - Résistance à l’attaque allemande Mar-Juin 1918.  
671 - Documents relatifs aux lois de la guerre, coupures de journaux allemands 1914- 
         1919. 
672 - Rapports sur l’état moral de l’armée, propagande aux armées, particulièrement 
          propagande aérienne, contrôle postal 1915-1919. 
840 - Discipline générale et justice militaire 1914-1917.  
868-869 - Section de renseignements de l’armée (S.R.A.) espionnage et propagande, 
                 contrôle de la circulation, censures des journaux et de la correspondance, 
                 état moral de l’armée 1914-1918.  
870-872 - Comptes rendus des observations sur l’activité des postes de T.S.F. 
                 radiotélégrammes allemands, anglais et français 1914-1918.  
1026 -1030 - Comptes rendus de la radiogoniométrie, du service télégraphique, de la 
                      radiotélégraphie. 
1037-1038 - Surveillance de la presse 1914-1919.  
1047-1048 - Messages téléphonés 1917-1918.   
1163 - Bulletins de presse, comptes rendus de renseignements 1915-1918.  
1164-1169 - Correspondance diverse expédiée : contrôle de la correspondance et de la 
                     presse 1914-1918.  
1187-1190 - Rapports des postes spéciaux d’écoute 1915-1917.  
1191 - Comptes rendus sur l’activité des postes de campagne, radios et T.S.F. 
            ennemies 1917. 
1197-1198 - Séjour et circulation des étrangers, surveillance de la correspondance et de 
                     la presse : journaux de tranchée, affaires civiles diverses 1915-1918.  
1199-1203 - Police, surveillance de la correspondance, de la presse, population civile 
                    de la frontière suisse 1915-1918.  
1204 - Propagande allemande 1915-1918.  
1205 - Contrôle de la presse. 1914-1918.  
1207 - Contrôle de la correspondance postale 1914-1918.  
1436-1438 - Contrôle postal 1915-1918.  
1562 - Interrogatoires de prisonniers de guerre, postes d’écoutes téléphoniques 1915 
           -1918.  
1735-1736 - Forces Françaises en Italie. Circulation, sections du chiffre: propagande, 
                     etat morale des troupes, rapports des commissions de contrôle postal 
                     1917-1919.  
 
 
20 N Unités Diverses 
 
145-148 - Télégrammes 1916-1920.   
 
 
 
Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine, Nanterre  (BDIC)  
 
 
Dossiers France. Censure 1914-1919. 
F.rés 0270/AFS -  Censure. Contrôle des informations d’agences et de fils spéciaux. 
F.rés 0270/AV - Aviation.  
F.rés 0270/AVIS - Services des périodiques. Avis donnés á la presse.  
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F.rés 0270/C - Consignes données á la presse.  
F.rés 0270/CEF - Censure économique et financière.     
F.rés 0270/CG - Consignes générales. 
F.rés 0270/CL - Copies de lettres de service… pièces. 
F.rés 0270/CM - Consignes militaires.  
F.rés 0270/CNS - Consignes et notes de service. 
F.rés 0270/CO - Courrier. 
F.rés 0270/CTR - Consignes téléphoniques aux régions. 
F.rés 0270/ENF -  Echoppages non faits.  
F.rés 0270/F - Censure militaire en Toulouse.  
F.rés 0270/MA - Marine, Consignes.   
F.rés 0270/RC - Relevé des consignes.  
F.rés 0270/REP - Registre d’entrée des périodiques .  
F.rés 0270/RTAC - Recueil de télégrammes arrêtés ou censurés. 
F.rés 0270/S - Secrétariat.  
F.rés 0270/SP - Service des Périodiques.  
F rés 0270/ SPC - Censure des Cartes Postales 14 April - 8 Nov 1916 
F.rés 0270/SPE - Service des Périodiques. Echoppages.  
F.rés 0270/TAC - Télégrammes Arrêtés ou Censurés.  
F.rés 0270/TAV - Dépêches Arrêtées ou Visées.  
F.rés 0270/TCH - Télégrammes Chiffrés Entre le Bureau de la Presse de Paris et la 
                              Bureau de la Presse de Rome.  
F.rés 0270/TI - Télégrammes Transmis Pour Information.  
F.rés 0270/TV - Télégrammes Visés.  
F rés 269 – Comité secret de la Chambre des députés1916-1917.    
F Pièce 236 A - Notes à l’Ambassade Américaine concernant le courrier. 1916.   
F Pièce 237 A - Memo adressée par les gouvernements français et britannique au  
                          gouvernement américain concernant le courrier 1917.   
F Pièce 1916 - Memos gouvernementaux français et britannique aux envoyées au 
                         neutres et concernant le courrier.   
GF delta - 103/1-2 - Coupures de Presse. 
GF pièce - 72 rés - Lettres des Poilus.  
S 22 19L - Lettres d’Henri Barbusse et sa femme.  
S 4112/6 - Lettres de membres mobilisés du SPD.  
 
 
Fonds Ligue des Droits de l’Homme 
 
F. delta rés 0798/107-110 - Ligue des Droits de l’Homme : Interventions diverses, 
    Ministère de la Guerre 1914-1918.  
F.delta rés 0798/124 - Ligue des Droits de l’Homme : Interventions diverses,   
                                    Présidence du Conseil.  
F.delta rés 0798/220-222 - Ligue des Droits de l’Homme : Requêtes individuelles en 
                                            temps de guerre (1914-1918), Libertés publiques.   
 
 
 
Archives Nationales, Paris (AN) 
 
 
F1 – Ministre de l’Intérieur : Administration Générale 
 
a2658-3052 - Décrets (collection originale) 1907-1937.  
a3051-3102 - Arrêtés ministériels 1907-1939.  
a3155-3170 - Répertoires des arrêtés ministériels  1906-1939.  
a3172 - Enregistrement des décrets envoyés au Ministère de Justice pour insertion au 
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             Bulletin des Lois 1853-1930.  
bI562-686 - Administration 1905-1930.  
bI865-878 - Association de l’administration préfectorale 1907-1939. 
bI912-918 - Personnel 1873-1940.  
bI943-980 - Dossiers individuels de fonctionnaires 1910-1950. 
 
 
F2 – Ministre de l’Intérieur : Administration Départementale.  
 
2047 - Etat civil 1806-1940.   
2048 - Marchés, adjudications, syndicats des communes 1916-1932.  
2056 - Affaires diverses 1892-1937.   
2095 - 2096 - Dépenses départementales diverses 1908-1938.  
2097 – 2098 - Circulaires 1872-1940.  
2132 - Franchises postales 1907-1922.  
2721-2726- Contrôle des associations et congrégations religieuses 1904-1940.  
2748-2750- Grèves et manifestations diverses 1918-1934.  
 
         
F7 – Police Générale  
 
12495-12502, 12525, 13609 - Socialistes 
12842-12847- Dossiers de sociétés et de journaux 1895-1926.  
12852-12869 - Royalistes et Bonapartistes 1832-1929. 
12870-12877- Ligue des Patriotes 1898-1925.  
12879-12881 - Catholicisme 1875-1925 
12885-12893- Parti socialiste. CGT 1894-1923 Parti communiste.  
12894-12896 - Révolutionnaires russes 1907-1918.  
12897-12902 - Parti communiste en France et à l’étranger 1909-1929.  
12904-12907 - Anarchistes en France et à l’étranger 1892-1923. 
12908-12911 - Antimilitaristes 1905-1917.   
12912-12920 - Grèves 1884-1925.  
12930-12943 - Affaires internationales. Guerre de 1914-1918.  
12970-13023 - Rapports des préfets, commissaires spéciaux et commissaires de police 
                         sur l’esprit public et la situation politique 1908-1938.     
12992 - Rapports des préfets. L’Isère. 
12994 - Rapports des préfets. La Loire 1917-1918 
13043-13044 - Organisation de la police 1906-1936.  
13053-13068 - Anarchistes français 1897-1932.  
13069-13085 - Socialistes 1894-1932.  
13086-13089 - Ligue des Droits de l’Homme 1916-1932.  
13213-13228 - Mouvement catholique 1902-1927. 
13229-13224 - Groupes et partis divers 1912-1933. 
13266 - Assemblée nationale de Versailles. Propagande en faveur du vote des femmes 
             1908-1928.    
13267-13295 - Manifestations 1906-1935.  
13333-13349, 13370 - Antimilitarisme  
13353-13376- Guerre de 1914-1918. Usines de guerre, propagande pacifiste 1915-  
                        1919. 
13356-13364 - Usines de guerre 1915-1919, esp. 13364 - Puy de Dôme   
13371-13376 - Bulletins confidentiels concernant la morale 1916-18 
13567-13623- Mouvement syndicaliste.     
13571 - 13574 - CGT 
13624-13837 - Fédérations et syndicats corporatifs 1852-1936.  
13838-13935 - Grèves 1898-1936.  
13966-13987 - Papiers divers provenant de la Sûreté et classés chronologiquement 
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                         1871-1940.  
14592-14604 - Fonctionnaires de police nés entre 1824 et 1893. 
      
 
F9 – Affaires Militaires 
 
3901-4493 - Victimes de la guerre de 1914-1918        
 
  
F12- Commerce et Industrie 
 
7795 - Notes et rapports au ministre Clémentel 1918.  
7811-7818 - Haut-commissariat de France aux États-Unis 1917-1919.  
7963-7964 - Commission militaire de contrôle postal 1916-1917.  
7989 - 7992 - Bulletin économique de l’état-major de l’armée 1916-1919.   
8018 - Mobilisation civile 1917-1918  
8023-8024 - Agitation ouvrier 1915-1918  
 
 
F18 – Impression, librairies, censure de la presse..  
 
I-156-157 - Enregistrement des déclarations de réimpression et des déclarations 
                   ‘Model C’ 1827-1940. 
2348-2358 - Importation de la libraire étrangère 1841-1914.     
2372- Impressions pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale 1915-1918.  
2373-2381- Imprimerie, librairie, presse, censure 1817-1920.  
 
 
F22 – Travail et la sécurité sociale 
 
6-166 - Unions fondées 1879-1930. 
164-234 - Grèves 1852-1935. 
240-247 - Syndicales professionnels. 1890-1939.  
590-595 - Mineurs 1915-1935.  
596-600 - Divers matériaux imprimés.   
 
 
F90 – Postes et télégraphes.  
 
20550-20553 - Grèves 1906 – 1939.  
 
 
AJ 17 - Imprimerie Nationale 
 
222-230 - Registre des consignes données à l’Imprimerie Nationale 1916-32.   
231-241 - Mémoires données à l’Imprimerie Nationale 1917-1952. 
 
  
AJ 52 -  Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts.  
 
16-21 - Comptes rendus de la direction sur l’enseignement 1863-1924.  
39-57 - Enseignement 1821-1950.   
 
  
AM - Cour de Cassation.  
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776 - 2720 - Chambre criminelle 1847-1919.  
 
 
AP - Archives Personnelles 
 
94 AP - Fonds Albert Thomas 
 
348/3 - Usines de guerre 
 
 
509 AP -  Fonds Adolphe Messimy 
 
 
AR – Archives de la presse 
 
1 AR (Le Matin) 
 
5- Procès-verbaux des assemblées générales 16 Mar 1912-28 Avr 1926. 
14-17- Procès-verbaux des assemblées du conseil d’administration 31 Oct 1913-26 
Mar 
            1919.      
27- Actions de la société ‘Le Matin’ 1910-1944.  
29 - Admissions officielle des titres. 1898-1940.  
30 - Dossiers des titres et créations du Matin 1898-1940.  
31 - Documents administratifs 1898-1940.  
32 - Documents et contractes. Administration 1910-1943.  
97- Divers. 1913-1943.  
99 - ‘Compagnie générale de publicité Parisienne’  29 Nov 1912- 4 June 1928.  
105 - Réunions extraordinaires de l’assemblée 1917-1940.  
106 - Réunions de l’assembléé 1918-1922.            
 
 
5 AR Agence et office français d’information. 
 
2-426 - La correspondance de la direction d’Havas avec ses bureaux dans le monde. 
429 - Contacts avec l’administration des P.T.T.  
430 - Contracts avec les entreprises privées.  
 
 
8 AR – Journal  
 
136-137,139 - Circulation 1916-1920.  
267 - Statut 1904-1918.  
270 - Divers 1915-1919.  
271 - Directions 1917-1918.  
277 - Procès-verbaux des assemblées 1917-1918.  
279 -Politique générale du Journal 1915-1939.  
290 - Correspondances reçues et envoyées par le Journal Août 1915 - Jan 1918.  
325 - Accords entre journaux parisiens : L’Echo de Paris, Le Journal, Le Matin, Le 
          Petit Journal et le Petit Parisien. (1917-1918.) 
365 - Tirages aux Suisse 1916-1918.  
443 - Exposition des arts plastiques mutilée par l’ennemie 1916-25.  
568-654 – Dossiers privés.  
 
 
11 AR - Petit Parisien  
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16-19, 61-63 - Actions de la société du ‘Petit Parisien’ 1914-1920. 
 
 
BB- Ministre du Justice.  
 
BB18 –  Garde des Sceaux.  
 
2448-2639 – Dossier du crime  1911-1920.  
6601 – Dossiers Banaux  
 
 
Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris (APP)  
 
 
 
B/A 
 
697-743 - Visas des chansons et des programmes de revues des cabarets.  
697-730 - Chansons Visés de A à Z. 
731-736 - Chansons modifiés 
754 - Censure de la presse.  
755-769 - Censure, télégrammes, journaux.    
770-836 - Censure des pièces de théâtre et revues par titre.    
837-864 - Revues classées par années et par établissement 
837 - 1914 
838-843 - 1915 
844-849 - 1916 
850-855 - 1917 
856-859 - 1918 
860-862 - 1919 
1588-1597 - Programmes de théâtre pendant la guerre.    
1614 - L’Etat d’esprit de la population de Paris 1918 et 1919. Rapports des 
           Commissions de Police.  
1639 - Situation morale de la France pendant la guerre. Rapports des préfets. 
1712 - Petites annonces de presse.     
 
 
D/B 
 
365 - Dépêches du Ministre de l’Intérieur aux préfets sur les opérations de guerre.  
 
 
D/B1 
 
323-324 - Brochures, publications, chansons…  
324-325 - Publications divers.    
326 - Ligue Française, prospectus, conférences. 
329-330 - Œuvres de guerre.   
338 - Manifestations, presse, rumeurs calomnieuses. 
341 - Documents divers.   
349-350 - Ordonnances et arrêtés.  
364 - Faux tampons, Faux billets, réformes militaires, surveillance des usines de 
guerre. Gaz asphyxiants, courrier privé.       
365 - Journaux de guerre. Dépêches du Ministre de l’Intérieur. 
339 - Moratorium.     
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501 - Régulations concernent la circulation en 1915.     
 
 
Dossier RG – 45729 – Dossier Marcel Berger.   
 
 
Archives Départementales de La Loire, St Etienne. (ADL) 
 
 
10 M- Législation et organisation ouvrières. Inquiètes et statistiques concernent le 
travail.  
 
16- Conseil Supérieur du Travail. 1891-1930.     
50 - Travail des femmes adultes.  
82 - Statistiques et enquêtes sur les salaires 1838-1932.  
115-118 - Accords collectifs.  
126 - Main d’œuvre 
128 - Rapports sur la situation de chômage 1857-1935  
138 - Fermeture des usines, chômage saisonnier.  
152 - Fonds départemental sur le chômage.  
213-218 - Main d’œuvre départemental pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. 
288-298 - Grèves et mouvements sociales dans l’industrie du coton.  
317-339 - Grèves et mouvements sociales dans les mines. 
342-348 - Grèves et mouvements sociales dans l’industrie des métaux lourds.  
349-357 - Grèves et mouvements sociales dans l’industrie des métaux légers.  
367 - Grèves et mouvements sociales dans l’industrie du chemin de fer 1913- 1921.  
404 - Etude sur le Confédération General du Travail (C.G.T.) 1876-1937.  
405- Rapports sur les syndicats professionnels 1876-1937.  
443 - C.G.T. 1901-1939. 
445 - Reconstruction syndicale à la fin de la Première Guerre Mondiale. 1917-1919.  
468, 472, 474 - Surveillance de l‘activité syndical des différents branches 
                         professionnelles.  
487-88 - Surveillance des syndicats professionnels 1867-1939. Bourse du travail, 
               Firminy 1908-1923  
493 - Bourse du Travail, Rive-de Gier 1892-1923  
494 - Bourse du Travail, Roanne 1891-1940  
495 - Bourse du Travail, Saint-Chamond. 1895-1925  
496 - Bourse du Travail, Saint-Etienne 1889-1934.  
 
 
Archives Départementales de L’Isere, Grenoble (ADI) 
 
 
J – Archives Privées.  
 
35 J 
 
3 -  Syndicat Libre Féminin des Tisseurs 1906-1919.  
15 - Statuts de l’Organisation Fédérale des Syndicats libres de l’Isère 1917-25. 
17 - Syndicats libres féminins, assemblées annuelles 1910-38.  
42 - Conditions du travail. 
119 - Rapport sur la situation professionnelle de la femme après la guerre. 1919. 
121 - L’Etat des salaires dans le tissage.   
 
 
51 J 
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1- Union fédérale des syndicats libres féminins de L’Isère. 
 
 
M - Administration générale du département. 
 
1M 
 
18 - Conseilles de préfecture: dossiers individuelles 1881-1925.  
       
 
52 M 
 
76 - Journées du 1er Mai, rapports de police, défiles affiches, correspondance. 1903- 
       1919 
 
 
56 M 
 
1 - Générale: Police. Correspondance générale. 1877-1935. 
 
 
76 M  
 
1 - Sûreté Générale: Antimilitaristes 1905-1926 
 
 
82 M 
 
1-3- Sûreté générale: suspects 
 
 
166 M 
 
11 - Grèves 1918.  
 
  
R – Guerres et affaires militaires. 
 
13 R 
 
22-23 - Correspondance générale de la préfecture concernant la guerre 1914-1918.   
28-29 - Œuvres de Guerre 1916-1918. 
34 - Personnel civil féminin employé dans les dépôts militaires 1916-1918. 
 
 
Archives Départementales du Puy de Dôme., Clermont Ferrand. (ADPD) 
 
 
M-  Administration Générale 
 
1 M - Administration générale du département. 
 
1950 - Activités des préfets – interventions. 
4462 - Circulaires et arêtés.   
4629 - Union des grandes associations françaises contre la propagande ennemie. 
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5434 - Enquête sur l’état des esprits   
5452 - Divers  
6437 - Annonce de l’armistice 
 
 
2 M - Personnel de la préfecture. 
 
212-213, 263, 2294 - Organisation 
4461- Affaires diverses  
 
 
4 M – Police 
 
166 - Recherches dans l’intérêt des familles. 1915-1918-  
299 - Situations mensuelles et contrôles 1918 
320 - Expulsions 1918 
2088 - Travailleurs étrangers et coloniaux: instructions et correspondances. 
3045 - Rapports des commissaires de police 1900-1917. 
3481 - Suspects 1914-1918. 
3622 - Pr. Driault. 
3626 - Saisies de journaux. 
3639 - Suspects, antimilitarisme 1914-1924.  
3882- Carnets B pour les départements voisins. 
3886 - Carnets B dans le département de Puy de Dôme.  
4511 - Direction de la sûreté générale. 
6693 - Réunions publiques 1913-1919.  
 
 
10 M  
 
34 - Grèves, coalitions et conflits 1884-1918. 
75-76 - 1917-1918.    
111-112 - Problèmes de chômage 1917-1918. .  
167 - Réunions, manifestations et affichage syndicaux 1883-1921.   
 
 
British Library of Political and Economic Science, London School of Economics, 
London (BLPES) 
 
ILP 10/10/33 World War One Censorship 1917-Texts and Pamphlets. Collection of 
British letters and pamphlets condemning the act of censorship.   
  
 
British National Archives - Kew, London. (BNA) 
 
FO 371 – Foreign office files from the British Embassy in Paris.  
 
 
National Archives, College Park Maryland. (NACP) 
 
A.E.F. Press Section. General File. Box 1. Record Group 120. NARA II.   
A.E.F. Press Section. General File. Box 6207. Record Group 120. Entry 240. NARA 
            II.  
A.E.F. General Headquarters Censorship Folders. Rules of Press Folder. Box no. 6127 
            Entry 221 Record Group 120.  
A.E.F. General Headquarters G-2-D Censorship Folders 20-28. Box no. 6128. Record 
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            Group 120. 
 
Published Primary Sources - Newspapers 
 
Colindale Newspaper Library, London.  
 
 
Daily Newspapers - Besançon 
 
L’Alsace - 1916-1918. 
 
 
Daily Newspapers - Bordeaux 
 
La Gironde - June 1918 - January 1919.  
La Petit Gironde - 1916-1919.  
 
 
Daily Newspapers - Grenoble 
 
Le Droit Du Peuple 1916-1917.   
 
 
Daily Newspapers - Lille 
 
Liller Kriegszeitung 1915-1918.   
 
 
 
Daily Newspapers - Limoges 
 
Le Populaire Du Centre. 1916-1918.  
 
 
Daily Newspapers - London 
 
Daily Telegraph 1856 - 1937.   
 
 
Daily Newspapers - Lyons  
 
Le Nouvelliste de Lyon 1916-1919. 
Lyon Républicain 1916-1919.  
 
 
Daily Newspapers - Marseilles  
 
Le Petit Marseille - 1914-1919.  
 
 
Daily Newspapers - Paris 
 
La Bataille - 5 November 1915-12 August 1919. 
La Croix - 1 January 1916-31 December 1945.  
L’Action Française - 28 March 1908 – 30 August 1944. 
La Démocratie Nouvelle - 27 October 1918-12 August 1919.  
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La France Libre - 1 September 1918 -11 August 1919. 
La France Militaire - 10 August 1916 - 11 September 1918. 
La Guerre Sociale - September 1914 - December 1915.  
La Liberté - January 1910-May 1930. 
La Libre Parole - 19 April 1892 - June 1924. 
La Petite République - 1916-1925.   
La République Française - November 1871 - July 1924.  
La Vérité - December 1917 - November 1919.  
La Victoire - 2 January 1916 - 12 August 1919.  
Le Bonnet Rouge - January 10 1914 - 12 July 1917.  
L’Echo de Russie - February - December 1916.  
Le Figaro - 2 April 1854 - 30 December 1942.  
Le Gaulois - 5 July 1868 - 31 March 1929.  
Le Journal - December 1914 - August 1919.  
Le Journal du Peuple - 9 February 1916 - 9 June 1929.  
Le Matin - January 1914 - 31 December 1920.  
Le Pays - 17 June 1917 - 26 December 1919.  
Le Petit Journal - 1915-1919.  
Le Petit Parisien - 1914-1919.  
Le Rappel - 1869-1928.   
Le Temps - 25 April 1861-30 November 1942.  
L’Événement - 10 October 1916 - 1 April 1919.   
L’ Homme Libre - 18 November 1917-12 August 1919.  
L’Humanité -  8 April 1904-26 August 1939.   
L’ Œuvre - September 1915 - August 1944.   
 
  
Daily Newspapers – Rennes 
 
L’Ouest-Éclair - 1914-1940.  
 
 
Daily Newspapers – Toulouse 
 
La Dépêche - January 1916 - December 1919.  
Le Midi - 1917-1918.  
Le Midi Socialiste - 1916-1917.  
 
 
Bibliothèque National, Paris (BNP) 
 
 
Relations Presses, Centre du Media. 
 
Presse Quotidienne Nationale 
 
Aujourd’hui en France  
Le Canard Enchainé 
Les Echos 
L’Equipe 
France Soir 
Libération 
La Tribune 
 
 
Presse Quotidienne Régionale 
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Le Bien Publique 
La Charente Libre 
Corse Matin 
Courrier de l’Ouest 
Courrier Picard 
Dauphiné Libéré 
L’Echo du Centre 
L’Est Républicain 
Journal de la Haute-Marne 
Le Journal de Saône et Loire 
Le Journal du Centre 
La Marseillaise  
Le Midi Libre 
Nice Matin 
La Nouvelle République 
Ouest France 
Paris Normandie 
Le Parisien 
Le Populaire du Centre 
Le Progrès de Lyon 
La Provence 
Le Républicain Lorrain 
Sud-ouest 
Le Télégramme de Brest 
L’Union 
La Voix du Nord 
Yonne Républicaine 
 
 
Bibliothèque de Documentation Internationale Contemporaine (BDIC) 
 
4 P 58 rés - ‘La Gazette du Creneau.’ 13th Infantry Trench Paper. 1917-1919.  
4 P 63 rés - ‘Les Poilus de la 9 ième’ 9th Infantry Trench Paper. 1917-1918.   
4 P 206 rés - Correspondance du ‘L’Icaridia poilus.’ May 1916-1917.  
4 P 657 - ‘Le Crapouillot’ Trench Paper : 1915-1919.  
4 P 3057 - Enregistrements du Bureau des Etudes de la presse étrangère. Classés par 
                  pays. 
4 P 7097 - ‘Le Coin’, Newspaper from the Camp at Trèves 1918. 
8 P 689 - ‘Bulletin de Revue de Presse’ Association de correspondants de guerre de la 
                 presse étrangère. 
8 P 68 rés - ‘Amon non Autos.’ Liégeois Trench Bulletin Jul 1917-Nov 1918.    
A.Per.1915 - ‘Revue Antigermanique’ Parisian Newspaper 1915-    
Delta 6I-I4 - ‘Le Cinacien’ For mobilized people and for refugees from the army. 
                      (Belgian) 
F.delta 45 - Divers journaux français 1914-1918. 
 
 
 Dossier Mantoux 
 
Fol.P. 729 - ‘Le Farceur des Tranchés’ Belgian Trench Paper 1917- 
FP rés 330 - ‘L’Echo du Bayan’ 214th Infantry Newspaper 1915-1918.  
FP rés 327 - ‘L’Esprit du Cor’ 66e Division Bleu Newspaper 1917-1919.  
FP rés 330 - ‘Le Filon’ 34e Division Newspaper 1917-1918.  
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FP rés 332 - ‘Le Cran’ 56th Infantry division Paper. 1916-  
FP rés 334 - ‘L’Horizon’ Trench Paper 1917-1919.  
FP rés 337 - ‘Nos Tanks’ War Newspaper of the Stormed Artillery.1917-1918.   
FP rés 346 -  83˚ ‘Pericopics. Le Périscopique’. 1915-.  
FP rés 4349 - ‘Le Mouchoir’ Newspaper of the 227th Infantry 1917-.  
F Pièce 2912 - Bulletin de ‘l’Association des journalistes professionnelles mobilisés’ 
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